2015 – EPA – USACE – West Lake Landfill – Communication Summary for St. Louis District FUSRAP

Key Messages: Key Stakeholders~ Congressional, public, community groups, state and federal agencies. Communication... View Document

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2009-12-28 – EPA – West Lake Landfill – EPA facing fresh pressure at key St. Louis-area radioactive landfill site

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2015-11-19 – EPA – West Lake Landfill is more difficult to clean up than other St Louis FUSRAP sites

To:
From:
Sent:
Subject:
Fritz, Matthew[Fritz.Matthew@epa.gov]
Hague, Mark
Thur 11/19/2015 6:15:17 PM
FW: New Bill in Senate: R7 OPA –West Lake Landfill Updates
From: Carey, Curtis
Sent: Thursday, November 19, 2015 11:41 AM
To: Hague, Mark ; Brincks, Mike ; Peterson,
Mary ; Stoy, Alyse ; Juett, Lynn
; Vann, Bradley ; Field, Jeff

Cc: Washburn, Ben ; Sanders, LaTonya
Subject: RE: New Bill in Senate: R7 OPA –West Lake Landfill Updates
WLLFOIA4312- 001 – 0055787
For Immediate Release
November 19, 2015
Contacts:
Missouri Members Demand Action on
West Lake Landfill
WASHINGTON, DC- Today, members of the Missouri congressional delegation,
including Senators Roy Blunt and Claire McCaskill, and Representatives Ann Wagner
and Wm. Lacy Clay, introduced legislation to transfer remediation authority over the
West Lake landfill from the Environmental Protection Agency to the Army Corps of
Engineers, putting the site in the Corps’ Formerly Utilized Sites Remedial Action
Program (FUSRAP).
“The EPA’s unacceptable delay in implementing a solution for the West Lake landfill has
destroyed its credibility and it is time to change course,” said Blunt. “The Corps has the
knowledge, experience, and confidence of the families living near the site. Transferring
clean up efforts to its control will help move the process forward and finally give these
families the peace of mind they deserve. No parent should have to raise their child in an
environment where they fear for their health and safety.”
McCaskill added, “The needs of this community are our top concern. We’ve heard loud
and clear that they want the West Lake site transferred to the Army Corps of Engineers’
program that oversees all other sites in St. Louis containing this World War II era
nuclear waste. This legislation is not a silver bullet, and will take far longer than we’d like
WLLFOIA4312- 001 – 0055788
to resolve the many issues surrounding this site, but this is a concrete, positive step
forward in a process that’s been stagnant for far too long.”
The bill introduced today would not alter the current liability of potentially responsible
parties at the site nor its designation as a Superfund site.
The measure represents the latest step in the delegation’s effort to utilize the Corps’
expertise to expedite remediation at the West Lake site. In July, Blunt, McCaskill,
Wagner, and Clay sent to Energy Secretary Ernest Moniz asking the
Department of Energy to re-evaluate whether West Lake qualified for inclusion in the
Corps’ FUSRAP in light of new information regarding the source of radioactive waste at
the site.
“My constituents in the St. Louis region deserve a government where officials work
proactively on their behalf, rather than kicking the can down the road with recurring
delays and deflections,” said Wagner. “The Formerly Utilized Site Remedial Action
Program (FUSRAP) and the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers have an excellent track
record, broad support in the community and the expertise to handle a site as
complicated as the Westlake Landfill. I believe that this legislation is a crucial step in our
efforts to reach a permanent solution for the people of Missouri.”
Clay added, “Over a year ago, I called for the transfer of West Lake to the U.S. Army
Corps of Engineers FUSRAP program. This new bipartisan legislation will bring us
closer to achieving that goal.
This is a 70-year old problem and the federal government has a duty to finally do the
right thing.
I am totally committed to removing all the nuclear waste from West Lake landfill. It just
makes no sense to allow radioactive waste to remain buried in an unlined landfill, near
residential neighborhoods, schools, a hospital, the airport and the Missouri River. It’s
time to clean up West Lake landfill.”
On February 28, 2014, the members also sent to the EPA asking the agency to
contract directly with the Corps to handle remediation efforts through FUSRAP, citing
the Corps’ “expertise in this area, and the local community’s faith in the Corps’ FUSRAP
WLLFOIA4312- 001 – 0055789
mission.” In March of 2014, the agencies~~== an agreement to work together to
build a fire break at the West Lake landfill.
Peterson,
Cc: Washburn, Ben Sanders, LaTonya
Subject: New Bill in Senate: R7 OPA –West Lake Landfill Updates
To require the Secretary of the Army, acting through the Chief of Engineers,
to undertake remediation oversight of the West Lake Landfill located
in Bridgeton, Missouri.
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2015-11-20 – USACE – EPA – West Lake Landfill – ISOLATION BARRIER ALIGNMENT ALTERNATIVES ASSESSMENT Amendment 1

U.S. Army Corps of
Engineers
ISOLATION BARRIER
ALIGNMENT ALTERNATIVES
ASSESSMENT
Amendment 1
WEST LAKE LANDFILL
BRIDGETON, MISSOURI
FOR
Environmental Protection Agency Region 7
Superfund Program
DATE: 20 November 2015
WLLFOIA4312- 001 – 0055680
Table of Contents
Isolation Barrier Alignment Alternatives Assessment
West Lake Landfill, Bridgeton, Missouri
Section Page
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
3.1
3.2
3.3
4.1
4.2
4.3
4.4
4.5
4.6
4.7
4.8
4.9
4.10
4.fl
Introduction …………………………………….••………………………… 2
Background ………………………………….••••••………………………… 3
RIM Isolation Alternatives ……………..•••••••…………………………… 3
Concrete Isolation Barrier Wall ……… ,. •••…. v •••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••• 4
Excavation to Create an Air Gap .. “‘ ……………. ,~ • .; ••…………………….. 5
Heat Extraction Barrier ………•.••••………………. ~,~”””•~•.• ……………….. 6
IB Alternatives Assessment ……………………………. · .. ,'””” …………… 7
Assessment Factors ……………….. , ……………………… · ………………. 7
IB Alternatives -Advantages and Duadvantages ………….. ·····~· …….. 7
Relative Comparison of Alternatives by Assessment Factor …………… 10
Structural IB Alignment 1 Advantages Dis~ussion …………………….. 10
Structural IB Alignmentl Disadvantages Diseus~ion ………………….. 11
Structural IBAlignment 2 Advantages Discussion …………………….. 12
StructurafiB Alignment 2 rii:sa.dvantsrges Discussion …………………. 12
Structn:tal IB Alignment 3 Advantages Discussion ……………………… 14
Structural IB Alignment 3 Disadvantages Discussion ………………….. 14
Heat.Extraction IB Advantages Discussion …………………………….. 19
Heal Extraction IB Disadvantages Discussion …………………………. 19
Design Considerations …………………………………………………… 20

Design Schedule Consider.ations …………………………………………. 22
Airport Negative EasementAgreement …………………………………. 24
Tables
Table 1 Relative Comparison of Alignment Alternatives …………………… ll
Table 2 Options to Address Remaining RIM ………………………………… 21
References ………………………………………………………………………… 25
1
WLLFOIA4312- 001 – 0055681
1. Introduction
Isolation Barrier Alignment Alternatives Assessment
West Lake Landfill, Bridgeton, Missouri
In 2014, the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) requested the United States Army
Corps ofEngineers (USACE) evaluate information conveyed by the Responsible Parties (RPs)
during discussions between US ACE, the RPs, EPA Superfund nersonnel (EPA), and EPA’s
Office ofResearch and Development (ORD) regarding proposedJocations and alignments of an
Isolation Barrier (IB) at West Lake Landfill in Bridgeton, Missouri. The purpose for
constructing an IB is to prevent a subsurface smoldering event (SSE) in the adjacent Bridgeton
Sanitary Landfill from coming into contact with radiologically rmpacted materials (RIM) located
in Operable Unit 1 (OU1) Area 1 of the West Lake Landfill. In August, 2014, USACE
submitted an Isolation Barrier Alignment Alterriatives Assessment Report. The 2014
assessment focused on the proposed alignments,the feasibility of constructing the IB, the
comparative advantages and disadvantages of the proposed alignments, anCI the associated risks.
One of the key findings from the repprl was that the extent of radiological material in the West
Lake Landfill was not fully characterized which was necessru:y to be able to quantify risks
associated with RIM remaining south of any battier. and inform EPA’s decision on alignment.
During spring and summer of2015, the RPs perforllfed additionalinvestigations to determine the
extent of RIM. In ad~iti()11, ~ver the last year,the RP~shave been performing a thermal barrier
pilot study in which 1iqqid is circulated through.converted Gas Interceptor Wells ( GIW) south of
the neck area (narrow section betWeen south and north quarry landfills) to determine if this could
remove sufficient heat from the waste to halt advancement of the SSE.
This 2015 a:Ssessment amends the 2.014 assessment to take into consideration results of the
additional RIM investig~tiadvantages and disadvantages by
assessment factor.
10
WLLFOIA4312- 001 – 0055690
Factor
Excavation
Volume
Odor Potential
Bird Hazard
Potential
RIM
Remaining
South of
Barrier

Potential for
Future SSE
North of
Barrier
On-Site Safety
Table 1: Relative Comparison of Alignment Alternatives
Alignment 1
Least volume than
other
aligmnents~50,000
CY±
Least odor
potential due to the
lowest volume of
waste handling
Least bird hazard
potential due to the
lowest volume of
waste handling
Mostrunount of
RIM to remain
south ofiB
… ~o~pared to the
other :aligmneilts
Anticipated to have
the lowest potential
for future SSEon
, the north side ofm
Alignment2
Largest volume to be
excavated due to
excavation for working
platformand 180-foot
depth in North Quarry,
and increased thickness
of wall to resist
increased loads
Highest odor potential
than both Alignment 1
and 3 due to highest
volume of waste
handling. Wouldbe
similar to active landfill
operations. ….. .
Highest bird hazard·
potenti;1l than both ……. .
Alignment} and 3 due ···
to lii~est v:oiume of
expos.ed waste. Would
be similar to active
landfill operations.
.. ·····
None -assum.es that no
RIM material wa:s
placed in the North
Qiuu:ry .landfill
Anticipated to be the
higbestpotential for a
future SSE on the north
side of the IB due to
highest volume of
newer, less degraded
waste remaining north
·.
due to waste being
oldet and likely
more fully
degracted: .> of the lB.
Potentially greater
on-site safety risk
than Alternative 3
due to known RIM
being excavated.
Greatest on-site safety
risk compared to
Alignment 1 and 3 due
to the significantly
higher volume of waste
excavated and handled.
Lowest on-site safety
risk due to RIM.
11
Alignment3
Approximately twice as
much as Aligmnent 1
~95,000 CY ±.,.
significantly less than
Aligmnent2
Higher odor potential than
Alignment 1 due to higher
volume ofwaste handling
Htgner bird hazard
pQ’tential than Aligmnent ··
1 due to higher volume of
waste handling
Least amount of RIM
would remain south ofiB
compared to Aligmnent 1
and potentially no RIM
would remain .
Anticipated to be higher
potential than Aligmnent
1for a future SSE on north
side of the IB due to
newer, less degraded
waste remaining north of
the IB but less than
Alignment 2 due to less
volume of newer waste
remaining north of the IB
Lower on-site safety risk
than Aligmnent 1 if little
or no RIM excavated but
higher general safety risk
than Aligmnent 1. Higher
on-site safety risk than
Aligmnent 2 if RIM is
encountered.
ThermaliB
Least amount of
excavated volume of all
alternatives. System
requires wells and near
surface coolant loop
system.
Least odor potential of all
options. Least amount of
waste to be removed
during well and cooling
loop installation.
Minimal bird hazard
potential due to limited
waste handling.
No RIM anticipated to be
located south of the
thermal lB.
Anticipated to have the
highest potential for a
future SSE north of the
lB. Can be offset by
flexibility and ease of
system expansion.
Lowest on-site safety risk
due to no open excavation
and no limited RIM
exposure.
WLLFOIA4312- 001 – 0055691
Criteria Alignment 1 Alignment2 Alignment3 ThermaliB
Off-Site Safety Potentially higher Highest off-site safety Lower off-site safety risk Lowest off-site safety risk
off-site safety risk risk due to the than Aligmnent 1 if no due to limited dust from
than Alignment 3 significantly higher RIM (dust generation). well installation and
during installation volume of waste being Higher off-site safety risk surface line excavation.
due to RIM excavated requiring off- than Alignment 1 due to Lowest risk for RIM
excavation (dust site transportation, off-site transportation exposure.
generation) and which increases truck (traffic accidents)
off-site traffic and risk for
transportation of traffic accidents.
RIM (traffic
accidents/spills).
Off-Site Waste RIM waste Largest volume of off- Off-tsitedisposal No offsite waste transport
Transportation excavated as part site disposal of non- potentially not required if anticipated.
and Disposal of wall installation RIM waste will be ~1 RIM is located north
will require off-site required due to limited .· ofaligmnent
disposal. on-site waste dispo:sal
capacity
Duration of Shortest design Longest design i.l. ··u•· ration Longer design dl.lration Shortest design duration
Design duration due to due to more than 180- than Alignment 1 due to due to well design
shortest wall and foot depth requiring longer duration of pre._ completed. Requires
shorter pre-design pre-design investig~tion des~gn investigations and surface equipment and
investigations an.d. highly complex more complex wall design coolant design
de&J:gn (:lue to increased depth preparation.
Duration of Shortest Loirgest construction ~onger construction Shortest duration of
Construction construction duration than both driration than Alignment construction. No
duration due to Alignment 1 and 3due 1 due to 30 to 40-foot excavation, just well
shortest wall to 180-foot depth, increased~epth of wall installation and cooling
significantly }Vider w:all loop installation.
\
to handle increase
loading ·.
Impact to No impaetto Greatest impacts to the Moderate impacts to the No impact to existing
Existing existing North Quarry North Quarry infrastructure on North
Infrastrucwre infi:astn,1cture on Inffastrt,u::.ture used to Infrastructure used to Quarry and no impact to
North Quarry brit balance lanilfill·gas balance landfill gas operation of the transfer
may impact extraction and extraction and station.
operation of the control/monitor the control/monitor the SSE
transfer station, SSR
which could result
” in delayed or
reduced trash
servi’ce to impacted
customers •··
Technical Technically At the limits of Technically Feasible Technically feasible –
Feasibility Feasible- however technical feasibility – although more difficult Application of heat
there are no known potentially not feasible than Aligmnent 1 – extraction wells for this
past application of Feasible- however there purpose has had limited
the use of concrete are past application of the testing (the RP’s pilot
as a heat barrier in use of concrete as a heat study)
a landfill. Studies barrier in a landfill.
have shown Studies have shown
degradation of degradation of concrete
concrete strength strength properties from
properties from prolonged exposure to
prolonged exposure high heat
to high heat
12
WLLFOIA4312- 001 – 0055692
4.4 Structural IB Alignment 1 Advantages Discussion
Of the three structural IB alignments, Alignment 1 is considered the most technically feasible
and will require the least volume of waste to be excavated. The RPs have estimated the total
volume of waste for Alignment 1 to be approximately 50,000 cubic yards. Because this
alignment requires excavation of the least amount of waste, it is expected that it will have the
shortest construction duration. A shorter construction duration will reduce the duration in
which the community is exposed to odors from the excavation. Landfill odor has been an
ongoing concern for the surrounding community and reduced duration for odor emissions
would be a favorable advantage.
Bird hazards to air traffic are a significant safety conc~m t0 the St. Louis Airport Authority
as West Lake Landfill is located within 10,000 feet o£ the nearest Lambert St. Louis Airport
runway (see Section 7). Alignment 1 will resultinthe least amount of excavated waste and
will therefore present less risk of bird hazards and other nuisance species (insects, rodents)
that can, in tum, attract more birds, when compared to the other alignments. While this
alignment offers the least bird hazard risk, mitigation efforts will still be.required to
minimize waste exposure during excavation ahd handling o{ waste materiaL
Based on a 2013 bird survey performed during well i:l:lstallation and toe drain excavation
activities in the North and South Quan”ies ofthe Bridgetol;l Sanitary Landfill, 256 gulls,
geese, doves, and raptors were observed within:~ 20-day period. According to the Federal
Aviation Administration (Dol beer et al, 2014 ), these bird species were among the species
most frequently struck.byair:planes betwee~ 1990 and 2~ 13. It is expected that geese and
doves would not he attractecf:~to the excavation and waste handling operations to be
undertaken as they typically do not consume decomposed waste. However, gulls and raptors
are expected to be attr~ted to thesite operations as they will seek out easy food sources
including decemposed waste. With/gulls, miti:g~tion efforts such as sudden loud noises from
bird scaring devices (canons, warning horns) are .effective only for a period of a few days as
gulls can rapidly adaptto these sounds (AirpdrtOperators Association and General Aviation
Awareness Council, 2066). Add1tionally, since gulls tend to feed at operating landfills as the
trucks hauli:l:lg in trash are”tipped”, it is expected that gulls will likewise feed as excavation
is being conducted and trucks are being loaded to move the excavated waste to the staging
areas and to load trucks for off-site waste transport. Therefore, minimizing the amount of
excavation exposed and reducing the duration of construction will be one of the best bird
hazard mitigation strategies for the site.
Storm water management will also require mitigation efforts as birds are attracted to standing
water sources. For work previously performed at the Bridgeton Sanitary Landfill, the RPs
have ensured that detention basins drain within 24 hours, thereby not providing a continued
standing water source to attract birds. It is expected that a similar mitigation method for
storm water management would be implemented for each of the IB alignments.
Alignment 1 would be located where there will be no newer waste located on the north side
of the IB and will be placed in an area with a maximum waste depth of approximately 40
feet. The extent of waste decomposition and the pressure and insulating conditions in a
13
WLLFOIA4312- 001 – 0055693
landfill (often determined by the depth or thickness of the waste) are two of several factors
that can contribute to the generation of a future SSE. Older waste and shallower waste
located north of the Alignment 1 IB are considered an advantage as these conditions are less
likely to support the generation of a future SSE than the newer and deeper waste of
Alignments 2 and 3.
Another advantage of Alignment 1 is that the design time would likely be shorter than the
design time for Alignment 3 primarily because some of the data required for design of the IB
has already been collected. Some geotechnical data would still be required to be collected
before design could begin, but these pre-design investigations would likely be shorter in
duration than those that would be required for the other alignments, therefore allowing design
efforts to be completed in a shorter duration than the other alignments.
Alignment 1 also has an advantage of not having to remove existing North Quarry
infrastructure (monitoring wells, landfill gas collection wells, andassociated piping) for the
installation of Alignment 1. The North Quarry infrastructure was installed as part of the
May 2013 First Agreed Order of Preliminary Injunction for the RPs to install infrastructure to
monitor for the SSE and control landfill gas. Therefore, the least impact to the existing
infrastructure will minimize the design and construction duration as the RPs will not have to
remove, redesign, and reinstall the North Quarry infrastrUcture.
4.5 Structural IB Alignment 1 Disadvantages Discussion
While Alignment l has comparatively more advantages than Alignments 2 and 3, the
disadvantages of Alignment 1 carry some amount of risk that must be considered. While it
may be possible to manage the risk associated with these disadvantages, these risks must be
considered. when selecting an align;ment.
The first disadvantage .of Alignment 1 is that although the vast majority of RIM will be
isolated north of the IB, some RIM will remain on the south side of the IB. Since the
purpose ofinstalling the IBis to prel(ent the SSE in the Bridgeton Sanitary Landfill, from
coming into contact with RIM in the West Lake Landfill, leaving some RIM on the south
side of the IB would not completely fulfill that purpose. To mitigate this significant
disadvantage, the Alignment 1 design would need to include a means for mitigating the RIM
remaining on the southside of the IB. Field and laboratory results from the recent sampling
performed by the RPs must be evaluated to determine what information is required to
evaluate technologies fotaddressing the remaining RIM, if the risk is shown to be such that
remediation is required. Section 5 includes a list of potential options that the RPs could
consider to address remaining RIM.
The second disadvantage of Alignment 1 is that the IB would be installed through RIM.
Handling RIM during excavating, staging, screening, transporting, and disposal of the RIM
are activities that must be appropriately planned during design and carefully managed during
construction due to the potential impact to the safety of on -site workers and the potential for
RIM release during off-site transportation to disposal facilities.
14
WLLFOIA4312- 001 – 0055694
The on-site worker safety risks can be mitigated through the preparation and thorough
execution of Health and Safety Plans; however, preparing and following these procedures
does add time to the construction process. Similarly, off-site disposal of RIM will require
some over the road transportation. This will result in increased truck traffic in the vicinity of
the site and could lead to increased risk for traffic accidents, which could result in spilling
RIM along the transportation route.
Excavation through RIM can also lead to off-site exposure risks associated with airborne
dust, which could contain RIM. Qualitative assessment of the relative off-site risk due to
airborne RIM exposure would be dependent upon the depth of the RIM and the RPs’ material
handling processes. Mitigation is planned through use Gf afi air monitoring network to
monitor for RIM and through proper dust control dur:ing ex~a~ation activities. Proper
planning and response plans to include these mitigation actions will be required to reduce the
risk but the preparation and implementation of t}tese mitigation efforts will increase the
design and construction durations.
Off-site waste transportation itself is a risk fornotonly s~fety reasons, but.due to how it can
impact the duration of construction. The time it takes to stage, screen, segreg~te, sample,
load, and transport the RIM can ~dd ~~nificant time !O the construction duration. The exact
impacts to the design and construction efforts cannot be quantified at this time and will need
to be addressed by the RPs as they determine how the RIM will be managed. The amount of
RIM, the saturation of the waste, how the waste will be transported, and the location,
permitting, and samplingtequirements of the disposal facility will contribute to the schedule
risk associated with handling RIM.
There are no know~ past applications using a concrete wall as a heat barrier in a landfill.
There have h~en. studies showing. thed~gradation of strength properties of concrete when
exposed to high heat. It maybe possibleto,overcome these issues during design, but more
study would be necessary to determine if speci~l mix designs could overcome this issue.
4.6 Structural IB Alignment 2 Advantages Discussion
The primary advantage of Alignment 2 is that this alignment should separate all identified
RIM from the existing SSKin:the Bridgeton Sanitary Landfill. This is a significant
advantage as that is the primary reason for the installation of the IB.
Another advantage is that from an off-site safety standpoint, because no RIM is anticipated to
be encountered, the risk for on-site and off-site exposure to RIM is low.
4.7 Structural Alignment 2 Disadvantages Discussion
The primary disadvantage of Alignment 2 is the significant volume of waste that would need
to be excavated. Because the depth of the IB would be approximately 180 feet and the
15
WLLFOIA4312- 001 – 0055695
potential for differential settling of the waste on the opposite sides of the IB, the IB design
would have to be significantly wider than the IB for Alignment 1 to be capable of
withstanding these differential stresses. This effort will significantly increase the design
duration as additional time will be required to ensure the design is stmcturally sound and that
the proper cooling system is incorporated. Additional geotechnical data will also need to be
collected and getting that data from a deeper depth will take longer. One potential way to
mitigate the width of the Alignment 2 IB would be to implement an on-going operation and
maintenance plan that restores the surface of the settled waste to prevent the overturning
stresses caused by differential settlement of the wastes adjacent to the barrier. The RPs will
need to make a determination on which means is most effective for addressing this issue,
should this alignment alternative be selected.
Due to the large depth and width of the excavation, thelength of time the excavation would
remain open would be significantly increased and the odor potential and duration of the odor
would, in tum, be significantly increased. The negative impact of the odor and the duration
of the odor to the quality of life for the nearby community may not be acceptable.
The significant volume of waste and the length of time to excavate will al~osignificantly
increase the bird hazard potentiaL As discussed itt Section 4.4, gulls and raptors are expected
to be attracted to the site operations as they will seeK: out easy food sources. Due to their
ability to rapidly adapt to loud and active surroundings, mitigation techniques would have to
be aggressive and vary frequently due to the significant dutation required to constmct this
alternative. Additionally, since gullswould be expected tofeed as excavation is being
conducted and tmcks are ~eing loadedlo move the exc~vated waste to the staging areas and
to load tmcks for off-site waste transport, bird nlifigation for this alignment alternative is
expected to be challenging over the extendedcmistmction duration expected for this
alignment alternative.
Alignment 2 would be located. within the Bridgeton Sanitary Landfill, therefore, a large
amount of the newer waste in this landfill will be located on the north side of the IB. The
maximum depth on the north side of the IB would be approximately 180′. The greatest depth
of this ‘hewer waste wouHfb’e located between the IB and the Quarry wall, which could
potentially i11crease the pressure and insulating factors, which, if other conditions are right,
could contribute to a future SSE on the north side of the IB.
Alignment 2 would be locate(! in the North Quarry of the Bridgeton Sanitary Landfill and
should not encounterRJM.because there has been no evidence that RIM was placed in this
area and because a review of historical records indicated that in 1973, while the RIM was
being placed in the West Lake Landfill, the North Quarry was still be excavated. This site
conceptual model does not support the presence of RIM from the Latty A venue site in the
North Quarry. Because of this, the risk to the safety of on-site workers due to RIM is
determined to be the lowest compared to the other alternatives. However, because of the
significant volume and depth to be excavated, the constmction techniques, and the length of
constmction required to install the IB, the general constmction safety risk to workers is
considered significantly higher than Alignments 1 and 3.
16
WLLFOIA4312- 001 – 0055696
With regards to off-site safety, due to the large volume of waste and limited space on site for
staging, off-site disposal will be required. The increased tmck traffic in the vicinity of the
site will increase the risk for traffic accidents. Additionally, the increased tmck traffic
waiting to enter and exit the site will impact the existing Transfer Station operations. This
could dismpt some of the Transfer Station’s operations including customer’s trash collection
services.
Another disadvantage of Alignment 2 is that monitoring wells, gas collection lines, and gas
extraction wells located in the North Quarry would have to be removed prior to installation
of the IB and then reinstalled after constmction is completed. Due to the long constmction
duration, that North Quarry infrastmcture would not be in place for a long duration. The
North Quarry infrastmcture was installed as part of an Qrder for Preliminary Injunction for
the RPs to monitor temperature fluctuations, carbon monoxide emissions, and control landfill
gas. This infrastmcture is important for detecting potential movement of the SSE and
controlling landfill gas.
The volume of waste to be excavated with Alignment 2 would result in daily conditions that
are considered similar to those of an operating landfill. Th~. number and the significance of
the disadvantages of Alignment 2 far outweigh the Aligmnent 2 advantages. Therefore, all
parties were in agreement of not suppoJ;ting selection ofAlignment 2.
4.8 Structural IB Alignment 3 Advantage~ Discuss ion
The primary advantages of A~gnment 3 are that 1t is tecllnically feasible and requires
significantly less volume of waste to be excavated compared to Alignment 2 while
minimizing and potentially eliminating RIMremaining south of the IB and potentially
exposed ~o the SSE when comparet:l to Alignment 1.
Anotlfler advantage ofAlignmeat 3 is that the on-site safety risk to workers due to RIM
exposure will be lowerthan Alignment 1 and the on-site safety risk to workers due to general
constmction efforts would be less than Alignment 2 because of the shorter constmction
duration and less challenging installation.
4.9 Structure/} Alignment 3 Disadvantages Discussion
Although Alignment 3 has significantly less volume of waste to be excavated than Alignment
2, the volume of waste to be excavated for Alignment 3 is considered a disadvantage when
compared with the volume of waste to be excavated for Alignment 1. Alignment 3 could
have as much as double the volume of waste as Alignment 1. As previously stated, the
volume of waste drives the disadvantages with each alignment, so more than doubling the
volume of waste will increase the risk associated with those disadvantages.
Alignment 3 will have less potential for odor than Alignment 2, but will have a greater
potential for odor than Alignment 1 due to the increased volume of waste to be excavated. In
17
WLLFOIA4312- 001 – 0055697
addition to the longer excavation duration, multiple staging areas will also be required for
Alignment 3 in order to stage the larger amount of excavated waste so it can be screened
prior to disposal. Having multiple staging areas will also contribute to the longer overall
construction duration and odor potential. As odor is a quality of life issue for the community,
this could be considered a significant disadvantage to the community.
Alignment 3 will also have a significantly less potential for bird hazard compared to
Alignment 2 due to the lower volume of excavated waste; however, when compared to
Alignment 1, the bird hazard potential increases and therefore, is considered a disadvantage.
As discussed in Section 4.4, gulls and raptors are expected to be attracted to the waste and
some mitigation efforts are not expected to be effective for more than a few days.
Additionally, since gulls tend to feed as the excavated material is loaded onto trucks for
transport, netting or other means of mitigation will likely be required to minimize bird
hazards.
A disadvantage of Alignment 3 is that it would need to move 50-feet closer to the high
quarry wall than the alignment evaluated as Gption 3 Alignment in the R.Ps October 2014
report entitled “Isolation Barrier Alternatives Analysis, West Lake Superfund Site.” This
will require additional design effort and potentially a thick;er wall in the w’esteJ;U third of the
wall to account for potentially higher differential settlement forces from North Quarry waste
settlement. Despite this, the overall level of effort as compared to the Option 3 Alignment in
the 2014 report is unlikely to be substantially. higher.
With Alignment 3, S(JMepfthe newer Waste in the North Quarry will be located on the north
side of the Alignment 3 IB. Tfiis overlay area; when combined with the West Lake Landfill
Area 1 waste below it, has a maximum depth ()f waste of approximately 90-feet. The
additional depth ofwasJe from the North Quarry overlay and the newer waste located on the
north side of the Alignment 3 IB are two factors that can contribute to the generation of a
future SSE on the north side of the IB. Because these conditions would exist if this
alignment were installed, they are considered·~ disadvantage. The on-site safety risk for
Alignment 3 would be lower wlien compared to Alignment 1 if little or no RIM is excavated
to ins tail this IB. The relative risk for Alignment 3 RIM exposure would be equal or slightly
higher compared to Alignmtnt 2 as noRIM is expected to be encountered during excavation
of Alignment 2. From a general construction standpoint (not considering RIM), the on-site
safety risk for Alignment 3 is higher than Alignment 1 due to the length of the construction
duration and higher revel of Qifficultly associated with a deeper wall. The general on-site
safety risk for Alignnfent3is considered significantly less than Alignment 2 due to the depth
of excavation and the amount of material handling required for Alignment 2.
Alignment 3 ‘s off-site risk for exposure to airborne dust containing RIM is considered lower
than Alignment 1 ‘s risk because Alignment 3 will be placed in an area that is expected to
encounter limited RIM, if any, based upon recent sampling results. As indicated in the
Alignment 1 discussion, mitigation measures, including air monitoring and dust control, can
be employed to control risks during excavation and waste handling.
18
WLLFOIA4312- 001 – 0055698
The duration of design for Alignment 3 will be longer than Alignment 1 due to the need to
for a more robust design to address differential settlement. The depth of the waste will
increase the amount of time required to collect the data necessary for design. Additionally,
because the IB will be deeper in the western portion of the alignment, additional design time
will be required due to more complex loadings and structural requirements of the wall. The
construction duration for Alignment 3 will also be longer than Alignment 1 due to the
increased depth of the western portion of the IB.
Another disadvantage of this IB alignment is the impact to existing infrastructure. The
monitoring wells, gas collection lines, and gas extraction wells located in the North Quarry
would have to be removed prior to installation of the IB and then reinstalled after
construction is completed.
There are no known past applications using a concrete wall asaheat barrier in a landfill.
There have been studies showing the degradation of strength properties of concrete when
exposed to high heat. It may be possible to oxercome these issues during design, but more
study would be necessary to determine if special mix designs could overcome this issue.
4.10 Heat Extraction Barrier Advantages
The most significant advantage oftheheat e~traction IBis that the volume of waste to be
removed will be negligible compared to any other option. The waste to be removed results
from drilling coolant wells. This amount of waste <;an easily be handled on site. As a result of the mfuimized waste, the odots. and bird hazards for this alternative is significantly less than the other alternatives. On-site safety risk is also the least of all alternatives due to limited, if any, :exwsure to R1;M or other chemicals. Additionally, offsite exposure to RIM :Fisk would l:>e the least ofall the other alternatives as well due to the limited
amount of waste handlfug. A€lditionally, thilalternative would have limited truck traffic
when compared to the other alternatives, significantly reducing the off-site traffic accident
risk.
One of the oth’er more significant advantages of the heat extraction barrier alternative is that
the design time is shorter than the other alternatives and it can be installed within a shorter
duration than the strUcturaliB+alternatives. Given that there are varying views of the
movement of the SSE, shorter design and installation durations are a strong advantage.
Because of the shorter design and installation time, the system can be expanded quickly in
the event actual monitoring data shows that additional cooling is necessary to contain the
heat front.
Data from the RP’s pilot study provides a proof of concept for the heat extraction barrier
alternative. The proposed heat extraction system combined with the heat sink properties of
the surrounding limestone makes the neck area between the North and South Quarries the
optimal location to install a cooling system.
19
WLLFOIA4312- 001 – 0055699
4.11 Heat Extraction Barrier Disadvantages
The primary disadvantage of the heat extraction barrier is the wells will be subject to high
heat, a corrosive environment, and waste settlement. This can be mitigated by planning for
well replacement if heat and corrosion or waste settlement impacts the cooling wells. In
addition, application of heat extraction wells for this purpose has had limited testing (the
RP’s pilot study).
Another disadvantage is that the proposed placement of the heat extraction barrier in the neck
is that if a future SSE were to occur in the North Quarry, the heat extraction barrier would
not be positioned to prevent the SSE from moving into the West Lake Landfill and coming in
contact with the RIM. However, the flexibility of the lieat: extraction barrier alternative is
such that additional wells and coolant capacity could he quickly installed at a location
between a new SSE and the RIM.
5. Design Considerations
Options to address some of the technical challenges anticipated during design and construction
were identified. Following are some of those design considerations.
For Alignment 1 and potentially for Afignment 3, the possibility of encountering RIM during
excavation exists. During discussions, the RPs i:ttdicated they Were considering utilizing a panel
wall construction method to install the IB, Utilizing a panel wall construction method would
reduce the amount of e~cavated materials arid drilling fluids/slurry tfrat would come into contact
with RIM when compared to a cont~uous trench excavation; kowever, there could still be a
significant volume ofwa~te and flui~s resulting from the in panel wall construction that would
require handling and disposal as RIM. Because ilie safe handling and disposing of additional
material as RIM. will increase the Qyerall duration and cost of the project, alternative construction
methods.thatcouldfurther minimize the potential amount of radiologically impacted slurry or
drilling fluids should be investigated.
One potential construction method that could be considered to minimize the use of fluids or
slurry is the use of a secant pile.wall for that portion of the IB that extends through RIM. A
secant pile wall w~:Uld not require ;use of a slurry, so it would minimize the potential spread of
RIM and eliminate handling of :RIM contaminated slurry. It is also suitable for installation in
difficult subsurface c6n~iti~ns, It also can be used in combination with panel wall installation
(panel wall installation on ilie east portion of the IB and a secant pile wall installation on the west
portion of the IB). The primary disadvantage of a secant pile wall installation is that there is less
certainty in the continuity of the wall; however, there are installation and down-hole verification
techniques to minimize this uncertainty. The RPs would also need to determine how to
incorporate an internal cooling system with both the secant pile wall and the panel wall
construction methods.
Depending upon the alternative selected, there may be some RIM remaining on the south side of
the IB wall that needs to be addressed as part of the IB design. Table 2 summarizes some
potential mitigation measures to consider.
20
WLLFOIA4312- 001 – 0055700
Table 2 – Options to Address Remaining RIM
Option Description Advantages Disadvantages
RIM handling, screening, transport,
disposal
Open excavation and increase in odor
Open excavation and increase in bird
hazard to air traffic
Ensuring IB stability while RIM
Excavate identified excavation is conducted adjacent to the
Excavate RIM remaining on Minimizes risk of RIM contact lB. This is a significant disadvantage
RIM south side ofiB with SSE and will increase the size of the IB, the
\l’olume of waste to be excavated, and
6tlfer associated risks. It is possible that
.excavation after IB installation may not
be technically feasible depending upon
the t?cation of the remaining RIM with
respectto the IB structure.
Off-site hauling for disposal may
increases risk of traffic accidents and
RIM release.
Reduces the amount of waste Effects of SSE in C:ontact with stabilized
Utilize deep soil to be handled, transported, and R.lM are unknown. Will likely require
mixing techniques di&posed .. • bench scale testing to verify
to auger down to
··················• May be difficult to implement in the
RIM, inject cement landfill due to potential loss of grout (in
In-Situ grout, and mix Reduces tlfe amoimt of situ deep soil mixing has been
Stabilization grout with the exposed waste and therefore successful in nonnal soil conditions).
waste to reduces the amount of od.or Some components of waste may hinder
immobil.izethe hydration of waste so bench scale
RIM and adjacent testing would be required to determine
waste intoa the appropriate stabilization agents.
hardened block less Reducesthe amount of Requires thorough identification of RIM
sl)St:;eptible to tlte exposed waste and therefore to know area requiring stabilization
···
SSE reduces the bird llit?:ard
Eftective for smaller areas of Requires ability to identify location of
Inject liquid N2 or RIM SSE. Difficult to detect SSE movement
1 ;n~~=~~c~h:s the
Wastefiandling/disposal Reliable supply ofliquid N2 and C02 is
would be limited to waste not currently available.
LiquidN2 or SSEapproaches to generated for injection well
C02 Injection cool tlfe. subsurface installation
and extinguish the Limited odors- no open
SSE excavation Increased worker safety issues when
Limited bird hazard-no open handling liquid N2
excavation
Heat Install closed- Flexible and can be Wells may settle as waste settles and
Extraction system cooling implemented quickly. Can be could impact effectiveness of system,
Barrier loop and wells to expanded easily if additional causing need for new wells. Well
cool the heat front cooling is required. material could be impacted by high heat
between the RIM and corrosion.
and the SSE to
prevent the SSE
from coming into
contact with the
RIM.
21
WLLFOIA4312- 001 – 0055701
Option Description Advantages Disadvantages
Allows for capture of landfill
Install synthetic gas. Landfill gas collected may require
Synthetic cover over top of Eliminates excavation, reduces treatment prior to discharge.
Landfill landfill south ofiB need to handle, transport, or
Cover& Gas where remaining dispose of waste
Collection RIM is located. Eliminates excavation, Any cover could potentially be
System Install gas minimizes bird hazard. susceptible to damage from SSE or
collection system RPs already planning to install natural events.
synthetic cover at North
Quarry
If any of these options were to be incorporated, the RPs wou:ld’:need to evaluate each one and, if
necessary, conduct the appropriate studies required for design and construction. As part of the
design to address any RIM remaining south of the I]3, the RPs should evaluate the possible risks
to receptors should the SSE come into contact with the remaining RIM.
6. Design Schedule Considerations
It is not known that the SSE will reach the RIM; however, due to the unpredictable nature and
movement of the SSE, the length ofti:nte for the SSE to reach the RIM in QUI, Area 1 is
currently unknown. Therefore, length df time required to design and install the IB was a
consideration during this assessment.
The standard industry practice is to complete the d~s1gn in stages with reviews conducted at each
stage. Typical design stages are the 3 0%, 60%, 90% and 1 00% i:fesign stages. The 3 0% design
stage is conceptual and many of the specific details of the design are not complete and are still
being evaluated, T~e 60% and 90% d~sign stages ate more complete with almost all of the
details defined, The Final Design represents the completed design product. It is USACE ‘s
understanding that a similar design process will be followed for the IB effort and that the
documents produced at each stage of the design will be subject to government review and
comment.’
This staged approa¢h to the designallows for good quality control and helps ensure that all
design objectives are met. However, at each stage in the process, a set of documents is produced
that requires sufficient time to prepare, review, and then respond to any technical review
comments so that those revisiotis may be carried forward into the next stage. There may be ways
to shorten the time required t6complete each design stage. Typical methods to speed up the
design process are: increase the number of designers; conduct “over the shoulder” or “in
progress” reviews while the design team continues working instead of requiring the designers to
stop and respond to review comments in between each stage; and reduce the time allowed for the
reviewers to perform their review. Each of these methods introduces some chance of error.
Rushing the design and quality control reviews in order to start construction earlier may result in
problems or delays during construction because those problems w

