1979-10-02 – Oak Ridge – What has happened to the survivors of the early Los Alamos Nuclear Accidents

-~ LA-UR-79-2 so 2 ca 0 ' \ ·No. 836 RJ :762\} I TITLE: WHAT HAS HAPPENED TO THE SURVIVORS... View Document

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1986-05-06 – NRC – Chernobyl – Information for Licensee Regarding the Chernobyl Nuclear Plant Accident – ML031250016

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·’;<) I • I LIS ORIGINAL UNITED STATES NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION • OFFICE OF INSPECTION AND ENFORCEMENT WASHINGTON, D.C. 20555 May 6, 1986 SSINS No.: 6835 --IN 86-33 IE INFORMATION NOTICE NO. 86-33: INFORMATION FOR LICENSEE REGARDING THE CHERNOBYL NUCLEAR PLANT ACCIDENT ~essees: Fuel cycle licensees and Priority 1 material licensees. furpose: • The purpose of this notice ts to provide background information only and requires no action on the part of recipients. The reference background information relates . to the Chernobyl nuclear plant accident and fs contained in the enclosed copy o.f Information Notice No. 86-32 sent to NRC nuclear power plant licensees on May 2, 1986. Discussion: As indicated by thr. enclosed information, radioactive material from the Chernobyl accident ts expected to be detected in the continental United States through EPA environmental surveillance, perhaps as assisted by Department of Energy facilities and NRC-lfcensed nuclear power reactor sites. The level·Of activity ta the United States ts expected to be low and should have little, if"any, impact on licensee monitoring programs. As stated in the enclosed notice~ any anomalous detection of radioactive material should be evaluated in ·accordance with your license to assure that any detected materials are properly identified as to source (i.e., licensed activities or the Chernobyl Event). , :J If you have any questions regarding this matter, please contact the Regional Administrator of the appropriate NRC regional office, or this office. Technical Contact: L. Rouse, NMSS 427-4205 Attachments: 1. Information Notice 86-32 "'"'1~ard L. Jod !:f:3 Division of~~.~~ Preparedness and Engineering Response Office of Inspection and Enforcement 2. List of Recently Issued I£ Information Notices ([6oso6os:W g lt0E>OU2
rt>R :t:€ la }Jo\\c.e. ~-~
PRIORITY ATlcNTION f\EQUESTEO
UNITED STATES
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
OFFICE.OF INSPECTION AND ENFORCEMENT
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20555
May 2,. 1986
SSINS No.: b~J~
IN 86-32
Attachment 1
rn 86-33
May 6, 1986
Page 1 of 9
IE INFORMATION NOTICE NO. 86-32: REQUEST FOR COLLECTION OF LICENSEE
RADIOACTIVITY MEASUREMENTS ATTRIBUTED
TO THE CHERNOBYL NUCLEAR PLAHT ACCIDENT
Addressee~:
All nuclear power reactor faC:ilfty licensees holding an operating license (OL)
or construction permit (CP).
Purpose:
The pu·rpose of this information notice is to update licensees of the recent
Chernobyl nuclear power plant accident and to request voluntary reporting of
any licensee environmental radioactivity measurement data probably caused by
that event.
In order to enhance the Federal and state monitoring programs, all nuclear power
rea1;tor facilities with on-going environmental monitoring programs are requested
to consider the NRC request to report confirmed anomalous environmental radioactivity
measurements probably caused by radioactive material released in the
accident at the Chernobyl nuclear power plant in the U.S.S.R. It is requested
that recipients review the attached information and provide the enviro,nmental
data discussed herein.
Description of Circumstances:
Information issu~d by the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) concerning the
recent reactor accident in Chernobyl, USSR is contained in Attachments 1, 2 and 3.
In the week following the accident at Chernobyl, elevated levels of radioactivity
have been detected in air, rainwater, soil and food in many European countries.
The radionuclides that have been detected in air in these countries include:
I-131, Cs-137, Cs-134, Te-U2, Ru-103, Mo-99, Np-239, and Nb-95. Although
estimates of plume arrival time and location of entry into the continental
United States are highly uncertain at this time, the plume may arrive in the
Pacific Northwest United States during Hay 7-10, 1986.
Discussfon:
It appears likely that radioactive material from the Chernobyl accident may
arrive within the continental U.S. in concentrations that are readily detectable.
In order to enhance nationwide environmental surveillance, the EPA (and some
states) have increased the airborne monitoring sampling frequencies to be better
able to detect any traces of the plume. In order to supplement and reinforce
this state and federal nationwide surveillance program, the NRC licensees [as
IN St”-32
Hay 2, 1986
Page 2 of 2
part of their routine Environmental Monitoring Program (EMP)] are requested to
voluntarily provide the following information:
1. Report to the NRC any anomalous environmental radiation or radioactivity
measurement that can be reasonably assumed to have resulted from the
Chernobyl accident. These confirmed measurement results from the
licensee’s routine EMP should be telephonically reported to the NRC
Operations Center (301-951·0550) wf thf n 24 hours of d~termining that
material from the accident has been measured. (Environment air sampling
probably is the most sensitive and thus most likely means of detecting
the airborne materials. Some other less-sensitive potential means of
detection may include personnel whole body counting equipment).
The reporting format should provide for:
1. Sample date(s) and approximate locations(s).
2. Medium or pathway (e.g., air particulate, air charcoal, milk).
3. Type of analysis (e.g., gross beta, iodine-131, other gamma emitter).
4. Statistical data (mean, range, number of samples).
Any data provided by NRC licensees wf 11 be shared with appropriate federal
agencies. The NRC as part a combined Interagency Task Force is providing daily
technical information reports to the Institute for Nuclear Power Operations (I~PO).
This updated technical information is available to member utilities through INPO’s
Nuclear Network system. Because the sensitivity and broad scope of existing
licensee programs, augmentation of the NRC licensee EMPs is not necessary.
Any anomalous detection of radioactive material should be evaluated in
accordance with facility license, technical specifications and applicable
regulations to assure that the detected materials are properly identified as
to source (e.g., either plant operations or the Chernobyl Event).
We appreciate your cooperation with us on thts matter. If you have any
questions regarding this matter, please contact the Regional Administrator of
the appropriate NRC regional office, or thts office.
• ~/;.~ Divf si of Emergency Preparedness
and E gineertng Response
Office of Inspection and Enforcement
Technical Contacts: James E. Wigginton, IE
(301).492-4967
Attachntents:
Roger L. Pedersen, IE
(301) 492-9425
1. EPA Task Force Report (May 1, 1986)
2. Talking Points (April 30, 1986)
3. Fact Sheet (May 2, 1986)
4. List of Recently Issued IE Information Notices
0.
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~ ~-~–~nir1-11m 8:6:-‘3:2″ 1’,–~~—-~~ Soviet Nuclear Mayz.
1986
Page 3 of
Accident
. ‘
ZOR KELEASE: 2:00 P.M., 1’BURSDAY, MAY l, ·1986
. .
A-Task Force Report
CONTACT: · DAVE COHEN
. (202) 382-4355 0n· Tues-‘ay:, thtt tnvtronrnental Protection Ag.,ncy, which
maintains the na~ion’s radiation ~onitoring net~ork,, increased
its Aa”plinQ frequency for airborne ra.,loactivlty to, daily. Results
o~tained thus far show no increase in radioactivity abov~ n~rT-tal
background levels. Th• Canadian air nonltorinQ network has also
increased lts sa~plin; frequency to daily. Results there show no
increase in radioactivity.
The air ~ass containing the radloactlvltf frOI~ t~~ initial
Ch•rnobyl nuclear event ls no~ widalt dispersed throughout
~orth•rn Europe and Polar regions. P~rti~~~ nf radioactivity.off
the north~•st norwe9ian coast yesterday ~ornlng shnulj continue to
disperse with possi~le no~eQent toward the east In the next s~~er&\
days. Other portions of the radioactive air ~ass may nove east~ar~
~hrough the Soviet Union and through th~ Polar regions over the
coning week.
The Soviets ~ave r•ported they t\a~e snoth~re~ the fire. From
our infot’Jllation.tt is not clear whether the fire is out or not. ~~
also cannnt confi CTt n.-•;; r.er>orts of ja.’!laoe at a second react•~L·, ~’Jt
the second hot spot seen in t.he L.,:.ans~T photos ls not a reAc~~c.
The u.~. Government has offered to provide technical
assistance to the Soviet GoverfU’llent to deal with the accident.
O~ Wednesday afternoo”• a senior Soviet official frona their
En~assy in WashinQton delivered a note to the ~part~ent of
State exrsressinQ appreciation for n’1c of fer of assistance and
stating that for the time being, assistanc\! is not n~eded •
. ,t the present tir”e, the! tl.S. no”-tC’n’=’ent has no data ~”
ra~latio” \e~~la oc- conta~lnatlon levels at •~Y location ~ithin
the Soviet Oniof\. Ye slso t\ave no fl rn l nforAat.ion concern t •l’J
the nuMhec- of casualties f co~ the aeci~ent.
(more) –
[)
-.
-2-. .. . . . . .
‘l’he Department of State is not advising ·against travel to the
S.oviet. Union, Scandinavia and eastern !urope. As a ·-result of the
nuclear.accident, the State Department has iaaued a travel advisory
recommending agalnilt travel to Xi•v and adjacent areas. We are
largely dependent on the Soviet• for information on conditions
within tbe USSR and we are doing everything posaible to obtain
relevant information frcn Soviet authorities. Americana plannino
travel to the sovi•t Union and adjacent countries abould carefully
monitor preaa reports on thi• rapidly changing a~tuation to make aa
fully jnfo~ed a decision aa poaalble with respect to their travel
plane. ·They .should bear in mind that many of these countries have
reported ·1nci.·e . aaed level• o-f radiation in ~· environment • . – ‘ .The State Department Off lee of Legia~atlve Affai~s has
commented that customary international law requires the soviet
Union to notify other-States/Countries of the possibility o!
transboundary effecta of the incident and to !urniah them with
the information neceaaa.ry to addreaa those effects.
Tbe Whit• Bouse has established an Interagency Taak Force
to coordinate the Government’s response to the nuclear reactor
accident in Chernobyl. Th• Task Poree is under the direction
o! Lee M. Thomas, Adminlatrator of the Environmental Protection
Agency, with representatives from th• White Bouse, Department of
State, EPA, Department of Energy, Nuclear Regulatory Camn1as1on,
National Oceanic and Atmospheric Adm1n1atratlon, o.s. Air Force,
Department of Agriculture, food and Drug Administration, Pederal
Emeroency Management Agency, Department of Interior, Federal . .
Aviation Adm1n1atratloA, the u.s. Public Health Service, and
other agenci••· ·
• I• •
I I I


— —
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. TAL~ING·POINTs:
CBERNORYL NUCLEAR ACCIDENT”
April 30, 1986: .
. ·- — -· ………. “” …
I~ 86-32
May Z, 1986
o Late Friday, April 25, or early:saturday, April 26, a
serious accident occurred at the Chernobyl· nuclear facility
near ~lev in the Soviet Union. As a result of :an apparent
loss of reactor coolant, the facility experienced a core·
meltdown, explosion, and fire. Causes of the ~ccident ·are .
not known.
o The explosion and resulting fire released a plu=e of
radioactive materials to the atmosphere. So long as the
reactor ~re.fire continues, radioactive gases will be given
off. · . · . · · ·
• – o The facility involved is a graphite-moderated,,
boiling-water-cooled, pressure-tube unlt. It is one df four
such units at Chernobyl. To our knowledge, only this one
unit, known as Onit t4, is involved in the accident.
o The initial plume traveled in a northwest direction
toward Scandanavia. Predictions now suggest it will move in
an eastward direction. Radiation levels above normal background
have been detected in Scandanavian countries. However, these
levels pose no significant risk to human health or the
environment.
o The U.S. government has made an offer of technical
assistance to the Soviets. This good faith offer vas made
out of genuine concern for the health and safety of the Soviet
people. The Soviet government responded April 30 that no ·
foreign assistance is needed. •
o We have also requested specific information on the
accident. To date, ve have not received a full response to
that request. This is also a matter of great concern to the
UnitP.d States.
o The radiation plume emitted as a result of the Chernobyl
accident will disperse over time throughout the Northern
Hemisphere. Eventually, some radioactive contamination will
reach the Onlted States. However, based on the limited
information we now have. there is no reason to believe that
levels reaching this country will pose any significant risk
to human health or the environment. Please see the accompanying
fact sheet on radiation health effects for basic information
on exposure.
Page 5 of
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~-
·-2-
.•
o It is very· unlikely t._hat any a~gnificant· :amoun~s of
radiation from the accident will reac~ the u.s~ during the
next few days. The Environmental Protection Agency’s •.
Environmental Radiation Ambient Monitoring:syst~ — ERAM$ -~
is conducting daily sampling throughout the nat~on. In
addition to ambient air, the system also monitors radiatlo~
levels in drinking .water., surface water, and milk.
o The White House has established an interagenc:y task
force to monitor the health, safety and environmental consequences
of the Chernobyl accident. T~e task force is chaired-by Lee
Thomas, Administrator of the U.S. Environmental Protection·
Agency. Members represent the following federal agencies:
EPA, DOE, N~C~ NOAA, HHS, USDA, DOD, DOT and others. On a
daily basia, the task force compiles, evaluates, and widely
distributes ·current technical information on the Chernobyl
accident and its environmental and health consequencers.
..