Post

2015-12-12 – EPA – West Lake Landfill – Analysis of requests to transfer authority to USACE

To:
From:
Sent:
Subject:
Hague, Mark[Hague.Mark@epa.gov]
Woolford, James
Sat 12/12/2015 8:24:55 PM
FW: WLL
I sent this and then, catching up on email, saw your note.
We argue similar points.
Let me know if I can help further.
Jim Woolford, Director
Office of Superfund Remediation & Technology Innovation
US EPA
Sent from my Windows Phone
Please excuse typos
Here are arguments from the Missouri coalition for the environment:
1) The St. Louis Army Corps of Engineers Formerly Utilized Sites Remedial Action Program
must be put in charge of the site now! The Corps is right for the job because:
West Lake Landfill deserves a much needed second opinion after mistakes made by the EPA,
it removes a significant amount of influence that Republic Services and Exelon Energy currently
enjoy as a Superfund site,
the Corps has the technical expertise and track record for the safe cleanup of radioactively
contaminated sites in the St. Louis metro area,
workers are better protected and compensated at FUSRAP sites than EPA Superfund sites,
the Corps is already familiar with the site through current interagency agreements with EPA
Region 7 so the transfer will be smooth,
the Corps office is local and therefore more accessible to the community
2) MCE supports the safe removal of the radioactive wastes from the West Lake Landfill
because the EPA’s 2008 decision to “cap-and-leave” the wastes will remain a constant threat to
our drinking water, public health, and our environment. The safe removal of the illegally dumped
radioactive wastes is necessary because the West Lake Landfill:
was never designed to permanently store radioactive material,
has no liner separating the radioactive material from the groundwater,
is in the floodplain of the Missouri River,
is upstream from St. Louis regional drinking water intakes,
is in an urban area,
is vulnerable to earthquakes,
is threatened by a smoldering landfill fire or future fires,
is susceptible to tornadoes, and
WLLFOIA4312- 001 – 0055676
is at a site never designed to temporarily or permanently store radioactive material.
+++++++=====
I have little exposure to the USACE-FUSRAP program since I went over to OSRTI.
Background. Around 1997 Congress transferred responsibility for remediating some of the
former DOE sites to the USACE. DOE and the USACE then signed a MOU defining their
respective responsibilities. The Legacy Management office at DOE has responsibility for
monitoring the sites and operating any technologies and ICs.
The USACE did get the St Louis property sites which were in reality not nearly as technically
challenging as WLL. Generally these properties had some radioactively contaminated soils as
fill. Most of the cleanup has been a relatively simple dig and haul although special precautions
were required due to the radioactivity. Most if not all if these properties/sites were on the NPL
and thus had EPA oversight from Region 7.
Interestingly, remediation work at the sites in and around St. Louis has been going on for almost
20 years. The most recent ROD was 10 yrs ago and remediation work is still going on. Not
exactly expeditious.
The challenge the USACE will have is there is an actively engaged PRP doing work. The
FUSRAP sites where the USACE has responsibility don’t typically have this element as far as I
can recall. That is, they are doing the work and not overseeing PRPs doing work. I don’t think
they are particularly well suited to perform such a task. The MCE seems to believe the USACE
can somehow ignore the PRPs. I can’t see that happening unless there is a cash out
settlement. The PRPs to date have not signaled any such interest.
I cld find 3 LFs in the USACE’s FUSRAP portfolio. At each, (the Tonawanda LF in NY,
Middlesex Muni LF in NJ and Shpack LF in Mass ) the USACE is doing the work. I could not
find any evidence of PRP involvement with the USACE .
Shpack is on the NPL abd has a separate EPA I PRP element. The USACE did excavate rad
waste there – about 50 k cubic yards. The entire site achieved CC about a year ago. Not all rad
contamination was excavated.
At Tonawanda LF, the most recent info I cld find is the USACE has issued a PP in Sept 2015
with the following preferred alternative : “targeted shallow removal and off site disposal of fusraprelated
material to address the contaminated soils in the LF OU”. The removal depth is approx 5
ft. 1000 yr post closure monitoring is also included. They propose to leave more deeply buried
waste in place. Public comment pd closes Dec 14. Remedy is estimated to cost about $12M.
They proposed a “deep excavation” alternative costing about $55M. It was not their preferred
alt. Each alternative has off site disposal.
I mention the above becz if the rationale or belief behind the legislative push for a change to the
USACE is that the LF will be excavated and all the rad/FUSRAP waste will be removed, that is a
huge leap of faith. Tonawanda is in many respects most similar to WLL.
PROS and CONS for transfer
-Pros
WLLFOIA4312- 001 – 0055677
1) Significant public discontent with EPA. (but the allegations of mismanagement stem from
disagreement with the first ROD and that the subsequent work has not resulted in a new ROD
requiring full excavation of all the rad waste.)
2) USACE generally has good reputation in StLouis area
3). The radioactive waste is similar to FUSRAP-related materials. Some argue it is. USACE has
experience here.
4). USACE had some knowledge of site due to support on the subsurface smoldering eventbut
not the WLL site – so an easy transition is not a given
5) site has been a significant investment for R 7 – they cld redirect to other sites
-Cons
1) USACE does not have experience working with or overseeing PRPs
2). Uncertain PRP reaction- PRP has generally been cooperative with EPA. Republic owns the
LF. When the legislation was announced, their statements were in opposition citing potential for
significant delays.
3). Despite community negativity, work on both the SSI and the characterization of the WLL has
been progressing. Sorting thru the USACE role and bringing the USACE up to speed will likely
stop progress towards a new PP.
4) related to #3- there are a number of EPA enforcement instruments- AOCs and UAOs- in
place that cover WLL. Not clear how the legislation would/ could affect. What happens with
special account? Can USACE access?
5). The US (DOE) is a PRP. Negotiations have been ongoing with them and DOJ I ED.
6). Outcome/remedy could be not much different than an EPA-lead process. The work has to
go thru the same CERCLA process. Full excavation faces two significant challenges that I see :
1 – FAA concerns about bird strikes from SL airport and 2- not likely to be a cost effective
remedy under CERCLA.
There is no evidence of off site contaminated GW migration and the GW likely will be monitored
at the fenceline. If CoCs are identified, then the remedy will be to pump and treat- that will be
less costly and safer -see FAA- than full excavation. Same level of protectiveness.
Tornadoes are surface events. Assuming there is a cap of substance, it a tornado very unlikely
to have an effect. Not far away from here is the above ground (75 feet) DOE Weldon Springs
waste storage facility/disposal cell- part of a state park if memory serves. It is much more
vulnerable to tornadoes. It has, according a website., 1.5 M cubic yards of hazardous wastes.
7). I have heard DOE does not support
8). Not sure about the USACE- but I think they are not in support
WLLFOIA4312- 001 – 0055678
9). Putting site under the USACE is one thing, will they have resources to address? Likely would
adversely affect delay other FUSRAP sites if no more funding.
Jim Woolford, Director
Office of Superfund Remediation & Technology Innovation
US EPA
Sent from my Windows Phone
Please excuse typos
Can you give me your thoughts on this question? I frankly can make an argument both ways
Mathy Stanislaus
USEP A Assistant Administrator
Begin forwarded message:
From: “Distefano, Nichole”
Date: December 11,2015 at 7:51:42 PM EST
To: “Stanislaus, Mathy” “Hague, Mark”
Subject: WLL
Mathy and Mark
I am going to raise the WLL issue with Gina via email.
I need to know from you both how strongly you feel about her weighing in on this. There
may be a couple of things she can try to do if we want to suggest she try to stop it – though
it may not work. She also may come to that conclusion on her own. That said, I need to
know from you all what you would suggest.
She gets back on Sunday so she may want to discuss with us when she lands.
Sent from my iPhone
WLLFOIA4312- 001 – 0055679

Post

2016-05-17 – NRC – Jocassee Dam – Concerns from NRC staff about Jocasse Flooding Analysis and Response to Public Laws – ML16202A537

Criscione, Lawrence
From: Criscione, Lawrence
Sent: Tuesday, May 17, 2016 8:49 AM
To: Kirkwood, Sara; Holahan, Gary; Clark, Theresa
Cc: ‘tomd@whistleblower.org’; Mitman, Jeffrey; Bensi, Michelle; Philip, Jacob; Perkins,
Richard
Subject: RE: RE: Meeting next week
Sara,
I look forward to meeting with you this morning.
Several colleagues of mine have expressed concerns regarding how the agency is handling flooding issues
and have indicated they would like to meet with your team to discuss their concerns. Their concerns relate to
the two bulleted items in your email below. Jeff Mitman, Michelle Bensi, Jake Philip and Richard Perkins are
all willing to meet with your team.
Jeff Mitman has specific concerns regarding Jocassee/Oconee in that the flooding analysis being used does
not take into account the Lake Jocassee Dam failing from overtopping. These concerns fall under the first
bulleted item in your email below.
Jeff Mitman, Michelle Bensi and Jake Philip have expressed concerns regarding the agency’s response to
Section 402 of Public Law 112-074. Their concerns were expressed in an October 2014 non-concurrence that
was primarily authored by Dr. Bensi. Jake has also expressed concerns regarding water-tight seals for power
plant penetrations. These concerns fall under the second bulleted item in your email below, although they are
not necessarily limited to the plants mentioned.
Richard Perkins has concerns regarding the manner in which the screening analysis report for Generic Issue
204 (flooding at nuclear power plant sites due to upstream dam failures) was redacted. Mr. Perkins’ concerns
were the primary motivation behind my 2012-Sep-18 letter to the NRC Chairman.
In a 2012-Oct-15 letter to the Chairman of the Senate Committee on Homeland Security & Governmental
Affairs I noted that there is no interagency process for ensuring that dams upstream of nuclear reactor plants
are guarded to the same design basis threat (DBT) that the NRC requires nuclear power plants (NPP) to be
guarded to. I realize that it is not within the NRC’s authority to dictate the guard force required at dams
regulated by Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) or maintained by the US Army Corps of
Engineers (USACE). However, since the catastrophic failure of the Oconee Nuclear Station would lead to a
reactor accident at Oconee, it is illogical to require that Oconee be guarded against a specific DBT yet to not—
after 8 years of claiming the flood height at Oconee due to a Jocassee Dam failure is non-public securityrelated
information—have done any study to determine whether or not the same DBT that we believe could
cause an accident at Oconee could also breach the Lake Jocassee Dam.
That is, to my knowledge no one has studied what the design basis threat to the Lake Jocassee Dam is and
whether or not that dam is adequately guarded against that threat. If the same DBT that could threaten
Oconee could also be capable of destroying the Lake Jocassee Dam, then reason dictates that the Lake
Jocassee Dam must be guarded against that DBT. I recognize this is an interagency problem the NRC would
like to avoid. But we have a duty to address it for Oconee and for all other susceptible reactors. What is the
design basis threat capable of destroying the dam? Is that threat less than or equal to the DBT for Oconee? If
so, then the Lake Jocassee Dam needs to be guarded against that DBT. Just because this is an interagency
problem does not mean the NRC can ignore it.
A similar concern exists regarding insider threats. When I worked in the nuclear industry, I needed to be
screened into PADS (Personnel Access Data System?) to ensure there was nothing adverse in my
background. Can an insider threat at the Jocassee Dam pump storage station cause the dam to fail? If so,
are the requirements for background checks and fitness-for-duty at the Jocassee Dam pump storage station
the same or greater than the requirements at Oconee?
I don’t know if you consider my concerns regarding external and internal security threats at the Lake Jocassee
Dam to fall within the two bulleted items in your email below, but they certainly need to be addressed.
Also, I did not mention the silo-ing issue in my disclosure to the OSC because I only became aware of it
recently. You should address what is driving the NRC to silo flooding information and the potential impact of
that silo-ing upon the agency’s Open and Collaborative Work Environment.
V/r,
Larry
573-230-3959
From:?Kirkwood,?Sara??
Sent:?Wednesday,?May?11,?2016?4:27?PM?
To:?LSCriscione@gmail.com;?Criscione,?Lawrence?;?’tomd@whistleblower.org’?
?
Subject:?RE:?RE:?Meeting?next?week?
Dear Mr. Devine,
This note is to confirm that members of the Flooding Working Group will interview your client, Mr. Criscione,
on Tuesday, May 17th, 10:00 a.m., at NRC Headquarters, Room O1F22. The interview will be transcribed.
NRC Headquarters
One White Flint North Building (OWFN)
11555 Rockville Pike
Rockville, MD 20852.
The purpose is to interview Mr. Criscione about the allegations he presented to the Office of the Special
Counsel (OSC) regarding the risk of flooding at 19 specific plants located downstream from dams. In response
to the referral from OSC, Chairman Burns convened a working group to conduct an investigation into the
matters referred to him. Please note that the working group’s investigation is limited in scope to issues referred
by OSC. Our investigation, and thus our interview is limited to the following:
? Whether the NRC has failed to require the Oconee Nuclear Station in South Carolina to take corrective
measures to safeguard the plant from potential flooding should the Lake Jocassee Dam fail.
? Whether the NRC has also failed to require the following nuclear power stations (Arkansas Nuclear,
Beaver Valley, Browns Ferry, Columbia, Cooper, Fort Calhoun, H.B. Robinson, Hope Creek/Salem,
Indian Point, McGuire, Peach Bottom, Prairie Island, Sequoyah, South Texas, Surry, Three Mile Island,
Waterford, and Watts Bar) to take appropriate measures to protect against the risk of flooding in the
event of upstream dam failures.
You will be registered in the visitor access system. Upon arrival to the building, your vehicle will be subject to
a routine screening, the security officer will direct you to a parking space, once parked, please walk around to
the front of the OWFN building to check in at the security desk with a valid ID.
The following link provides directions to NRC Headquarters
http://www.nrc.gov/about-nrc/locations/hq.html
Map for Visitor vehicle entrance

Post

2016-05-09 – NRC – Jocassee Dam – Affidavits regarding flooding concerns at Oconee nuclear power plant – ML16202A536

Criscione, Lawrence
From: Criscione, Lawrence
Sent: Monday, May 09, 2016 6:16 PM
To: Kirkwood, Sara; Holahan, Gary; Clark, Theresa
Cc: ‘LSCriscione@gmail.com’; tomd@whistleblower.org
Subject: Affidavit with Exhibits of interest
Attachments: Criscione OSC affidavit-signed.pdf; Exhibit_35_Letter_from_Criscione_to_Lieberman_
2012-10-15.pdf; Exhibit_47_Letter_from_Criscione_to_Boxer_2012-11-14.pdf; Exhibit_54
_Various_emails_concerning_redactions_to_GI-204_Screening_Anal….pdf
Sara,
Attached is the affidavit that the Government Accountability Project used to draft my 2015 complaints to the US Office
of Special Counsel. The sections regarding the flooding concerns are on pp. 24‐27.
Also attached are my 2012 letters to the Senate E&PW and HS&GA committees and some emails concerning the
redactions made to the GI‐204 Screening Analysis report. The other exhibits of interest are my 2012‐Sep‐18 letter and
email to the chairman which you already have.
I got involved with the Jocassee/Oconee issue in 2011/2012 when some of my coworkers in RES were drafting the
Screening Analysis Report for GI‐204 (flooding at NPP sites due to upstream dam failures) and were concerned that they
were being unduly pressured to keep inconvenient information from the report—inconvenient in the sense that the NRC
did not yet know the extent of the flooding concerns and how to address them and thus desired that they be kept from
the public. It was disconcerting to my colleagues that their internal report on flooding might be watered down due to
containing information on significant nuclear safety issues that did not have a ready resolution.
The flooding portion of the attached affidavit was written in 2013 and based on information I obtained in 2012. This
issue has evolved since then and I have not stayed on top of it.
The concerns I still have regarding flooding are:
1. Instead of building the flooding defenses which they committed to, Duke Energy redid their flooding analysis at
Oconee and now claim that the site will not flood beyond the height of the five foot flood wall surrounding the
Standby Shutdown Facility. However, the unclassified and non‐safeguards records regarding this nuclear safety
issue are being strictly controlled within an internal group of employees designated as having a “need‐to‐know”
the information. I thus cannot find it in ADAMS and so do not know the new assumptions used by Duke
Energy. I have been told that Duke Energy did not consider an overtopping situation at Jocassee—something of
concerned to myself and some colleagues in RES and NRR.
2. Flooding documents regarding Fort Calhoun are being tightly controlled within the agency to a select group of
individuals designated as having a “need‐to‐know”. The Advisory Committee on Reactor Safeguards was even
excluded from seeing this unclassified and non‐safeguards information; the ACRS had to agree to a
Memorandum of Understanding with the US Army Corps of Engineers (USACE) whereby three of their members
were allowed to travel to a USACE facility in Nebraska to review the information and had to agree not to take
any documents back with them.
3. Personnel in NRO assigned to work on flooding reviews are being told they cannot discuss their work with
colleagues who do not have a specific “need‐to‐know” the information. That is, they cannot discuss concerns
they have with colleagues they trust unless those colleagues have been specifically assigned to the project they
are working on. This is anathema to an Open and Collaborative Work Environment and good scientific
protocol. This type of silo‐ing of information is necessary when working with classified or safeguards security
information, but has no place when the issues at hand are about protecting reactor plants from extreme acts of
natures. It is difficult to predict the frequency and severity of earthquakes, probabilistic maximum precipitation
events, latent construction and engineering failures, etc. and such topics warrant extensive peer review and
debate.
4. In 2012 I wrote the Chairman of the Senate Committee on Homeland Security & Governmental Affairs (at the
time, Senator Lieberman) concerning the fact that—based on their extensive use of Exemption 7(F) in redacting
dam‐related FOIA responses—the NRC believes there are credible terrorist threats to dams yet, to my
knowledge, there is no interagency process for ensuring that those dams whose failure from sabotage could
result in a serious nuclear accident are guarded against the same design basis threat that nuclear reactor plants
are guarded against. Senator Lieberman referred my concerns to Hubert Bell in December 2012 yet, after 3 ½
years, the NRC IG’s office has not obtained and reviewed any study from any source to determine whether or
not dams upstream of nuclear reactor plants are adequately guarded against terrorist activity (see FOIA appeal
2016‐0088A).
5. Supposedly the internal silo‐ing of dam/flooding related information and the broad use of Exemption 7(F) with
regard to dam/flooding FOIA responses is due to security concerns regarding the theoretical utility of
dam/flooding information to terrorists, yet to my knowledge—despite having concerns grave enough to justify
silo‐ing of information from even the full ACRS—the NRC has not made any attempt (e.g. commissioning a
security review or requesting an inquiry by the Department of Homeland Security) to determine whether or not
dams upstream of nuclear reactor plants are adequately guarded from the same design basis threats that
nuclear reactor plants must be guarded against.
6. Several of my colleagues in RES, NRO and NRR are concerned that the post‐Fukushima orders on flooding—
which were in response to a public law—have been backtracked on even though the law that was the source of
those orders has not been amended or rescinded.
7. Several of my colleagues are concerned that NRC licensees do not know whether all their penetrations of flood
barriers are water tight.
I have copied Tom Devine on this email. I do not expect that Tom will be able to participate in our meeting at Region III
next week, but I also do not expect him to have any concerns regarding us meeting without him present.
I will be taking leave on Wednesday through Friday this week, but please do not hesitate to call me at 573‐230‐3959 if
you have any questions. My gmail account forwards to my Hotmail account which forwards to my phone. Most of my
project work can be done outside of Citrix so I’m usually not connected to my NRC account during most of the day. If
you copy my Hotmail or gmail account I’ll likely see your questions sooner than if it just goes to my NRC account.
Thank you,
Larry
Lawrence S. Criscione
573‐230‐3959
From: Lawrence Criscione [mailto:lscriscione@hotmail.com]
Sent: Monday, May 09, 2016 4:33 PM
To: Criscione, Lawrence
Subject: [External_Sender]
1
AFFIDAVIT
My
name
is
Lawrence
Stephen
Criscione.
I
have
worked
for
the
US
Nuclear
Regulatory
Commission
(NRC)
as
a
Reliability
&
Risk
Engineer
since
October
26,
2009
in
the
Division
of
Risk
Assessment
of
the
Office
of
Nuclear
Regulatory
Research
(RES/DRA).
My
series
and
grade
are
series
801,
grade
GS-­‐14.
I
am
submitting
this
affidavit
to
the
U.S.
Office
of
Special
Counsel
(OSC)
under
the
Whistleblower
Protection
Act,
because
I
believe
I
have
been
denied
honest
consideration
for
a
position
for
which
I
was
qualified
(NRC
job
vacancy
R-­‐III/DRP-­‐
2013-­‐0009).1
I
also
believe
I
was
the
subject
of
an
unwarranted,
retaliatory
criminal
investigation
(OIG
Case
13-­‐001)
by
the
NRC’s
Office
of
the
Inspector
General.
(OIG)
The
denial
of
honest
consideration
for
position
R-­‐III/DRP-­‐2013-­‐0009
and
the
investigation
under
OIG
Case
13-­‐001
were
the
result
of
disclosures
I
made
to
the
NRC
regarding
the
agencies
handling
of
(1)
the
2003-­‐10-­‐21
unintentional
passive
reactor
shutdown
at
Callaway
Plant;
(2)
the
flooding
concerns
at
the
Oconee
Nuclear
Station
from
a
catastrophic
failure
of
the
Lake
Jocassee
Dam,
with
analogous
threats
at
nearly
one
third
of
America’s
operating
nuclear
reactors;
and
(3)
the
NRC’s
violation
of
federal
law
with
regard
to
implementing
the
Freedom
of
Information
Act.
Pursuant
to
5
USC
1213,
I
also
am
seeking
an
independent
investigation
of
the
breakdowns
I
witnessed
in
the
NRC’s
nuclear
safety
mission.
§
1.
Background

October
21,
2003
Unintentional
Passive
Reactor
Shutdown
at
Callaway
Plant
and
Violation
of
10
CFR
2.206
In
2003
I
was
working
at
the
Callaway
nuclear
power
plant
in
Callaway
County,
Missouri.
On
October
20,
2003
at
07:21
a
safety-­‐related
inverter
failed
at
Callaway.2
The
plant’s
Technical
Specifications
required
that
this
equipment
either
be
repaired
within
24
hours
or
that
the
operators
commence
shutting
down
the
reactor
and
have
it
shutdown
within
6
hours
(i.e.
by
13:21
on
October
21,
2003).3
At
01:00
on
October
21,
2003
the
operators
began
shutting
down
the
reactor
at
10%
per
hour.
Their
goal
was
to
have
the
reactor
shut
down
by
noon
if
repairs
could
not
be
made
to
the
failed
inverter
by
then.4
At
09:36
reactor
power
was
at
nominally
10%
and
the
operators
were
essentially
2
hours
ahead
of
schedule
for
shutting
down
the
plant
within
the
required
time
frame.5
In
accordance
with
accepted
industry6
and
regulatory7
practices,
the
operators
decided
to
stabilize
1
(Exhibit
1)
2
Exhibit
22
of
NRC
Office
of
Investigations,
Case
4-­‐2007-­‐049
(see
footnote
11
of
this
affidavit)
3
Callaway,
Unit
1,
Current
Facility
Operating
License
NPF-­‐30,
Tech
Specs,
Revised
6/27/2007
(ML053110040)
4
NRC
Event
Notification
40263
5
International
Nuclear
Safety
Journal
(INSJ),
14-­‐109-­‐1-­‐PB1,
“Analysis
of
the
October
21,
2003
Unintentional
Passive
Reactor
Shutdown
at
Callaway
Plant
with
regard
to
aspects
of
Reactivity
24
§
2.
Background

Flooding
Concerns
at
Oconee
Nuclear
Station
As
will
be
discussed
below,
the
Nuclear
Regulatory
Commission
has
known
since
April
2006
that,
were
the
Lake
Jocassee
Dam
to
fail,
the
resultant
flood
waters
would
inundate
the
Oconee
Nuclear
Station
(ONS)
and
disable
the
equipment
necessary
to
remove
decay
heat
from
the
cores
of
the
three
reactor
plants
sited
there.
The
NRC
has
been
informed
by
Duke
Energy
that
within
10
hours,
all
three
reactor
cores
would
melt
down,
releasing
their
fission
product
inventories
into
the
Reactor
Coolant
System
(RCS).
Without
mitigative
action
to
restore
equipment
(something
that
will
be
extremely
difficult
to
do
following
the
dam
failure
and
resultant
flood),
within
three
days
(1)
the
reactor
vessels
will
fail
and
release
their
fission
product
inventories
into
the
containment
buildings,
(2)
the
containment
buildings
will
fail
and
allow
release
of
fission
products
into
the
atmosphere,
(3)
a
radioactive
plume
of
fission
products
will
leave
the
site
and
travel
in
accordance
with
the
current
wind
patterns,
depositing
radioactive
fallout
along
its
path,
(4)
if
the
radioactive
plume
encounters
a
rain
storm
prior
to
reaching
the
sea,
it
will
likely
cause
large
parts
(i.e.
counties)
of
South
Carolina,
North
Carolina
and/or
Georgia
to
be
permanently
evacuated
in
a
fashion
similar
to
what
occurred
in
the
Ukraine
following
the
Chernobyl
accident
and
what
has
occurred
in
Japan
following
the
accidents
at
Fukushima.
The
plans
for
resolving
the
flooding
issues
at
the
Oconee
Nuclear
Station
have
been
delayed
repeatedly
over
the
past
eight
years,
and
currently
have
a
due
date
of
December
2016
based
on
my
informal
discussions
with
those
working
on
the
issue.
The
only
corrective
actions
done
thus
far
have
involved
minor
changes
to
monitoring
equipment
and
procedures;
none
of
the
actions
taken
thus
far
will
prevent
the
meltdown
of
the
reactors
were
the
Lake
Jocassee
Dam
to
fail.
The
resolution
of
this
substantial
and
specific
danger
to
public
safety
has
been
impeded
by
gross
mismanagement
and
abuse
of
authority
enabled
through
secrecy
in
violation
of
the
Freedom
of
Information
Act.
The
misconduct
is
ongoing.
The
flooding
concerns
at
Oconee
led
to
a
Generic
Issue
on
Flooding
at
Nuclear
Power
Plant
Sites
Due
to
Upstream
Dam
Failures
(Exhibit
32)
that
was
never
fully
released
to
the
public
(although
several
variously
redacted
versions
have
been
released
in
response
to
FOIA
request).
§
2.1.
Substantial
and
Specific
Danger
to
Public
Safety
The
probability
of
the
Lake
Jocasee
Dam
failing
has
been
calculated
by
the
NRC
to
be
2.8E-­‐4/year.72
Since
the
probability
of
a
reactor
accident
occurring
given
72
The
nomenclature
2.8E-­‐4/year
refers
to
an
annual
probability
of
failing
of
0.00028
for
every
given
year.
Although
this
is
a
small
number
equating
to
a
chance
of
failure
of
once
in
every
3571
years,
integrated
across
the
entire
US
fleet
of
100
reactors
this
number
equates
to
a
Fukushima
style
accident
of
once
every
37
years
in
the
U.S
and
once
a
decade
world
wide.
It
is
about
ten
times
higher
than
the
risk
goal
for
a
typical
US
reactor
plant.
25
the
failure
of
the
Lake
Jocassee
Dam
is
a
certainty,
there
is
thus
a
2.8E-­‐4
annual
probability
that
a
reactor
meltdown
will
occur
in
Oconee
County,
South
Carolina.
This
is
roughly
ten
times
the
risk
acceptable
for
a
licensed
US
nuclear
power
plant.
On
September
18,
2012
I
sent
a
letter73
to
the
NRC
Chairman
detailing:
(1)
the
NRC’s
inability
to
resolve—after
knowing
about
the
issue
for
six
years—the
actions
needed
to
be
taken
by
Duke
Energy
to
protect
the
three
reactors
at
the
Oconee
Nuclear
Station
(ONS)
from
a
catastrophic
failure
of
the
Lake
Jocassee
Dam,
and
(2)
the
fact
that
speculative
and
abstract
fears
regarding
terrorist
targeting74
were
sustaining
unwarranted
secrecy
that
prevented
the
open
and
transparent
discussion
of
the
significant
safety
concerns75
threatened
by
a
failure
of
the
Lake
Jocassee
Dam
due
to
acts
of
nature
or
latent
construction/design
failures.76
The
NRC
Chairman
never
contacted
me
regarding
my
2012-­‐09-­‐18
letter.
The
only
follow
up
I
ever
received
was:
(1)
my
branch
chief
(Ben
Beasley)
informed
me
on
September
20,
2012
that
he
had
been
directed
to
file
a
security
infraction
form
against
me
for
not
designating
my
letter
to
the
Chairman
as
“Security-­‐Related
Information”
(Exhibit
34),
(2)
the
Chairman’s
legal
counsel—following
an
October
15,
2012
letter
to
the
Senate
Homeland
Security
&
Government
Affairs
Committee
(Exhibit
35)
in
which
I
mentioned
I
had
not
received
any
follow
up
to
my
concerns—sent
me
an
email
on
October
16,
2012
informing
me
that
the
Chairman
had
referred
my
letter
to
her
to
the
NRC’s
Inspector
General
(Exhibit
36),
and
(3)
the
Inspector
General’s
special
agents
asked
me
about
my
concerns
on
January
17,
2013
during
their
interrogation
of
me
to
build
a
case
to
indict
me
on
felony
charges
of
Fraud
with
Computers
(18
U.S.C.
1030).
The
sense
I
got
was
that
no
one
was
interested
in
discussing
my
safety
and
mismanagement
concerns
and
that
they
were
resentful
that
I
had
“leaked”
the
issue
outside
to
Congress.
73
(Exhibit
33)
74
To
date
no
nuclear
plants
or
dams
have
been
destroyed
by
terrorist
activities.
The
solutions
to
security
concerns
(e.g.
vandalism,
sabotage,
terrorist
attack
or
acts
of
war)
are
vastly
different
than
the
solutions
to
nuclear
safety
concerns.
If
there
are
legitimate
security
concerns,
then
the
solution
is
to
increase
the
guard
force
at
the
dam.
Concerns
regarding
security—whether
speculative
or
grounded—should
not
impede
the
open
discussion
of
legitimate
safety
concerns.
75
Safety
concerns
(vice
security
concerns)
are
failures
from
acts
of
nature
(e.g.
a
PMP—
Probabilistic
Maximum
Precipitation
event),
from
design
or
construction
errors,
or
from
human
errors
in
the
operation
of
the
facility.
76
The
safety
concerns
are
real—according
to
Bureau
of
Reclamation
data
all
dams
(concrete,
earthen,
mixed)
fail
at
a
rate
of
approximately
1E-­‐4/yr
(this
corresponds
well
with
the
NRC’s
determination
of
2.8E-­‐4/yr
for
the
failure
rate
of
the
Lake
Jocassee
Dam).
The
failure
of
the
Lake
Jocassee
Dam
would
place
ONS
under
17
feet
of
water,
leading
to
the
meltdown
of
the
reactors
and
the
failure
of
their
containment
buildings,
and—depending
on
the
current
wind
direction—would
cause
significant
radiological
contamination
in
various
parts
of
the
Southeast.
Since
the
odds
of
a
“Fukushima-­‐style”
accident
happening
in
South
Carolina
are
equivalent
to
the
failure
rate
of
the
Lake
Jocassee
Dam,
there
needs
to
be
an
open
public
discussion
on
the
safety
of
the
Lake
Jocassee
Dam.
26
§
2.2.
Abuse
of
Authority
and
Gross
Mismanagement
The
NRC’s
Office
of
Nuclear
Reactor
Regulation
has
a
duty
to
be
open
and
transparent
with
the
public
about
their
concerns
regarding
the
hazards
posed
by
the
Lake
Jocassee
Dam
to
the
reactors
at
the
Oconee
Nuclear
Station.
But
NRR
successfully
kept
a
serious
safety
liability
at
a
commercial
nuclear
power
plant
site
secret
from
the
public
for
over
five
years
(from
2007
until
2012).
The
issue
regarding
the
“Fukushima-­‐style”
hazards
posed
by
the
Lake
Jocassee
Dam
to
the
three
reactors
at
the
Oconee
Nuclear
Station
only
came
to
the
light
of
the
public
due
to
a
FOIA
“fishing
expedition”
by
a
reporter
in
Oregon
(Exhibit
37).
Managers
within
NRR
abused
their
authority
in
keeping
this
issue
from
the
public.
In
a
2006
publicly
available
inspection
report
(which
was
pulled
from
the
NRC’s
public
website
in
November
2012)
the
NRC
Resident
Inspectors
at
Oconee
noted:
…a
December
10,
1992
Jocassee
Dam
Failure
Inundation
Study
(Federal
Energy
Regulatory
Commission
Project
No.
2503)
predicted
that
a
Jocassee
Dam
failure
could
result
in
flood
waters
of
approximately
12.5
to
16.8
feet
deep
at
the
Oconee
Nuclear
Site.
At
some
point
in
2007
NRR
began
marking
all
external
and
internal
correspondence
regarding
the
flooding
hazards
posed
by
the
Lake
Jocassee
Dam
as
“Official
Use
Only

Security-­‐Related
Information”
or
similar
designations
prohibiting
public
release.
The
reason
for
the
shift
away
from
transparency
and
Open
Government
is
not
fully
understood
by
me,
but
it
undermines
public
oversight
and
shields
the
NRC
from
accountability
or
even
exposure
of
dangerous,
embarrassing
breakdowns
in
nuclear
safety
law
enforcement.
It
is
difficult
for
the
NRC
to
publicly
admit,
or
even
let
the
public
know,
that
three
reactors
in
South
Carolina
are
vulnerable
to
a
nuclear
accident
due
to
flooding
caused
by
the
failure
of
an
upstream
dam.
By
withholding
this
information
from
the
public,
the
NRC
eliminated
all
public/legislative
scrutiny
of
their
efforts
and
public/legislative
pressure
to
address
the
issue
in
a
timely
manner.
The
consequence
has
been
a
five
to
fifteen77
year
delay
in
acting
against
a
hazard
whose
likelihood
is
ten
to
one
hundred
times
greater
than
accepted
standards,78
and
77
The
Jocassee/Oconee
flooding
issue
arose
in
February
1994
and
was
dismissed
in
November
1994.
It
then
reappeared—in
its
present
incarnation—in
August
2005.
It
does
take
time
to
address
a
complex
issue
such
as
this,
but
if
the
NRC
had
been
efficient
in
Aug.
2005
we
would
be
about
five
years
ahead
of
where
we
are
now.
If
one
would
make
the
argument
that
the
NRC
dropped
the
ball
in
1994
(and
I
support
that
argument
but
it
is
not
the
one
I
made
to
the
Chairman)
then
one
could
argue
we
are
15
years
behind
where
we
should
be.
78
Although
there
are
no
regulatory
limits
for
risk
of
a
core
meltdown
and
containment
failure,
the
generally
accepted
expectation
at
the
NRC
is
a
risk
of
Core
Damage
Frequency
(CDF)
on
the
27
whose
consequences
would
likely79
be
worse
than
Fukishima.
The
elimination
of
public/legislative
scrutiny
and
pressure
invariably
enabled
this
issue
to
languish.
The
vulnerability
persists,
and
the
delay
in
honoring
our
public
safety
mission
is
gross
mismanagement.
§
2.3.
Media
Coverage
The
issues
regarding
flooding
at
nuclear
power
plants
due
to
upstream
dam
failures
were
covered
in
2012-­‐02-­‐25
and
2012-­‐03-­‐01
articles
in
the
Cascadia
Times.
The
issue
also
appeared
in
the
Huffington
Post
in
September
(Exhibit
38),
October
(Exhibit
39),
and
December
2012
(Exhibit
40).
The
issue
appeared
in
other
news
outlets
as
well
including
an
Iranian
newspaper.
All
of
the
occurrences
listed
here
were
brought
to
my
attention
by
fellow
NRC
employees
who
saw
the
articles
via
the
“NRC
in
the
News”
link
on
the
home
page
of
the
NRC’s
internal
webpage.
I
was
well
known
at
the
NRC
to
be
associated
with
this
issue.
§3
Retaliatory
Investigation
On
September
19,
2012
the
NRC’s
Office
of
the
Inspector
General
opened
Allegation
A-­‐12-­‐07095,
Release
of
Security
Related
Documents
by
RES
Employee
in
response
to
my
September
18,
2012
email
and
letter
to
the
NRC
Chairman.
Note
that
the
“release
of
security
related
documents”
referred
to
in
the
allegation
was
not
a
release
of
information
to
the
public
but
rather
a
release
of
information
to
the
US
Congress
and
the
US
Office
of
Special
Counsel.
On
October
10,
2012,
the
Office
of
the
Inspector
General
completed
their
review
of
Allegation
A-­‐12-­‐07095
and
opened
OIG
Case
13-­‐001
for
a
full
investigation.
Although
these
documents
eventually
made
it
into
the
public
domain,
at
the
time
Allegation
A-­‐12-­‐07095
and
OIG
Case
13-­‐001
were
initiated
(i.e.
September
19
and
October
10,
2012)
there
was
not
yet
any
indication
that
the
documents
had
order
of
1E-­‐5/yr
and
a
risk
of
Large
Early
Release
Frequency
(LERF)
on
the
order
of
1E-­‐6/yr
to
1E-­‐
7/yr.
There
are
some
at
the
NRC
(e.g.
me,
Galloway,
Mitman,
Ferrante,
Perkins)
who
believe
that
a
catastrophic
failure
of
the
Lake
Jocassee
Dam
will
almost
certainly
lead
to
core
damage
at
Oconee
and—in
the
absence
of
any
data
showing
that
Duke
Energy
could
recover
containment
cooling
within
68
hours—possibly
containment
failure.
Since
the
NRC’s
current
failure
frequency
for
the
Lake
Jocassee
Dam
has
been
calculated
at
2.8E-­‐4/yr
(which
is
an
order
of
magnitude
higher
than
the
typical
plant
CDF
and
two
orders
of
magnitude
higher
than
the
typical
LERF),
the
risk
at
ONS
is
about
10
to
100
times
greater
than
at
a
typical
US
reactor
plant.
79
Once
the
cores
meltdown
and
the
containment
buildings
fail
(which
Duke
Energy
predicts
would
happen
within
9
and
68
hours
respectively)
the
consequences
become
dependent
on
the
weather.
If
no
rain
is
encountered
by
the
radioactive
fallout
cloud
on
its
way
to
the
Atlantic
Ocean
or
Gulf
of
Mexico,
and
if
its
path
is
relatively
direct,
then
the
consequences
could
be
less
than
Fukushima.
If
precipitation
systems
are
encountered
then
substantial
amounts
of
land
might
need
to
be
evacuated
for
decades.
28
been
released
beyond
the
US
Congress
and
the
Office
of
Special
Counsel.80
This
is
an
important
distinction:
OIG
Allegation
A-­‐12-­‐07095
and
Case
13-­‐001
were
not
initiated
to
investigate
the
appearance
of
Official
Use
Only
documents
in
the
public
domain,
but
rather,
were
initiated
to
investigate
the
disclosure
of
Official
Use
Only
documents
to
the
US
Congress
and
to
the
US
Office
of
Special
Counsel
even
though
disclosures
to
both
these
bodies
are
protected
by
law.
On
January
17,
2013
I
was
interrogated
by
two
special
agents
from
the
NRC’s
Office
of
the
Inspector
General
regarding
my
release
of
documents
stamped
“Official
Use
Only”
to
several
dozen
Congressional
staffers
and
to
US
Special
Counsel
Carolyn
Lerner.
That
interrogation
was
recorded
and
I
was
informed
during
the
interrogation
that
I
would
be
afforded
an
opportunity
to
review
the
transcript.
During
the
interrogation
I
agreed
to
several
requests,
which
I
did
not
write
down
due
to
the
stress
of
being
involved
in
an
accusatory
and
confrontational
interrogation
and
due
to
the
understanding
that
I
would
be
allowed
to
review
the
transcript.
At
the
end
of
the
interrogation,
I
was
directed
to
agree
to
a
Confidentiality
Agreement
while
still
under
oath.
I
asked
for
a
copy
of
the
agreement
to
keep,
but
was
told
I
could
not
have
one.
Again,
I
did
not
take
notes
on
what
I
was
required
to
read
because
I
had
been
told
I
would
be
afforded
an
opportunity
to
review
the
transcripts.
After
seven
weeks
and
despite
repeated
requests
I
was
neither
afforded
an
opportunity
to
review
the
transcripts
of
my
interrogation
nor
was
I
provided
a
copy
of
the
confidentiality
statement
I
was
directed
to
read.
On
March
3,
2013
under
the
Privacy
Act
I
requested
the
recording
of
my
interrogation.
On
March
14,
2013
my
Privacy
Act
request
was
denied
citing
Exemption
7(A)
of
the
Freedom
of
Information
Act.
I
appealed
that
decision
and
on
March
15,
2013
the
NRC
assigned
tracking
number
2013-­‐008A
to
my
appeal.
On
April
2,
2013
my
appeal
was
denied
by
Hubert
Bell,
the
NRC
Inspector
General.
Mr.
Bell
cited
Privacy
Act
exemption
(j)(2)
and
FOIA
exemption
(7)(A)
as
the
basis
for
his
denial.
In
order
to
obtain
the
record
of
my
interrogation,
I
employed
Scott
Hodes
in
order
to
ensure
the
NRC
did
not—prior
to
the
closure
of
OIG
case
13-­‐001—
maliciously
destroy
the
recording
of
my
January
17,
2013
session.
On
July
3,
2013
Mr.
Hodes
filed
a
civil
action
on
my
behalf
that
was
assigned
“Civil
Action
No.
13-­‐CV-­‐
00942-­‐RMC”.
After
prolonged
negotiations,
on
October
28,
2013
a
settlement
agreement
was
reached
whereby
the
transcript
and
recording
of
my
interrogation
would
be
released
within
the
shorter
time
period
of
either
the
passage
of
one
year
(i.e.
by
October
28,
2014)
or
within
5
working
days
of
the
closure
of
both
OIG
Case
13-­‐001
and
13-­‐005.
The
transcript
and
recording
were
provided
to
me
on
March
17,
2014.
80
The
first
appearance
of
one
of
these
“Official
Use
Only