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” .
Fact Sheet-Chernobyl
SOVIET NUCLEAR
ACCIDENT
Attachment 3
IN 86-S
May 2, 1986
FOR RELEASE: 2:00 P.M., FRIDAY, MAY 2, 1986
CONTACT: DAVE COHEN (202) 382-4355
Radiation monitoring networks ~n the United States and
Canada are continuing to analyze for airborne radioactivity •
daily. No increases fn radioactivity above normal background
levels have been detected in either country. Canadian officials
intend to increase the sampling frequency of their milk
monitoring network, which consists of 16 stations near
population centers in southern Canada, to weekly beginning
next week.
It is believed that air containing radioactivity now covers
much of Europe and a large part of the Soviet Union. The distribution
of radioactivity is likely to be patchy. Afr containing
radioactivity detected by aircraft at 5000 feet about 400 miles
west of no,rthern Norway is believed to have moved westward and now
appears to be heading south or southeastward perhaps to return to
western Europe. There is no independent confirmation O·f the radioactivity
in the air moving eastward across Asia.
(A weather map should be attached to today’s Task Force Report.
If you do not have a copy, ft can be picked up in the EPA press
office, room 311, West Tower, 401 M St., S.W. (202) 382-4355.)
Environmental monitoring data have been provided by the Swedish
government for the Stockholm area for April 28-30. Extrapolations
of those data suggest that radiation exposure levels at the Chernobyl
site would have been in a range from 20 rem to hundreds of rem
whole-body for the two-day period over which IDOSt of the radiation
release probably took place. Radiation doses for the thyroid gland
have been estimated to be in a range from 200 rem to thousands of rem
for the same period. These doses are sufficient to produce severe
physical trauma including death. It should be emphasized that these
are estimates subject to considerable uncertainty. The U.S. has
as yet no information from the Soviet Union as to actual radiation
levels experienced at the accident site.
Page 7 of
-2-
The Soviets have reported they have smothered the fire. We
still cannot confirm that the reactor fire in unit 4 has been
extinguished. There fs evidence that the reactor or associated
equipment continues to smolder. We also cannot confirm news
reports of damage at a second reactor, but the second hot spot
seen in the LANDSAT photos is not a reactor.
Based on the fact that no harmful levels of radioactivity are
expected to reach the continental United States, ft is highly
unlikely that potassium iodide (KI) will be needed to minimize
the uptake of radioactive iodine from the Russian nuclear power
plant accident. KI, although relatively harmless, has been
associated with certain allergic reactions; thus, since the use
of KI is not without some risk to the population, the U.S. Public
Health Service recommends against taking KI as a precautionary
measure. Federal authorities do not believe there is any reason
for concern at this time about the safety of either our domestic
food or drug supplies. Nor should there be concern over imported
products already in the United States or on their way to the
United States at the time of the nuclear accident in the Soviet
Union.
The State Department is continuing efforts to obtain relevant
information from Soviet authorities on the nuclear accident and
the potential health dangers that might be posed to individuals
in the Soviet Uni on and adjacent countries. State has noted, f.or
example, recent statements issued by Polish authorities concerning
public health precautionary measures.
The State Department is seeking more information from all the
governments in the region. The U.S. is sending experts to
potentially affected areas for medical consultation and to provide
relevant expertise on which to make appropriate reconnendations
with regard to the health of American citizens.
With the limited data at hand, the Departments of State and
‘- . Health and Human Services have issued an advisory against travel
to Kiev and adjacent areas. To minimize possible exposure to
radioactive contamination, we also suggest that those in Eastem
Europe avoid milk and other dairy products. In addition, State
is recommending that women of child-bearing age and children
i!:k should not travel to Poland until the situation ts clarf fied.
The State Department is receiving reports from our European
embassies, based on their discussions with local officials, as to
the impact of the accident and local reactions to it. We are
still not receiving the necessary technical information from the
Soviets on the details of the accident.
.Page”. cs. of–:~ ·.
,
,_ ….
The White House has .established an Interagency .Task Force
to coordinate the Government’s response to the nuclear reactor
accident in Chernobyl. The Task Force is under the direction
of Lee M. Thomas, Administrator of the Environmental Protection
Agency, with representatives from the White House, Department of
State, EPA, Department of Energy, Nuclear Regulatory Conaission,
National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration, U.S. Atr Force;
Department of Agriculture, Food and Drug Administration,· Federal
Emergency Management Agency, Department of Interior. Federal
Aviation Administration. the U.S. Public Health Service, and
other agencies.
‘ ‘ ‘ •
PLEASE NOTE: THE EPA PRESS OFFICE WILL BE OPEN OVER THE WEEKEND
FOR UPDATING. HOURS WILL BE FROM lOam TO 2PM. 202-382-4355.
Page 9 of 9
1
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LIST OF RECENTLY ISSUED
IE INFORMATION NOTICES
Information
Notice No. Subject
86-32 Request For Collection Of
Licensee Radioactivity
Measurements Attributed To
The Chernobyl Nuclear Plant
Accident
86-31 Unauthorized Transfer and
Loss of Control of
Industrial Nuclear Gauges
86-30 Design Limitations of
Gaseous Effluent Monitoring
Systems
86-29 Effects of Changing Valve
Motor-Operator Switch
Settings
86-28
86-27 Access Control at Nuclear
Facilities
86-26 Potential Problems In
Generators Manufactured By
Electrical Products
Incorporated
86-25 Traceability And Material
Control Of Material And
Equipment, Particularly
Fasteners
OL = Operating License
CP = Construction Permit
Date of
Issue
5/2/86
5/6/86
4/29/86
4/25/86
4/28/86
4/21/86
4/17/86
4/11/86
Attachment 2
IN 86-33
Hay 6, 1986
Issued to
All power reactor
facilities holding
an OL or CP ..
All power reactor
facilities holding
an OL or a CP
All power reactor
facilities holding
an OL or a CP
All power reactor
facilities holding
an Ol or a CP ·
All power reactor
facilities holding
an OL·or CP, research
and nonpower reactor
facilities, and fuel
fabrication & processing
facilities
All power reactor
facilities holding
an Ol or CP
All power reactor
facilities holding
an OL or CP

Post

2013-05 – NRC – Chernobyl Nuclear Power Plant Accident Background

Chernobyl Nuclear Power Plant Accident
Background
On April 26, 1986, a sudden surge of power during a reactor systems test destroyed Unit 4 of the nuclear power station at Chernobyl, Ukraine, in the former Soviet Union. The accident and the fire that followed released massive amounts of radioactive material into the environment.
Emergency crews responding to the accident used helicopters to pour sand and boron on the reactor debris. The sand was to stop the fire and additional releases of radioactive material; the boron was to prevent additional nuclear reactions. A few weeks after the accident, the crews completely covered the damaged unit in a temporary concrete structure, called the “sarcophagus,” to limit further release of radioactive material. The Soviet government also cut down and buried about a square mile of pine forest near the plant to reduce radioactive contamination at and near the site. Chernobyl’s three other reactors were subsequently restarted but all eventually shut down for good, with the last reactor closing in 1999. The Soviet nuclear power authorities presented their initial accident report to an International Atomic Energy Agency meeting in Vienna, Austria, in August 1986.
After the accident, officials closed off the area within 30 kilometers (18 miles) of the plant, except for persons with official business at the plant and those people evaluating and dealing with the consequences of the accident and operating the undamaged reactors. The Soviet (and later on, Russian) government evacuated about 115,000 people from the most heavily contaminated areas in 1986, and another 220,000 people in subsequent years (Source: UNSCEAR 2008, pg. 53).
Health Effects from the Accident
The Chernobyl accident’s severe radiation effects killed 28 of the site’s 600 workers in the first four months after the event. Another 106 workers received high enough doses to cause acute radiation sickness. Two workers died within hours of the reactor explosion from non-radiological causes. Another 200,000 cleanup workers in 1986 and 1987 received doses of between 1 and 100 rem (The average annual radiation dose for a U.S. citizen is about .6 rem). Chernobyl cleanup activities eventually required about 600,000 workers, although only a small fraction of these workers were exposed to elevated levels of radiation. Government agencies continue to monitor cleanup and recovery workers’ health. (UNSCEAR 2008, pg. 47, 58, 107, and 119)
The Chernobyl accident contaminated wide areas of Belarus, the Russian Federation, and Ukraine inhabited by millions of residents. Agencies such as the World Health Organization have been concerned about radiation exposure to people evacuated from these areas. The majority of the five
http://chat.nrc-gateway.gov
Page | 2
million residents living in contaminated areas, however, received very small radiation doses comparable to natural background levels (0.1 rem per year). (UNSCEAR 2008, pg. 124-25) Today the available evidence does not strongly connect the accident to radiation-induced increases of leukemia or solid cancer, other than thyroid cancer. Many children and adolescents in the area in 1986 drank milk contaminated with radioactive iodine, which delivered substantial doses to their thyroid glands. To date, about 6,000 thyroid cancer cases have been detected among these children. Ninety-nine percent of these children were successfully treated; 15 children and adolescents in the three countries died from thyroid cancer by 2005. The available evidence does not show any effect on the number of adverse pregnancy outcomes, delivery complications, stillbirths or overall health of children among the families living in the most contaminated areas. (UNSCEAR 2008, pg. 65)
Experts conclude some cancer deaths may eventually be attributed to Chernobyl over the lifetime of the emergency workers, evacuees and residents living in the most contaminated areas. These health effects are far lower than initial speculations of tens of thousands of radiation-related deaths.
U.S. Reactors and NRC’s Response
The NRC continues to conclude that many factors protect U.S. reactors against the combination of lapses that led to the accident at Chernobyl. Differences in plant design, broader safe shutdown capabilities and strong structures to hold in radioactive materials all help ensure U.S. reactors can keep the public safe. When the NRC reviews new information it takes into account possible major accidents; these reviews consider whether safety requirements should be enhanced to ensure ongoing protection of the public and the environment.
The NRC’s post-Chernobyl assessment emphasized the importance of several concepts, including:
 designing reactor systems properly on the drawing board and implementing them correctly during construction and maintenance;
 maintaining proper procedures and controls for normal operations and emergencies;
 having competent and motivated plant management and operating staff; and
 ensuring the availability of backup safety systems to deal with potential accidents.
The post-Chernobyl assessment also examined whether changes were needed to NRC regulations or guidance on accidents involving control of the chain reaction, accidents when the reactor is at low or zero power, operator training, and emergency planning.
The NRC’s Chernobyl response included three major phases: (1) determining the facts of the accident, (2) assessing the accident’s implications for regulating U.S. commercial nuclear power plants, and (3) conducting longer-term studies suggested by the assessment.
The NRC coordinated the fact-finding phase with other U.S. government agencies and some private groups. The NRC published the results of this work in January 1987 as NUREG-1250.
The NRC published the second phase’s results in April 1989 as NUREG-1251, “Implications of the Accident at Chernobyl for Safety Regulation of Commercial Nuclear Power Plants in the United
Page | 3
States.” The agency concluded that the lessons learned from Chernobyl fell short of requiring immediate changes in the NRC’s regulations.
The NRC published its Chernobyl follow-up studies for U.S. reactors in June 1992 as NUREG-1422. While that report closed out the immediate Chernobyl follow-up research program, some topics continue to receive attention through the NRC’s normal activities. For example, the NRC continues to examine Chernobyl’s aftermath for lessons on decontaminating structures and land, as well as how people are returned to formerly contaminated areas. The NRC considers the Chernobyl experience a valuable piece of information for considering reactor safety issues in the future.
Discussion
The Chernobyl reactors, called RBMKs, were high-powered reactors that used graphite to help maintain the chain reaction and cooled the reactor cores with water. When the accident occurred the Soviet Union was using 17 RBMKs and Lithuania was using two. Since the accident, the other three Chernobyl reactors, an additional Russian RMBK and both Lithuanian RBMKs have permanently shut down. Chernobyl’s Unit 2 was shut down in 1991 after a serious turbine building fire; Unit 1 was closed in November 1996; and Unit 3 was closed in December 1999, as promised by Ukrainian President Leonid Kuchma. In Lithuania, Ignalina Unit 1 was shut down in December 2004 and Unit 2 in 2009 as a condition of the country joining the European Union.
Closing Chernobyl’s reactors required a combined effort from the world’s seven largest economies (the G-7), the European Commission and Ukraine. This effort supported such things as short-term safety upgrades at Chernobyl Unit 3, decommissioning the entire Chernobyl site, developing ways to address shutdown impacts on workers and their families, and identifying investments needed to meet Ukraine’s future electrical power needs.
On the accident’s 10th anniversary, the Ukraine formally established the Chernobyl Center for Nuclear Safety, Radioactive Waste and Radio-ecology in the town of Slavutych. The center provides technical support to Ukraine’s nuclear power industry, the academic community and nuclear regulators.
Sarcophagus
The Soviet authorities started the concrete sarcophagus to cover the destroyed Chernobyl reactor in May 1986 and completed the extremely challenging job six months later. Officials considered the sarcophagus a temporary fix to filter radiation out of the gases from the destroyed reactor before the gas was released to the environment. After several years, experts became concerned that the high radiation levels could affect the stability of the sarcophagus.
In 1997, the G-7, the European Commission and Ukraine agreed to jointly fund the Chernobyl Shelter Implementation Plan to help Ukraine transform the existing sarcophagus into a stable and environmentally safe system. The European Bank for Reconstruction and Development manages funding for the plan, which will protect workers, the nearby population and the environment for decades from the very large amounts of radioactive material still in the sarcophagus. The existing sarcophagus was stabilized before work began in late 2006 to replace it with a new safe shelter. The new confinement
Page | 4
design includes an arch-shaped steel structure, which will slide across the existing sarcophagus via rails. This new structure is designed to last at least 100 years.
Information Resources
United Nations Scientific Committee on the Effects of Atomic Radiation – Chernobyl
International Atomic Energy Agency – Chernobyl Forum
World Health Organization – Health Effects of the Chernobyl Accident
May 2013

Post

2011-03-23 – NRC – Fukushima Daiichi – DOE Consequence Management Field Team – HPGe Data Sets

From:
Sent:
To:
Subject:
OST02 HOC
Wednesday, March 23, 2011 5:02 PM
Hoc, PMT12; PMT11 Hoc; PMT02 Hoc; PMT01 Hoc
FW: HPGe Data sets
Attachments: Triage Report- TE-11-0721 Final (OUO).pdf; Triage Report- TE-11-0721 Final
(OUO).docx
-Original MessageFrom:
HOO Hoc
Sent: Wednesday, March 23, 20114:58 PM
To: LIA07 Hoc; OSTOl HOC; OST02 HOC; OST03 HOC
Subject: FW: HPGe Data sets
–Original Message—From:
Sheron, Brian
Sent: Wednesday, March 23, 20114:57 PM
To: HOO Hoc
Subject: FW: HPGe Data sets
Please pass on the ET, RST, and PMT Directors. Thanks.
—Original Message—–
From: Aoki, Steven [mailto:Steven.Aoki@nnsa.doe.gov]
Sent: Wednesday, March 23, 20114:38 PM
To: Pitts, William Karl; Bowyer, Theodore W; cjb@lanl.gov; Brinkman, Bill; Hurlbut, Brandon; Sheron, Brian; McFarlane,
Harold; Adams, lan; Kelly, John E (NE); Grossenbacher, John (INL); Owens, Missy; Per Peterson; Finck, Phillip; Dick
Garwin; Bob Budnitz; Rolando Szilard; Aoki, Steven; Koonin, Steven; Steve Fetter; Binkley, Steve; Richard L Garwin
Cc: NITOPS; Adams, lan
Subject: HPGe Data sets
FYI -just to make sure you are seeing the data.
1
DB 407 of696
Date(s):
Event Type:
Location:
Submitted by:
Triage Web:
Contact(s):
Responder(s):
Report Date:
22 Mar 2011
Actual
Japan
OFFICIAL USE ONLY
DISTRIBUTION LIMITED TO NNSA/NA-40
Triage Event: TE-11-0721
DOE Consequence Management Field Team
TE-11-0721
A. Aragon (Triage FTL); R. Spa nard (Triage FTL)
J. Bounds (LANL), W. Casson (LANL), S. Myers (LANL), N. Wimer (LLNL)
22 Mar 2011
List of data files used in the analysis.
2011_03_21_12_ 49_350.spc 2011_03_21_13_25_360.spc 2011_03_21_13_58_ 490.spc
2011_03_21_14_29_090.spc 2011_03_21_15_01_510.spc 2011_03_21_15_35_350.spc
2011_03_22_22_17 290 BKGD.spc
Summary
These ORTEC Detective-EX HPGe spectra were provided by the DOE Field Monitoring Teams in Japan.
Triage analysts were asked to examine these spectra for characterization of reactor damage.
As with other spectra analyzed to date, Triage analysis shows coolant release nuclides only; anticipated
since the data was collected at a distance from the reactor site. There were no features in these spectra
that would indicate core melting.
Analysis
The spectra are of good quality and well suited for comprehensive nuclide identification; they were
collected in uniform fashion across a range of distances from the plant (along three distinct highways).
With the understanding the spectra reflected ground deposition of unknown distribution, nuclide
identification and relative activities can be reported, while absolute activities cannot.
The spectra were consistent with the suite of radionuclides that had been observed earlier this week.
The radionuclides observed are indicative a coolant release only, expected for spectra taken at a
distance from the Fukushima plant. No refractory nuclides, indicators of core release, were observed in
any of these spectra; spectra from the grounds of the plant would be more definitive. The nuclides
present in the spectrum are here listed:
Major Radionuclides
1-131
1-132
Te-132
1-133
Cs-134
Cs-136
Cs-137
Minor Radionuclides
Te-129
Te-129m
La-140
1
DB 408 of 696
OFFICIAL USE ONLY
DISTRIBUTION LIMITED TO NNSA/NA-40
No other radionuclides were evident in the spectra. The nuclides Mo-99, Zr-95, and Nd-147, all high
melting point species and indicators of core melting, were specifically sought and not observed. The
spectrum plot below shows the spectrum analyzed, along with a modeled fit which used attenuation
through air to fit the full spectrum.
Cai.PCF,33-!
Energy (keV)
llve·lime(s) = 580 >I
chr·sc;uare = 2~ ~5
1 &o~~-2~oo~~~-6,a_o,_s~oo~1~oo_o~1-2~oo~~~,7~o~o~~2~2~oo~~2~7o~o~
03
c
~ 1tr
.s::::. u
C/) c 111
:l
0 u
1cf
• j.j : .. •\ • • • •
Channel Number
I.: …
• i311
[I
Figure 1. Screen dump of GADRAS fit to one of the spectra for TE-11-0721. All peaks were identified as
being from the nuclides listed above. Attenuation through air was used to perform full spectrum
fitting.
Ratios may provide some additional information. All spectra were analyzed assuming a Detective EX and
a one meter detection distance. However, since the source is distributed over a wide area and is not a
point source, absolute activity calculations are not being attempted. Instead, we report the ratios of
activities which should be consistent for similar situations. Table 1 shows average values of relative
activities. If 1-131 has an activity of 1 (arbitrary units), the other detected nuclides had approximate
activities in the proportions as given. Ground spectra taken at various times can be compared in this
fashion to observe variations in deposition composition and the effect of the various halflives.
2
DB 409 of696
OFFICIAL USE ONLY
DISTRIBUTION LIMITED TO NNSA/NA-40
Table 1. Relative activities of radionuclides evident in TE-11-0721.
Latitude 37.29076 37.442435
Longtitude 140.61472 140.52471
2011_03_2 2011_03_
2_18_14_1 22_17_35
Filename 20.spc 500.spc
mR/h 0.090 0.148
Ban- Ban-
Highway Etsu Etsu
Exit2 Exit 3
Distance 40km 45km
129Te
129mTe
1311 1.000 1.000
132Te 0.272 0.300
1321 0.269 0.299
1331 0.003 0.002
134Cs 0.145 0.201
136Cs 0.025 0.030
137Cs 0.134 0.177
140La 0.007 0.008
Comments on distributions:
Relative
1-131
3.5
3
2.5
2
1.5
1
0.5
0
0


20
37.590206 36.797261 36.903004
140.41986 140.72635 140.75162
2011_03_ 2011_03_ 2011_03_
22 16 43 21 15 35 21_15_01
51o.s”Pc 3SO.s”Pc 510.spc
0.605 0.329 0.696
Tohuku Joban Joban
Exit 20 Exit 14 Exit 15
58km 74km 62km
0.246 0.474
0.139 0.320
1.000 1.000 1.000
0.516 0.283 0.715
0.387 0.442 0.741
0.000 0.008 O.D13
0.301 0.034 0.041
0.043 0.006 0.006
0.240 0.034 0.044
0.010 0.000 0.001
• •
• •

• • •
40 60
km from Fukushima
37.001973 37.067582
140.81259 140.83824
2011_03_ 2011_03_
21 14 29 21_13_58
OSO.spc 490.spc
0.98 0.446
Joban Joban
Exit 16 Exit 17
50km 42km
0.420 0.343
0.241 0.211
1.000 1.000
0.573 0.220
0.762 0.577
0.013 0.015
0.028 0.020
0.004 0.004
0.034 0.024
0.001 0.001
mR/h
3.5
3
2.5
2
1.5
• 1
• 0.5
0
80
37.124803
140.94779
2011_03_
21 13 25
36o.sP<: 0.56 Joban Exit 18 33km 0.130 0.101 1.000 0.194 0.268 0.005 0.023 0.003 0.022 0.001 Figure 2. Dose rates and 1-131 relative activity versus distance SSW of Fukushima on Joban Expressway. The other Table 1 data sites represent different directions and are not included here. 3 DB 410 of 696 37.235578 140.98569 2011_03_ 21 12 49 3SO.spc 3.0 Joban Exit 19 20km 0.160 0.100 1.000 0.092 0.257 0.007 0.018 0.005 0.020 0.001 OFFICIAL USE ONLY DISTRIBUTION LIMITED TO NNSA/NA-40 Figure 3. Map of data locations Figure 3 shows the locations where the data was taken, relative to the Fukushima nuclear plant. Note that exit 20, exits 2 and 3, and exits 14 through 19 are from three different highways. Figure 2 shows the variation of dose rates and iodine intensities on the Joban Expressway SSW of the plant, Exits 14 through 19. Note that the radiation does not fall off linearly with distance, rather it is affected by the local winds and weather patterns. Recommendations for follow up activities: Definitive determination of whether core releases have occurred is expected to require HPGe assays from grounds of the plant itself. A spectrum of the quality that was submitted for this report, but taken from an air filter from the Fukushima Daiichi site, would provide the best data for determination of the status of core damage via gamma spectroscopy. 4 DB 411 of 696 Date(s): Event Type: Location: Submitted by: Triage Web: Contact(s): Responder(s): Report Date: 22 Mar 2011 Actual Japan -ofFICIAL USE ONL't' DISTRIBUTION UMITED TO NNSA/NA-40 Triage Event: TE-11-0721 DOE Consequence Management Field Team TE-11-0721 A. Aragon (Triage FTL); R. Spanard (Triage FTL) J. Bounds (LANL), W. Casson (LANL), S. Myers (LANL), N. Wimer (LLNL) 22 Mar 2011 List of data files used in the analysis. 2011_03_21_12_ 49_350.spc 2011_03_21_13_25_360.spc 2011_03_21_13_58_ 490.spc 2011_03_21_14_29_090.spc 2011_03_21_15_01_510.spc 2011_03_21_15_35_350.spc 2011_03_22_22_17 290 BKGD.spc Summary These ORTEC Detective-EX HPGe spectra were provided by the DOE Field Monitoring Teams in Japan. Triage analysts were asked to examine these spectra for characterization of reactor damage. As with other spectra analyzed to date, Triage analysis shows coolant release nuclides only; anticipated since the data was collected at a distance from the reactor site. There were no features in these spectra that would indicate core melting. Analysis The spectra are of good quality and well suited for comprehensive nuclide identification; they were collected in uniform fashion across a range of distances from the plant (along three distinct highways). With the understanding the spectra reflected ground deposition of unknown distribution, nuclide identification and relative activities can be reported, while absolute activities cannot. The spectra were consistent with the suite of radionuclides that had been observed earlier this week. The radionuclides observed are indicative a coolant release only, expected for spectra taken at a distance from the Fukushima plant. No refractory nuclides, indicators of core release, were observed in any of these spectra; spectra from the grounds of the plant would be more definitive. The nuclides present in the spectrum are here listed: Major Radionuclides 1-131 1-132 Te-132 1-133 Cs-134 Cs-136 Cs-137 Minor Radionuclides Te-129 Te-129m La-140 1 DB 412 of 696 OFFICIAL USE ONbY DISTRIBUTION LIMITED TO NNSA/NA-40 No other radionuclides were evident in the spectra. The nuclides Mo-99, Zr-95, and Nd-147, all high melting point species and indicators of core melting, were specifically sought and not observed. The spectrum plot below shows the spectrum analyzed, along with a modeled fit which used attenuation through air to fit the full spectrum. Cal.PCF,33- ! Energy (keV) lrve·time(sl = 58() SJ tho SGUJI·~ - 2~ ~5 lif~~·--~/~OO~--JC~·0~~60~0~8~00~1~C~00~1/~0C~~--1~70~0--~/~/~00~--/~7~00~ Hf" Q) c:: c ro 1cf .c. .0.._ ~ 1o3 c ;::, 0 0 1rl 10' . ·; .. •• Channel Number •. :.1· • ··:11 Figure 1. Screen dump of GADRAS fit to one of the spectra for TE-11-0721. All peaks were identified as being from the nuclides listed above. Attenuation through air was used to perform full spectrum fitting. Ratios may provide some additional information. All spectra were analyzed assuming a Detective EX and a one meter detection distance. However, since the source is distributed over a wide area and is not a point source, absolute activity calculations are not being attempted. Instead, we report the ratios of activities which should be consistent for similar situations. Table 1 shows average values of relative activities. If 1-131 has an activity of 1 (arbitrary units}, the other detected nuclides had approximate activities in the proportions as given. Ground spectra taken at various times can be compared in this fashion to observe variations in deposition composition and the effect of the various halflives. 2 DB 413 of 696 OFFICIAL USE ONLY DISTRIBUTION LIMITED TO NNSA/NA-40 Table 1. Relative activities of radionuclides evident in TE-11-0721. Latitude 37.29076 37.442435 37.590206 Longtitude 140.61472 140.52471 140.41986 2011_03_2 2011_03_ 2011 03 2 18 14 1 22 17 35 22 16 43 Filename io.sp{; - 500.Six: 510.spc mR/h 0.090 0.148 0.605 Ban- Ban- Highway Etsu Etsu Tohuku Exit2 Exit 3 Exit 20 Distance 40km 45km 58km 129Te 129mTe 1311 1.000 1.000 1.000 132Te 0.272 0.300 0.516 1321 0.269 0.299 0.387 1331 0.003 0.002 0.000 134Cs 0.145 0.201 0.301 136Cs 0.025 0.030 0.043 137Cs 0.134 0.177 0.240 140La 0.007 0.008 0.010 Comments on distributions: Relative 1-131 3.5 3 2.5 2 1.5 1 0.5 0 0 <> •
<>

20
36.797261 36.903004
140.72635 140.75162
2011_03_ 2011_03_
21 15 35 21 15 01
3SO.spc 510.spc
0.329 0.696
Joban Joban
Exit 14 Exit 15
74km 62km
0.246 0.474
0.139 0.320
1.000 1.000
0.283 0.715
0.442 0.741
0.008 0.013
0.034 0.041
0.006 0.006
0.034 0.044
0.000 0.001
<>
<> <>
• • •
40 60
km from Fukushima
37.001973 37.067582
140.81259 140.83824
2011_03_ 2011_03_
21_14_29 21 13 58
090.spc 490.spc
0.98 0.446
Joban Joban
Exit 16 Exit 17 ·
50km 42km
0.420 0.343
0.241 0.211
1.000 1.000
0.573 0.220
0.762 0.577
0.013 0.015
0.028 0.020
0.004 0.004
0.034 0.024
0.001 0.001
mR/h
3.5
3
2.5
2
1.5
<> 1
• 0.5
0
80
37.124803
140.94779
2011_03_
21 13 25
3SO.spc
0.56
Joban
Exit 18
33km
0.130
0.101
1.000
0.194
0.268
0.005
0.023
0.003
0.022
0.001
Figure 2. Dose rates and 1-131 relative activity versus distance SSW of Fukushima on Joban
Expressway. The other Table 1 data sites represent different directions and are not included here.
3
DB 414 of696
37.235578
140.98569
2011_03_
21 12 49
3SO.spc
3.0
Joban
Exit 19
20km
0.160
0.100
1.000
0.092
0.257
0.007
0.018
0.005
0.020
0.001
OFFICIAL USE ONLY
DISTRIBUTION LIMITED TO NNSA/NA-40
Figure 3. Map of data locations
Figure 3 shows the locations where the data was taken, relative to the Fukushima nuclear plant. Note
that exit 20, exits 2 and 3, and exits 14 through 19 are from three different highways. Figure 2 shows the
variation of dose rates and iodine intensities on the Joban Expressway SSW of the plant, Exits 14 through
19. Note that the radiation does not fall off linearly with distance, rather it is affected by the local winds
and weather patterns.
Recommendations for follow up activities:
Definitive determination of whether core releases have occurred is expected to require HPGe assays
from grounds of the plant itself. A spectrum of the quality that was submitted for this report, but taken
from an air filter from the Fukushima Daiichi site, would provide the best data for determination of the
status of core damage via gamma spectroscopy.
4
DB 415 of 696

Post

2011-03-22 – NRC – Total Core-Melt of Fukushima Daiichi Unit 1 on March 11 or 12, 2011