Security-­‐Related
Information”
documents
in
the
public
domain
was
in
an
October
19,
2012
Huffington
Post
article.
29
I
chose
to
settle
my
lawsuit
because
it
had
already
cost
me
$2,000
and—
although
my
attorney
believed
we
would
certainly
prevail
in
court—it
was
the
estimation
of
my
attorney
that
it
would
likely
take
at
least
12
months
before
I
would
get
the
recording
and
would
cost
an
extra
$4,000.
Below
is
a
summary
of
the
retaliatory
investigation
and
criminal
referral
for
prosecution,
which
openly
and
specifically
occurred
because
I
made
non-­‐classified
disclosures
to
Congress
of
the
upstream
dam
vulnerability.
§3.1
Background
On
September
18,
2012
I
wrote
a
19-­‐page
letter
to
the
NRC
Chairman
(Exhibit
33).
I
transmitted
that
letter
from
my
NRC
email
account.
Along
with
the
letter,
I
attached
to
the
email
several
NRC
documents
designated
“Official
Use
Only

Security-­‐Related
Information”
to
back
up
statements
I
had
made
in
the
letter.
I
copied
the
email
to
about
two
dozen
Congressional
staffers,
several
dozen
NRC
employees
and
to
the
US
Special
Counsel
(Exhibit
43).
Everyone
to
whom
I
copied
on
the
original
email
or
to
whom
I
later
forwarded
the
email
were
all
employees
of
the
US
federal
government.
I
was
informed
on
or
prior
to
September
20,
2012
by
my
branch
chief
(Ben
Beasley)
that
he
had
been
directed
to
fill
out
a
NRC
Form
183,81
because
my
2012-­‐
09-­‐18
letter
to
the
NRC
Chairman
and
the
accompanying
email
were
not
stamped
“Official
Use
Only

Security-­‐Related
Information”.
Over
the
past
year
my
2012-­‐09-­‐
18
letter
and
most
of
the
documents
submitted
with
it
had
been
released
under
the
Freedom
of
Information
with
no
security-­‐related
redactions.82
Although
some
of
the
documents
attached
to
my
2012-­‐09-­‐18
are
still
designated
“Official
Use
Only”,
there
are
currently
outstanding
FOIA
appeals
regarding
these
documents
and
the
NRC
may
yet
release
them.
So,
although
these
documents
were
designated
“Security-­‐
Related
Information”—and
although
I
did
control
them
as
if
they
were
(i.e.
I
did
not
distribute
them
to
anyone
outside
the
federal
government)—it
is
apparent
that
most
of
them
did
not,
in
fact,
contain
any
security
sensitive
information.
On
a
number
of
separate
occasions
in
September,
October
and
November
2012,
I
was
interviewed
by
a
Huffington
Post
reporter
(Tom
Zeller)
regarding
the
NRC’s
handling
of
the
flooding
risk
posed
to
the
reactors
at
the
Oconee
Nuclear
Station
by
the
Lake
Jocassee
Dam.
I
was
quoted
in
at
least
three
Huffington
Post
articles.
At
some
point
in
the
autumn
of
2012
I
was
quoted
by
an
Iranian
news
service
concerning
the
NRC’s
handling
of
the
flooding
concerns
at
Oconee.
I
have
never
spoken
with
any
foreign
reporters,
foreign
government
agents,
or
anyone
else
81
(Exhibit
34)
82
The
only
redactions
were
my
home
address
and
cell
phone
number
which
were
redacted
by
the
NRC
under
Exemption
6
due
to
their
belief
that
releasing
information
I
voluntarily
allow
to
be
published
in
the
telephone
directory
is
a
“clearly
unwarranted
invasion
of
personal
privacy”.
30
connected
with
a
foreign
government
or
group
regarding
the
Jocassee/Oconee
flooding
issues.
Although
the
quote
attributed
to
me
was
accurate,
I
did
not
provide
it
to
the
Iranians.
All
quotes
attributed
to
me
in
the
Iranian
news
story
were
verbatim
repetitions
of
quotes
I
had
made
to
Tom
Zeller
of
the
Huffington
Post
and
which
appeared
in
Mr.
Zeller’s
articles.
Since
the
quotes
in
the
Iranian
newspaper
appeared
after
Mr.
Zeller’s
articles
were
published,
I
have
always
assumed
that
the
Iranians
merely
copied
the
quotations
out
of
the
Huffington
Post.
The
Huffington
Post
articles
on
the
Jocassee/Oconee
flooding
issue
contained
links
to
some
of
the
documents
that
I
provided
to
the
US
Congress.
It
is
my
understanding
that
a
Congressional
staffer
to
whom
I
submitted
the
documents
provided
copies
of
them
to
Greenpeace
who,
in
turn,
passed
them
along
to
the
Huffington
Post.
Although
I
did
not
distribute
any
“Official
Use
Only”
documents
outside
of
the
US
government,
the
NRC’s
Office
of
the
Inspector
General
claims
that
I
essentially
“laundered”
documents
through
Congress.83
That
is,
they
claim
I
sent
the
documents
to
Congressional
staffers
who
I
knew
would
leak
them.
Although
everyone
at
the
NRC
should
know
there
is
a
potential
that
information
submitted
to
Congress
could
be
publicly
released
through
a
number
of
venues,84
I
did
not
make
any
arrangements
with
anyone
in
Congress
to
leak
any
documents.
However,
when
asked
by
the
Huffington
Post
I
did
tell
them
to
whom
in
Congress
I
had
sent
the
documents.
I
do
not
view
this
as
conspiring
to
launder
documents.
I
view
this
as
informing
the
Huffington
Post
as
to
what
congressional
offices
should
be
aware
of
the
flooding
issues
and
whose
own
oversight
should
be
monitored.
None
of
the
documents
in
question
were
classified
or
in
any
way
restricted
from
release
by
law.
On
October
26,
2012
I
met
with
my
branch
chief
and
division
director
and
was
told
to
submit
a
list
of
all
the
documents
that
I
had
shared
outside
of
the
NRC.
At
this
meeting
I
was
also
told
to
route
any
future
documents
that
I
wished
to
send
to
Congressional
offices
through
my
chain
of
command
and
the
Office
of
Congressional
Affairs.
I
provided
the
requested
list
on
October
30,
2012.
It
is
enclosed
as
(Exhibit
43).
In
mid-­‐January
2013
I
was
contacted
by
special
agent
William
Walls
of
the
NRC’s
Office
of
the
Inspector
General
regarding
my
availability
to
participate
in
an
interview
concerning
OIG
Case
13-­‐001
of
which
I
was
told
I
was
the
subject
of
the
investigation
(Exhibit
44).
Prior
to
the
interrogation,
the
OIG
refused
to
inform
me
as
to
what
the
specific
charges
were.
I
was,
however,
informed
that
the
interrogation
would
be
conducted
under
a
Garrity
warning
and
not
a
Kalkines
statement,
which
meant
that
I
was
under
criminal
investigation.
83
(Exhibit
42)
84e.g.
during
meetings
of
Congressional
oversight
committees,
by
press
releases
of
Congressional
offices,
or
simply
by
a
leak
from
a
staffer
31
§3.2
January
17,
2013
Interrogation
On
January
17,
2013
I
was
interrogated
by
two
armed
special
agents,
William
Walls
and
Daniel
Esmond
of
the
US
NRC’s
Office
of
the
Inspector
General.
Kevin
Nietmann,
an
OIG
Technical
Advisor,
was
also
present.
Also
present
was
Randy
Sullivan
(my
NTEU
steward)
and
a
transcriber
from
Neal
R.
Gross
Court
Reporters
and
Transcribers
who
was
transcribing
the
interrogation
and
operating
a
recording
device.
In
the
sections
below,
which
summarize
the
transcript85
in
(Exhibit
45),
I
hope
to
make
the
case
that
my
2013-­‐01-­‐17
interrogation
was
conducted
with
the
intent
of
trumping
up
felony
charges
against
me
in
order
to
use
as
leverage
to
get
me
to
resign
from
my
job.
In
the
aftermath,
it
places
me
at
a
severe
disadvantage
when
seeking
any
other
federal
position,
such
as
the
Resident
Inspector
posts
for
which
I
have
been
denied.
The
first
37
minutes
of
the
interrogation
(up
to
page
34,
line
7
of
the
transcript)
we
discussed
OIG
Case
13-­‐005
which
the
OIG
claims
I
am
the
source
of
(i.e.
they
claim
that
in
my
letter
to
the
Chairman
I
made
allegations
which
they
are
now
investigating).
Although
I
never
intended
for
a
criminal
investigation
to
be
initiated
into
the
NRC’s
mismanagement
of
the
Jocassee/Oconee
flooding
issues,
the
OIG
initiated
one
anyway
(i.e.
OIG
Case
13-­‐005).
During
that
exchange
I
tried
to
accurately
summarize
my
views.
The
Oconee
Nuclear
Station
was
licensed
to
design
criteria
that
we
now
believe
are
no
longer
valid—particularly
we
now
believe
(versus
what
we
believed
in
the
late
1960s/early
1970s
when
the
plant
and
dam
were
originally
sited)
that
the
failure
of
a
dam
of
similar
construction
to
Jocassee
is
a
credible
event
(i.e.
something
we
must
account
for
in
our
analysis)
whereas
when
the
reactors
and
dam
were
originally
constructed
a
dam
failure
at
Jocassee
was
considered
of
such
low
probability
(i.e.
not
credible)
that
it
did
not
need
to
be
analyzed.
So
although
I
would
be
comfortable
living
and
working
in
Oconee
County,
as
a
regulator
I
believe
that
our
current
understanding
of
dam
failures
and
flooding
at
nuclear
plants
dictates
that
to
prevent
a
substantial
and
specific
threat
to
public
health
and
safety
we
need
to
either
improve
the
flooding
defenses
at
Oconee
or
we
need
to
lower
the
level
of
Lake
Jocassee
such
that
the
flooding
due
to
a
dam
failure
would
be
acceptable.
The
impression
I
get
from
my
transcript
is
that
the
OIG
agents
were
trying
to
manipulate
this
view
into
an
opinion
that
I
did
not
think
the
issue
was
safety
significant
since
there
was
not
an
immediate
need
to
shut
down
the
plant.
Nuclear
accidents
rarely
kill
people.
At
Fukushima
we
are
seeing
thousands
of
people
displaced
from
their
homes
but
we
are
not
seeing
any
deaths.
My
nightmare
85
The
recording
of
the
interrogation
is
being
included
as
(Exhibit
46).
There
is
information
on
the
recording
that
is
not
in
the
transcript
(e.g.
the
tone
of
the
questions,
pauses,
inflections)
and
the
transcription
does
have
some
errors.
32
at
Jocassee/Oconee
is
a
failure
of
the
dam
would
cause
flooding
at
the
site
that
eventually
leads
to
all
three
nuclear
reactors
melting
down
and
their
containment
structures
failing
(as
what
occurred
at
Fukushima
following
the
tsunami
flooding).
Then
the
radioactive
debris
being
carried
by
the
winds
meeting
a
precipitation
system
on
its
way
to
the
ocean
and
contaminating
several
counties
in
South
Carolina
to
the
extent
that
they
need
to
be
evacuated.
This
is
an
economic
nightmare
for
all
US
taxpayers
and
a
life-­‐altering
catastrophe
for
the
people
who
need
to
be
evacuated—but
it
involves
no
deaths.
I
have
serious
safety
concerns.
Yet
when
asked
if
I’d
live
and
work
in
Oconee,
I
have
to
say
“yes”.
I’m
not
from
there.
If
the
government
has
to
buy
me
out
of
my
home
due
to
a
nuclear
accident
it
would
not
devastate
me
to
move.
In
the
59-­‐68
hour
scenario
that
it
would
take
for
the
nuclear
accident
to
unfold,
I
could
easily
move
my
family
to
safety.
I
had
to
be
honest.
I
was
under
oath.
But
the
OIG
agents
manipulate
this
to
“Well,
in
your
own
words,
you
just
mentioned
that
you
wouldn’t
sell
a
house
and
you’d
continue
to
live
there.”
You
can
have
serious
safety
concerns
without
fearing
for
your
life.
Millions
of
Americans
having
to
leave
their
hometowns
and
family
farms
due
to
radiological
contamination
is
a
devastating
catastrophe
even
if
no
one
falls
ill
or
dies.
Another
concern
I
had
was
that
the
agency
had
not
done
an
adequate
job
staying
on
top
of
the
issue
and
driving
it
to
conclusion.
However,
I
am
not
aware
of
any
statutes
that
make
it
a
crime
for
federal
bureaucrats
to
be
ineffective.
In
all
my
letters
(e.g.
to
the
NRC
Chairman,86
to
Senator
Lieberman,87
to
Senator
Boxer88)
I
focus
on
the
ineffectiveness
of
the
process,
which
is
gross
mismanagement
and
abuse
of
authority,
and
not
criminal
wrongdoing
on
the
part
of
any
individuals.
During
their
questioning,
I
get
the
overall
impression
from
the
first
34
pages
of
the
transcript
that
the
agents
believe
the
agency’s
actions
have
been
adequate.
Finally,
during
these
first
34
pages
there
is
discussion
about
my
background.
In
totality,
this
came
across
as
them
trying
to
discredit
my
background
because
I
have
not
been
trained
in
hydrology,
civil
engineering,
security,
etc.
My
background
was—at
the
time—nearly
17
years
working
in
nuclear
power.
I
understand
how
organizations
function
and
make
decisions,
how
operators
typically
perform
(or
fail
to
perform)
both
when
they
are
doing
a
well
trained
task
and
a
novel
evolution,
the
history
behind
the
evolution
of
nuclear’s
“defense-­‐in-­‐depth”
strategy,
the
limitations
of
deterministic
analyses
and
probabilistic
risk
assessments,
the
reliability
concerns
with
equipment,
etc.
Like
all
operators,
I
have
had
in-­‐depth
training
for
the
accidents
at
Three
Mile
Island
and
Chernobyl.
I
worked
in
the
NRC’s
Operations
Center
in
the
weeks
following
the
Fukushima
accident.
Although
I
must
defer
to
other
experts
with
regard
to
hydrology
and
dam
design—these
experts
agree
with
me
(I
have
no
citation
here
but
you
are
welcome
to
interview
Greg
Baecher
of
the
University
of
Maryland
and
Tom
Nicholson
of
NRC/RES
and
they
will
tell
you
that
the
failure
rate
of
the
Lake
Jocassee
Dam
is
on
the
order
of
1E-­‐4/yr).
Although
I
am
86
(Exhibit
33)
87
(Exhibit
35)
88
(Exhibit
47)
33
not
a
security
expert,
the
security
experts
in
Office
of
Nuclear
Security
and
Incident
Response
(NRC/NSIR)
agree
with
me
that
the
Jocassee/Oconee
issue
is
not
a
nuclear
security
concern
requiring
designation
as
Safeguards
information
(Exhibit
48).
The
remainder
of
the
interview
(i.e.
beyond
page
34
line
7)
was
conducted
for
the
purposes
of
manufacturing
a
felony
case
against
me.
Beginning
on
page
34
they
asked
me
general
questions
about
my
assigned
work,
my
work
schedule,
my
work
from
home
habits,
and
my
use
of
personal
computers.
I
had
the
general
sense
from
the
interview
that
they
were
questioning
whether
or
not
I
should
be
pursuing
concerns
regarding
Jocassee/Oconee
on
“agency
time”.
To
be
clear,
a
lot
of
my
efforts
were
done
“off
the
clock”.
However,
at
no
time
were
any
of
my
work
products
hindered
by
office
hours
spent
looking
at
Jocassee/Oconee
documents.
As
a
nuclear
professional,
I
am
expected
to
be
able
to
interact
with
colleagues
and
to
discuss
safety
issues
not
assigned
to
me.
Although
I
cannot
neglect
my
assigned
work
to
pursue
personal
interests,
that
is
not
what
occurred.
What
occurred
was,
in
addition
to
my
assigned
duties,
I
spent
some
time
looking
into
concerns
that
colleagues
(primarily
Richard
Perkins
but
others
as
well)
shared
with
me.
This
is
not
uncommon
at
the
agency,
where
discussion
and
research
among
staff
beyond
those
immediately
assigned
to
a
task
is
common.
Due
to
my
assigned
workload,
by
necessity
I
conducted
nearly
all
research—beyond
that
necessary
to
respond
to
colleagues—after
working
hours.
I
would
find
it
chilling
were
someone
to
tell
me
I
cannot
look
into
a
safety
concern
a
colleague
has
brought
to
me
unless
I
am
authorized
to
do
so
by
my
supervisor.
Although
no
one
has
said
this
to
me,
it
is
the
impression
I
got
from
the
totality
of
the
OIG’s
January
17,
2013
interrogation
of
me.
Beginning
on
page
44
my
union
steward
interrupted
the
interrogation
to
ask
what
is
meant
by
“Security-­‐Related
Information”
(Exhibit
49).
My
steward
works
in
NRC/NSIR
and
is
used
to
working
with
Safeguards
information,
which
is
a
designation
defined
by
a
federal
statute
that
controls
release
of
such
information.
He
was
unaware
of
“Security-­‐Related
Information”
which
is
an
informal
marking
that
NRR
places
on
documents
that
they
don’t
wish
to
be
publicly
release.
I
think
it
telling
that
my
steward
had
this
confusion,
because
I
believe
that
“Security-­‐Related
Information”
is
intentionally
made
to
resemble
Safeguards
Information
so
that
staff
will
be
leery
of
leaking
it
(it
is
a
federal
crime
to
release
Safeguards
Information
to
an
individual
without
an
official
government
need
for
it
whereas
“Security-­‐Related
Information”
has
no
formal
definition
whatsoever
and
can
legally
be
given
to
anyone).
There
was
much
discussion
as
to
whether
or
not
I
processed
“Security-­‐
Related
Information”
on
my
personal
PC.
I
am
still
not
sure
whether
or
not
I
am
allowed
to
process
“Security-­‐Related
Information”
and
proprietary
information
on
my
personal
PC
(I
know
I
cannot
process
Safeguards
or
classified
information).
I
got
34
the
impression
from
reading
the
testimonies
of
Kathy
Lyons-­‐Burke
(Exhibit
51)
and
Thorne
Graham
(Exhibit
52)
that
it
is
not
allowed
to
send
“Security-­‐Related
Information”
or
proprietary
information
via
commercial
email
servers
(e.g.
Hotmail,
Gmail,
Yahoo)
yet
it
is
still
common
for
employees
to
do
so.
But
I
am
still
unclear
about
using
my
personal
PC
for
processing
propriety
documents.
I
may
have
broken
some
IT
rules,
but
it
is
clear
to
me
that
the
IT
rules
are
ill
defined
and
often
violated.
In
their
September
11,
2013
Report
of
Investigation,
the
agents
mention
the
following
findings
(Exhibit
50):
OIG
found
that
on
December
10,
2012,
CRISCIONE
forwarded
an
email
containing
NRC
OUO-­‐SRI
from
his
NRC
email
account
to
his
personal
Hotmail
account,
although
NRC
prohibits
transmittal
of
such
information
to
commercial
and
personal
email
accounts.
The
sensitive
information
he
forwarded
pertained
to
subject
matter
of
the
Screening
Analysis
Report.
In
addition,
CRISCIONE
admitted
sending
the
NRC
OUO

SRI
Screening
Analysis
Report
to
members
of
Congress
from
his
personal
Hotmail
account,
and
storing
a
copy
of
the
report
in
his
Hotmail
account,
although
NRC
prohibits
staff
from
using
their
personal
email
accounts
to
transmit
or
store
OUO