Miroslav Gregoric
(b)(6)
+43-650-5660-528
From: GREGORIC, Miroslav
Sent: Tuesday,22 March 2011 14:42
To: IEC3 – INCIDENT & EMERGENCY CENTRE
Cc: FLORY, Denis; ANDREW, Graham; NILSSON, Anita Birgitta; LYONS,
James E.; SUZUKI, Satoshi; MRABIT, Khammar; YLLERA, Javier; LIPAR,
Miroslav; CARUSO, Gustavo; HAHN, Pil-Soo; CZARWINSKI, Renate; VINCZE,
Pal; BUGLOVA, Elena; MARTINCIC, Rafael; Kryuchenkov,Vladimir
(V.Kryucbenkov(aiaea.org); COLGAN, Peter; COLGAN, Tony; DUSIC, Milorad;
WINTER, Denis Jacques
Subject: Core melt at Fukushima Unit 1 from 11 to 12 March 2011 JST
***NOT for distribution***
Importance: High
Dear colleagues
Please find attached calculations for Fukusbima Daiichi Unit 1 core
melt from basic principles. Of course with your input the
calculations could be improved.
Best regards
Miro
DK 1888 of 1892
Total Core-melt of Fukushima Daiichi Unit 1 on 11 or 12 March 2011
Basic hand held calculations by Miroslav Gregoric, checked by Vladimir Kryuchenkov on 22 March
2011. (Note: The excel sheet is attached. Of course the modelling by MELCOR or other severe
accident codes will give better results, but one cannot go against basic heat equations.)
Basic assumptions based on known reported data from TEPCO and NISA
1) At the earthquake, reactor scrammed from 1380 MWth on I I March at 14:46 SJT, and after station
blackout, main steam isolation valves closed. Reactor was cooled by injecting condensate water to
Reactor Pressure Vessel via diesel operated pump (via steam turbine – not confirmed), and by
releasing steam to containment suppression pool -wetwell. This went on almost an hour, when at
15:42 tsunami flooded both diesels and many electrical distributing equipment and washed away or
damaged condensate storage tanks. Yet NISA reported that water injection continued for almost
additional hour until 16:36 when water injection failed. By that time 198000 MJ of the residual heat
was generated. In order to cool the core also the accumulated heat in the core needed to be taken
away, but that was small compared to decay heat. Assumption is that all this heat was successfully
discharged to the wetwell, acting as the only hit sink, where the temperature and pressure increased.
At least 79 tons of condensate water was needed to be injected and boil off to take the heat away.
No measured pressures are available for this period.
2) After loss of water injection on 11 March at 16:36 there was no water flow to reactor for almost
28 hours, up to 12 March at 20:20 when sea water injection was established via fire pumps to
reactor. During this time 1000000 MJ (one million Mega Joule) of the residual heat was generated. In
order to cool the core at least 412 tons of water should be boiled off in the core, but this was not
available. The core dried and overheated. If average heat capacity of the core is 0.3 ki/kg/degC, and
if fuel in the core and core internals mass is 140 tons then it takes only about 42 MJ to heat the core
for one degree Celsius. To melt the core it should be heated first to the melting point(s) and then the
melting (phase transition) will consume additional 260 kJ/kg or 62000 MJ in total. The residual heat
generated in this period is much higher (ten times or more) than needed for heating up to melting
points and for melting. The available heat could heat up the core far above the melting points. The
only cooling during this time was heat irradiation to the reactor pressure vessel from the outer layers
of fuel elements.
On the 12 March at 0:49 (or 8 hr 13 minutes after loss of water injection) un unusual increase of PCV
pressure was detected (drywell). At that point the residual heat generated after loss of water
injection was 390000 MJ, which would need additional 156 tons of water to boil off, which was not
available and the core heated up above melting point. Before core melting Zirconium in the fuel
cladding starts oxidising and adding chemical reaction heat. This added additional heat and also a lot
of hydrogen, causing sudden increase of pressure in reactor pressure vessel, discharging hydrogen
through the relieve valves to the wetwell. We can assume that once the Zirconium started to oxidise,
very soon all fuel rods have broken to release all noble gasses and volatiles like Iodine and Cesium
into the reactor. Some of the iodine and Cesium could be trapped in the wetwell water, but not the
noble gases.
All of the above points to a conclusion that a substantial core melt in reactor unit 1 has
happened starting in the night from 11 to 12 March and going on up to the start of injection of
sea water on 12 Mach at 20:20. It is possible that the vessel has melted through already before
increase in PCV pressure on 12 March at 0:49 hours, 8 hr 13 minutes of no cooling, and molten
core has penetrated the drywell as no water was there.
00005.doc
DK 1889 of 1892
Page 2
3. Venting of the containment started on 12 March at 14:30, releasing mixture of water vapour,
hydrogen, most of noble gases in the core, Iodine, Cesium and all other volatile radionuclides. Release
point was not given, stack release was probably not successful as in less an hour later, at 15:36 a huge
hydrogen explosion blasted the top of reactor building I sideways and upwards. The explosion must
have damaged the operating floor where spent fuel pool is located, with the crane for spent fuel is
located (and maybe the crane for the reactor vessel).
The wind was on 11 and 12 March blowing to the Pacific during the containment venting and
explosion, so that all noble gases and volatile radionuclides of the first release were going towards
ocean. However sharp peaks should be observed on the monitoring stations inland, 3 km to the west,
mainly reading the cloud shine (to be checked with actual data).
DK 1890 of 1892

Post

2011-03-21 – NRC – Fukushima Daiichi – A Delta pilot’s perspective on his approach to Tokyo in the wake of the March 11th earthquake

From: Stuchell. Sheldon
To: Cru.Holl GoiIa. Joe; Hon. Andrew; Honcharik. Michelle; Lenning. Ekaterina: Miller.Bar; Philpott. Stephen;
Rowley. Jonathan
Subject: FW: Written by a Delta pilot on approach to Tokyo during…
Date: Monday, March 21, 2011 11:22:42 AM
From (b)(6) Thought you may enjoy the read…
Oriainal M–e-s-saae —-
From: (b)(6)
Sent: Monday, March 21, 2011 7:5/ AM
To:
Subject: Written by a Delta pilot on approach to Tokyo during…
Great observation on the Japan disaster from an aerial viewpoint. Kind of leads to one of those ‘what
would I do?’ introspectives.
Scott Stuchell, Contractor, 914OSS/DON
System Support Representative, BAE Systems Niagara Falls ARS, NY, 14304-5010
DSN: 238-3534, Comm: 716-510-1846
I ~(b)(6)
I’m currently still in one piece, writing from my room in the Narita crew hotel.
It’s 8am. This is my inaugural trans-pacific trip as a brand new, recently checked out, international 767
Captain and it has been interesting, to say the least, so far. I’ve crossed the Atlantic three times so far
so the ocean crossing procedures were familiar.
By the way, stunning scenery flying over the Aleutian Islands. Everything was going fine until 100 miles
out from Tokyo and in the descent for arrival.
The first indication of any trouble was that Japan air traffic control started putting everyone into holding
patterns. At first we thought it was usual congestion on arrival. Then we got a company data link
message advising about the earthquake, followed by another stating Narita airport was temporarily
closed for inspection and expected to open shortly (the company is always so positive).
From our perspective things were obviously looking a little different. The Japanese controller’s anxiety
level seemed quite high and he said expect “indefinite” holding time. No one would commit to a time
frame on that so I got my copilot and relief pilot busy looking at divert stations and our fuel situation,
which, after an ocean crossing is typically low.
It wasn’t long, maybe ten minutes, before the first pilots started requesting diversions to other airports.
Air Canada, American, United, etc. all reporting minimal fuel situations. I still had enough fuel for 1.5 to
2.0 hours of holding. Needless to say, the diverts started complicating the situation.
Japan air traffic control then announced Narita was closed indefinitely due to damage. Planes
immediately started requesting arrivals into Haneada, near Tokyo, a half dozen JAL and western planes
got clearance in that direction but then ATC announced Haenada had just dosed. Uh oh! Now instead of
just holding, we all had to start looking at more distant alternatives like Osaka, or Nagoya.
One bad thing about a large airliner is that you can’t just be-pop into any little airport. We generally
need lots of runway. With more planes piling in from both east and west, all needing a place to land
and several now fuel critical ATC was getting over-whelmed. In the scramble, and without waiting for
my fuel to get critical, I got my flight a clearance to head for Nagoya, fuel situation still okay. So far so
good. A few minutes into heading that way, I was “ordered” by ATC to reverse course. Nagoya was
saturated with traffic and unable to handle more planes (read- airport full). Ditto for Osaka.
DO 595 of 1673
With that statement, my situation went instantly from fuel okay, to fuel minimal considering we might
have to divert a much farther distance. Multiply my situation by a dozen other aircraft all in the same
boat, all making demands requests and threats to ATC for clearances somewhere. Air Canada and then
someone else went to “emergency” fuel situation. Planes started to heading for air force bases. The
nearest to Tokyo was Yokoda AFB. I threw my hat in the ring for that initially. The answer – Yokoda
closed! no more space.
By now it was a three ring circus in the cockpit, my copilot on the radios, me flying and making
decisions and the relief copilot buried in the air charts trying to figure out where to go that was within
range while data link messages were flying back and. forth between us and company dispatch in Atlanta.
I picked Misawa AFB at the north end of Honshu island. We could get there with minimal fuel
remaining. ATC was happy to get rid of us so we cleared out of the maelstrom of the Tokyo region. We
heard ATC try to send planes toward Sendai, a small regional airport on the coast which was later the
one I think that got flooded by a tsunami.
Atlanta dispatch then sent us a message asking if we could continue to Chitose airport on the Island of
Hokkaido, north of Honshu. Other Delta planes were heading that way. More scrambling in the cockpit –
check weather, check charts, check fuel, okay. We could still make it and not be going into a fuel critical
situation … if we had no other fuel delays. As we approached Misawa we got clearance to continue to
Chitose. Critical decision thought process. Let’s see – trying to help company – plane overflies perfectly
good divert airport for one farther away.. .wonder how that will look in the safety report, if anything
goes wrong.
Suddenly ATC comes up and gives us a vector to a fix well short of Chitose and tells us to standby for
holding instructions. Nightmare realized. Situation rapidly deteriorating. After initially holding near Tokyo,
starting a divert to Nagoya, reversing course back to Tokyo then to re-diverting north toward Misawa, all
that happy fuel reserve that I had was vaporizing fast. My subsequent conversation, paraphrased of
course…., went something like this:
“Sapparo Control – Delta XX requesting immediate clearance direct to Chitose, minimum fuel, unable
hold.”
“Negative Ghost-Rider, the Pattern is full” <<< top gun quote <<< "Sapparo Control - make that - Delta XX declaring emergency, low fuel, proceeding direct Chitose" "Roger Delta XX, understood, you are cleared direct to Chitose, contact Chitose approach....etc...." Enough was enough, I had decided to preempt actually running critically low on fuel while in another indefinite holding pattern, especially after bypassing Misawa, and played my last ace.. .declaring an emergency. The problem with that is now I have a bit of company paperwork to do but what the heck. As it was - landed Chitose, safe, with at least 30 minutes of fuel remaining before reaching a "true" fuel emergency situation. That's always a good feeling, being safe. They taxied us off to some remote parking area where we shut down and watched a half dozen or more other airplanes come streaming in. In the end, Delta had two 747s, my 767 and another 767 and a 777 all on the ramp at Chitose. We saw two American airlines planes, a United and two Air Canada as well. Not to mention several extra Al Nippon and Japan Air Lines planes. Post-script - 9 hours later, Japan air lines finally got around to getting a boarding ladder to the plane where we were able to get off and clear customs. - that however, is another interesting story. By the way - while writing this - I have felt four additional tremors that shook the hotel slightly - all in 45 minutes. Cheers, J.D. DO 596 of 1673

Post

2011-03-16 – NRC – Fukushima Daiichi – Heroic Efforts Mean Fatal Doses

Riley (OCA), Timothy
From: Droggitis, Spiros
Sent: Wednesday, March 16, 2011 7:27 AM
To: Powell, Amy; Dacus, Eugene; Decker, David; Weil, Jenny; Riley (OCA), Timothy; Shane,
Raeann
Cc: Schmidt, Rebecca
Subject: Re: Q&As re: Japan
Heroic efforts mean fatal doses.
From: Powell, Amy
To: Droggitis, Spiros; Dacus, Eugene; Decker, David; Weil, Jenny; Riley (OCA), Timothy; Shane, Raeann
Cc: Schmidt, Rebecca
Sent: Wed Mar 16 07:11:36 2011
Subject: Re: Q&As re: Japan
Yes, I noticed that we time traveled a bit…
Amy Powell
Associate Director
Office of Congressional Affairs
U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Phone: 301-415-1673
Sent from my Blackberry
From: Droggitis, Spiros
To: Powell, Amy; Dacus, Eugene; Decker, David; Weil, Jenny; Riley (OCA), Timothy; Shane, Raeann
Cc: Schmidt, Rebecca
Sent: Wed Mar 16 07:07:25 2011
Subject: Re: Q&As re: Japan
This is great, except for the error in the first line – the date.
From: Powell, Amy
To: Droggitis, Spiros; Dacus, Eugene; Decker, David; Weil, Jenny; Riley (OCA), Timothy; Shane, Raeann
Cc: Schmidt, Rebecca
Sent: Wed Mar 16 06:06:40 2011
Subject: Q&As re: Japan
Attached is a document of Q&A responses prepared by OPA and technical experts in the Ops Ctr. We CANNOT send this
document in its entirety down to the Hill as is, but we can use it to respond to individual questions. I know that we “owe”
answers to questions to a number of staffers. Please read through here and see if answers are provided to questions that
came into you anf get back to the requesting staff. This may also help those of you in the Ops Ctr with calls.
Questions that speculate about what could happen, compare Japan regs with US, and other speculative Qs are NOT
included here. Just not the focus now.
Thanks
Amy
Amy Powell
Associate Director
339
Office of Congressional Affairs
U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Phone: 301-415-1673
Sent from my Blackberry
From: Harrington, Holly
To: Coggins, Angela; Taylor, Robert
Cc: McIntyre, David; Schmidt, Rebecca; Powell, Amy
Sent: Tue Mar 15 21:51:03 2011
Subject: RE: Japanese-Rx-Incident addtl questions – March-14-2011 doc.docx
Angela, Amy, Becki – These are fully approved by relevant folks in the Op Center. For your use. I have not
added to WebEOC yet as it’s not clear these should also be used by others…
From: Coggins, Angela
Sent: Tuesday, March 15, 2011 8:36 PM
To: Taylor, Robert
Cc: Harrington, Holly; McIntyre, David; Schmidt, Rebecca; Powell, Amy
Subject: Re: Japanese-Rx-Incident addtl questions – March-14-2011 doc.docx
Thanks so much!! I appreciate all the effort!
Angela Coggins
Policy Director
Office of Chairman Gregory B Jaczko
US Nuclear Regulatory Commission
anqela.co a)nirncs. oov/301-415-1828
From: Taylor, Robert
To: Coggins, Angela
Cc: Harrington, Holly; McIntyre, David; Schmidt, Rebecca; Powell, Amy
Sent: Tue Mar 15 20:29:17 2011
Subject: Japanese-Rx-Incident addtl questions – March-14-2011 doc.docx
Angela,
We have done our best to incorporate your questions into the Chairman’s Q&As that were developed earlier
today and provided to OCA. The updated set of Q&As is undergoing ET review and we will hopefully have it to
you in the near future. The attached provides a roadmap of where we believe the responses can be found. A
few questions fell into the broader “After this event is over, we will determine what changes need to be made in
the US” message. I did not directly incorporate them, but you can see a draft response in the attached.
Regarding the third question about past events, I did not try to evaluate all of the events you listed. I would
propose sticking to the party line, in that, “The NRC routinely reassess its regulatory requirements in light of
new operating experience and plant events.”
Regards,
Rob
340

Post

1966-08-04 – AEC – Health Physics Analysis – Continental Mining and Milling Co

()
JIE.\LTii Pi!YSICS M.’\LYS:i:S
of t~is ins pee t ion. !he majo-c di fGcul ty noted was the lad~ o£ pre-
.cauti o~s by t fle licensee to secure the sto r.1gc locati.on of this
mcc..,l· i :: l. Like,:i.s!ssatj’ Htrvc-ys to
!ihOtf that this r.~acc t·.i.6 visit, the licensee
t.:d cor~ec ted ;;b:ce of t:,e itc::~s c::.:-:c !-.<>d achieved parttol col!lpliance
~ nd t he; 1·1ords “Cuution ~ tt.!..::~oactive t-:a~eri. al” were not ,;,ounted as
needed a3d locks wetc not ~ei~g placed on the eates .
n:e only matter of a poor h~alth physics practi ce noted durLng these
th~ transpC:rt vehicles . The licc:-. :::~e “‘~S t:y i ng t o correct this conditi.
on by keeping the tt~;cks loaded to o:-.:y th::e.: quarters of the allo~.table
h~ig ~t and/or. toe pl~cem~ nt of si~~ boa::d5 on the venicl~s. The licensee
has tall~: chis has
11\Jl teria L ch.::t ha,s lod~ed on c:hz ou ~sice of che be.d on ledges and extendin&
truck bed”‘. \,’hen ;:he v~hicl.:. ::.hen n::~k:::s a con,r.:r, this falls off.
!he licensee’s scbcontractors, tn~ ~tansporti~g contractors, have hired
a man full ti~e co ~ravel along ~his route in a pickup truck and using a
broom and shov~l, clean up this fallen ~:;aterial. Since the conce•,tration
and radi~tio~ levels in this materia ~ is so lo~, this can hardly be considered
a =~~~acion hazard.
The licc n~~e currently has a survey p rog~am in operation which is not
e~:ensivc, bvt is adeGuate to show that a radiation and contamination
~rob l c~ ~ocs not exist.
4\-.;;:refo>c, it ._~ ~he: opinion of thi.s inspecto-c that the prog-ram at tl\e
)
p::escnt time cal\ be ‘– .. 3idercd safe fro:n a radiological hazard st<>ndpoint,
( c .’ .’•'( ,’- 1: ~·:·). 1
591 ·,~_v
1. J.~cc,~:: ee, _ _ _____ _..C:..o.:n_t _i _rtc_n_t :l_l _?l_i n_l •:::::z_&_.’ti_l _l i•-‘S:::….C_o_m…. ;P:…·~n..;y:.._ ____
2 . .. ~.,:'”.:\!:;~ :’ ~’ South La S:.!!c S~~:~c c ·————– ·————————- • Chic;.go, Ii L::.: _.; 60604
3. ~~~~~l~ ~o(: ) ___________~·–~_-e~2 ___________________________________ L • r. • I AL”!llSI: 4 , 1966
• w~~~ ~( L~~ ?~CC -G~—–~——————————————
3. t ~~:;ector _____________o_ a_ v_i_ d_L_.,~s_c_e_r_ _________________________
6 . S ~ c :;;.; :; o f c(.~l;’ll i.:·:.cc __N_ o_n_c_om_.:.p_l_i<_-_nc_e_ __ ____ ____________ _ _ 7. S'-!ct:.er) o.Z t\~:;u!..::.:.: ~on C.J~Cllilo PO\"D ~rs ~il 0 :" l~e~ncc Condit~ ~n A 10 ~ FR 20. J.OS A 1?.3 s 10 CfR 2C , 20 1 e Lie . Cond. 6 3 e4 c 12 cr:-s 2Q. ?-03(-l.-} c . ;>. 5
D 10 C:’Lll. .,J 3{e} (2) D “-‘1
E …..1.\..S(lri:;;P- CondU:ior. 9 2 21
F
G c
Clr.s s ~. ~ied :t:-:1 ;:c: … ::: t £on
8.
.- !” );I
;,.,. ~~
~ -… (‘I?
\ ,,
I
-,;;,
;:r
‘ r”J …
,r .
. :r.: · .: :…. -: — t :j
(‘)
~ C…..J., •
• –
\
r·~
\ ‘ ~ .. _ /
• C0~:’! ~:\::, 7.:.:, ~IINil{G & MII..Lf.NC CO.
· .cii1.aco, XLLl:-::ots
L:.:c:::-:s-s •~o . s~~-S62
9. ‘i:,is is ;;:a io: ici..:~ i.ns;>-~cti on of the licc:~seG <1r:.d vis i t s h;tVe heeo con• ,:uc~euse Su perintendent
X:. Joseph J. Do::~avan, C:xecutiv ~ Vice- President
lZ . An unan~ou:1ceci vis it ~o~as ::;:…::~ co the licensee ‘ s faci li.ti es i n Ha7.e l\lOOd ,
Kissouri, on X~y 16, 1966. A v~si: ~as ~~de to the office o f Kr . Jcseph
J. Dor..svan, Chicago, Illir.ois, o1: •. :;;.y 17, 1966. The ! nformat!.on oi i:hese
I
v isit::: i.s cover.ed in o:1 ii’..;. .. i:::; :-:. . a::::o dated Hay 27, 1966. Details of these
vi.si t s a.re <• i so cov"'-::~d i~ this •~po·:-t:, a.-:~ iterr.s oe noncorr.;> liance t.;i th
tcv4.~V:-~
s:..sbs cq~.: ont,._ .!lct:ior:s .:r2 .. -~~::..-./• c()>Je-.:cd.
?ROG!V-.M
13 . On }:.arch 14′ 2.’>.5.5~, the Region !!1 oftice IJeS noafie.d by H. Fred Belcher’
Han3.get: , St. :..o~..:..s a~ea AE·~ o~-:..ce, ~~.l.ldon Springs, Mis souri, that the ore
t”esidues ot t:c.e St. LouL:. ai-.:po~:: had bcae.n sold t o Co t’\t’i.ne.n~al Hinin~ and
Hilling Com~any, and that n:ovement of this materi al from that site shollld
be~~o with:n a 2 month period. This material movement wa$ begun on or around
~fay 1, 1966 .
14. As of August 4 ,1966,34 , 000 tons of t h e Congo :residueSand 25,000 ton& of
the Colorado residues b~·.-~ been moved from tne s t o::a ge location at 50 t;ro'”-n
Ro ~d, Rooerts:on, Hissouri, to the Continental Mini nB ~nd M.i.ll.ing facility
a:: 9ZOO L~;:oximately half of the m:•tcrial that is to be moved,
\

~) • I ‘ ~
c)
3000 ::. : .s p~t d;ly. I.e t1as esti.Dlat~d by the licen s~e til;r t tl:e moverucnt
of r’4 t..!ri~ls s!’.o;.~ld i,;2 co-::~plctcd by the c:-td of Septembcn~. Licensee cst
ie~;:e-.. th~t by the end of the t’aOV.!.”:lC:np.:my. A.ll .ha uli n~ is concuc tcc bc::\/al!tl che llours of 7:30 .’. ‘.{ 0:1d 4:00 PM co :.s t o r:ot b~ ~:~volved
sourrou~.d the s tor.:ag ~ ;>:ilce in RobeTtsor., Xi:;11ouri .
l’l. to date, the :.i<:.ensee ~as dcne no ~n::occ ssin : of the matl3rials, bu:: has ~er r.~ated.al f:or this lic€:r.se,/~::-;.:o licc::seii>’s facility is locat:eC: on a
3.5 .;;ere p:,):: of g:-o:.~nd ,.,:,ich tha license.;. p;.:rchased f::::o;a the Busy Bee
l~c:tcr~al Serv.i::a Cor..?lmy and 7.5 acr~s which the licensee leased fro:n the
Xo::-~olx a;::,d H.::>stetn Railway Compgr.y, :;’liS ~:c.::. is located at 920~ ‘2-c.tty
A·,•c:1u:2, H:;ze l\lood. t·:issouri, tir.cr« Latty Av”nue dead ile storage area
a~d :::-:.: ;no~..:ctioa buildir.gs. License Conciiacn 9 S?ecl.fl.es that the
transfer of source r~atc:::-~.:1 to tr.,~ l:.censee’s P.a~ehJood, Hissouri, site
is not authorized until fencin~ ~~c locked gates h~ve been insta:lec in
acco:::dance with the licer;!;.:;:~’s mcrr.o dated Fcbrary S, 1966. At the time
of this insyector’s visit t~ the licensee’s facility on May 16, 1966, it
“”G.S ~oce.c ·~hat t”t\e fe.nca had been erected upon the stock pile storage ao:ea,
b~~ ~~~ticns of th~ fence and c~~tain of the gates had been removed for
eE.::e of entrance to the stock pile a1:ea by the ttansfet: vehicles. At that
time, ~ate”ial was being transferred to the licensee’s Hazelwood facility
G.;.~ ~Jas oeing stock piled and stored at th$t location. therefore, the
1,:.”t~
_ ~~~see ~ in ~oncompliance with Lice~se Condition 9 in that t~~ transfer
of ~~~eri~l was initiated ana the matctial was stored at the Hazelwood,
___Y.Lssouri, ~ita .prior to co~;>letion of the fencine and installation oC the
l o::ks . License Cor.·7as unattended. \{e in(ono.~cd
::h\s i :~spector t ho’lt that: was no t being oonc at that t i,me. . Therefore, com-
;>lHe COtllpliance \lith License Co’:lc:.tion 9 had no:: been ach.£eved as of
•· .. : ~us :; 4, 1966.
no\: th :;>or~ion of the ~ste;.:;: sect~.-n of the ~nd.l ity. This building is
used as an ofi:ice ·b.Jildi-:-:g and is locatec! outside of the. fenced areas.
Tha licensP.e h:1;; ~ l~rg.:l t::~t<'ll fabri.catio:\ building under construction to t1~e so:J ~':. of the office bui ldi. ng ;;o 'be used as a proc!uc tion facility. 'I'his 'bul.lcing is located •~i.t.hi.n t'he (er.c:e tatcd ~h arrel
s~vn ….. ~ area ::..·.~i.cated a:1 average of 0 , ;: ·;~· /hr at ~8 inches from the bat·rels
with a ~::.:.::1::-.u;n oi 10 mr /hr at 18 inches from the barrels . The maxirr.um radi at
:.on level detected at the surface of any barrel o;.~z.s 90 mr./:-.r , 7herefore,
\. .. :e..~·
– .~:i s ted i;’l the un-res trict:(Od areas arcurid the b.nrel s to·r age area such that
a ~ ~t.6ividual could ~eceive a cose in excess of those limits S?ecified ia
;::,is part. .i.e was noted during the revisit on Augvst 4 , t966, ::hat the
perim<:::cr fence had been extended to i.ncl~tce thi.s ban:el storage ;t:;ea, making it a portion of t~~ restricted area. ~- - 5 - 2(,.. At ti~.! ti~c of the v:..sit to the licensee's f<:~ci 1! ty on l':ay lG, 19o6, :-~o s i.sns of :tny t y;>e “~re posted in the are.a. Since the license Rlatliat:ce 1rith
10 en 20.~03(e}(2}, in that signs wari•·~ ~.!le conventional r”d!.ation
.:;.:; t.I.!3USt 4 , 19ii6 , that c~u~ ic:-. s:.g:-.s shc•.ting the ~onventionc.l l: :-.ot:ed that r.o s i gns shot•i.ng t”:-~e
conve:~::ion;.l. ray~’oo l no-:- t hr. worcs ”C.ou t ion or Dan~er • 1\;ldiation
A-:ea” hacl been ;os:ec S c~libra t~c by calculations for procedur es provided hy Nuclea•
Co~~~lt ~n ts Corpor ation such that the actual re~din’ i n counts per ~~nuce
when ~u lt i; lied by 5 . 56 is e~ual t o d~~ per 100 centimecer square.
n \ /
– 6 ~
!-“el>;:.:::y 4, l\166, rafy 16, 1966 visi:: to the licensee’s f::cility, u: ‘dngs facili.tics .
.12. A~:;·,cu:;h t:,e ra.diation levels as c.:!.:.:.ct~cl i.n the :;urvey by Nuclelacad w~ekly film badges on all t>ersonnel and
::’!’.~s~ ~le average bet;..reen 0 and 20 :nrc::~. Some filrn badges
shot»ed ex~osures as high as 4o’ mrem for a single week. The licen~ee indicated
to this inspector that they :1ad so::~e doubts about the Nuclear Cons~
lt~nt Co::-?or~tion film badg~ service since ~ bas~ci on the r~diatio~
:C.:.ve l:s. ~l:totr.. f::om the surv-js, they did r~ot see :·.o>~ people cou lo:l be gc tting
~!..-. ~. . t th~ t!.r.””:e of the vi.si t on. May 16, 1960 • it was note.d that small clumps
of .-::ceri..;.l nad .fallen fro:n the tr~nsport vehicles to the ro<1dway bett~een the t..:c -.:cilities. Radioactivity up to 1 mrad/nr was detected :tt contact ' ' .. '. - s - .,:::.;:;:, ::1:-::s~ ch .. ~tps. ·rhe situ.:1tion W3S cli.scus:>cd ~>i.th the liccncce. .:Jt that:
tb:c, .w.d chc licensee stGt:Cd t:h.:J\: <1ll cf(o.t ‘ec::o~ \·:as at th~ Uc.a•.see’ .. s facility, .orr&
nge::-,_ .. .:s tt~re mace for ~ s~·:~et .::·.·c.;:. de::: and $\lee pet: to pro~e~q 11i t!l the
cleanup of ::::~ -coacibcds.
35. In ~h~ Ciisc’..lssions ~1ith these inC:ividl.lals, i.: vl!s explained that it was
their :aspo~sibility as the licensee, not the responsibility of the s~b-
-.;)n::r<.cto::.:s (materi.al h.:;.~ leo}, to see t'hat this materia 1 was n.ot scattered througiloct ::1-.e unrestt:icted areas. The lice:· .... .:.e stated that they realized t:O:is, .and t:'ley i.' _·e doing every t:!-.~ng they cct:lG to insure that the ~:~ate:-ial haule~s would cooperac~. ~·:censee ;.~aintains recv-rds of the material t:: .·.sported it\ the form of for ~---· · :::\e. vehi.cles. 'Every third veh;;..;:le ht~uling licensee's facility is wcighed0 loaded al\d again empt<::::>~·
~-;.·-., ….. ~ •• ~ :he weight of n:aterial being h.:;.~led on that load. This eveeyn
\ . .. .. ·’
.. .. ef .:
~ 9 –
..
l’:l~·/h;: at t:.e f ence . lin-a .::·oc.:nd ti1o·.:t vehicle s rcve<~ l c.:; lhoc t he r adiation lP.vel i n the csb oi t:· . .: truck er.d ;:;rou=td the ou\:side of the ve;,icle ~.:as l ess Cl:on 0 .1 mr/hr . Li:>eltise, a survey of the ~,:r.cin~ secu red when ~o<: a tten:lc :>~.:r t~ co'”i> 1~ with that licens-e condition. Y.r. Knockc stated lh<1 t .-:..'.:.:; h~ .:!:'t'l!~ t! t lt3t t.::..:..;.:; otast w wi;~t: the l;.c~:-.43 co~di t ion ctc;ons and that potn~cd out to ~ir. :{:-:.ockc that they ap?ear cci to ba in noncoo?li<:nce t·ri;;h 😮 C7., 20. 20J{c)(2) i n that the sigt>s s::ot~i.:ig the tJo).·ds “Cnution R~di.o:~ctiv e
}:tt e:.:!.cl” tJ~r e not posted around t h~ pcrir.;~ C:er area. in \Jhich ~his i.1<>te~: ial
•.:….::…:::..::.-~-· • – ·- ..;· in t h.s t t’:-,c ~rca <>.::our.ci .:.he t>att’e l stor.,~c .l”:”C,, hod be~~ .
;:;, •• ..$!, ~. ; l·
-~–
4 :-“~ ~~tion ;;.:::ea <>.nd no s i ;;nsj <..s such hac :Jce:1 up :tC that l:i~e; but at the +J..'.J ~).::-;: of t he •\ugust 4, 19.>6 v ~s i.t, <'~;: h:.G ~~;::1. cor~ccLed. Li:..c~.rise, the ftct .:~a t :::1 ~ s uas a ·c astric~~G a '!:..:a, or sr.ould have bc~n' a restt·::cted atea, 1•/1\S r:.)CCtl cueing the ea~:ly visit, o.H: the!: llS of t hic August 4• vis!t , thi s area hod bec :1 e.:c1cs cd -.;.Jit.h a \:<;.r.c~ anc es such, was no11 a r eseri::c:ed a rea. 1;).th 'License. Co\\d:!.tion 8 ar.d 10 CF.~ 20. 201 i:1 ~ h :tt s u ·~vcys l•ere not. 'o~ ing ".; J;, e ;:() nducted a: ~he t.·•IO Locatio::s s.:-tdfa~ivi 'I:.J.t>.s being t:;’lor:dence f r om the Commissi o:l, and Forms AEC-591 llnd 592
42. !·lr. J. J, ~n.:. .-an, Vice-President , was co:.::acced by telephone 3t his
Chica&o of:.: ;c. on Augus t 5, 1966 . The items noted during tl~h inspe c t ion
\1ere r eviewed w:i th hita a t t hat time. Be stated that as of Augus t 5 , l ocks
had bye~ placed on t he ga tes and would be locked ~en not i~ atte nda nc e,
” ~ . ·.s h~