SRI
information.
Note
that
the
above
findings
were
never
presented
to
me.
I
had
to,
on
my
own
initiative,
request
the
Report
of
Investigation
under
the
Freedom
of
Information
Act
and
wait
six
weeks
for
the
NRC
to
release
it
to
me.
Despite
all
the
discussion
of
IT
issues
during
my
interrogation,
no
one
has
ever
informed
me
that
any
of
the
IT
actions
taken
by
me
and
discussed
during
the
interrogation
violated
any
NRC
policies.
The
only
reason
I
am
aware
I
have
violated
policies
is
because
I
have
gained—through
my
own
initiative—documents
through
the
Freedom
of
Information
Act
and
inadvertently
(i.e.
while
looking
for
other
information)
came
across
passages
indicating
I
had
broken
some
NRC
IT
rules.
I
still
have
supposedly
“Security
Sensitive”
documents
in
my
personal
email
account.
During
my
interrogation
I
was
told
not
to
delete
anything
from
my
personal
email
account.
As
I
was
being
walked
to
the
elevator
after
my
interrogation,
I
asked
special
agent
Daniel
Esmond
when
I
can
again
delete
records
from
my
Hotmail
account.
He
told
me
that
they
would
let
me
know.
I
have
yet
to
hear
from
anyone.
So,
what
exactly
is
so
sensitive
about
these
documents
that
they
cannot
be
stored
on
my
Hotmail
account
yet—even
though
the
NRC
knows
they
are
in
my
account—cannot
be
deleted?
I
left
my
January
17,
2013
interrogation
pretty
shaken
up
about
having
to
admit
apparent
violation
to
NRC
IT
rules
(rules
which
I
was
not
aware
of
but
likely
had
signed
statements
agreeing
to),
yet
in
the
end
these
rules
do
not
seem
to
be
of
much
concern
to
anyone.
35
Beginning
on
page
54,
line
24
there
was
much
discussion
on
using
the
Non
Concurrence
Process,
the
Differing
Professional
Opinions
(DPO)
process,
Open
Door
meetings,
etc.
to
address
my
concerns.
The
topic
of
going
through
channels
was
again
brought
up
around
page
70,
line
14
(Exhibit
23).
The
totality
of
the
discussion
left
me
with
the
impression
that
my
professional
integrity
was
being
challenged
because
I
did
not
use
these
processes.
I
used
Open
Door
meetings
in
the
past
on
the
Callaway
2003-­‐10-­‐21
issue,
with
little
success.
I
could
not
use
the
Non-­‐Concurrence
process
on
the
Jocassee/Oconee
issues
because
I
was
not
assigned
to
concur
on
any
of
the
correspondence.
I
could
not
use
the
DPO
process
because
none
of
the
Jocassee/Oconee
issues
were
formally
assigned
to
me
and
thus
I
was
not
involved
in
any
of
the
decision-­‐making.
I
believe
the
Non
Concurrence,
DPO
and
Open
Door
policies
are
good
policies,
but
the
problem
with
“going
through
channels”
is
that
those
who
control
the
channels
have
myriad
ways
to
bureaucratically
stymie
you.
That
being
said,
as
a
Professional
Engineer
I
typically
go
through
channels:
at
Callaway
Plant
I
dutifully
took
the
October
21,
2003
incident
through
all
levels
of
my
chain
of
command
seeking
a
solution
before
bringing
the
matter
to
the
NRC
as
a
career
ending
allegation.
The
above
being
said,
the
Jocassee/Oconee
issue
had
spent
six
years
“going
through
channels”.
And
Melanie
Galloway—a
deputy
division
director
in
NRR—
submitted
a
Non
Concurrence
and
so
did
Jeff
Mitman—a
well-­‐regarded
senior
risk
analyst
in
NRR.89
If
these
individuals
could
not
get
proper
consideration
for
their
concerns,
how
could
I?
Additionally,
regarding
the
inappropriate
withholding
of
the
issue
from
the
public,
Richard
Perkins—the
project
lead
for
the
Upstream
Dam
Failure
generic
issue—fought
that
battle
at
every
meeting
he
attended
for
over
a
year.
The
NRC
had
had
ample
exposure
of
this
issue
through
its
“channels”
when
Richard
Perkins
and
others
asked
me
if
I
could
get
the
issue
in
front
of
a
congressional
oversight
committee.
Beginning
on
page
58
we
discuss
the
role
other
federal
agencies
had
in
reviewing
the
release
of
the
report
(Exhibit
53).
The
general
implication
of
this
discussion
was
that
other
agencies
did
not
want
their
information
released,
yet
I
somehow
released
it.
These
other
agencies
are—like
the
NRC—not
monolithic
organizations.
There
were
plenty
of
individuals
in
these
organizations—just
like
in
the
NRC—who
felt
the
report
could
go
out
with
no
redactions
(Exhibit
54).
Beginning
on
page
79
there
is
a
discussion
on
“need-­‐to-­‐know”
(Exhibit
55).
On
October
25,
2012
I
was
directed
by
Dan
Cardenas
in
the
Division
of
Facilities
Security
(NRC/ADM/DFS)
to
go
to
an
internal
web
page
and
read
all
the
documents
89
Ms.
Galloway’s
Non-­‐Concurrence
is
in
NRC
ADAMS
as
ML091170104
(Exhibit
83)
and
Mr.
Mitman’s
is
ML110260443
(Exhibit
84).
36
there
concerning
handling
of
SUNSI
(Sensitive
Unclassified
Non-­‐Safeguards
Information—so
basically
SUNSI
is
anything
that
is
controlled
from
public
release
by
administrative
policies
vice
by
legal
statutes)
(Exhibit
56).
This
direction
was
being
given
as
a
follow
through
item
from
the
September
20,
2012
security
infraction
that
had
been
submitted
against
me
for
not
marking
my
2012-­‐09-­‐18
letter
to
the
NRC
Chairman
as
“Security-­‐Related
Information”
(which,
by
the
way,
in
response
to
the
PEER
v.
NRC
lawsuit
was
publicly
released
by
the
NRC
in
September
2013
with
no
redactions
other
than
my
home
address
and
phone
number).
This
direction
was
coming
two
days
after
Doug
Coe’s
October
23,
2012
interview
with
OIG
special
agents
in
which
Doug
was
pointedly
asked
about
what
actions
had
been
taken
as
a
result
of
the
supposed
2012-­‐09-­‐18
security
infraction
and
why
I
continued
to
have
unrestricted
access
to
NRC
internal
ADAMS
(Exhibit
57).
I
did
not
fully
understand
the
contradictory
and
confusing
agency
guidance
for
marking
and
handling
SUNSI
and
replied
to
Dan
Cardenas
with
a
series
of
questions.
After
19
months,
Mr.
Cardenas
still
had
not
seen
fit
to
answer
my
questions—despite
being
the
subject
matter
expert
on
SUNSI—and
instead
referred
me
to
my
supervisor
(Exhibit
56).
I
am
far
from
the
only
NRC
employee
confused
by
our
guidance
on
SUNSI.
From
discussions
in
Ben
Beasley’s
October
19,
2012
interrogation,
it
is
clear
that
he
is
confused
too
(Exhibit
58).
Unfortunately
for
the
sake
of
public
transparency
and
openness,
Ben—like
most
NRC
employees—deals
with
his
confusion
by
defaulting
“conservatively”
and
ensures
he
errs
on
the
side
of
withholding.
The
central
questions
I
had
for
Mr.
Cardenas
revolved
around
the
idea
of
need-­‐to-­‐know
for
official
government
business
(e.g.
is
me
leaving
the
screening
analysis
report
on
upstream
dam
failures—which
is
marked
“Not
for
Public
Disclosure—with
the
intern
in
Representative
Duncan’s
office—the
US
Congressman
from
the
South
Carolina
congressional
district
that
includes
Oconee—
for
distribution
to
his
appropriate
staffer
a
violation
of
“need-­‐to-­‐know”).
The
totality
of
this
part
of
the
IG’s
questioning
of
me
left
me
with
the
impression
that
I
did
not
have
the
authority
to
determine
who
had
a
“need-­‐to-­‐know”
and
therefore
needed
to
go
through
official
channels
to
deliver
documents
to
Congress.
Beginning
on
page
88
there
is
a
discussion
regarding
how
I
came
to
be
quoted
in
the
Iranian
press
(Exhibit
59).
I
am
not
certain
how
I
came
to
be
quoted.
I
did
not
speak
to
any
foreign
journalists
and
the
quotes
attributed
to
me
(which
I
recall
to
be
actual
quotes
which
I
had
spoken
to
Tom
Zeller
of
the
Huffington
Post)
in
the
Iranian
newspaper
match
the
ones
quoted
in
an
earlier
Huffington
Post
article
so
I
assume
that
the
Iranians
used
the
Huffington
Post
as
a
source
for
their
article.
37
The
Iranian
news
article
was
linked
to
in
the
“NRC
in
the
News”
link
on
the
NRC’s
internal
home
page
so
it
is
widely
known
throughout
the
NRC
that
I
was
quoted
by
an
Iranian
newspaper.
Beginning
on
page
89
there
is
a
discussion
regarding
how
Greenpeace
and
the
Huffington
Post
came
to
possess
the
unredacted
GI-­‐204
screening
analysis
(Exhibit
60).
At
the
time,
I
believed
that
it
had
been
provided
to
Jim
Riccio
of
Greenpeace
by
Vic
Edgerton
of
Congressman
Kucinich’s
office.
However,
I
did
not
know
this
for
certain
and
strongly
felt
that,
even
had
I
known,
it
was
not
appropriate
for
me
to
discuss
the
completely
legal
actions90
of
a
legislative
branch
staffer
(i.e.
Edgerton)
with
investigative
agents
of
the
executive
branch
(i.e.
Walls)
who
were
trying
to
determine
how
an
embarrassing—yet
unclassified,
non-­‐Safeguards
and
wholly
otherwise
legally
unrestricted
from
release—document
made
it
into
the
public
domain.
When
I
hesitated
to
speculate
on
the
precise
name
of
an
individual,
I
was
directed
to
do
so.
This
made
me
very
uncomfortable.
I
did
not
think
it
right
that
I
name
Vic
Edgerton,
who
might
not
have
been
the
one
who
leaked
the
document
and
thus
whose
name
I
would
be
besmirching.
I
also
did
not
think
it
right
that,
were
Vic
to
be
the
actual
source,
I
name
him
since
he
had
every
right
to
consult
with
Greenpeace
on
the
document
and
his
mention
in
an
NRC
IG
investigation
report
might
limit
his
ability
to
get
documents
from
the
NRC
in
the
future.
I
should
note
here
that
my
feelings
about
this
questioning
would
have
been
wholly
different
had
we
been
discussing
classified
or
Safeguards
documents.
I
believe
that
the
NRC’s
IG
has
every
right
to
investigate
the
release
of
classified
material
and
Safeguards
documents
since
their
release
is
a
violation
of
law.
Congressional
staffers
are
not
above
the
law,
but
they
are
above
NRC
administrative
rules
designed
to
keep
embarrassing
issues
out
of
the
hands
of
the
public.
Beginning
on
page
98
there
is
a
discussion
regarding
my
relationship
with
Richard
Perkins
with
regard
to
the
Jocassee/Oconee
issue
(Exhibit
61).
Richard
and
I
worked
in
the
same
branch
and
he
would
share
his
concerns
with
me
all
the
time
regarding
how
he
believed
NRR
was
trying
to
withhold
the
Oconee/Jocassee
issue
from
the
public.
It
was
in
support
of
his
efforts
that
I
reached
out
to
congressional
committees.
I
believe
our
relationship
is
the
typical
type
of
professional
collaboration
that
is
expected
in
an
“Open
and
Collaborative
Work
Environment”
(OCWE).
The
totality
of
this
part
of
the
IG’s
questioning
of
me
left
me
with
the
impression
that
they
believed
I
had
colluded
with
Richard
Perkins
to
publicly
release
the
GI-­‐204
Screening
Analysis.
90
There
was
nothing
legally
prohibiting
Vic
Edgerton,
me,
or
anyone
else
from
releasing
the
GI-­‐
204
screening
report
to
the
public.
For
NRC
employees
(such
as
myself)
there
were
administrative
policies
preventing
it
but
no
legal
statutes.
38
Beginning
on
page
116
there
is
a
discussion
regarding
what
qualifies
me
to
determine
whether
or
not
an
issue
is
release-­‐able
to
the
public
(Exhibit
62).
As
an
NRC
employee,
one
of
my
tasks
is
to
process
Freedom
of
Information
Act
(FOIA)
requests
for
which
I
am
the
document
owner.
In
that
role,
I
believe
I
have
the
authority
to
determine
what
can
and
cannot
be
released
(although
that
authority
can
be
questioned
and
overridden
as
the
FOIA
submittal
is
routed
through
the
process).
Another
role
I
am
sometimes
assigned
is
to
do
the
SUNSI
review
of
records
I
am
placing
in
ADAMS.
In
that
role,
I
am
specifically
being
assigned
the
task
of
determining
if
a
document
is
publicly
release-­‐able.
The
totality
of
the
OIG’s
questioning
in
this
part
of
the
interview
left
me
with
the
impression
that
only
the
FOIA
office
and
the
Office
of
General
Counsel
can
authorize
the
public
release
of
a
document.
Beginning
on
page
123
the
tone
of
the
investigation
gets
accusatory
(Exhibit
63).
The
accusation
is
made
that
it
was
my
intent
to
publicly
release
the
report
through
Congress.
On
page
126
there
is
a
hostile
exchange
between
Agent
Esmond
and
my
union
steward
regarding
Agent
Esmond’s
inability
to
understand
why
I
would
think
it
acceptable
to
provide
a
document
marked
“Not
for
Public
Disclosure”
(i.e.
the
GI-­‐204
screening
analysis)
to
Congress
when
I
knew
there
was
a
possibility
it
could
get
publicly
release.
On
page
129
agent
Walls
states
in
a
very
intimidating
manner
(Exhibit
63):
Many
people
believe
that
you
are
directly
responsible
for
Greenpeace
and
Huffington
Post’s
receipt
of
the
unredacted
GI-­‐204
report,
and
posting
that
report
for
the
public’s
consumption.
I
didn’t
know
how
to
answer
such
an
accusation.
As
I
was
trying
to
formulate
and
answer
he
interrupted
me
and
stated:
Well,
you’ve
told
me,
you
didn’t
say,
“No,
I’m
not
responsible,”
so
that—you
not
coming
out
and
telling
me
that,
that
tells
me
something.
I’ve
got
another
follow
up
question.”
At
this
point
I
asked
him
to
hold
on
and
give
me
a
chance
to
answer
that
accusation
at
which
point
he
aggressively
interrupted
me
and
stated:
You’re
right,
I’m
going
to
make
some
accusations,
because
I
think
you
have
taken
some
steps
that
you
haven’t
fully
thought
through,
or
maybe
you
have.
At
this
point
he
went
on
to
the
next
question
without
giving
me
an
opportunity
to
finish
my
answer
to
his
earlier
accusation
about
many
people
believing
I
am
directly
responsible
for
the
release
of
the
GI-­‐204
screening
analysis
report.
39
This
portion
of
the
interrogation
left
me
feeling
intimidated.
I
felt
that
I
was
being
accused
of
directly
releasing
the
report
to
the
public—something
I
am
legally
allowed
to
do
but
something
that
I
did
not
do
since
it
violates
NRC
administrative
policies.
The
interrogation
then
focused
on
whether
or
not
I
led
anyone
to
believe
that
it
would
be
acceptable
to
release
the
documents
and
what
I
did
once
I
realized
that
the
Huffington
Post
was
in
possession
of
the
documents.
Again
Agent
Walls
asked
me
if
I
felt
responsible:
SR.
SPEC.
AGENT
WALLS:
Did
you
feel
responsible?
MR.
CRISCIONE:
That
there
was
an
article
written
about
this?
SR.
SPEC.
AGENT
WALLS:
That
those
documents
were
made
public.
Did
you
feel
responsible?
MR.
CRISCIONE:
Yeah.
That’s
going
back
to
that
first
question
too
about
“many
people
believe”
whatever…
SR.
SPEC.
AGENT
WALLS:
Do
you
feel
responsible
for
this
public—this
report
being
made
public?
MR.
CRISCIONE:
It
was
not
my
intent…
SR.
SPEC.
AGENT
WALLS:
[interrupting
in
a
harsh
tone]
You’re
the
only
subject
of
this
investigation.
I’m
asking
you,
do
you
feel
responsible?
Yes
or
no?
MR.
CRISCIONE:
It
was
not
my
intent
to
release
this
document
through
some
unofficial
channels
to
the
public.
All
right?
SR.
SPEC.
AGENT
WALLS:
That
may
have
not
been
your
sole
intent,
but
you
knew
it
was
a
possibility.
MR.
CRISCIONE:
Right.
SR.
SPEC.
AGENT
WALLS:
And
you
were
okay
with
it.91
91
Here
I
am
“guilty
as
charged”.
It
was
not
my
sole
intent,
but
I
was
certainly
“okay
with
it”.
The
document
we
are
talking
about
here
was
not
Safeguards,
was
not
classified
a

Post

2016-05-19 – NRC – Jocassee Dam – MOU between USACE and ACRS – ML16201A093

Criscione, Lawrence
From: Criscione, Lawrence
Sent: Thursday, May 19, 2016 8:00 AM
To: Kirkwood, Sara; Holahan, Gary; Clark, Theresa
Cc: tomd@whistleblower.org; ‘LSCriscione@gmail.com’
Subject: FW: MOU between USACE and ACRS
Attachments: 2016-Mar-1 MOU between ACRS and USACE.pdf
Sara, et. al.,
The email below is just an example of how ridiculous we are being about keeping flooding information
secret. The attached MOU between the ACRS and the USACE was not publicly released in ADAMS when it
was implemented and now, after being released under the FOIA, is still not in ADAMS. And the NRC contact
for that MOU will not even speak about it. Why? What kind of organization have we become?
I realize that the fact that Fort Calhoun could be flooded to beyond the height of the turbine building is
embarrassing to both the NRC and the USACE, but if you lived in Omaha would you not like to know this?
Larry
From: Criscione, Lawrence
Sent: Thursday, May 05, 2016 1:13 PM
To: Harvey, Brad ; Bley, Dennis
Cc: ‘Dennis Bley’ (bley@buttonwoodconsulting.com)
Subject: RE: MOU between USACE and ACRS
Brad,
What does the email below mean? Are you telling me you do not want me to ever ask you anymore
questions?
You are listed under section E of the attached MOU as the NRC interface for that MOU. Can you at least tell
me whom at the NRC I should contact if I have any questions regarding the attached MOU?
I’m asking you because you are the only NRC staff member whose name appears in the MOU. If there is a
better contact, I would appreciate knowing who it is.
R/
Larry
From: Harvey, Brad
Sent: Thursday, May 05, 2016 11:45 AM
To: Criscione, Lawrence ; Bley, Dennis
Cc: ‘Dennis Bley’ (bley@buttonwoodconsulting.com)
Subject: RE: MOU between USACE and ACRS
Larry:
Please remove me from future emails.
Thank you.
Brad
From: Criscione, Lawrence
Sent: Wednesday, May 04, 2016 2:41 PM
To: Harvey, Brad ; Bley, Dennis
Cc: ‘Dennis Bley’ (bley@buttonwoodconsulting.com)
Subject: MOU between USACE and ACRS
Brad/Dennis,
Do you know the ADAMS accession numbers for the attached MOUs?
Are there any documents in ADAMS relating to Dr. Ballinger’s review of flood hazard assessments (mentioned
in the MOUs)?
Thanks,
Larry
573-230-3959
_____________________________________________
From: Stevens, Margo
Sent: Wednesday, May 04, 2016 1:49 PM
To: Criscione, Lawrence
Subject: RE: FW: FOIA/PA‐2016‐0455 Final Response
I do not know the answers to your questions. (After receiving the records from ACRS, I did a very quick
search, using the Enterprise Search Tool, in ADAMS and did not locate them, but I am not particularly expert in
ADAMS). As to the why, I don’t know. That is not within my wheelhouse.
Margo L. Stevens
FOIA Analyst/Team Leader (Contractor)
OCIO/CSD/FPIB
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
11545 Rockville Pike, Mail Stop T-2F7
Rockville, Maryland 20855
Telephone #: (301) 415-8148
_____________________________________________
From: Criscione, Lawrence
Sent: Wednesday, May 04, 2016 1:47 PM
To: Stevens, Margo
Subject: FW: FW: FOIA/PA‐2016‐0455 Final Response
Margo,
I received the attached memoranda of understanding today in response to FOIA request 2016-0455.
Are these two MOUs in ADAMS? If so, what are the Accession numbers? If not, why not?
Thanks,
Larry
573-230-3959
MEMORANDUM OF UNDERSTANDING
BETWEEN
United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission Advisory
Committee on Reactor Safeguards
AND
United States Army Corps of
Engineers, Omaha District
Fact-Finding Exchange on Flood Hazard
Assessment
A. PURPOSE
This Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) is entered into between the United States Nuclear
Regulatory Commission (NRC) Advisory Committee on Reactor Safeguards (ACRS) and the
United States Army Corps of Engineers (USAGE), Omaha District (the “Parties”) to establish a
fact finding exchange concerning USAGE’s flood hazard assessments related to dam operation
and failure in support of NRC’s Fukushima Lessons Learned activities.
B. AUTHORITIES
The ACRS was established as a statutory Committee to the Atomic Energy Commission (AEC)
by a 1957 amendment to the Atomic Energy Act of 1954. The functions of the Committee are
described in Sections 29 and 182b of the Act. The Energy Reorganization Act of 197 4 transferred
the AEC licensing functions to the NRC, and the Committee has continued in the same advisory
role to the NRC.
The ACRS reports directly to the Commission. It provides the Commission with independent
reviews of, and advice on, the safety of proposed or existing NRC licensed facilities and the
adequacy of proposed safety standards. The ACRS reviews power reactor and fuel cycle facility
license applications for which the NRC is responsible as well as the safety- and risk-significant
NRC regulations and guidance relating to these facilities On its own initiative, the ACRS may
conduct reviews of specific generic matters including nuclear facility safety and risk-significant
items. The Committee also advises the Commission on safety and risk-significant technical issues,
and performs other duties as the Commission may request.
ACRS operations are governed by the Federal Advisory Committee Act (FACA), which is
implemented through NRC regulations at 10 CFR Part 7. ACRS operational practices encourage
the public, industry, state and local governments, and other stakeholders to become involved in
Committee activities.
MOU NRC-ACRS USACE-NWO 2016FEB19 FINAL.docx Page 1 of 3
C. SCOPE
1. The scope of this MOU involves the ACRS developing an understanding of the methods
used by the USAGE in the flood hazard assessments they are developing in support of
NRC’s efforts to reevaluate flood hazards at operating nuclear facilities. The assessments
involve determining peak potential water surface elevations in the vicinity of nuclear power
plant sites resulting from dam operation and failure. Understanding the sources and
treatment of uncertainties is of special interest to the ACRS. The vehicle for this process
will be to select one, or two at the most, nuclear power plants within the USAGE’s
watershed as examples and to work through the process that the USAGE uses for hazard
assessment to better understand the flood/dam failure scenarios considered, the
assumptions used for the scenarios, and the modeling methods and assumptions Based
on initial discussions with USAGE staff, the Cooper and Ft. Calhoun nuclear power plants
have been identified as suitable examples of plants representative of the full scope of the
hazard assessment.
2. This fact-finding exchange will consist of ACRS members visiting a USAGE office where a
hazard assessment has been or is being performed. One or more meetings may be held.
The location, time, duration, and topics to be discussed during each meeting will be
mutually agreed upon by both the USAGE and ACRS in advance of each meeting. ACRS
members also will be provided technical letter reports (TLRs), upon request, for review in
accordance with the terms of this MOU regarding the safeguarding of sensitive and/or
classified information.
3. The topics covered by this MOU include technical discussions regarding the probable
maximum precipitation and probable maximum floods; river basin hydrologic and hydraulic
models; evaluation of hydrologic, seismic, and sunny day dam failures; and the resulting
time-series stage, velocity, and discharge hydrographs.
4. This MOU does not obligate any funds.
D. INTERAGENCY COMMUNICATIONS
1. To provide for consistent and effective communication between the ACRS and the
USAGE, each party shall appoint a principal representative to serve as its central point of
contact on matters relating to this MOU.
2. Except as otherwise indicated, NRC and USAGE will ensure open technical exchange
related to specific technical issues while, at the same time, maintaining each organization’s
requirements to safeguard sensitive information. The ACRS members and ACRS staff
engineer in attendance will follow USAGE protocol for handling information (i.e., proprietary
and security-related material). Documents reviewed by the ACRS members will not be
removed from the USAGE site unless specifically authorized by the USAGE.
3. ACRS member Dr. Ronald Ballinger and two other ACRS members and an ACRS staff
member will visit a location where hazard assessment has been or is being performed in
order to become familiar with the evaluation process, including the detailed calculations,
including assumptions, which may be required during the process.
MOU NRC-ACRS USACE-NWO 2016FEB19 FINAL.docx Page 2 of 3
E. COORDINATION BETWEEN THE ACRS AND USACE
Brad Harvey will serve as the interface for the NRC and ACRS; Christopher Fassero will serve as
the interface for the USACE.
F. AMENDMENT AND TERMINATION: This Memorandum of Understanding may be modified
or amended by written agreement between both parties by the issuance of a written amendment
signed and dated by all parties prior to the implementation of any changes to the scope of the
Memorandum of Understanding being performed. Either party may terminate this Memorandum
of Understanding by providing written notice to the other party. The termination shall be
effective upon the sixtieth calendar day following notice, unless a later date is set forth.
G. EFFECTIVE DATE: This Memorandum of Understanding shall become effective as of the
date of the final signature.
H. SIGNATURES
3/;(-z~(~
(Date)
n _,t,C~
Vf/c/ -c;;
DENNIS BLEY, Chairm(ri
Advisory Committee on Reactor
Safeguards
United States Nuclear Regulatory
Commission
I 7 t?’?IWZ… I {.p
(Date)
O-J_;__ J ;J_
JG’HN W. HENDERSON
MOU NRC-ACRS USACE-NWO 2016FEB19 FINAL.docx
EN Commanding, Omaha District
United States Corps of Engineers
Page 3 of 3