Post

2011-04-06 – NRC – Severe Accidents and MELCOR Code

From:
Sent:
To:
Attachments:
PMT02 Hoc
Wednesday, April 06, 2011 9:06 AM
PMT11 Hoc; PMT02 Hoc
Severe Accidents and MELCOR Code.pdf
DB 139 of 696
JU.S.NRC
Information Sheet: Severe Accidents & MELCOR Code, Dr. Hossein Esmaili (NRC/RES/DSA)
The Risk
The risk to the public by nuclear power generation arises
if accident progress to the point where fuel degradation
occurs, and large quantities of radioactive materials are
released into the environment. The NRC has invested
heavily in the investigation of severe reactor accidents
and has developed computer codes for the analysis of
severe accident phenomena and progression. It is
essential to the mission of the NRC that it possesses
expertise on severe accident phenomenological
behavior and a quantitative predictive capability for
simulating the response of nuclear power systems to
severe accidents. The role of such expertise and
analytical capability is potentially wide ranging in our
regulatory environment including the transition to a more
risk informed regulatory framework and to the study of
vulnerabilities of nuclear power plants.
MELCOR Severe Accident Code
The MELCOR code is a fully integrated, engineering-level
computer code whose primary purpose is to model the
progression of postulated accidents in light water reactors
as well as non-reactor systems (e.g., spent fuel pool and
dry cask). MELCOR is a modular code consisting of
three general types of packages: (a) basic physical
phenomena (i.e., hydrodynamics – control volume and
flow paths, heat and mass transfer to structures, gas
combustion, aerosol and vapor physics); (b) reactorspecific
phenomena (i.e., decay heat generation, core
degradation, ex-vessel phenomena, sprays and
engineering safety systems); and (c) support functions
(thermodynamics, equations of state, material properties,
data handling utilities, equation solvers). These
packages model the major systems of a nuclear power
plant and their associated interactions. MELCOR 1.8.6
(Fortran 77) was released in September 2005, and the
code modernization effort resulted in the release of
MELCOR 2.0 code (Fortran 95) in September 2006. The
latest version (MELCOR 2.1) was released to the NRC in
July 2007.
The Needs
Severe accident competency will be needed to evaluate
new generic severe accident issues and to address risk
informed regulatory initiatives and operating reactor
issues associated with plant changes, as in the case of
steam generator tube integrity.
Modhling and A
Severe Accid
Nuiclear Powe
.nalysis of
ele nis
r Plants
tnm7molo w ea.
phnmfogsfun…d 5ne0 0ho
1 f[4
TM. . odeWi. 1979 OfSOfdyf
1ým -dt~- Ut
-R bcl’,ot 8alr
* orr… t .~….l .r…I .t . g o:
UMe
b,UboIIr (.xLw ] n.I*o~pSf
Licensees will continue to pursue plant modifications that
require assessment of incremental risk impacts that will
necessitate analysis of severe accident related
phenomena. Licensees in many cases rely on industry
codes, such as MAAP to analyze plant behavior and risk
impacts.
The NRC will need capability for the foreseeable future to
independently evaluate behavior about which there is still
considerable uncertainty around the best estimate and to
assess phenomena which are regarded quite differently
by various analysts.
MELCOR represents the current state-of-the-art in severe
accident analysis, which has accumulated through NRC
and international research performed since the accident at
Three Mile Island in 1979. The code is fully integrated for
the analysis of severe accident phenomena and
progression. These predictions are required as part of
licensing issues in new reactors and operating reactors’
modifications process. Future needs will include
development and implementation of new and improved
models to predict the severe accident behavior of
advanced non-light water reactor designs.
DB 140 of 696
Information Sheet: Severe Accidents & MELCOR Code-Page 2, H. Esmaili (NRC/RES/DSA)
Applications
The improved understanding of phenomenological
behavior and modeling in severe accidents and their
implementation in MELCOR has had a direct impact on
the analytical methods and criteria adopted for design
basis accidents (e.g., source term research and the
revised source term). It is anticipated that the
development of best estimate severe accident models in
the future will improve the licensing evaluation models.
The development of best estimate models reveals,
quantitatively, margins in existing models.
Activities associated with the development, assessment,
and application of MELCOR include:
3 Safety analysis and risk decision-making
o Revision of NRC’s alternative source term
(NUREG-1465) for high-burnup fuel and
mixed oxide (MOX) fuel.
o New reactor certification (AP-1000, ESBWR,
EPR, APWR)
Experimental analyses and code validation activities
> NPP beyond-design-basis accidents
> Aerosol transport and deposition in steam generators
during bypass accidents
Risk of severe accident induced steam generator
tube rupture
Effects of air ingress on fission product release
Vulnerabilities of spent fuel pool to accidents
State-of-the-art consequence analysis
National laboratories, universities (e.g., Texas A&M), and
international organizations (e.g., Paul Scherrer Institute-
Switzerland, Institut de Radioprotection et de SOret6
Nucl6aire (IRSN) – France) are involved in the MELCOR
code development effort.
Examples of international collaborations that
resulted in MELCOR improvement include:
(1) USNRC Cooperative Severe Accident Research
Program (CSARP)
(2) MELCOR Code Assessment Program (MCAP)
(3) Institut de Radioprotection et de SOrete Nucl6aire of
France: Ph6bus-FP, VERCORS, and follow-on
program (Ph~bus-STSET) – fission product releases
and degradation of U0 2 fuel (including burnup
>40 GWD/Mt) and MOX fuel under severe accident
conditions, and the effects of air ingress on core
degradation and fission product release. Results are
used to validate the NUREG-1465 source term and
MELCOR code.
(4) German QUENCH
investigating overheated fu(
experiment Program,
(5) ARTIST – Paul Scherrer Institute (Switzerland): To
investigate experimentally the potential mitigation of
radioactive material releases through secondary side
of a steam generator. Results from this research
would allow the NRC to decide whether improved
source term bypass models are needed.
(6) OECD MCCI program – Argonne National Laboratory
(USA): Separate effects experiments to further
address the ex-vessel debris coolability issue. The
results will be used to develop coolability models for
incorporation into severe accident codes.
(7) CSNI Behavior of Iodine Behavior (BIP) – Nuclear
Energy Agency: Committee on the Safety of Nuclear
Installations (France): Experimental investigations of
behavior of iodine in containment during post severe
accident conditions for computer code model(s)
development and validation. BIP will provide
experimental data to model iodine behavior in
containment. It addresses uncertainties related to
iodine behavior (especially with respect to iodine
interactions with paints in containment). With
complementing testing at Atomic Energy of Canada
Limited (AECL) and at IRSN, the state-of-the-art on
modeling of iodine behavior in the containment can
be advanced and quantified. Adequate modeling of
iodine behavior in the containment is crucial in
determining the need for pH control in containment
sump. The proposed research will complement the
on-going IRSN of France Ph6bus-FP and follow-on
program Ph6bus – Source Term Separate Effects
Test Project.
For More Information
Contact Hossein Esmaili at 301-415-6084
NOTE: Availability of international experimental data
is determined by individual international program
and not by NRC. \3,U.S.NRC
DB 141 of 696

Post
Post

1982-05 – NRC – Radiological Survey of the West Lake Landfill St. Louis County, Missouri

06os 0
·. Ni:;IREG/CR-2722
\

Radiological Survey •

of the West Lake Landfill
St. Louis County, Missouri

Manuscript Completed: April 1982 Date Published: May 1982
Prepared by
L. F. Booth, 0. W. Groff, G. S. McDowell, J. J. Adler,
S. I. Peck, P. L. Nyerges, F. L. Bronson
Radiation Management Corporation 3356Commercial Avenue Northbrook, IL 60062
Prepared for Division of Fuel Cycle and Material Safety Office of Nuclear Material Safety and Safeguards
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Washington, D.C. 20555
NRC FIN B6901

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224>.:(G.ool
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~”””~; f /’7 ~-nW –•
S) measurement of radon flux emanating from
surfaces;
6) measurement of airborne radioactivity; and
7) measurement of gross activity in

,:::egetation.
These measurements were performed on-site using two mobile facilities designed by RMC. A small number of samples were returned to the RM& radiological laboratories in Philadelphia for analysis for nuclides which could not be> det:cted ~the field, and for quality assurance checks on the field measurements. A set. of reference background measurements were made at three locations in the St •.. Louis area, near west Lake Landfill. In addition, a series of non-radiological measurements were performed to identify the possible presence of toxic or hazardous agents known or believed to have been buried at this landfill.
( ..
…….., …

2

II. ~CHAJV,CTEBISTICS

The west Lake Landfill is located on St. Charles Rock
Road just west of the Taussig Road intersection in .Bridgeton, Missouri. The site is about one (1) mile northwest of Route 270 and approximately 1-1/2 miles east of

the Missouri River. It is located in a combined
rural-industrial area, and is bounded on three sides by farm
land and on the fourth by St. Charles Rock Road, beyond
which are located several commercial and industrial
establishments. The nearest residential area is a trailer
park located about 3/4 of a mile southeast of the landfill.

The site is approximately 200 acres and consists of a
quarry, stone and limestone processing and storage areas,
and several active and inactive landfills (Figure 1), which
are open to the public during normal working hours. West
Lake Landfill keeps track of entries for the purpose of
assessing fees for disposal: however, access is not
controlled for other reasons. Users are Erohibited from

.:.===.disposing of hazardous materials at this site by current

Missouri state law.
Studies indicate the landfill is _911 the alluvial
,..
floodplain of the Missouri River. This fact prompted
>
the Missouri Geological Survey, in 1973, to propose
classification of the site as hazardous under the then
existing operating proce dures. In addition, samples from
.ESrimeter monitoring wells taken in 1977 and 1978

3

indicated some movement of leachate into monitoring wells,
based on chemcial (no,S._radiological)- analyses. However,
recent studies by the Department of Natural R,sources
indicate little or no surface or sub-surface movement of·
;>
materials from the site[2). Leachate from the active

sanitary landfill is collected and treated on-site. At
this time there is no evidence of significant ground water
contamination; however, geological reports indicate a
~
~otential for such problems.

In May 1976, the St. Louis Post-Dispatch[3) printed a story alleging that radioactive material had been erroneously dumped in the West Lake Landfill in 1973. The source of this material was identified as the Cotter Corporation, Hazelwood, Missouri, Latty Avenue Site.
An~ investigation conducted by Region III in 1976
[4) concluded that about 4 tons of U308, contained in 8700
tons of leached barium sulfate residues, had been mixed with
about 39,000 tons of soil at Latty Avenue and the entire\
volume disposed of at the West Lake Landfill. The earlier
study by the r~st- Dispatch (1976) claimed only 9000 tons
(presumably the leached barium sulfate residues) had been

buried, and that the remaining material had not been disposed of at west Lake. The Post-Dispatch alleged that the contractor hauling the dirt had admitted falsifying invoices for about 40,000 tons of soil. Discussions with
_!i~per~~nn~ indicated that a large quantity of~ from
Latty Avenue had indeed been dumped at West Lake, although .
*
NQc,: ?#n-4-.~+ ~7’Do ~]
~.._+ :J’J,=o -:12.-C…ft–…
L,.,*f !
4 P -L. • 9000 ~-fM -,f!ll.6 w,hw,w11 .
the exact amount was unknown.
A fly-over radiological survey (ARMS flight), I Eerformed
for the high as personnel addition, NRC in ~, showed external radiation levels as 100 uR/hr in the area indicated by West Lake as containing the Latty Avenue material. In this survey revealed another possibly contaminated (D ~
zone in a fill area previously believed to be “clean•.
Figure 2 shows the results of the 1978 aerial survey.

The area in the southeast fill was believed to contain
Latty Avenue material, while that on the northeast boundary
was previously unidentified.

In addition to radioactive material, it is known that hazardous chemical wastes have been disposed of at this landfill. Since disposal was unregulated prior to 1973, little is known about the actual materials present. However, it is believed that aside from normal landfill materials, there are chemical industrial wastes in the landfill.
Among the chemical wastes believed to be present are:
waste ink halogenated intermediates
pigments aromatics
oily sludges oils
esters wastewater sludges
alcohols heavy metals
insecticides herbicides
5

III. RAPIOr,OGIC/\L SURVEY !!3TffQDS
I
(Al Measurement of External Radiation Levels
The two areas of contamination were gridded and
surveyed for both_eamma radiation levels at one meter above the surface, and beta-gamma levels at the ground surface.
The basic pattern at each contaminated area was survey
blocks defined by a 10 meter grid system. External gamma levels at one meter were recorded at each grid point (i.e.
at each intersection of two grid lines). Initially, precise
exposure rate measurements at a few specially selected grid
points were made with a sensitive Tissue Equivalent
l ,.-4
Ionization Chamber System (described in Appendix I). At the same time, NaI scintillation detector (described in Appendix

I) measurements were made and a conversion factor for the Na I count rate versus uR/hr established (See Figure I-3) • -,, ~,11-l Once this factor was confirmed, the scintillation detector
was used for all grid measurements at relatively low exposure rates. For the few higher rates encountered, a
Gei~s-Mueller portable survey instrument was used.
At each grid point, an end window G-M tube (described in Appendix I) was used for surface measurements. An open and closed window reading was made at 1 cm, and the ratio of
the two used to indicate the presence or absence of surface
contamination.
6
(Bl Measurement -of Surface Radioactivity
t
T
Based on the external surface measurementst surface soil samples were collected for analysis from both contaminated areas. These samples were collected from locations on-site where surface deposits were indicated, as well as locations where the drainage characteristics indicated the possibility that radioactive materials may have been carried or washed away from original burial locations. The soils were dried, ground and sealed in 500 ml aluminum cans for counting on the intrinsic germanium (IG) gamma ray spectroscopy system (described in Appendix I).
Vegetation on-site consisted only of grass and common weeds. Off-site, crops are grown on farm land immediately north and west of the site. Since the possibility of contamination exists here, crop samples were collected where indicated by surface measurements. These samples were dried, crushed and counted as described above.
(C) Measurements of Subsurface Radioactivity
Since it was known that most, or all, of the
radioactive materials at the West Lake Landfill have been
buried, extensive subsurface monitoring and sampling was
required. The purpose of this activity was to determine the
~hand lateral extent of subsurface contamination.
,:;::–.
A series of holes through and bordering the
contaminated deposits were drilled and lined with 4-inch PVC

7

‘i

casing. Each hole was then scanned with a 2″ by 2″ Nal(Tl) scintillation detector and rate meter system. •
Representative holes were then logged using an in Ji.i.t.u.
.gamma measurement system consisting of an intrinsic germanium (IG) detector coupled to a multichannel analyzer (described in Appendix I). Field analyses were then made, both qualitatively and quantitatively, thereby eliminating time consuming ~analyses aQd expensive core sampling of each hole. Measurement intervals ranged from 6″ to 24″, depending upon factors such as hole depth and activity. An occasional core sample was taken to verify the ill .s.i.tll measurements and to confirm the presence or absence of non-gamma emitting nuclides such as Th-230.
(D) Measurement of Radioactivity in water
Whenever possible, water samples were taken from the bore holes and two off-site monitoring wells. Samples were also taken from standing water, run off water, and leachate liquids. Samples were filtered, evaporated and counted for gross activity, or were filtered and sealed in Marinelli beakers for gamma spectroscopic analysis.
(El Measurement of ~irbprpe Radioactivity
Measurements were made to determine if the material buried on-site is a source of airborne radioactivity. The isotopes of concern are Ra-226, Ra-224 and/or Ra-223, which decay to Rn-222, Rn-220 and Rn-219. This may result in the
8

emanation of radon from the soil, and movement of radon and
daughters off-site. •.

These measurements may be used to determine Rn J:,lMiS
emanation as a source term for off-site dose calculations,

or as an. indication of the presence of radium at or below the surface. Additional on-site Rn daughter measurements were made to perform !orkin~ leyel (WL) determinations.
Radon flux measurements which are to be related to off-site dose calculations were of no value for Rn-219, due to its very short (4 sec) half-life. Therefore, only its long-lived daughters are of concern for off-site exposures. In addition, if the parent (Ra-223) is not within a few millimeters of the surface, Rn-219 is not likely to emanate into the atmosphere [5].
Due to these considerations, only Rn-222 and Rn-220 fluxes were measured. The principal measurement technique was collection of a filtered gas sample from an accumulator and subsequent counting in a radon gas analyzer (described
ff·11:z.in Appendix 1) • Sequential alpha counting, starting immediately after sampling, allowed separation of Rn-222 from.Rn-220 (if present). Repetitive samples were taken from several locations during the survey period in an effort to evaluate the effect of fluctuations between individual measurements, due to varying meteorological and soil conditions. A second method using charcoal canisters was also employed as a check on the accumulator technique.
9

The presence of~n-219/was determined by dete~tion of
its volume
!auqh~ers deposited high particulat:e sampleon
filters, using gamma spectroscopy. Total Rn daughter levels
were also estimated by gross alpha activity on particulate
filters. From this, a total working level (WL)
determination was made.

IV. SURVEYRESULTS

(A) External Radiation Levels =’ Two areas of elevated external radiation levels have been identified by this survey. Figure 3 shows the two p,2’1 areas as they existed in November, 1980, at the time of the preliminary RMC site survey. As can be seen, both areas contained locations where levels exceeded 100 uR/hr at 1 meter, and in Area 2, gamma levels as high as_3-4 mR/hr were if”
detected, The total areas exceeding 20 uR/hr were about 3 acres in Area 1 and 9 acres in Area 2.
External i~mma levels measured in May and July of 1981 are shown in Figure 4. These levels had decreased significantly, especially in Area 1, due to continuing activities at the landfill • In both cases, contaminated

areas were covered with additional fill material. RMC estimates that about 4 feet of sanitary fill was added to the entire area denoted as Area 1, and that an equal amount of construction fill was added to most of Ar~a 2. As a
< result, only a small region of a few hundred square meters -h,r:,c f: :-:;>
in Area 1 exceeds 20 uR/hr. In Area 2, the total area
~
exceeding 20 uR/hr decreased by about 10%, and the highest
levels are now about 1600 uR/hr, near the Shuman buildin~.
Both areas were marked off in a 10 m by 10 m grid, based
(.
on a north-south line erected from a boundary marker, as
t,;.;_. laid out by a surveying team, as a reference line. Grid
11 *~~=r-111
,–. “,,
designations are shown in Figures Sand 6. At each grid point, external gamma levels at 1 m, and beta-gamma: count rates at 1 cm, were measured. Results of these measurements
ff· ‘{4-,’f1
are given in Tables 1 and 2.
Beta-gamma measurements at 1 cm from the surface are
given in cougt rates, rather than dose rates, due to the
–= …0
djfficulty in measuring beta dose rates accurately with end
window G-M tubes. Large differences between open-and closed-window readings indicate the possibility of surface contamination. Little surface contamination was found in Area 1, as would be expected due to fresh land fill cover over nearly the entire area.
Several isolated spots of surface contamination in Area 2 were indicated by beta-gamma measurements, and later confirmed by surface soil sampling. These spots are
generally located near the northwest edge of Area 2, which
includes the~ that bounds the landfill at that point.
Some erosion and run-off is evident along the top of the
fill, apparently uncovering deposits of radioa£tiye mate.J,_i_?l

in the process. Thus far, fresh construction fill has not
been added here, due to the inaccessibility of these spots.
A second region of surface contamination is found just
north of the Shuman building. It is not clear why material

appears on the surface here, except that it is possible that
some digging or excavation has occurred here in the past.
12
(Bl Surface Soil -Analyses
A total of 61 surface soil samples were gathered and

analyzed on-site for gamma activity. Samples were ‘normally stored 10 to 14 days to allow ingrowth of radium daughters.

,,. ,…

Concentrations of U-238, Ra-226 (from PB-214 and Bi-214), Ra-223, Pb-211 and Pb-212 were determined for each sample. Locations of surface soil samples are shown in Figures 7 and
,,.3,(
B, and the results in Table 3.
r,:2.

f· 51o
In all soil samples nothing other than uranium and/or
thorium decay chain nuclides and K-40 was detected. Off-site
background samples were on the order of 2 pCi/g for Ra-226. On-site samples ranged from about l to 21,000 pCi/g Ra-226,
and from less than 10 to 2,100 pCi/g U-238. In those cases
where elevated levels of Ra-226 were detected, the
concentrations of U-238 were generally anywhere from a
factor of 2 to 10 lower. In cases of elevated sample
activity, daughter products of both U-238 ~ :;:::,-. U-235 were
found.

In general, surface activity was limited to Area 2, as indicated by the surface beta-gamma measurements. Only two small regions in Area 1 showed contamination, both located near the access road across from the site offices.
In addition to on-site gamma analyses, a set of 12 samples were submitted to the RMC radiochemical laboratories for thorium and uranium~ determinations. The

13

results of these measurements are shown in Table 4. They show that~ samples contain. high levels of Th-230 .~ The
~
ratio of Th-230 to Ra-226 (Bi-214) is about 20, which indicatesftn ·~rfchment” of thorium in these residues, as discussed in Section v,(‘f.z~
(Cl Subsurface Soil Analysis
::… ,;:::
Subsurface contamination was assessed by extensive “logging” of holes drilled through the landfill at locations known or thought to contain radioactive materials. Several holes were drilled in a~eas known to contain contamination, then additional holes were drilled outward in all directions until no further contamination was encountered. A total of 43 holes were drilled, (11 in Areal and 32 in Area 2), inclµdjqg 2 off-site water monitoring wells. All holes were
a::: . -~
drilled with a 6-inch auger and lined with 4-inch PVC casing. The location of these auger holes is shown in Figures 9 and 10,
Each hole was scanned with a 2-inch by 2-inch Nal(Tl) detector and rate meter system for an initial indication of the location of subsurface contamination. Based on the initial scans, certain holes were selected for detailed gamma logging using the IG detector and MCA. A total of 19

holes were logged in this manner.
The results of the Nal(Tll counts and IG analyses are
shown in Table S. Concentrations of .Bi-214, as determined
f·~’ 14 ..-. U·J.’}3d!.1.,&;.~

by the IG systemr ranged from less than l to 19,000 pCi/g. For those holes where both Nal(Tl) and JG counts were made,

a good correlation between gross NaI(Tl) counts and Ra-226 concentrations, as determined by .in .&.it.l1analysis of the daughter Bi-214 by the JG system, was found. Figure 11 is a (f-Z>5 plot of Nal(Tl) count rate versus IG determination of Ra-226, and shows a nearly linear relationship between the two at concentrations near the action criteria. The conclusion is that the Nal(Tl) data is a good estimation of the Ra-226 concentration in soil, so long .-as the radionuclide mix is reasonably constant. I.n the case of West Lake Landfill, this has been shown to :be the case.
It was determined that the {subsurface/ deposits extended beyond areas where surface radiation measurements exceeded

action criterip. Figures 12 and 13 show the approximate
·-= area of~ contamination versus the area of elevated

surface radiation levels. The total difference in areas is
~
on the order of 5 acres.
The variations of contamination with depth are shown in Figure 14. As can be seen, the surface elevations vary by about 20 feet, with the highest elevations at locations of fresh fill. Contamination (> 5 pCi/g Ra-226) is found to extend from the surface, in several areas, to a depth of about 20 feet below surface, in two cases. In general, the

/ subsurface contamination appears to be a continuous single
‘2.;” “”···’
layeJ, ranging fr.om -cwo to fifteen feet thick, located 15
between elevations of 455 feet and 480 feet and covering 16 acres total area. •
In Figures 15-19, representations of the subsurface deposits are provided based on auger hole measurements.

These representations are consistent with the operating history of the site, which suggests that the contaminated material was moved onto the site within a few days’ time, and spread as cover ,.pver fill material. Thus, one would
>
expect a fairly continuous, thin layer of contamination, as indicated by survey results.
(D) Water Analyses
A total of 37 water samples were taken during this survey, 4 in the fall of 1980, and the remainder in the spring and summer of ·1981. Results of water analyses are shown in Table 6. p.73
JIBQ:of the sample alpha activities exceeded the MPC for Ra-226 (the most restrictive nuclide present) in water for unrestricted areas. ~sample exceeded the EPA gros§.
.:::—-.
.~ activity guidelines for drinking water and that was a sample of standing water near the Shuman building. Several
e;, ;r;;. ;;, >’
;»a • ; “Z
samples, including !,!l the leachate treatment plant samples,
exceeded the EPA gross beta drinking water standards.
Subsequent isotopic analyses indicated
->

that §the beta (E) Airborne Radioactivity Analyses
activity can be attributed to K-40. -= None of the off-site
samples exceeded either EPA standard.
16


Both ,gaseous and particulate airborne radio~ctivity
…::::.~
were sampled and analyzed during this study. Since it was known that the buried material consisted partially or totally of uranium ore residues, the sampling program concentrated on measuring~ and d;ughters in the air. Two methods were used: the first was a scintillation flask method for ~sand the second was analysis of filter

A series of grab samples using the accumulator method
(described in Appendix I) were taken between May and August
of 1981. A total of 111 samples from 32 locations were
collected. Results can be found in Table 7. Radon flux

~ levels ranged from 0.2 pCi/sg.m-s in low~ areas to \._ 86R pCi/sq.m-s in areas of surface contamination. L
~ f\. “‘”d.,n,e.ve.r.
Se.:::c,12,,
At three locations, repetitive measurements were made
over a period of two months. These results are plotted in
Figure 20. As can be seen, significant fluctuations were
observed at two locations. The fact that these .• t~_s;gaJ}W
were real and not measurement artifacts was later confirmed
by duplicate charcoal canister samples, as described below.

A total of 35 charcoal canister samples were gathered
at 19 locations over a three month period. The results are
listed in Table 8, and show levels ranging from 0.3
pCi/sq.m-s to 613 pCi/sq.m-s. On 24 different occasions,

;..
17

the charcoal can1sters and accumulator were placed in
essentially the same locations, at the same time, for
•.
duplicate sampling. The results of this side-by-side study are presented in Table 9, and show generally good correlation between the two methods,

A set of ~O minute/ high volume particulate air samples were taken to determine both short•-lived radon daughter concentrations and lon9-lived gross alpha activity. Sample
-.. .z_
results are shown in Table 10. The highest levels were
ff·
‘BJ-~.
detected in November, 1980, near and inside the Shuman
building. Only these two samples exceed MPC for radon

=-.
daughters for unrestricted areas.
In addition to the routine 10 minute samples, five~
=.
J!linutr high volume air samples were taken and counted immediately on the IG gamma spectroscopy system. The purpose of these analyses was to detect the presence of Rn-219 dauq_hters. All samples were taken near surface contamination and are listed in Table 11, In addition to Rn-222 daughter gamma activities, Rn-219 daughters were detected by measuring the low abundance _2amma rays of Pb-211, Concentrations of Rn-219 daughters ranged from 6E-ll uCi/cc to 9E-10 uCi/cc,

(Fl Vegetation Analysis
Vegetation samples included weed samples from on-site
locations and farm crop samples (winter wheat) from the

18

northwest boundary of the landfill. This location was
chosen due to possible run off from the fill into the •’ farm
field. No elevated activities were found in· these samples.