Post

2016-05-19 – NRC – Jocassee Dam – Failure to Study Dam Security – ML16201A086

Criscione, Lawrence
From: Criscione, Lawrence
Sent: Thursday, May 19, 2016 7:34 AM
To: Kirkwood, Sara; Holahan, Gary; Clark, Theresa
Cc: tomd@whistleblower.org; ‘LSCriscione@gmail.com’
Subject: Failure to study Dam Security
Attachments: Final Response.pdf; Senator Lieberman’s letter to Hubert Bell–OIG Case 13-001.pdf
Sara et. al.,
In his response to the FOIA appeal mentioned below, Hubert Bell confirmed that his agents have not reviewed
a single study regarding whether or not the Lake Jocassee Dam is vulnerable to terrorist action or internal
sabotage.
My have concerns have always been about dams failing due to acts of nature and not from acts of
sabotage. However, given the secretive silo-ing of flooding information, there are obviously many individuals
within the NRC and the US Army Corp of Engineers who believe that there are credible security threats to
dams. That being the case, after knowing about this problem for a decade should we not at least have studied
the issue?
Is the Lake Jocassee Dam vulnerable to terrorist action? If so, should it not be guarded against the same
Design Basis Threat (DBT) used for Oconee? If not, why are we being so secretive about flood heights and
basic dam design? Is the Lake Jocassee Dam vulnerable to internal sabotage? If so, does Duke Energy
screen individuals granted access to the dam to the same level as it screens individuals granted access to
Oconee?
These questions might not have been in the OSC referral letter, but they should be answered. I will certainly
be pointing them out—and any lack of consideration of them—in my comments upon your response to the
President via the OSC.
Larry
Lawrence S. Criscione
573-230-3959
From: Lawrence Criscione [mailto:lscriscione@hotmail.com]
Sent: Wednesday, April 06, 2016 10:16 PM
To: Bell, Hubert ; Lee, David
Cc: Andoh, Roger ; Dave Lochbaum ; Paul Gunter ; Paul Blanch ; whistleblower@ronjohnson.senate.gov; Tom
Devine ; Jim Riccio ; FOIA Resource ;
William R. Corcoran, Ph.D., P.E.
Subject: [External_Sender] Appeal of search adequacy for FOIA/PA‐2016‐0397
Mr. Bell,
Please accept this email as a FOIA appeal.
On October 15, 2012 I wrote a letter to the Chairman of the Senate Committee on Homeland Security and
Governmental Affairs (HS&GA). That letter is attached for your reference (it follows the one page letter
Senator Lieberman sent to you on Dec. 18, 2012).
On page 2 of my letter I requested that the HS&GA verify that the NRC is ensuring access to Jocassee Dam is
adequately guarded and is ensuring personnel with access to the pump storage plant at Jocassee Dam are
adequately screened for insider threats.
On page 4 of the 2012-Oct-15 letter I requested that the HS&GA ensure that after five years of assuming there
is a security threat to Jocassee Dam, the NRC has adequately assessed the minimum required threat capable of
jeopardizing the integrity of the Lake Jocassee Dam.
In early December 2012 I reiterated my concerns to the HS&GA in a joint letter with Paul Blanch which also
included Paul’s concerns regarding the natural gas pipeline near Indian Point.
On December 18, 2012 Senator Lieberman forwarded my 2012-Oct-15 letter onto you for your consideration.
On March 22, 2016 I requested under the Freedom of Information Act:
1. All studies reviewed by the Office of the Inspector General concerning the security at the Lake Jocassee
Dam.
2. All replies from the Office of the Inspector General to the Senate Committee on Homeland Security &
Governmental Affairs concerning the 2012-Dec-18 letter from Senator Lieberman to Hubert Bell.
On March 30, 2016 I received the attached response stating that no records could be found.
I find it hard to believe that your agents have never reviewed any studies concerning whether or not the security
at the Lake Jocassee Dam is adequate to protect the dam–and the downstream reactors at Oconee–from terrorist
attack and/or internal sabotage. I am therefore appealing the 2016-Mar-16 FOIA response on the grounds of
inadequate search.
I also find it hard to believe that neither the NRC nor any other federal agency has ever assessed the adequacy
of the security of the Lake Jocassee Dam; however due to the regulatory gaps described in my 2012-Oct-15
letter (e.g. FERC regulates the Lake Jocassee Dam but has no mandate to ensure it is protected to the same
design basis threat as the downstream nuclear reactor plants which it would flood) I do recognize it is possible
that both FERC and the NRC have avoided addressing security issues surrounding the dam. However, if that is
the case (i.e. if neither FERC nor the NRC has adequately studied whether the Lake Jocassee Dam poses a
security threat to the Oconee reactors) I would expect that you would have reported back to the HS&GA that
you found a gap in the regulatory domains of FERC and the NRC.
Therefore, I find it hard to believe that FOIA 2016-0397 would find no records. I would expect either that your
agents satisfactorily determined the existence of at least one security study showing the Lake Jocassee Dam is
adequately guarded against sabotage or that you reported back to the HS&GA that there is currently an
outstanding concern regarding whether the security at the FERC regulated dam is adequate to ensure the
security of the downstream NRC regulated reactors.
Please ensure your agents conduct an adequate search for the records requested under FOIA/PA 2016-0397.
Thank you,
Larry
Lawrence S. Criscione
573-230-3959
From: foia.resource@nrc.gov
To: LSCriscione@hotmail.com
CC: Nina.Argent@nrc.gov
Date: Wed, 6 Apr 2016 14:42:02 -0400
Subject: FOIA/PA-2016-0397 Final Response
Dear Mr. Criscione: Please find attached NRC’s final response to your FOIA request, FOIA/PA-2016-00397.
Please take a moment to help us improve our FOIA processes, and let us know what your experience has
been. Just click on this embedded link: http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/foia/foia-user-survey.html. Once you
have completed the survey, just click the “SUBMIT” button and your survey response will be returned to us.
Thank you,
Freedom of Information, Privacy & Information Collections Branch
Customer Service Division, Office of the Chief Information Officer
Mail Stop: T-5F09
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Washington, D.C. 20555-0001
FOIA.Resource@nrc.gov Ph: 301-415-7169 Fax: 301-415-5130
NRC FORM 464 Part I (OIG) U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION FOIA RESPONSE NUMBER
(12·2015)
/”Rto”‘-<., I 2016-0397 II l I ~~% RESPONSE TO FREEDOM OF ; ' ~ !~ . ) INFORMATION ACT (FOIA) REQUEST RESPONSE D 0 INTERIM FINAL ....... TYPE REQUESTER: DATE: !Lawrence Criscione li~ a o ze• 1 DESCRIPTION OF REQUESTED RECORDS: All studies reviewed by the OIG regarding security at Lake Jocassee Dam and all replies from the OIG to the Senate Committee on Homeland Security & Governmental Affairs concerning the December 18, 2012letter from Senator Lieberman to Hubert Bell. PART I. -INFORMATION RELEASED Agency records subject to the request are already available in public ADAMS or on microfiche in the NRC Public Document Room. Agency records subject to the request are enclosed. D Records subject to the request that contain information originated by or of interest to another Federal agency have been referred to that agency (see comments section) for a disclosure determination and direct response to you. D We are continuing to process your request. 0 See Comments. PART I.A •• FEES AMOUNT' 0 $11 II You will be billed by NRC for the amount listed. None. Minimum fee threshold not met. "See Comments for details D You will receive a refund for the amount listed. Fees waived. PART I.B -INFORMATION NOT LOCATED OR WITHHELD FROM DISCLOSURE 0 We did not locate any agency records responsive to your request. Note: Agencies may treat three discrete categories of law enforcement and national security records as not subject to the FOIA ("exclusions"). 5 U.S.C. 552(c). This is a standard notification given to all requesters; it should not be taken to mean that any excluded records do, or do not, exist. We have withheld certain information pursuant to the FOIA exemptions described, and for the reasons stated, in Part II. D Because this is an interim response to your request, you may not appeal at this time. We will notify you of your right to appeal any of the responses we have issued in response to your request when we issue our final determination. You may appeal this final determination within 30 calendar days of the date of this response by sending a letter or email to the FOIA Officer, at U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, D.C. 20555-0001, or FOIA.Resource@nrc.gov. Please be sure to include on your letter or email that it is a "FOIA Appeal." PART J.C COMMENTS ( Use attached Comments continuation page if required) r-====~~- '"'- ----~ • ••••••~ •••••CTOR GENERAL FOR INVESnGATIONS, OIG -3l:~- ~:::::::::::... NRC Form 464 Part I (OIG) (12-2015) Page 2 of 2 Mr. Hubert I3ell Inspector General Nuclear Regulatory Commission Ollke or the Inspector General I (b)(7)(C) I I ~ 55 5 Rockvill~ Pike Rockville, MD 20852 Dear lnspcc!Or General Bell: .. ... . ~ . December 18. 2012 Instead of seriously considering the safety issues, the NRC Inspector General's agents went after the person raising the concerns. 1 am enclosing a copy of a letter I received from Mr. Lawrence S. Criscione regarding safety concerns by the U.S. Nuckar Regulatory Commi$sion (NRC.) The concerns are in regards to the Oconee Nuclear Station uno Jocassee Dam. The allegation claims that the NRC is aware of safety issues at these two facilities, and has fa iled to act appropriately. t\s I have no way of ascertaining the basis for these allegations. I have enclosed thi'i letter for your consideration . Thank you for your attention to this matter. Sinc erely . :J:eU:::: Chairmnn 1412 Dial Court Springfield, II. 62704 Sen Nuclear Station, it stands
to renson that the .security, operations and maintenance personnel at the }ocassce Dam
pumped storage station should be held to the same background checks and periodic
rt’aS!>Cssmcnts as similar personnel at the Oconee Nuclear Stat1on and other reactor plants.
I re!>pectfully request that the Senate Committee on Homeland Security & Governmentgu latory Commission (FERC). I know little about FF.RC. but it is my understanding that
FERC doe~ not reqUire the facilities it regulates to be guarded against the same design basis
threats that commerc1al nuclear reactors are guCirded against. Although FF:RC’s security
requirements arc likely adequ~tc for most of the facilities it regulates. in the case of a
pumped storage dam whose sabotttge is assumed to result tn a nuclear drains
to) are pumped storag~ impounds. Within a matter of hours, Duke Energy can lower the
volume of water impounded by the Lake jocassee and Lake Keowee Dams such thdt in the
event of a failure of the Jocassee Dam the remaining volume of water impounded will not
overtop the in<~dequatcly sized tlood fall surrounding the Standby Shutdown Facility at the Oc·onee Nuclear St:ltion. There is also ancther :;olution to the security concern: shut down the three reactors at the Oconee Nucle~1r St:1tion until the flooding defenses surrounding the Standby Shutdown Facility are adequately improved. It IS understandable that the NRC cannot address the perceived security vu lnerabilities at JocassPe Oam since it does not regulate Jocassee Dam. Howe\·cr. the NRC rcgubtes the Oconee Nuclear Station and it is unconscionable that for five years rhe NRC has suspected a grave security concern and has not addressed it by requiring the three reactors at the Oconee Nuclear Stat1on to be shutdown as long as the volume of water impounded in Lakes JocassE'e and KCO\'\'eE' pose a security threat to those reactors. And it is equally unconscionable thdt the NRC is going to allow this condition to continue for an additional ~hree or four years. 3 I am not convinced that there is a credible security concern regarding jocasscc DrlC.Ige
vandals with some stolen dynamite nnd a canoe? Or is it a platoon of trained underwater
demolition experts from a technologically ad\’:-~nced nation-state?
I do not know enough about dam construction, terrorism or demolition to say what the
min: mum requtred threat to jocassN• Dam is. If it is less than (e.g. teenage vandals} or
equ<~l to (e.g. a well-armed squad of terrorists) the design basis threat for the Oconee Nuclear Station, then I agree with the NRC that there ts a security concern with the Lake jocassec Dam. If. however, it is greater than the design basis threat for the Oconee Nuclear Station (e.g. underwater demolition experts from the CIA, KGB. Mossad or M16). then I do not believe there is a credible threat to jocassee Dam. I respectfully request the followi ng from the Senate Committee on Homeland Security & Gov0rnmcntal Affairs: 1. Ensure that after five years of assuming there is a security threat to Jocasscc Dam. the NRC hns adequately assessed the minimum required threat capable of jeopardi7ing the integrity of the Lake Jocassee Dam. 2. If the minimum required threat capable of jeopardizing the integrity or the Lake jocassee Dam is greater rhan the design basis threat for the Oconee Nudear Station. then request the NRC to cease v;ithholding frotn the public the correspondence, memos and studies concerning the safety liabilities which a failure of the Lake Jocassee Dam poses to the Oconee Nuclear Station. 3. If the minimum required threat capable of jeopardizing the integrity of the Lake Jocassee Dam is less than or equal to the design basis threat for the Oconee Nuclear Station, then request the NRC to ensure the three reactors at the Oconee Nuclear Station are in a shutdown condition whenever the combined volume of water impounded by the )ocassee and Keowee Dams is great enough to pose a noodir.g thre;~t to the Oconee Nuclear Station in the event of a failure of Jocassec Dam. Enclosed with this letter is a list of the correspondence. memos and studies concerning the saff't~· li;tbilities posed by a failure of the Lake }ocassee Dam. Most of these documents have been stamped by the NRC as "Official Use Only- Security-Related Information" despite not containing <~ny discussion of security concerns. It is my perception that the "securityrelated" concerns are merely assumed to exist; however it is possible that the I\11C has done an actual assessment that shows there is a credible security threat to the dam. If this is the case, then it is unconscionable that in five years the NRC has not done any~hing to prevent the operation of the three reactors at ONS while an unaddressed vulnerability to their security remains outstanding. 4 Copied on this letter are several industry groups and government watchdog organ1zations. There :1re some within the Nuclear Regulatory Commission who will claim that it is irresponsible for me to share the information in this letter with members oft he public. To them I would note that there is nothing in this letter- other than the I 1st of documents enclosed- that is not aln•ady public knowledge. With regard to the list of documents enclosed, although these documents are stamped "Official Use Only - Security-Related Informatio n", I do not believe that the mere mention of the existence of these documents constitutes the release of"Security-Related Information''. I h <~ve copied politically active organiz<~tions on this letter because I believe their participation is vital to the proper functioning of our democ ratic and republican proces!.cs. Although it might not be appropriate to release specific infomHltion to these org:mizations from documents stamped "Sec urity-Related Information", merely informing them that after five years the NRC has failed to adequately address a perceived security threat from the LakE' )oct~sscc Dam is certainly within my rights as a citizen and my duties as a licensed profl!ssional engint>er.
Very respectfu!’.•;,
Lawrence S. Criscione, PE
573-230-3959
I “C.ill.t iou..!:.!tit’ ”’ “DillJ.cnm
Enclosure- 5 pages
C:c: Senator Susan Collins, Ranking Member. Homeland Security & Governmental Affairs
Sen ator Richard Durbin, Illinois
Congressman Pete King, Chairman, Homeland Security
Congressmun Bennie Thompson. Ranking Member. Homeland Security
Co ngres ~ ma n Prcd Upton, Chairman, Energy & Commerce
Congressman I lenry Waxman. Ranking Member, Energy & Com mere~
Chairman Allison Macf<1r lane, US Nuclear Regul:nory Commission Special Counsel Carolyn Lerner. US Office of Special Counsel Michael Corradini, American Nuclear Society Admiral )ames Ell is, Institute of Nuclear Power Operdtions Leshe Barbour, Nuclear Energy Institute David J.ochbaum, Union of Concerned Scientists Scott Arney. Project on Government Oversight Louis Cl:lrk, Government Accountability Project Ken Bunting. National Freedom of Information Coali tion Tyson Siocum, Public Citizen Energy Program Jim Riccio, Greenpeace 5 Date 1994-FEB·ll 1994 ·MAR·l4 19Q4-0CT-6 1994-DE::-19 2000-MAR-15 2006-APR-28 2006·AUG 31 2006-0\ T S 2006-NOV-22 2006-0EC-20 2007-JAN-29 2007-FEB-S 2007-'E3·22 2C':J7 MAR·l 2007-MAY-3 2007-JUN-22 2007-JUN-28 2007-0CT ·l 2007-0CT 1 2007-0 C. I -1 2007-NOV-20 2008-MAY-19 2008-JUN-23 7.008-JUL-28 List of NRC Correspondence, Memos and Studies Regarding Failure of jocassce Oilm ADAMS M lQ(,ll804 ~1 ~LO~Q?J!OJ.12 Ml06~890206 _tyltOG ns:!
MLOG:G20092
ML070440345
ML070590329
ML070610460
ML072970510
ML07:580259
Ml07:’77076S
ML072770775
MLOi:770777
Ml073241045
ML08:3S0689
ML082390669
ML082120390
Title
tetter from Albert F. Gibson, NRC, toJ. W Hampton, Duke, “Notice ofVIolat1on and
Notice of Deviation (NRC lnspectton Report Nos. 50-2 69/93-25, 50·270/93-25, and
50·287/93-25).” dated February 11, 1994
Letter from J. W. Hampton, Duke. dated March 14, 1994
Internal NRC memo documenting a meeting between Region II and NRR concerning
a hypothetical Jocilssee Dam failure.
Letter from Albert F. Gibson, NRC, to J. W. Hampton, Duke, “Notice of Viol at 1M and
Notice of Deviation (NRC Inspection Report Nos. 50·269/94-31, S0-270/94-31, Mld
50-287/ 94-31),” dated December 19, 1994
Letter from Davtd E. LaBarge, NRC, toW. R. McCollum, Jr., “Oconf:’P. Nuclear Station,
Units 1, 2, and 3 Re: Review of Individual Plant Examination of External Events (TAC
No~. M83649, M83650, and M8365l),” dJted March 15, .2000
OCONEE NUCLEAR STAT10N -INTEGRA-fO INSPECTION REPORT
05000269/2006002,05000270/200602,05000287/2006002
IR 05000269-06·016, IR 05000270-06-016, IR 05000287·06·016, on 03/31/2006,
Ocon~:>e Nuclear Station – Prefim1nary White Findmg
Oconee. Units 1, 2 & 3 .. Response to Preliminary White Finding
IR 0500026’l·06·017, IR 05000270·06-017, IR 05000287 ·06·017, Final Signi ficance
Determination for a White Finding and Notice of Violation, Duke Energy Carolinas,
LLC
Ocone~. Units 1, 2. & 3, Appeal of Final Significance D€termination for White
Finding and Reply to Notic;e of VIolation; EA-06-199
Summary of Revised Fragility Evaluation Results for Jocassee Dam
Letter from Bruce H. Hamilton, Duke, to NRC, ”SE- ismic Frag11ity Study”
Manual Chapter 0609.02 Appeal Panel Recommendatio r.s (Oconf’f’ Reply to a
Notice of Vrolation and White Finding (EA-06-199))
Oconee Appeal Panel Review of Manual Chapter 0609.02 Appeal Panel Review of
Oconee Standby Shutdown Facility White Finding (EA-06-199)
Oconee. Units 1, 2 and 3- Request for NRC to Review Appeal of Final Sign ificance
Determination f~>r SSF Flood Barrier White Finding
Consideration of New Information Associated with a Final Signi ficance
Determinatior for a White Finding – OconeE’ NS
Phone calf between the NRC and Duke Energy
10/01/2007, Slides with Notes for Final ReguiP Nuclear Station- Revisions to the Selected Licensee Commitments Manual
(SlC)
Enclosure, page 1
Lic;t of NRC Correspondence, Memos and Studies Regarding Failure of Jo c:~sscc Dam
Date ADAMS Title
2008-AUG-15 Ml081640244 Information Request Pursuant to 10 CFR 50. 54( F) Related to Extprnal Flooding,
Including Failure of the Jocasst>e Dam at Oconee Nuclear Station, Units 1, 2, and 3
(TAC Nos. MD8224, MD822S, and MD8226)
200!!·AUG 26 ML08~390690 Kick Off for Risk Analysis of the Failure of the Jocassee and Keowee Dt~ms to Assess
the Potential Effects on the Safe Shutdown Facility at the Oconee Nuclear Station
2008-AUG-28 ML083300427 08/28/2008 · Summary of Closed Meeting to with Duke Energy Carolinas. UC to
Discuss the August 15. 2008, 50.54(f) LeltN on External Flooding (TAC Nos.
MD8224, MD8225. and MD8226)
:>008-AUG-28 ML082550290 Meeting with Duke Energy Carolinas. Oconee Flood Protection and the JocassPP
Dam Hatard
2008-SEP-6 ML082250166 OconPP. Nuclear Station – Communication Plan for lnforlllation Request Related to
Failure Frequencies for the Jocassee Pumped Storage Dam (Joca~~PP Dam) at thP
OconE’e Nuclei!r Station and Potential Gt-neric tmphcat1ons
2008·SEP-26 ML0827S0106 Oconee, Units 1, 2 and 3 · Response to 10 CFR 50.54(f) Request
2008-NOV·S ML09:0607&1 11/0S/08 Summary of Closed Meeting with Duke on External Flooding Issues,
including failure of the Jocassee Dam, at Ocon£>e Nucle<~r Stanon, Units 1, 2, and 3 2008-NOV·S ML0833906SO 2C08·DEC-4 ML09:420319 2008 ·DEC·4 ML09048()(\44 ?009-FE13·3 Ml 090280474 2009-AI'R-6 Ml092170104 2009-APR-9 ML09:0301 7~ 2009-APR-30 Ml090570779 11/0S/2008 Meet ing Slides, "Oconee Site Flood Protection," NRC Meeting with Duke Energy Carolinas, LLC 12/04/2008 Mel'ting Summary, Meeting to Discuss External Flooding at Oconee Nuclear Station (Reissuance, with Error on Page 3 Corrected) OconeP Nuclear Station. External Flood NRR Meeting, Rockville, MD, D~cem ber 4, 2008 Briefing Package for Commissioner Lyons Visit to Oconee on February 4, 2009 Oconee NuciPar Station, Units 1. 2 And 3 · Non-concurrence on Evaluation of Duke Energy Carolinas, llC Septembl'r 26, 2008. Response to Nuclear Regulatory Commission LettE'r Dated August 15, 2008 Related to External Flooding Oconee External Flooding Briefing for Commissioner Janko OconPe Nuclear Station Units 1, 2, and 3, Evaluatio'l of Duke Energy Carolinas Seotembcr 26, 2008, Response to External Flooding, Including Failure of the Jocassee Dam 2009·MAY ·11 ML092940769 05/11/2009 Summary of Closed Meeting with Duke Energy Carol1nas, LLC, to D1scuss Preliminary Results of the Recent Inundation and SensitiVIty Studies Concern.ng Failure of the Jocassee Dam and Resultant Flood1ng at Oconee Nuclear Station, 1, 2, and 3 2009·MAY 11 ML090820470 5/11/2009 Notice of Forthcoming Closed MePting with Duke Energy Cdrolinas, LLC, to Discuss Sensitivity Studies Concerning Failure of the Jocassee Dam & Resultant Flooding at the Oconee Nuclear Station, Unit 1, 2, & 3 2009-MAY· l l ML091380424 OconeE' Nuclear Station, Slides for Closing Meeting May n . 2009 with Duke on the Ocont>e Flooding Issue
2009·MAY·20 Ml091470265 Oconee, Units 1, 2 & 3, Request for Extension of Duke Response Time to Referenced
Letter
2009·MAY·26 Ml091480116 E-mail re Bnefing Package for ViSit to Jocassee Dam on June 23, 2009
2009·JUN·l Ml091590046 Oconee, Units 1, 2, and 3, Request to Withhold Sensitive Information in
Presentation Materials Left with Staff
2009-JUN· l O ML09168019S Oconee. Units 1, 2, and 3 ·Interim 3Q-Day Response to Reference 2.
Enclosure, page 2
Date
2009-JUN-11
2009-JUN-25
2C09·JL:l·9
2009-JUL-28
2009-AUG-12
2009·AU(;·27
2009-SEP 25
2009-0CT-28
2009 -NOV-30
2009-U~C-4
2C10·JAN-6
2010-JAIHl
2010-JAN-15
2010-JAN-29
2010-FEB-8
2010·FE8·26
2010·MAR·S
2010·MAR·15
2010-MAR-18
2010-APR-14
2010·MAY·27
2ClO·JUN· l
2ClO·JvN·3
2010·JU~ · 22
20 lO·JU’-1 ·29
2010 JUL-7
2010-JUL-19
List of NRC Correspondence, Memos and Studies Regarding Failure of Jocassee Dam
ADAMS
M L091620669
Ml091760072
ML092020480
ML092230608
ML09C570117
ML092380305
ML09~7 10344
ML093080034
ML09::380701
M L09C680737
Mll0C2809S4
Ml100150066
Ml100210199
Mll0(l271591
ML100470053
Mll00610674
Mll05430047
ML100780084
ML100810388
ML100760109
Mll0l600468
Mll0!750619
Mll01610083
MllO~ 730329
Ml10::.890803
ML10!880768
ML10l90030S
Title
6/11/09 Summary of Closed Meeting wtth Duke Carolina to Distuss External
Flooding at Oconee
NRC Site V1sit to the Oconee Nuclear Station on June 15, 2009
Oconee, Units 1, 2, & 3, Finai6Q-Day Response to Reference 2
Oconee, Submittal of Selected Licensee Commitments Manual SLC Revision
Oconee Flood Protection and thE’ Jocas.spe Dam Hazard Basis for NRC Allowing
Continued Operation
Oconee, Slides for Closed Meeting Regarding External Flood Technical Meetang On
August 27, 2009
Site Visit Observation on 09/25/2009 by Joel Munday for Ocon(‘t’
10/:’R/09 Slides for Oconee Nuclear Station, Units 1, 2. and 3 · Meeting Slides ·
E!Cternal Flood NRC Technical Meeting
OconP.P. Nuclear Station, Units l, 2, and 3, Oconee External Flood Analyses and
Msociated CorreC1ive Action Plan
12/04/09 Summary of Oosed MeE-ting to Discuss the Duke Energy Carolinas, LLC.,
09/26/08 Response to NRC’s August I S, 2008 SO.S4(f) letter on External Flooding at
OconeE’
01/06/2010 Briefing to the Executive Team on the Oconee Nuclpar Station External
Flooding Issue
Request Addittonallnformation Regarding the Oconee External Flooding Issue
Ocone!’. Units 1, 2 and 3 · Additionallnformatton Rega~ding Postulated External
Flood Threat Issues
Evaluation of Duke Energy Carolina, llC (Duke), November 30, 2009, Response to
Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) l etter Dated Apnl 30, 2009, Related to
External Flooding At Oconee Nuclear Station, Units 1, 2, And 3 (Oconee)
Oconee, Units 1, 2, & 3, External Flood. Response to Request for Additional
Information
OconeP, Units 1, 2, & 3, External Flood Revised Commitment Letter
Oconee Nuclear Stat1on, Units 1, 2, & 3, Letter From Duke Energy Carolinas, LLC
Regarding Ext ernal Flood. Response to Request For Additional Information
Generic Failure Rate Evaluation for Jocassee Dam Risk Analy!>is
Prepare Briefing Book and Material fo r Eric lPeds for the Dukt> Fleet MPeting on
March 18, 2010
Generic Failure Rate Evaluation for Jocassee Dam
oconee. Units 1, 2 Be 3, Response to Requested Information on the Protection
Against External Flooding Including a Postulated Failure of the JocassP!’ Dam
OUO • Communicatton Plan For Issuance of Conf:rmiltory Action Letter To Duke For
Oconee· External Flooding June 2010
OconeE> Nuclear Station, Untts 1, 2, and 3, • External Flood CommitmPnt•
Oconee, Units 1, 2 & 3, Confirmatory Action Letter (CAL 2· 10·003), Commitments to
Address External Flooding Concerns
06/29/2010 Summary of Closed Meeting With Duke Energy Carohnas, LLC. to
Discuss External Flooding at Oconee
OUO ·IR OS000269·10.002, 05000270-10·006, 05000287-10·006; 01/01/2010 •
03/31/2010; Oconee Nuclear Station Units 1, 2 and 3; lntenm Compensatory
Mt>asures for External Flood
Identification of a Generic External Flooding Issue Due to Potential Dam Faalures
Enclosure. page 3
Date
2010-AUG-2
20l0-0CT·20
2010-0CT 26
2010-N0\1·29
20ll·JA’J-S
20:1-JAN·lO
20~1-JAN -28
List of NRC Correspondence, Memos and Studies Regarding Failure of Jocassee Dam
ADAMS
ML102170006
ML102910480
ML102990064
ML103490330
Mlll0180609
ML110260443
ML110280153
Title
Oconee Units 1, 2, & 3, Response to Confirmatory Action Letter (CAL) 2·10·003
NRC Assessment of Oconee External Flooding Issue (October 18, 2010)
NRC Staff Assessment of Duke Energy Carolinas, LLC, Oconee ExtNni\1 Flood1ng
Issue (TAC NOS. ME4441, ME4442, and ME4443)
0<"onee Nuclear Site, Units 1, 2, and 3, Oconee Response to Co"lf:rmatory Action Lcttc:>r (CAL) 2·10·003
Enclosure 1, Ocont-e> Nuclear Station, Major Projt-ct Plans
Non-concurrence on Oconee Assessment Letter
Staff Assessment of Duke’s Response to Confirmatory Action Letter Regarding
Duke’s Comm1tments To Address EKtcrnal Flooding Concerns At The Oconee
NuciPar Station, Units 1. 2. And 3 (ONS) (TAC NOS. ME3065. MF3066. and ME3067)
2011-MAR-S Mll03410042 Supplement to Technical Basis for Allowing Oconee Nuclear Station to Remain in
Operation Through November 2011, Associated with the External Flooding Issues
2011-MAR 1!> M Ll10/40482 Analysis Report for the Proposed Generic Issue on Flooding of Nuclear Power Plant
Sites Follow1ng Upstream Dam Fa1lures
2011-APR-29 Mllll460063 Oconee Nuclear Site, Units 1, 2, and 3, Response to Confirmatory Action Letter
(CAL) 2-10·003
201l·AUG·16 Mlll229A710 E-mail re Briefing Package for Visit to Oconee Nuclear Power Plant on September 12·
13, 2011
2011-AUt;-18 ML11174A138 OconPe Nuclear Station, Umts 1, 2, and 3, Assessment of Duke Energy Carolinas, LLC
April29, 2011, Response to Confirmatory Action Letter Regardmg Modifications to
Address External Flooding Concerns (TAC Nos. ME6133, ME6134, and ME6135)
20l1-AUG-31 ML112430114 Screening Analysis Report for the Proposed GPneric Issue on Flooding of Nuclear
Power Plant Sites Following Upstream Dam Failures
2Cll·S:f’-1 ML 11?44A024 Brie fine Package for Visit to Oconee Nuclear Power Plant on September 12 ·13, 2011
2011-0CT-3 ML11278A173 Oconee Nuclear Station (ONS), Units 1. 2, and 3. Response to Requests for
Additional Information Regarding Necessary Modifications to Enhance the
Capability of the ONS Site to Withstand the Postulated Failure of the Jocassee Dam
20: 1-0::i-17 ML11294A341 Oconee Nuclear Station (ONS). Units 1. 2. and 3, Response to Requests for
Additionallnformat •on Regarding Necessary Modifications to Enhanc~ the
Capability of the ONS Site to Withstand the PostulatE-d Failure of the Jocassee Dam
2011-DE::-16 ML1B500495 Screenmg Analysis Report for the Proposed Generic Issue on Flooding of Nuclear
Power Plant S1 tes Following Upstream Dam Failures_redacted
2012-IAN-26 Mll2C26A549 Briefing Package for Commissioner Svinlcki Visit to Oconee on February 1. 2012
20 12-JAN-31 ML12026A254 Communication Plan for Oconee Nuclear Station (ONS) Following Issuance of Gl -204
2012 rfB-3 Mll2C39A239 Oconet>, Units 1. 2 and 3 · Request for Withholding from Public Disclosure Duke
EncrRv Letter Dated May 20, 2009 Involving Postulated Failure of the JocasseP Dam
2012HG·9 ML12C39A217 Briefing Pilckage Request for Mel:’ting with Duke Energy on Febru<~rv 16, 2012 Enclosure, page 1 List of NRC Correspondence, Memos and Studies Regarding Fuilure ofjocasst>P. Dam
Date ADAMS Title
201.2 ‘E[: 17 ML120S3A016 Duke Energy Carolinas, LLC- Recommended Revisions to the Oconee Nuclear
Station Section of NRC’s Scret-ning Analysis Report for the Propost>c1 Generic Issue
on Flooding of Nuclear Plant Sites Following Upstream Dam Failure
20l2·FEB-23 Mll20S8A236 02/23/12 Summary of a Teleconft-rPn::e between the US NRC and Duke Energy
Regarding Comments made by Duke Energy Concerning th!’ Issuance of the
Screening Analysis Report for Generic Issue 204
2012 · M~ting Slides on Oconep External Flood
Mitigation
Briefing Paclc;~gP. for Meeting with Ouke Energy on July 11, 2012
Briefing Book for Meeting w ith Duke Energy on August 7, 2012
Communication Plan for Flooding September 2012
OconeP. Nuclear Station, Units 1, 2 and 3 – Response to Questions Rt>p,tlrding
Modifications to Address External Flooding Hazards (TAC Nos. ME7970. ME7971,
AND ME7972)
Enclosure. page 5
Case Title:
Origination Doclink: ·j
OFFICIAL USE ONLY
Memos to File
Prepared by.i (bX7)(Cl j 011081101 J
Release of NRC Security Case Number:
Related Documents ·by RES
Employee
c 13 001
Subject: OIG Receipt of Letter from U.S. Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental
Affairs, dated December 18, 2012, LIEBERMAN
Report Date: 12/18/2012
Narrative:
Status: Closed Edit Authorization:
Request Review:
Approval:
OFFICIAL USE ONLY 1

Post

2014-05-01 – EPA – USACE – West Lake Landfill – Haul Road Information

To: Tapia, Cecilia[Tapia.Cecilia@epa.gov]
Cc:
From:
Field, Jeff[Field.Jeff@epa.gov]; Kiefer, Robyn V NWK[Robyn.V.Kiefer@usace.army.mil]
Cotner, Sharon R MVS
Sent: Thur 5/1/2014 2:17:49 PM
Subject: RE: Haul Roads Information (UNCLASSIFIED)
Classification: UNCLASSIFIED
Caveats: NONE
Dear Cecilia:
I’m going to assume that you are looking for information regarding USAGE sampling of haul roads
between Latty & Westlake (since that seems to be the topic of the day.)
USAGE has sampled and remediated haul roads between SLAPS and HISS since the completion of the
2005 ROD. These roads are Pershall Road, Latty Ave, Hazelwood Ave, a small stretch of Lindbergh,
Frost, Banshee and McDonnell Blvd.
USAGE never sampled the roads from Latty to Westlake Landfill.
The sampling mentioned in the 2005 was completed by DOE prior to USAGE assignment to FUSRAP in
1997. It was only mentioned in the ROD in order to give a full picture of the sampling completed to date in
the area. (In hindsight perhaps it should not have been mentioned.)
The sampling completed by DOE was briefly mentioned in a report completed by DOE. We are trying to
find some sort of document with the actual sample results but are having no success. (At this point I am
not sure we even have the data since the area would be outside the scope of FUSRAP as Westlake was
not a FUSRAP project at the time of the transfer of the program from DOE.)
If we find anything more, we will let you and the State know.
(Also- as a side thought, someone here recalls MDNR sampling these roads in the 2003-2004 timeframe.
You may wish to touch base with them.)
I hope this helps.
Sincerely,
Sharon Cotner
—–Original Message—–
From: Tapia, Cecilia [mailto:Tapia.Cecilia@epa.gov]
Sent: Wednesday, April 30, 2014 4:16PM
To: Cotner, Sharon R MVS
Cc: Field, Jeff
Subject: [EXTERNAL] Haul Roads Information
Is there any other haul road information other than the work USAGE completed that resulted in the 2005
ROD?
Thanks
WLLFOIA4312- 001 – 0058973
Cecilias Microsoft Outlook Signature large font
Classification: UNCLASSIFIED
Caveats: NONE
WLLFOIA4312- 001 – 0058974

Post

2014-05-14 – EPA – West Lake Landfill – Why is EPA not testing drainage ditches at BMAC

To:
From:
Sent:
Subject:
Aboussie, Lou[Lou.Aboussie@mail.house.gov]
Sanders, LaTonya
Wed 5/14/2014 2:47:12 PM
RE: Westlake
Good Morning Lou,
EPA has no validated information indicating the need to screen for radiation outside of the West Lake
Landfill site. We are undertaking a screening of BMAC to allay public concerns at that heavily used
recreation complex. The screening methods EPA will use there have been employed at many sites
across the country and are supported by research and documented procedures. Soil sampling will also
be performed at BMAC to confirm the screening results. In their 2005 Record of Decision the U.S. Army
Corps of Engineers cited extensive Department of Energy sampling of the haul roads. None of the
samples collected exhibited radionuclide concentrations exceeding the proposed surface and subsurface
soil remediation goals identified in the ROD. Soil sampling conducted by MDNR in 2005 in the ditches
and shoulders along Boenker Lane and Taussig Road for radium, thorium and uranium did not identify
any high concentrations of these radionuclides. With regard to screening haul roads, they remain under
the purview of the USAGE FUSRAP program.
—–Original Message—–
From: Aboussie, Lou [mailto:Lou.Aboussie@mail.house.gov]
Sent: Tuesday, May 13, 2014 6:01 PM
To: Sanders, LaTonya
Subject: Re: Westlake
Just curious, does not have to be formal. Thx
—– Original Message —–
From: Sanders, LaTonya [mailto:Sanders.Latonya@epa.gov]
Sent: Tuesday, May 13, 2014 06:46PM
To: Aboussie, Lou
Subject: RE: Westlake
Hi Lou,
Working on a response.
—–Original Message—–
From: Aboussie, Lou [mailto:Lou.Aboussie@mail.house.gov]
Sent: Saturday, May 10, 2014 8:35AM
To: Sanders, LaTonya
Subject: Westlake
Why are the drainage ditches at BMAC not going to be tested? LA
WLLFOIA4312- 001 – 0058472

Post

2014-10-07 – EPA – Congressional Inquiries to USACE regarding Westlake Landfill

To:
From:
Sent:
Subject:
Robyn.V.Kiefer@usace.army.mii[Robyn.V.Kiefer@usace.army.mil]
Slugantz, Lynn
Tue 10/7/2014 8:43:51 PM
Congressional Inquiries to USAGE regarding Westlake Landfill
WLLFOIA4312- 001 – 0058772

Post

2015-11-20 – EPA – USACE – West Lake Landfill – Update of Available Cooling Loop Data

To:
From:
Sent:
Subject:
Hi Ed-
Barth, Edwin[Barth.Ed@epa.gov]
McKernan, John
Fri 11/20/2015 3:23:47 AM
FW: Update of Available Cooling Loop Data (UNCLASSIFIED)
Since you are looking at the cooling loop design docs, here are corps questions on them..
Thanks,
John
—–Original Message—-From:
Vann, Bradley
Sent: Friday, October 09, 2015 2:00PM
To: McKernan, John
Subject: FW: Update of Available Cooling Loop Data (UNCLASSIFIED)
John, the Corps has sent a list of questions they have regarding the cooling loop system for our meeting
with Republic (sharing them above). Are there any other question you would like to have them answer (or
data provided) for that meeting? If so, just send it and I’ll pass on to Lynn for the meeting.
Thanks,
Bradley Vann – Remedial Project Manager
U.S. Environmental Protection Agency
Superfund Division
Missouri/Kansas Remedial Branch
11201 Renner Blvd.
Lenexa, KS 66219
Phone: 913-551-7611
Fax: 913-551-9611
Cell: 816-714-0331
—–Original Message—–
From: Kiefer, Robyn V NWK [mailto:Robyn.V.Kiefer@usace.army.mil]
Sent: Friday, October 09, 2015 12:36 PM
To: Vann, Bradley
Subject: Update of Available Cooling Loop Data (UNCLASSIFIED)
Classification: UNCLASSIFIED
Caveats: NONE
Brad:
Attached is our update to information required to analyze the pilot study. We found proposed information
on the pilot study cooling loop wells, but no as-builts.
Also of interest was MDNR’s letter to Republic regarding data needed and Republic’s response.
Republic’s response contained some informative narrative, but again, we need to see as-builts, know their
input and output temperatures (not just TMP data), and all the other system data they should be
WLLFOIA4312- 001 – 0059513
collecting. I’ve attached those two letters as well.
Looking forward to seeing the additional information on the cooling loop system.
I will be on leave all next week, but will be monitoring my Blackberry for time-sensitive emails. Please
make sure Paul is CC:’d on anything that is time sensitive next week in the event I’m in an area without
good cell reception.
Have a good long holiday weekend!
Thanks,
Robyn
Robyn Kiefer
Project Manager
US Army Corps of Engineers
Kansas City District
Phone: 816-389-3615
Classification: UNCLASSIFIED
Caveats: NONE
WLLFOIA4312- 001 – 0059514

Post

2015-01-06 – EPA – West Lake Landfill – Preparation language for Wednesday’s meeting with MDNR

To:
Cc:
From:
Sent:
Vann, Bradley[Vann. Bradley@epa .gov]
McKernan, John[McKernan .John@epa.gov]
Kiefer, Robyn V NWK
Tue 1/6/2015 3:34:30 PM
Subject: RE: Preparation language for Wednesday’s meeting with MDNR (UNCLASSIFIED)
Classification: UNCLASSIFIED
Caveats: NONE
Brad:
We essentially would like to see all their operational information on the pilot, including the date they
started operating the cooling equipment along with all data collected.
We see that they have provided readings for the TMPs adjacent to a couple of the GIWs; however, we
don’t know which readings are prior to or after the cooling equipment was started up. There isn’t an
apparent impact, so we don’t even know if the cooling equipment has been started.
The data provided is in word format. It would be helpful to have the data either in excel format so we can
sort by depth and date or more preferred would be to have Republic provide graphs for each TMP that
show the temp trends by depth and date with start of cooling equipment annotated.
Also, to clarify 7) below, for the pilot, it would be best to have coolant temperature in and out at each pilot
well in addition to the in/out temps of the cooling equipment. After looking at Republic’s proposed system
(Aug 15 letter), there are no provisions for measuring coolant temperature at each well, but they do have
means to measure in/out temps at the cooling equipment.
The attached table attempts to summarize the data needed to evaluate the pilot study and incorporates
the ROI info. It might help clarify some of the info we’d like to see.
Thanks,
Robyn
—–Original Message—–
From: Vann, Bradley [mailto:Vann.Bradley@epa.gov]
Sent: Monday, January 05, 2015 3:52PM
To: Kiefer, Robyn V NWK; McKernan, John
Subject: [EXTERNAL] Preparation language for Wednesday’s meeting with MDNR
Robyn/John,
Trying to confirm what information EPA needs before our meeting with MDNR on pending IB items. I’ve
listed a number of items below from our call today (and others), but are there any specifics missing
please let me know so we can have a clear EPA position and be sure MDNR fully understands our
concerns.
I heard the following needs:
1) Monitoring gas analytical data to better evaluate SSE
WLLFOIA4312- 001 – 0059051
2) Anticipated radiant heat to remove from system (delta temp)
3) Energy use required related to cooling capacity
4) Radius of Influence per cooling point
5) As-Builts
6) How quickly they can expand it/remove heat from an area (ramp up time) to respond to SSE
7) Water temps in/out
8) Best options for design needs/expanded pilot
9) Quality of data to EPA with regards to where the SSE is in Neck vs North Quarry (if we can get
this)
10) Include prior technical USAGE “wish list” items sent to MDNR for draft order in December 2014
(bullet list)
Feel free to amend any errors or add items.
Thanks,
Bradley Vann – Remedial Project Manager
U.S. Environmental Protection Agency
Superfund Division
Missouri/Kansas Remedial Branch
11201 Renner Blvd.
Lenexa, KS 66219
Phone: 913-551-7611
Fax: 913-551-9611
Classification: UNCLASSIFIED
Caveats: NONE
WLLFOIA4312- 001 – 0059052

Post

2015-08-10 – EPA – USACE – West Lake Landfill – Radon Flux – Emanation measurements related to EPA Pyrolysis study of RIM

To: Donakowski, Joseph NWK[Joseph.Donakowski@usace.army.mil]
From: Mahler, Tom
Sent: Mon 8/10/2015 9:34:18 PM
Subject: Re: Radon flux/emanation measurements related to potential EPA Pyrolysis study of
RIM from the West Lake Landfill (UNCLASSIFIED)
I’ll set up a conference line tomorrow morning and send you the information. I had to leave the office a
little earlier than I expected today.
Tom
Sent from my iPhone
>On Aug 10,2015, at 4:14PM, Donakowski, Joseph NWK
wrote:
>
> Classification: UNCLASSIFIED
> Caveats: NONE
>
> 10 sounds good to me. Would you like me to call you, or you I, or is there a conference number we can
call in if anyone else wants/needs to participate?
>
> Jough Donakowski
>Health Physicist- USACE Kansas City
> (816) 389-3993
>
>
> —–Original Message—–
> From: Mahler, Tom [mailto:mahler.tom@epa.gov]
>Sent: Monday, August 10,2015 3:00PM
>To: Donakowski, Joseph NWK
> Subject: [EXTERNAL] RE: Radon flux/emanation measurements related to potential EPA Pyrolysis
study of RIM from the West Lake Landfill (UNCLASSIFIED)
>
> 10:00am tomorrow work?
>
>
>
> —–Original Message—–
> From: Donakowski, Joseph NWK [mailto:Joseph.Donakowski@usace.army.mil]
>Sent: Monday, August 10,2015 12:16 PM
>To: Mahler, Tom
> Subject: RE: Radon flux/emanation measurements related to potential EPA Pyrolysis study of RIM from
the West Lake Landfill (UNCLASSIFIED)
>
> Classification: UNCLASSIFIED
> Caveats: NONE
>
>Yes, I’ll be free tomorrow, I get in around 7:45 so anytime between 8:00 and 4:00 would work for me.
>
> Jough Donakowski
> Health Physicist- USACE Kansas City
> (816) 389-3993
>
>
WLLFOIA4312- 001 – 0058859
> —–Original Message—–
> From: Mahler, Tom [mailto:mahler.tom@epa.gov]
>Sent: Monday, August 10,2015 10:43 AM
>To: Donakowski, Joseph NWK
> Subject: [EXTERNAL] RE: Radon flux/emanation measurements related to potential EPA Pyrolysis
study of RIM from the West Lake Landfill (UNCLASSIFIED)
>
>Hey Jough,
>
> Just thought I would check in with you now that you are back in the office. I am free all day tomorrow
and plan to be in the office from about 7:30am central time to about 4:00pm. Any chance you would be
available for a short chat about Radon? I don’t think this would take longer than about 30 minutes.
>
>Let me know if you are available.
>
>Tom Mahler
> On-Scene Coordinator
> EPA Region 7
> 816-604-0546
>
> —–Original Message—–
> From: Donakowski, Joseph NWK [mailto:Joseph.Donakowski@usace.army.mil]
>Sent: Tuesday, August 04,2015 4:01PM
>To: Mahler, Tom
> Cc: Vann, Bradley
> Subject: RE: Radon flux/emanation measurements related to potential EPA Pyrolysis study of RIM from
the West Lake Landfill (UNCLASSIFIED)
>
> Classification: UNCLASSIFIED
> Caveats: NONE
>
>Hi Tom,
>
>I’m currently TDY at our Maywood site in New Jersey doing field work and won’t be available until next
week, but I’d be available just about any time that week, so if there’s any time that works good for you I can
be available, just let me know. Thanks!
>
> Jough Donakowski
>Health Physicist- USACE Kansas City
> (816) 389-3993
>
>
> —–Original Message—–
> From: Mahler, Tom [mailto:mahler.tom@epa.gov]
> Sent: Tuesday, August 04, 2015 1 :54 PM
>To: Donakowski, Joseph NWK
> Cc: Vann, Bradley
> Subject: [EXTERNAL] Radon flux/emanation measurements related to potential EPA Pyrolysis study of
RIM from the West Lake Landfill
>
> Sorry about the very long subject of this email…
>
>
>
>I was given your email address from Brad Vann, Remedial Project Manager for West Lake Landfill Site,
WLLFOIA4312- 001 – 0058860
because I was hoping to talk to you more about the Radon flux/emanation measurements related to a
pyrolysis study. I was given the impression that you at least initially suggested that the study include radon
and that the result might help improve the associated radon modeling of the site.
>
>
>
> My main goal is to make sure I understand as best as I can the intent or potential intent of such
measurements to help me evaluate whether the proposed sampling and measurement techniques are capable
of providing this information.
>
>
>
> I am an On-Scene Coordinator here at EPA Region 7 with a degree in Nuclear Engineering and aspiring
to become a certified health physicist (I took the first exam last month and still have a ways to go … ). I have
been asked me to help out with the pyrolysis study.
>
>
>
> Are you available to talk about radon flux/emanation at some point this week?
>
>
>
> I am available pretty much any time. Let me know what is convenient for you and thanks in advance.
>
>
>
>Tom Mahler
>
> On-Scene Coordinator
>
>US EPA Region 7
>
> 816-604-0546
>
>
> Classification: UNCLASSIFIED
> Caveats: NONE
>
>
>
> Classification: UNCLASSIFIED
> Caveats: NONE
>
>
>
> Classification: UNCLASSIFIED
> Caveats: NONE
>
>
WLLFOIA4312- 001 – 0058861

Post

2014-10-14 – EPA – West Lake Landfill – Fiscal Year 2014 Accomplishments

To:
From:
Sent:
Subject:
Sumpter, Richard[Sumpter.Richard@epa.gov]
Weber, Rebecca
Tue 10/14/2014 6:35:10 PM
RE: West Lake FY14 accomplishments
From: Sumpter, Richard
Sent: Tuesday, October 14,2014 1:31PM
To: Weber, Rebecca
Cc: Lubbe, Wendy
Subject: RE: West Lake FY14 accomplishments
From: Weber, Rebecca
Sent: Tuesday, October 14, 2014 11:21 AM
To: Sumpter, Richard
Subject: RE: West Lake FY14 accomplishments
From: Sumpter, Richard
Sent: Tuesday, October 14,2014 11:19 AM
WLLFOIA4312- 001 – 0058210
To: Weber, Rebecca
Subject: RE: West Lake FY14 accomplishments
From: Weber, Rebecca
Sent: Tuesday, October 14,2014 11:15 AM
To: Sumpter, Richard
Subject: RE: West Lake FY14 accomplishments
From: Sumpter, Richard
Sent: Tuesday, October 14, 2014 11:07 AM
To: Jackson, Robert W.
Cc: Weber, Rebecca
Subject: RE: West Lake FY14 accomplishments
From: Jackson, Robert W.
Sent: Tuesday, October 14, 2014 10:55 AM
To: Sumpter, Richard
Subject: FW: West Lake FY14 accomplishments
WLLFOIA4312- 001 – 0058211
From: Gravatt, Dan
Sent: Tuesday, October I4, 20I4 I0:42 AM
To: Jackson, Robert W.; Field, Jeff; Ferguson, Jaci
Subject: West Lake FYI4 accomplishments
Provided at Bob’s request this morning:
FY20 I4 Milestones for West Lake Landfill
EPA entered into two separate Interagency Agreements with the US Army Corps of Engineers:
one to obtain their assistance with design and construction oversight for the subsurface barrier
intended to separate the subsurface oxidation event in OU2 from the radiologically impacted
material in OU I; and the other to provide independent technical reviews of the deliverables the
PRPs will generate under the Supplemental SFS. USACE provided EPA its evaluation of the
engineering considerations with the three potential barrier alignments that have been considered
to date. EPA continued to coordinate with the US Geological Survey under another IA as they
prepared a comprehensive evaluation of groundwater hydrology and background concentrations
and sources of radionuclides at the site. EPA issued a Pre-Construction Order to the PRPs that
directed them to begin preparing the site for the eventual construction of the subsurface barrier
and provide other technical documents on bird mitigation and air monitoring that will support
this construction. EPA installed a network of five off-site air monitor stations in the surrounding
community to begin collecting a background baseline data set to help evaluate air sampling data
to be collected during the eventual construction of the subsurface barrier. EPA’s Office of
Research and Development evaluated the PRP’s report on the possible effects the OU2
subsurface oxidation event might have on the RIM in OUI should the SSE migrate into OUI in
the future. ORD has also been tracking the monthly reports on the SSE extent and gas and
temperature data provided by the PRPs to the Missouri DNR to provide an independent
assessment of SSE behavior. EPA responded to community concerns about possible radiological
contamination at the Bridgeton Municipal Athletic Complex and conducted a thorough
investigation of the area which determined that there was no radiological contamination there.
EPA has coordinated extensively with the community through attendance of the monthly
Community Advisory Group meetings and issuance of weekly “West Lake Update” newsletters.
Sincerely,
WLLFOIA4312- 001 – 0058212
Daniel R. Gravatt, PG
US EPA Region 7 SUPR/MOKS
11201 Renner Boulevard, Lenexa, KS 66219
Phone (913) 551-7324
Principles and integrity are expensive, but they are among the very few things worth having.
WLLFOIA4312- 001 – 0058213

Post

2014-07-21 – EPA – West Lake – West Lake Landfill – Second lnter-Agency Scope Of Work is Coordinated in Corps

To:
From:
Sent:
Seaman, Marvene L HNC@NWO[Marvene.L.Seaman@usace.army.mil]
Square, Ina
Mon 7/21/2014 6:20:26 PM
Subject: RE: West Lake Landfill Second lA SOW is Coordinated in Corps (UNCLASSIFIED)
Thanks for all your help, I have sent the lA to Cathy Reese.
—–Original Message—–
From: Seaman, Marvene L HNC@NWO [mailto:Marvene.L.Seaman@usace.army.mil]
Sent: Monday, July 21, 2014 12:08 PM
To: Square, Ina
Subject: FW: West Lake Landfill Second lA SOW is Coordinated in Corps (UNCLASSIFIED)
Classification: UNCLASSIFIED
Caveats: NONE
Ina- As noted in the message below, the new Westlake Landfill lA will be signed and accepted by the
USAGE Kansas City District. The Authorizing Official Name (Block #41) for the signature and acceptance
of the lA will be Scott Young (Kansas City District)- this is the same information Region 7 used on the
previous Westlake lA DW96958582. Let me know if you need any additional information for Scott Young,
and I will contact the Kansas City District to confirm.
Also, as I mentioned in another e-mail, the SOW needs a spelling correction on Page 4 for the word
“Technical” -just want to make sure that is corrected in the final SOW forwarded to IASSCWEST.
I left a voice mail message for you also. I can be reached today at 402-697-1769.
Thanks very much!
—–Original Message—-From:
Jordan, Greg HQ02
Sent: Monday, July 21, 2014 11:43 AM
To: ‘Square, Ina’
Cc: Seaman, Marvene L HNC@NWO; Hines, Eric D HNC@NWO; Huston, Kip R HQ02; Koontz, Kelly J
HQ02; Turner, Renee N MVD; Lien, Lindsey NWD@ NWO; Feldmann, Michael G MVS; Adams, Susan
MVS; Iverson, Steven K NWK; Young, Scott E NWK; Pender, Robert M NWK; Kiefer, Robyn V NWK
Subject: West Lake andfill Second lA SOW is Coordinated in Corps (UNCLASSIFIED)
Classification: UNCLASSIFIED
Caveats: NONE
Ina,
I just heard from Saint Louis District that they and Kansas City District have reviewed and coordinated the
work described in your draft second West Lake Landfill lA. They have agreed on how to divide the work
for maximum effectiveness. Your draft scope of work is fine as written. I would like to have Kansas City
District accept the lA for the Corps and share the assignment as they have planned with Saint Louis
District. If Region 7 agrees, please send the completed and signed lA to Marvene Seaman and she will
log it in and send it to Kansas City District for the Corps’ signature and acceptance. This should be quick.
Thank you again for your patience,
Greg Jordan, PE
USAGE Superfund National Program Manager CEMP-CEP
WLLFOIA4312- 001 – 0058961
202-761-0414 desk
201-713-6171 cell
—–Original Message—-From:
Jordan, Greg HQ02
Sent: Monday, July 21,2014 10:45 AM
To: Square, Ina
Cc: Hines, Eric D HNC@NWO; Seaman, Marvene L HNC@NWO; Koontz, Kelly J HQ02
Subject: RE: West Lake Draft SOW- Typo Noted (UNCLASSIFIED)
Classification: UNCLASSIFIED
Caveats: NONE
Good morning Ina,
The Corps normally reviews and accepts a correct and complete lAin two days. Coordinating this second
West Lake lA has been slower than I have ever seen in 30 years. Perhaps you can help me resolve it.
I need to know if Region 7 has a specific district in mind to accept the second West Lake lA. The first was
accepted by Kansas City District who transferred some of the work to Saint Louis District. Superfund work
in Missouri is usually assigned to Kansas City District, which is very experienced with supporting EPA
Superfund projects, but some of the proposed West Lake Landfill work is more reasonably suited to Saint
Louis District.
Has Region 7 been coordinating the proposed second lA with one or both of these districts? Is it ok if we
accept the assignment at Kansas City District, and execute the public affairs and on-site presence using
Saint Louis District? Does the RPM agree with this approach?
I am sorry for the additional delay I caused. I was disabled most of last week, and unable to pursue a
resolution.
Thank you for your patience and help,
Greg Jordan, PE
USAGE Superfund National Program Manager CEMP-CEP
202-761-0414 desk
201-713-6171 cell
—–Original Message—–
From: Square, Ina [mailto:Square.lna@epa.gov]
Sent: Monday, July 21,2014 10:12 AM
To: Seaman, Marvene L HNC@NWO
Cc: Jordan, Greg HQ02; Hines, Eric D HNC@NWO
Subject: [EXTERNAL] RE: West Lake Draft SOW- Typo Noted (UNCLASSIFIED)
Marvene,
WLLFOIA4312- 001 – 0058962
Does it take this long to get personnel information for an lAG?
—–Original Message—–
From: Seaman, Marvene L HNC@NWO [mailto:Marvene.L.Seaman@usace.army.mil]
Sent: Thursday, July 17, 2014 3:38PM
To: Square, Ina
Cc: Jordan, Greg HQ02; Hines, Eric D HNC@NWO
Subject: West Lake Draft SOW- Typo Noted (UNCLASSIFIED)
Classification: UNCLASSIFIED
Caveats: NONE
Ina- Received a brief message from Greg Jordan (HQUSACE) this morning that he is out of the office on
sick leave.
In the USAGE review process of the draft SOW for the new Westlake lA, I received a message regarding
Page 4 (Task 2) that “Techical” needs to be revised to “Technical” (see attached highlighted correction on
page 4 ). Since the SOW is still in draft form, can the correction be made on the final SOW sent to EPA
IASSCWEST?
Thanks very much!
Classification: UNCLASSIFIED
Caveats: NONE
Classification: UNCLASSIFIED
Caveats: NONE
Classification: UNCLASSIFIED
Caveats: NONE
Classification: UNCLASSIFIED
Caveats: NONE
WLLFOIA4312- 001 – 0058963

Post

2015-07-21 – EPA – West Lake Landfill – Conference call with USACE

To: Stoy, Alyse[Stoy.Aiyse@epa.gov]; Juett, Lynn[Juett.Lynn@epa.gov]
Cc: Field, Jeff[Field.Jeff@epa.gov]; Jackson, Robert W.[Jackson.Robertw@epa.gov]; Peterson,
Mary[Peterson.Mary@epa.gov]; Sanders, LaTonya[Sanders.Latonya@epa.gov]; Washburn,
Ben[washburn.ben@epa.gov]; Carey, Curtis[Carey.Curtis@epa.gov]; Whitley,
Christopher[Wh itley. Christopher@epa .gov]
From: Vann, Bradley
Sent: Tue 7/21/2015 2:59:50 PM
Subject: RE: West Lake Landfill
From: Vann, Bradley
Sent: Tuesday, July 21, 2015 9:47AM
To: Stoy, Alyse; Juett, Lynn
Cc: Field, Jeff; Jackson, Robert W.; Peterson, Mary; Sanders, LaTonya; Washburn, Ben; Carey,
Curtis; Whitley, Christopher
Subject: RE: West Lake Landfill
WLLFOIA4312- 001 – 0058775
From: Stoy, Alyse
Sent: Tuesday, July 21, 2015 9:40AM
To: Vann, Bradley; Juett, Lynn
Subject: Fwd: West Lake Landfill
Brad/Lynn- I just sent an email to Steven that a call tomorrow would be best. I’ve asked him to
send me some times that work for them. Can you two figure out who should be on this call from
our end?
Sent from my iPhone
WLLFOIA4312- 001 – 0058776
Begin forwarded message:
From: “Miller, Steven (GC)”
Date: July 21,2015 at 9:19:02 AM CDT
Cc: “‘Vann, Bradley”‘
Subject: RE: West Lake Landfill
From: Stoy, Alyse I.!Il§W1Q:J;ili;~~~~!MQ’YJ
Sent: Monday, July 20, 2015 11:18 AM
To: Miller, Steven (GC); ·'”-==’-‘=~-====~· ”–‘-‘=========:.;;_,
Cc: Vann, Bradley
Subject: RE: West Lake Landfill
Hi Steven/Phil-
Our RPM is still getting questions about a DOE point of contact for the West Lake
CAG. Do you have a public affairs POC that we can forward along? Thanks!
Alyse Stoy
Assoc. Deputy Regional Counsel for Enforcement
Office of Regional Counsel
U.S. EPA Region 7
(913) 551-7826 phone
(816) 807-3271 cell
WLLFOIA4312- 001 – 0058777
From: Stoy, Alyse
Sent: Friday, May 22, 2015 10:03 AM
To:~~~~~~~~*·~~~,~~~~~~~~~~-
Subject: West Lake Landfill
Hi Steven/Phil-
Quick question for you. The West Lake CAG (community advisory group) has
asked EPA the name of a DOE contact person. I don’t know the specifics of what
the community is wanting to contact DOE about, but will defer to you who the
appropriate contact would be. Let me know and we are happy to pass this
information along to the CAG.
Thanks, Alyse
Alyse Stay
Assoc. Deputy Regional Counsel for Enforcement
Office of Regional Counsel
U.S. EPA Region 7
(913) 551-7826 phone
(816) 807-3271 cell
WLLFOIA4312- 001 – 0058778

Post

2015-10-09 – EPA – West Lake Landfill – Heat Extraction Barrier Pilot Study Data Needs

Heat Extraction Barrier Pilot Study Data Needs –Update
Subject: Heat Extraction Pilot Study Updated Data Needs to Adequately Evaluate Potential
Effectiveness of Heat Extraction Barrier, West Lake Landfill
Date: October 9, 2105
Purpose:
One of the alternatives evaluated in the October 2014 Isolation Barrier Alternatives Analysis
report submitted by Bridgeton Landfill LLC is a heat extraction barrier. However, the
Alternatives Analysis report lacked detailed information necessary for USACE to make an
independent technical evaluation of the potential effectiveness of such a system. Since the
October report was submitted, Bridgeton Landfill LLC proposed to expand on the current test
well (GIW-4) and perform a pilot study to obtain information to demonstrate the effectiveness of
this proposed alternative and to obtain data necessary for design of the system. It is USACE’s
understanding that this expansion pilot study was approved by the Missouri Department of
Natural Resources (MDNR) and implemented.
In December 2014, USACE submitted to EPA the information listed below. This list is
information USACE will need regarding the heat extraction study at GIW -4 and the pilot study
expansion system that consisted of retrofitting 6 additional GIW wells with recirculation coolant
tubes, to assess whether adequate information is being collected to design an effective heat
extraction system.
It is USACE’ s understanding that the pilot study data that was submitted to the Missouri
Department of Natural Resources (MDNR) was posted on their website. USACE reviewed the
information posted on the MDNR web site and supplemented the list below with what
information was identified from that web page. The supplemental information is included below
in brackets with text bolded. If there is no bracketed/balded information, we could not locate the
information.
• Schematic of the modified GIW -4 used in the preliminary heat extraction study including
depth and construction of the well and all pipe sizes where fluid is flowing [MDNR website
has a submittal from Republic that shows a schematic of the cooling loop proposed for
the expanded pilot. As-built information was not provided]
• Details of the cooling equipment and/or coolant being used in the pilot study.
• The preliminary data collected from the heat extraction study at GIW -4 including inflow and
outflow water temperatures, flow rate, and the temperature within the casing measured at
multiple depths.
• Calculations to determine the 25kW extraction rate.
1
WLLFOIA4312- 001 – 0059515
• Location of the 6 additional GIW wells to be retrofitted with recirculation coolant tubes
including depth and construction of the wells and all pipe sizes where fluid will flow.
[MDNR website has a Republic submittal requesting expansion of the pilot study and
includes a plan view of proposed GIW wells and locations of proposed new temperature
probes.]
• An explanation ofhow the modified GIW wells are representative of the proposed driven
heat extraction wells and whether or not a pilot study of driven wells of the material proposed
for the full scale system will be tested prior to design and installation of the system.
• Plans of the proposed closed loop header system used to convey cooling water to the
mechanical cooler.
• Location of current Temperature Monitoring Probes and depths and proposed locations and
depths of temperature measurements when the pilot study is expanded.
• Proposed study procedures including assumptions used.
• Proposed calculations to determine thermal conductivity and heat storage properties of the
landfill waste. In addition, how is obtaining thermal conductivity and heat storage properties
of the South/North Bridgeton landfill waste representative of these properties in the proposed
location of the heat extraction system in the West Lake Landfill waste?
• Results of the assessment ofheat front progress to the north and the rate of energy flux to the
north.
• Calculations used to predict the amount of heat that could be extracted under steady state
conditions and the results of those calculations.
• A plan view of the proposed Temperature Monitoring Points as well as a cross section
showing depth intervals of temperature readings. Attachment C indicates it is envisioned as
one array per 120 feet would be sufficient. Is this 120 ft spacing parallel with the proposed
barrier? [[MDNR website has a Republic submittal requesting expansion of the pilot
study and includes a plan view of proposed GIW wells and locations of proposed new
temperature probes.]
• It appears the settling front associated with the SSE would render the heat exchange system
non-functional if the system fell within the influence of settlement (similar to the need to set
back Option 3 IB wall). Therefore, it appears the heat exchange system would need to halt
the SSE and settling front some distance south of the barrier to prevent this failure from
occurring. What distance is this and what temperature needs to be attained some distance
from the barrier to prevent this from happening?
On October 8, EPA notified US ACE that Republic Services had provided them with more details
of the cooling system. Once that information is provided, US ACE will review that information
and provide further updates, as required, on what additional information is necessary to evaluate
the cooling loop pilot with the potential of utilizing it as a thermal barrier option for the isolation
barrier.
2
WLLFOIA4312- 001 – 0059516
If you have any questions, please contact me at 816-389-3615.
V.1271182852
Robyn Kiefer
Project Manager
3
ou=DoD, ou=A

Post

2014-04-27 – EPA – USACE – West Lake Landfill – Draft Responses – Senator Blunt

To:
From:
Sent:
Kiefer, Robyn V NWK[Robyn.V.Kiefer@usace.army.mil]
Field, Jeff
Sun 4/27/2014 9:41:43 PM
Subject: Re: [EXTERNAL] FW: Westlake: Draft Responses- Senator Blunt (UNCLASSIFIED)
Thanks
From: Kiefer, Robyn V NWK
Sent: Sunday, April 27, 2014 12:46:46 PM
To: Field, Jeff
Cc: Lyle, Mary B NWK
Subject: Re: [EXTERNAL] FW: Westlake: Draft Responses- Senator Blunt (UNCLASSIFIED)
Thanks Jeff. We’ll forward along. Since St. Louis district took the call, will forward to them for response.
I will have them CC: you. I have told them that epa and kansas city district are available for meeting with
Ms. DeGregorio on Thurs or Fri. If that works for her, we will respond to Jaci to confirm that we will be
available to attend the Wed meeting with Republic on the lB.
Thanks,
Robyn
Robyn Kiefer
Project Manager
U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, Kansas City District
Work: (816) 389-3615
Cell: (816) 803-5730
—– Original Message —–
From: Field, Jeff [mailto:Field.Jeff@epa.gov]
Sent: Sunday, April 27, 2014 09:58AM Pacific Standard Time
To: Lyle, Mary B NWK; Kiefer, Robyn V NWK
Cc: Young, Scott E NWK
Subject: [EXTERNAL] FW: Westlake: Draft Responses- Senator Blunt (UNCLASSIFIED)
Sorry for the delay.
Jeffrey L. Field, Chief
Missouri/Kansas Remedial Branch
Superfund Division
U.S. Environmental Protection Agency
11201 Renner Blvd
Lenexa, Kansas 66219
Phone: 913-551-7548
Cell: 816-500-3861
Fax: 913-551-9548
—–Original Message—-From:
Peterson, Mary
Sent: Sunday, April 27, 2014 9:52AM
To: Field, Jeff
Subject: RE: Westlake: Draft Responses- Senator Blunt (UNCLASSIFIED)
Sorry – here it is.
WLLFOIA4312- 001 – 0058823
Mary P. Peterson, Acting Deputy Director Office of Public Affairs EPA Region 7
11201 Renner Blvd.
Lenexa, KS 66219
913-551-7882- desk
816-398-3945- mobile
—–Original Message—-From:
Field, Jeff
Sent: Sunday, April 27, 2014 9:28AM
To: Peterson, Mary
Subject: RE: Westlake: Draft Responses- Senator Blunt (UNCLASSIFIED)
Hi Mary:
There wasn’t any attachment.
Jeff
—–Original Message—-From:
Peterson, Mary
Sent: Saturday, April 26, 2014 6:48PM
To: Field, Jeff
Subject: RE: Westlake: Draft Responses- Senator Blunt (UNCLASSIFIED)
Here is my edited version. My edits reflect the comments Curtis sent by email on Thursday.
Mary P. Peterson, Acting Deputy Director Office of Public Affairs EPA Region 7
11201 Renner Blvd.
Lenexa, KS 66219
913-551-7882- desk
816-398-3945- mobile
—–Original Message—-From:
Field, Jeff
Sent: Saturday, April26, 2014 10:02 AM
To: Peterson, Mary
Subject: FW: Westlake: Draft Responses – Senator Blunt (UNCLASSIFIED)
Just to make sure the attachment is included.
—–Original Message—–
From: Lyle, Mary B NWK [mailto:Mary.B.Lyle@usace.army.mil]
Sent: Friday, April25, 2014 3:17PM
To: Field, Jeff
Subject: Westlake: Draft Responses- Senator Blunt (UNCLASSIFIED)
Classification: UNCLASSIFIED
Caveats: FOUO
Jeff,
I don’t mean to keep pestering you, but wanted to follow up on this one more time today as we would like
to respond to this Congressional inquiry soon. I do understand we also need to coordinate with you
specifically on meeting with this staffer next week, in addition to the other meeting (ORO observations for
barrier design/alignment). Let me know what timing works so I can coordinate here in Robyn’s absence.
Thanks,
WLLFOIA4312- 001 – 0058824
Mary
—–Original Message—-From:
Lyle, Mary B NWK
Sent: Friday, April 25, 2014 9:11 AM
To: Field, Jeff
Subject: RE: Draft Responses (UNCLASSIFIED)
Classification: UNCLASSIFIED
Caveats: FOUO
Jeff,
As mentioned in my voice message this morning, can you let me know the status of EPA’s review of this
response? Let me know if you have any questions or need to discuss.
Thanks,
Mary
Mary Lyle, P.E., PMP
Section Chief, PM-ED
460 Federal Building
601 E. 12th Street
Kansas City, MO 64106-2896
Phone: 816-389-3890
Cell Phone: 816-719-6453
Fax: 816-389-2023
mary.b.lyle@usace.army.mil
—–Original Message—-From:
Kiefer, Robyn V NWK
Sent: Wednesday, April 23, 2014 6:21 PM
To: Field, Jeff
Cc: Young, Scott E NWK; Lyle, Mary B NWK; Fraley, Jill K NWK
Subject: RE: Draft Responses (UNCLASSIFIED)
Classification: UNCLASSIFIED
Caveats: FOUO
Jeff:
When your office has finished reviewing the draft responses, please notify Mary Lyle. Mary is my direct
supervisor and she will be coordinating the response to Ms. DeGregorio while I am out of the office.
Also, please let Mary know what time frames you would be available to participate in the meeting with Ms.
DeGregario next Wed, Thurs, or Fri. She will let St. Louis District know so the meeting date/time can be
finalized with Ms. DeGregario. Will provide a call-in number to you for the meeting or we can call you at
your desk.
If you need anything else from us between now and Tuesday, please contact Mary. Her phone number is
816-389-3890.
Thanks,
Robyn
WLLFOIA4312- 001 – 0058825
—–Original Message—-From:
Kiefer, Robyn V NWK
Sent: Wednesday, April 23, 2014 2:24 PM
To: ‘Field, Jeff
Cc: Young, Scott E NWK
Subject: Draft Responses (UNCLASSIFIED)
Classification: UNCLASSIFIED
Caveats: FOUO
Jeff:
See attached proposed responses to Ms. Kerry DeGregorio’s verbal inquiries regarding West Lake
Landfill. Ms. DeGregorio is the Constituent Advocate for Sen Blunt’s office. Also attached is a copy of her
business card along with the cards for the other congressional staff that attended Monday’s CAG.
St. Louis District also mentioned that Ms. De Gregorio requested an opportunity to meet with them next
week in St. Louis. I do not know what topics she wanted to discuss or if they involve West Lake (might be
FUSRAP-related). I am trying to get clarification. Will confirm if this meeting request is regarding West
Lake. If so, I will coordinate through you regarding EPA and USAGE participation.
Thanks,
Robyn Kiefer
Project Manager
US Army Corps of Engineers
Office: 816-389-3615
Blackberry: 816-803-5730
Classification: UNCLASSIFIED
Caveats: FOUO
Classification: UNCLASSIFIED
Caveats: FOUO
Classification: UNCLASSIFIED
Caveats: FOUO
Classification: UNCLASSIFIED
Caveats: FOUO
WLLFOIA4312- 001 – 0058826

Post

2015-04-28 – USACE – EPA – Review of West Lake Landfill Radon Flux Analysis

DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
KANSAS CITY DISTRICT, CORPS OF ENGINEERS
700 FEDERAL BUILDING
KANSAS CITY, MISSOURI 64106-2896
April28, 2015
Mr. Brad Vann, Remedial Project Manager
Environmental Protection Agency Region 7
11201 Renner Boulevard
Lenexa, KS 66219
Dear Mr. Vann:
Per your request, The U.S. Army Corps of Engineers (USACE) has reviewed the Responsible
Party’s (RP’s) Radon Flux Analysis provided in Attachment A of their October 2014 Isolation
Barrier Alternatives Analysis Report. The purpose of this review was to identify assumptions
made by the RPs in their radon exposure and risk calculations and identify standard geotechnical
analyses or other tests that could be performed on core samples to verify the assumptions made
and utilized in the RP’s calculations and modeling.
In the October 2014 report, the RPs used the RAECOM model to calculate radon exposure and
risk. The following parameters that are inputs into the RAECOM model were assumed in the
RP ‘s report:
• Change in soil density
• Change in soil porosity
• Change in soil moisture content
• Radon emanation fraction of soil
• Rate of settlement
Fallowing are the geotechnical tests that would provide information that could be utilized to
confirm the RP’s assumptions:
• Soil dry density testing (ASTM D 7263 Laboratory Determination of Density (Unit
Weight) of Soil Specimens) could be conducted using existing cores to verify the density
of 1.4 g/cm3 utilized in the RP’s modeling effort.
The dry density could then be used to calculate the void ratio, which would be used to
calculate porosity. This number would confirm the porosity of 67% utilized for layer 1 of
the RP’s modeling effort and would confirm the change in soil porosity assumed in the
RP’s model that reflected an SSE.
• Moisture content testing (ASTM D 2216 Standard Test Method for Lab Determination of
Moisture Content) could be conducted to verify the initial moisture content of25%
WLLFOIA4312- 001 – 0059044
West Lake Core Testing Alternatives
April28, 2015
2
utilized in the RP’s modeling effort. Newly obtained cores would be necessary in order
to obtain accurate current moisture content. After heating is applied to simulate an SSE,
the resulting moisture content measurement would allow for confirmation of the 20%
reduction assumed by the RPs in their modeling effort.
Other geotechnical tests that may be of value:
• ASTMD 6539 Measurement of the Permeability ofUnsaturated Porous Materials by
Flowing Air. While this test wouldn’t confirm the RP’s parameter assumptions directly
input into the RAECOM model; it could potentially be used to better calculate the landfill
gas flow rate and radon retention time. These parameters would be used to estimate the
radon concentration in the landfill gas emission stack. The test could be conducted under
baseline conditions and after drying the core to measure the change in airflow when the
pore spaces are not filled with water.
• ASTM D 4318 Standard Test Method for Liquid Limit, Plastic Limit, and Plastic Index
of Soils (Atterberg Limits) and ASTM D 421/422 Test Method for Grain Size analysis of
Soils- washed sieve analysis. While these two tests will not directly confirm parameters
input into the RP’s modeling program, it is useful to know the material type which is
directly related to soil behavior characteristics and may be useful information in the
future, such as designing the IB.
There were no known standard geotechnical tests identified that would allow for confirmation of
the following parameters:
• Radon emanation fraction of soil
• Rate of settlementN olume of landfill gas expelled due to subsidence
Radon emanation fraction of soil (radon emanation coefficient) could be determined through a
specifically-designed laboratory test. Documentation for the RESRAD model references a test
method by Strong and Levins (1982) that determines the radon emanation coefficient by using an
accumulation (ingrowth) chamber, a sampling cylinder, a diaphragm pump, a scintillation cell,
and supporting electronics for the radon measurement. This test could likely be conducted under
baseline conditions and with modification, be subjected to heat to simulate an SSE to determine
if the emanation coefficient changes due to temperature. The resulting coefficient would directly
be entered into RAECOM for the the baseline conditions, and if the coefficient changes under
temperature, for the SSE conditions.
The volume of landfill gas expelled due to subsidence is a parameter that would be extremely
difficult to reproduce in a laboratory environment. Field scale testing would likely be extremely
time-consuming and costly.
It should also be noted that when the RPs revise their calculations, in addition to incorporating
the parameters confirmed by any core testing conducted, they should also incorporate the most
recent RIM investigation results and utilize temperatures that are reflective of the SSE event in
the south quarry. Additionally, the link the RPs provided in Section 2.1 of their October 2014
report for the web-based radon calculator (Wise Uranium Project:
WLLFOIA4312- 001 – 0059045
West Lake Core Testing Alternatives
April28, 2015
3
=..:::===.::.~===’ 2011) is no longer active. That link should be updated in the next report
addressing their approach so that their radon flux calculations may be verified.
If you have questions, please call me at 816-246-5660.
Respectfully,
KIEFffiFOBYN.V.12 ~~~~i~~;~:.~·~~~~~~~=
71182852 ~.~;~’;.~,~=~~:1182852
Robyn Kiefer
Project Manager
WLLFOIA4312- 001 – 0059046

Post

2015-12-01 – EPA – West Lake Landfill – OUl (ITR) – EPA Region VII Monthly Report

West Lake Landfill SF Site OUl (ITR) – EPA Region VII Monthly Report
Bill No.: I 27076207 I lAG No.: DW9695864601 I P2# : 445793 I lAG Exp. Date: I 30-Dec-2016
Reporting Period: I From:
2 Nov2015
I To:
1 Dec2015
I EPARPM:
BradVann
I USACEPM:
Robyn Kiefer
Work Performed
Narrative
Meetings
Key Milestones
Projected Work
Narrative
Meetings
Key Milestones
Forlhroming
Work completed includes monthly reporting.
None.
None.
Receive finalized Charge Statement from EPA for ITR reviewers and prepare review plan
based upon charge statement
Receive RP’s first deliverable, complete background document reviews, complete ITR, and
submit first ITR report
Meet with EPA to coordinate I discuss preparation of reviewer’s charge statement
Receipt of first RP deliverable/charge statement and completion of ITR on first deliverable
Issues/Challenges/Risks
—————————————————————————-~
lAG Summary
USACE
Reimbursable
310,052
Expenditures
Challenge: ensuring USACE has all background documents necessary to perform thorough
ITR prior to start of review and that charge statement is clear.
Challenge: Advanced notice of dates when RP’s first deliverable will be received will be
critical to ensure there is sufficient time to coordinate reviewer’s charge statement and
prepare review plan prior to start of ITR, and ensure designated resources are available for
review effort.
Labor correction for Paul Speckin’s hours (29 hours in Oct and 29 hours in Nov) will be made
on the next invoice. These hours were to be charged to the IB project, not the ITR project.
This change will be reflected in next month’s invoices.
Contract Total Amend Total lAG Date
Direct Fund Cite
– 310,052 310,052 1 Aug-2014
1 OF 2
K\MISSIONPROJECTS\H1WIINEST lAKE lANDFILL-ITR\PROJECT MANAGEMENT\5-EPA MONTHLY REPORTS
WLLFOIA4312- 001 – 0058904
West Lake Landfill SF Site OUl (ITR) – EPA Region VII Monthly Report
Bill No.: I 27076207 I lAG No.: DW9695864601 I P2# : 445793 I lAG Exp. Date: I 30-Dec-2016
Reporting Period: I From:
2 Nov2015
I To:
1 Dec2015
I EPARPM:
BradVann
I USACEPM:
Robyn Kiefer
USACE
Funded Current Bill Previous Remaining EAC Notes
Billed Funding
310,052 4,597.88 11,853.79 293,600.33 310,052 Future correction will be made to
reduce Paul Speckin’s hours that
were erroneously charged to this
project in Oct and Nov instead of
the IB project.
Note: This is an in-house action, therefore no contractor expenditures
Scope of Work Summary
PERFORM PROJECT PLANNING /SUPPORT EFFORTS FOR THE WEST LAKE LANDFILL OU-1, AREA 1, BRIDGETON, MO AND
PERFORM AN INDEPENDENTTECHNICALREVIEW (ITR) OF UPTO FIVE DOCUMENTS GENERATED BY THE RESPONSIBLE PARTIES
IN RESPONSE TO NRRB COMMENTS ON THE SUPPLEMENTAL FS, INCLUDING A SUPPLEMENTAL FS ADDENDUM (OR SIMILAR
DOCUMENT). SCOPE ALSO INCLUDES COMMUNITY RELATIONS SUPPORT TO INFORM THE PUBLIC OF THE ITR PROCESS AND
RESULTS OF THE ITRs.
Project Development Team
Name
Robyn Kiefer
Susan Adams
Paul Speckin
Jon Rankins
Robin Parks
Dave Evans
Brad Vann
Electronic Deliverable
Robyn Kiefer
Project Manager
816-389-3615
Org Phone
CENWK-PM-M 816-389-3615
CEMVS-CE-CF 314-422-7205
CENWK-ED-EG 816-389-3592
CEMVS-HP 314-260-3933
CEMVS-ED-GT 314-436-7237
CEMVS-PM-PR 314-260-3939
EPAR7RPM 913-551-7611
December 14,2015
Date
20F 2
K\MISSIONPROJECTS\H1WIINEST lAKE lANDFILL-ITR\PROJECT MANAGEMENT\5-EPA MONTHLY REPORTS
WLLFOIA4312- 001 – 0058905
:2: r
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0
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0
0
0
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Page 1 of 1
CIC #: 99EPA EPA SUPERFUND PROGRAM VOUCHER FOR TRANSFERS * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * *
Billed Date: 01-Dec-2015 BETWEEN APPROPRIATIONS AND/OR FUNDS (AR 37-1)
Customer Order Number:DW96958646
D.O. Voucher No.
WESTLAKE LANDFILL ITR 445793
EPA 728
BU. Voucher No. Bill No.
Mission Assignment No:
BZ886
Paid By Check No. Collection Vou. No.
Accounts Of
27076207
Partial# 7 02-Nov-2015 Thru 01-Dec-2015 * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * *
Billed Office (Mail To):
US ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY
ACCOUNTING OPERATIONS OFFICE
26 W MARTIN LUTHER KING DRIVE
CINCINNATI OH45268-7002
Billed Accounting Classification
Billing Office (Send Remittance To):
USAGE FINANCE CENTER G5
KANSAS CITY DISTRICT G5
5720 INTEGRITY DRIVE
MILLINGTON TN 38054-5005
Billing Accounting Classification
068 068 X 8145.0000 2014 00 0000 000000 0000 00000 68010015 $4,597.88 096 NA X 3122.0000 G5 08 2416 868 017646 96231
Line Item Moa
1 INHOUSE- LABOR
1 INHOUSE – LABOR
1 INHOUSE- LABOR
Description
DEPARTMENTAL OVERHEAD COSTS
GENERAL AND ADMINISTRATIVE OVERHEAD COSTS
LABOR
Eaid No
Subtotal:
Total Billed Amount:
“:ORPS CER11RCATION Less Partial Amount Paid:
“I CERTIFYTH!l.TTHE f\bOV’: 4.RTICLES WERE DEUVERED ””·D OR
THE SERVICES PERFORMED AS STATED AND THAT THE PAYIV:ENT
REQUESTED iS CORRECTTO THe 3EST OF MY KNOWLEDGE:. AND
SHOULD BE PAID AND CHARGE[, TO THE APPROPRIAT.C~<(S) OR FUNDS AS INDICATED." ==>
DATE SIGNATURE
Funds Authorized:
Payment Due Date: 31-Dec-2015
Digitally signed by
Kl EFER RJBYN. ~~~~~-1~~~~n2~~~t,
V:1271182852 ~~=~:~~~0~~~7~82852
Date: 2015.12.1414:51:47 -06’00’
Robyn V. Kiefer
Project Manager
CERTIFICATE OF OFFICE BILLED
Pay This Amount:
Total Billed Amount:
Prev Billed Amount:
Current Billed Amount:
$310,052.00
$16,451.67
$11,853.79
$4,597.88
$0.00
$0.00
$0.00
certify that the above articles were received and accepted or the services performed as stated and
should be charged to the appropriation(s) and/or fund(s) as indicated above, or that the advance
payment requested is approved and should be paid as indicated.
Total Flux Billed:
Prev Flux Billed: Date:
Current Flux Billed: Authorized Administrative or Certifying Officer
DA Form 4445-R
Approved by Treasury For Use In Lieu of SF 1080
$4,597.88
Amount
$1,429.83
$364.46
$2,803.59
$4,597.88
$4,597.88
$0.00
$4,597.88
cobilnonit.957 v2.1.4
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0
0
0
0
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99EPA
KANSAS CITY DISTRICT
WESTLAKE LANDFILL MO
IA Number: DW96958646
MONTHLY REPORT FOR NOVEMBER 2015
,-
PROGRESS REPORT
Page: 165
Date: 02-DEC-2015
Time: 08:28:20
I Revised Reimbursable Direct Fund Cite IA Totals I
I (096X3122) ( 096X3122) I
I ——————– ——————– I
I STATEMENT OF CHARGES FOR PERIOD: I
I I
I I I Total Funds Authorized: $310, 052. 00 $0. 00 $310, 052. 00 I
I I
I I I Less Total Expenditures: (-) $16,451.67 $0.00 $16,451.67 I
I Less Undelivered Orders: (-) $0.00 $0.00 $0.00 I
I Less Commitments: (-) $149,804.48 $0.00 $149,804.48 I
I ——————– ——————– ——————– I
I I
I I
I Funds Available Balance: $143,795.85 $0.00 $143,795.85 I
—————————–
Bill N~~er: 27076207
Funds Expended During Report Period: $4,597.88
Total Billed to Date: $16,451.67
DIRECT FUND CITE PAYMENTS:
————————-
Funds Expended During Report Period: $0.00
to Date: .00
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY (FOUO)
:2: r
r
11
0
~ .w…..
N
0
0
0
0
01
OJ
(!)
0
OJ
msfcr.2.1.18 275
99EPA
KANSAS CITY DISTRICT
WESTLAKE LANDFILL MO
IA Number: DW96958646
Bill Nuwber: 27076207
Bill Invoice Date: 01-DEC-2015
Monthly Billing Amount(096X3122):
Monthly Direct Fund Cite Contract Cost(068X8145):
Budget Categories
a Personnel
b Fringe Benefits
c Travel
d Equipment
e Supplies
f Procurement
g Construction
h Other
i Total Direct Charges
Total Indirect Charges
k TOTAL
LABOR BREAKOUT FOR MONTH:
Individual
ROBYN V. KIEFER
PAUL D SPECKIN
SCOTT E YOUNG
TOTAL LABOR:
Location
KA.~SAS CITY DISTRICT
KA.~SAS CITY DISTRICT
Kk~SAS CITY DISTRICT
PROGRESS REPORT
$4,597.88
$0.00
Costs for Prior Month’s
Current Month Summary
——— ————-
$1,741.36 $4,500.57
$1,062.23 $2,754.93
$0.00 $0.00
$0.00 $0.00
$0.00 $0.00
$0.00 $0.00
$0.00 $0.00
$0.00 $0.00
$2,803.59 $7,255.50
$1,794.29 $4,598.29 —– ——————–
$4,597.88 $11,853.79
Function Hours
ENVIRONMENTAL ENGINEER
LEAD CIVIL ENGINEER
PROGRAM MANAGER
1. 00
29.00
3.00
33.00
Project Costs
to Date
$6,241.93
$3,817.16
$0.00
$0.00
$0.00
$0.00
$0.00
$0.00
$10,059.09
$6,392.58
————–
$16,451.67
Labor Amount
$130.24
$3,980.95
$486.69
$4,597.88
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY (FOUO)
Page: 166
Date: 02-DEC-2015
Time: 08:28:20

Post

2016-02-26 – EPA – USACE wants EPA to comment on whether legislation would expedite cleanup at West Lake Landfill

To:
From:
Sent:
Subject:
Levine, Carolyn[Levine. Carolyn@epa.gov]
Carey, Curtis
Fri 2/26/2016 11 :20:35 PM
RE: Corps edits to Technical Assistance-WEST LAKE
From: Levine, Carolyn
Sent: Friday, February 26, 2016 2:18 PM
To: Carey, Curtis
Subject: Corps edits to Technical Assistance-WEST LAKE
Hi Curtis,
The Corps was delayed in reviewing our input on the tech assistance doc, and they have a few
suggested edits and they also ask if EPA also wants to comment on Q4 re: whether the
legislation would expedite cleanup. I would be fine to edit the response to be from both of us.
Let me know your thoughts.
Thanks,
Carolyn
—–Original Message—–
From: Greer, Jennifer A HQ02 [mailto:Jennifer.A.Greer@usace.army.mil]
Sent: Friday, February 26, 2016 3:03 PM
To: Levine, Carolyn
Subject: FW: Technical Assistance-WEST LAKE – feb 2016.docx
Hi Carolyn – just a couple of changes? If you are good, we can send.
« File: Technical Assistance-WEST LAKE – feb 2016.docx »
WLLFOIA4312 – 001 – 0001726

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