(G) Non-Radiological Analysis
Six composite samples were submitted to the RMC Environmental Chemistry Laboratory for priority pollutant analysis. Five samples were taken from auger holes (one from Area l and four from Area 2) and the sixth from the west Lake leachate treatment plant sludge. The results,
shown in Table 12, indicate a significant presence of organic solvents in Area 2 samples. The results of the

. ‘ ‘ leachate samples. sludge analysis were not as high as any of the soil
A chemical analysis of radioactive material from both areas was also performed by RMC labs and reported in Table 13. Results show elevated levels of parium and lead in most cases. /’D’t
~(Bl ~kground]Measurements and Remedial Action Criteria
Various off-site locations were selected for reference background measurements. The results of these measurements are summarized in Table 14, and can be compared with the established NRC target criteria for remedial action, for d this project, shown in Table 15. f-1/D f• I I I
19

v. CONCLUSIONS

Based on survey results, it is evident that the West Lake Landfill contains two areas of surface and/or subsurface contamination. These deposits yield detectable external radiation levels in both areas. However, only an area of less than 0.1 acre in Area 1 exceeds 20 uR/hr, while about 8 acres in Area 2 exceeds the 20 uR/hr criteria. The highest reading detected in the most recent survey was
1.6 mR/hr in Area 2, near the Shuman Building.
t
Analyses of soil samples from both areas, as well as in sjty measurements, show that the contaminants present at West Lake consist of uranium and uranium daughters. Chemical analyses reveal high concentrations of barium and sulfates in the radioactive deposits. These results tend to confirm the reports that this contaminated material is uranium and uranium ore, contained in leached barium sulfate residues, and presumably transferred from the Latty Avenue Site in Hazelwood, Missouri.
Analysis of soils also shows a high Th-230 to Ra-226 ratio. Since the target criteria for Ra-226 is the most restrictive of those contaminants present, it has been assumed that Ra-226 would be the controlling radionuclide for remedial action determinations. However, since Th-230 levels may be from 5 to. 5o times higher than Ra-226 concentrations, this assumption may be erroneous. It is likely that high concentrations of thorium resulted from
,/
20
separation of both uranium and radium from the ores, thus
•depleting• the ores of uranium and radium, or, •enciching•
the residues in thorium. This •enrichment• would also be
evident in the U-235 chain, despite the short half-lives of
Th-227 and Th-231, since the _!,ong-lived Pa-231,would remain ~
in the residues. The concentrations of Pa-231, in~erred from
Ra-223 determinations, are also shown to be high.
Auger hole measurements show that nearly all the
contamination present is located below the landfill
surface,although a few locations near the northwest berm in
Area 2 show surface, or near surface, deposits. These
deposits range from 2 to 15 feet in thickness, and appear to
form a contiguous layer covering an area of about 14 acres
(68,000 sq.yd.) in Area 2 and about 2 acres (10,000
sq.yd.)in Area 1. If an average thickness of 2 yards is
assumed, the estimated total volume is[l~O-O ___c_u-.~.,Jwhich
:>
corresponds to roughly 170,000 tons of soil. This implies that if the source of contamination was the Latty Avenue JI
material, the original volume of 40,000 tons has been
diluted by a factor of about 4, which is not unexpected,
with the continual movement and spreading of materials
during fill operations.

As discussed previously, the auger hole measurements detected deposits exceeding 5 pCi/g Ra-226 within a few feet of the surface, in areas where surface external radiation levels were indistingyish9ble from normal background levels.
21

These results confirm suspected difficulties in detecting buried materials with surface measurements, even w~en using relatively sensitive portable survey instruments.
At no time has radioactivity in off-site water samples been above any applicable guidelines. 1These results indicate that the buried ore residues are probablr not soluble and are not moving off-si~ vJa ground water. On.site samples have shown some gross beta activity above EPA drinking water guidelines (attributable to K-40); however, gross alpha and Ra-226 levels are within limits. The absence of significant contamination in the leachate liquid or sludge is consistent with the implication that the buried material is~ moving through the landfill.
~
As would be expected,, radon flux emanation rates were highest at locations of surface, or near surface, contamination. At locations where the material is covered by several feet of fill, flux levels are near background rates.
Particulate ~ samples established indicated the

presence of Rn-222 and Rn-219 daughters near the locations ~
of surface deposits. However, concentrations are very low,
and do not exceed allowable levels for unrestricted areas,
except in one location, In general, cover of a few feet of
fill reduces airborne concentrations to near background
levels.

22
The fact that West Lake is an active landfill presents

problems for performing radiologicalseveral serious
‘ assessments and remedial actions. In the first place, as
the landfill radiological the reduction conditions characteristics. of radiation change, These levels in so changes Areal do the were ebetween surface vident in November
1980, and activities May 1981. It is will obscure~ possible detect that future landfill able surface radiation
levels at the site.

REFERENCES

•’
Ill u. s. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Letter Contract:
NRC-02-080-034, August 13, 1980.
[21 Missouri Department of Natural Resources, “Groundwater
Investigation, West Lake Landfill, St. Louis County,
September 30 through October 1, 1980.”
[31 St. Louis Post-Dispatch, May 30, 1976.
(4) u. s. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Office of
Inspection and Enforcement, Region III, IE Inspection
Report No. 76-01, June and August, 1976.
[5) Crawford, D. J., “Radiological Characteristics
Rn-219”, Health Physics, Vol. 39, No. 3, pp. 450 •

. ,.,..—-.-.—-.
24

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Figure 11. Auger hole Na! (Tl) count rate ver5us Ra-226 concentration, by the I.G. in situ measurements. Data is from bore holes 21 , 31 , 6, 19 and 20. as determined 16, 32, 22,

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18 3 32 21 16 2 17 22 30 31 23 11 1 10 8 7 4 5 13 34 20 33 6 19 35 40 39 42 12 9 24 25 26 27 28 29 36 37 38 41 AUGER HOLE NUMBER
430· .. ——————————–·———·
Figure 14. Auger hole elevations and location of contamination within each hole.

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The blackened areas indicate the estimated extent of contamination exceed.ing 5pCi/g Ra-226, based on surface and auger hole measurements.
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~Figure 16. Cross section B-B (from Figure 9) showing subsurface deposits in Area 1. The blackened areas indicate the estimated extent of contamination exceed.ing 5pCi/g Ra-226, based on surface and auger hole measurements.

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Figure 17. Cross section C-C (from Figure 10) showing subsurface deposits in Area 2. Blackened areas indicate the estimated location of contamination exceeding 5pCi/g Ra-226, based on surface and auger hole measurements.
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Figure 18. Cross section D-D (from Figure 10) showing subsurface deposits in Area 2. Blackened areas indicate the estimated location of contamination exceeding 5pCi/g Ra-226, based on surface and auger hole measurements.
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Fiaure 20. Radon-222 flux measurements at three locations in Area 2, for May, 1981.
Table l
Grid Location
GOOE HOOE IOOE JOOE KOOE LOOE MOOE NOOE POOH POOI QOOI POOJ QOOJ POOK QOOK COOF DOOF EOOF FOOF GOOF HOOF I00F JOOF KOOF LOOF HOOF NOOF OOOF EOOG FOOG GOOG HOOG I00G JOOG KOOG LOOG
MOOG
NOOG OOOG EOOH FOOH GOOH BOOB IOOH Gamma Radiation Levels and Beta-Gamma

Count Rates at Grid Locations in Area l .
NaI Exposure Beta-Gamma Count Beta-Gamma Count Count Rate Rate Rate w/window Rate w/o window
(c/min) (uR/hr) (c/min) (c/min)
1000 10 30 40
900 9 60 50
1200 11 30 50
800 8 40 40
800 8 20 30
1200 11 20 30
800 8 40

40
760 7 40 30
1100 10 50

50
1200 11 40 30
1000 10 50 50
1100 10 50 50
1200 11 40 60
1100 10 40

30
1200 11 30 50
900 9 40

50
900 9 30 40
1100 10 40

50
1200 11 30 40
900 9 40 40
1000 10 40 40
1200 11 40 40
2000 ¥’ 16 40 50

2700 20 50 50
2100 17 40 60
1500 12 60 60
1000 10 40 60
800 8 30 30
1100 10 20

30
1000 10 30 60
900 9 40

40
1000 10 20 40
1200 11 30 30
1000 10 30 40
1600 13 60 70
1300 11 40 50
2200 17 60 50
1300 11 30

40
50 40
1100 10 40

40
900 9 30 30
1100 10 30

50
1200 11 50 40
1000 10 40 50
44 4,-Loe,,$~=-/• 3E,
Table 1, cont.
Na! Exposure Beta-Gamma Count Beta-Gamma Count Grid Count Rate Rate Rate w/window Rate w/o window
Location (c/min) (uR/hr) (c/min) •. (c/min)
————————–T————–.
JOOH 1000 10 50 40
KOOH 1000 10 20 50
LOOH 1100 20 50
MOOH 1200 11 50 40
NOOH 1500 12 50 80
OOOH 40

40
EOOI 1000 10 40 30
FOO! 1000 10 30 40
GOO! 800 8 30 30
HOO! 1000 10 50 40
IOOI 1100 10 30 60
JOO! 1000 10 30 40
KOO! 900 30

9 40
LOOI 1000 10 30 40
MOO! 900 9 40 40
NOOI 1100 10 40 40
0001 1100 30

10 50
EOOJ 1100 10 40 60
FOOJ 1200 11 30 40
GOOJ 1300 11 50 40
HOOJ 1200 11 50 50
IOOJ 1100 10 50 50
JOOJ 1000 10 30 30
KOOJ 1100 10 40

40
LOOJ 1000 10 40 50
MOOJ 1200 11 50 40
NOOJ 900 40

9 30
OOOJ 900 9 40 40
EOOK 1000 5010 50
FOOK 900 9 40 50
GOOK 1000 5010 50
HOOK 1100 10 50 60
IOOK 800 8 50 50
JOOK 900 9 40 40
KOOK 900 9 40 40
LOOK 1000 10 30 30
MOOK 900 9 30 60
NOOK 800 8 30 40
000K 900 40

9 40
EOOL 800 8 40 60
FOOL 1000 10 50 50
GOOL 900 9 40 40
HOOL 900 9 40 60
IOOL 1000 10 50 50
JOOL 1000 10 50 60

KOOL 1000 10 50 50
LOOL 900 9 20 30
i I
45
Table 1, cont.
NaI Exposure Beta-Gamma Count Beta-Gamma Count Grid Count Rate Rate Rate w/window Rate w/o window .Location (c/min) (UR/hr) (c/min) ; (c/min)
MOOL 1100 10 30 40
NOOL 1000 10 50 40
OOOL 900 9 20 40
FOOM 900 7 30 40
GOOM 1100 10 20 30
BOOM 1000 10 30 40
IOOM 1000 10 40 50
JOOM 800 8 30 40
KOOM 1000 10 40 40
LOOM 1100 10 40 30
MOOM 1000 10 30 30
NOOM 1000 10 30 50
DOOM 1000 10 30 40
FOON 900 9 30 50
GOON 1000 10 30 30
BOON 1100 10 30 30
IOON 900 9 40 30
JOON 900 9 40 50
KOON 800 8 40 60
LOON 900 9 40 30
MOON 1100 10 30 30
GOOO 1000 10 40 60
BOOO 1100 10 20 30
IOOO 1000 10 20 30
JOOO 1200 11 30 40
KOOO 1000 10 40 50

46

Table 2
Grid Loca.tion
BOOF CODE COOF COOG DOOB DOOC DODD DODE DOOF DOOG DOOH DODI DOOJ EOOA EOOB EOOC EOOD EOOE EOOF EOOG EOOH EOOI EOOJ FOOA FOOB FOOC FOOD FODE FOOF FOOG FOOH FOO! FOOJ
GODA
GOOB GOOC GOOD GODE GOOF GOOG
GOOH
“-c…,.
GOO! GOOJ
BODA
Gamma Radiation Levels and Beta-Gamma
•.
count Rates at Grid Locations in Area 2
Na! Exposure Beta-Gamma Count Beta-Gamma Count Count Rate Rate Rate w/window Rate w/o window
(c/min) (uR/hr) (c/min) (c/min)
600 10 40 40
600 10 20 20
600 10 20 30
700 11 30 40
800 12
800 12
700 11 20 40
500 9 20 20
600 10 20 20
700 11 30 50
800 12 so 50
700 11 30 50

1100 15 30 40
500 9
800 12
800 12
700 11
700 11 30 30
500 9 20 20
500 9 30

30
800 12 30 40
700 11 30 30
900 13 30 30
800 12
900 13
800 12 40 40
900 13 30 30

1000 14 30 40
500 9 30 30
800 12 40 40
700 11 50 50
800 12 30 40
800 12 30

30
800 12
900 13
800 12 30 40
900 13 40

40
700 11 30 40
1000 14 30 40
1000 14

40 40
800 12 30
40
800 12 30 30
800 12 20 40
800 12

47

Table 2, cont.


Na! Exposure Beta-Gamma Count Beta-Gamma Count Grid Count Rate Rate Rate w/window Rate w/o window
Location (c/min) (uR/hr) (c/min) (c/min)
BQOB 800 12
B00C 800 12 30 30
HOOD 1000 14 30
40
BOOE 900 13 40 40
HOOF 800 12 30 30 BOOG 800 12 30
40
BOOH 700 11 30 30
BODI 600 10 30 30
BOOJ 900 13 30 30 BOOK 800 12 40 60
HOOL 800 12 30 50
IOOA 900 13
IOOB 1000 14
IOOC 1000 14 30 30
I00D 900 13 40

40
!ODE 800 12 40
40
I00F 800 12 20 40
IOOG 900 13 30 40
!OOH 800 12 30 30 I00I 600 10 40
40
IOOJ 900 13 40
40
!DOK 900 13 40 60 IDOL 1100 15 40 80
JOOA 900 13
JOOB 800 12
JOOC 900 13
JOOD 1000 14

30 50 JOOE 900 13
40 40
JOOF 1200 16 30
40
JOOG 1000 14 40 40
JOOH 800 12 40 40
JODI 600 10 40

50
JOOJ 900 13 30 30
JOOK 900 13 40 40
JOOL 600 10 30 30
KOOB 1000 14
KOOC 1100 15
K00D 1200 40

16 50KOOE 1100 15 40
60
KOOF 2000 23 30 40
KOOG 1400 18 40 40
KOOH 1000 40

14 40KOOI 1000 14 40
60
KOOJ 800 12 20 30
KOOK 800 3012 30
KOOL 800 12 20 40
LOOB 1000 14
48
i

Table 2,
Grid Location
LOOC LOllD LODE LOOF
*
LOOG

LOOH
LOOI
LOOJ
LOOK
LOOL

*
L73E

MOOB MOOC MOOD MOOE MOOF MOOG
MOOH

MODI
MOOJ
MOOK
MOOL
NOOB
NOOC
NODD
NOOE
NOOF
NOOG
NOOH
NOOI
NOOJ
NOOK
NOOL
oooc
OOOD
OOOE
OOOF
OOOG
OOOH
000I
* OOOJ
OOOK OOOL
POOD
\
PODE
POOF
POOG
cont.
NaI Count Rate (c/min)
1100 1800 2600 2500 >50000 7000 2300 1300 2100 700 >50000 1100 1500 1900 3700 8000 3600 5000 7000 1800 900 900 1200 1300 1600 2000 3300 1000 1000 47000 2300 1000 900 1200 1100 1400 1400 900 1000 900 >50000 1500 600 1100 1200 1000 1000
Exposure Beta-Gamma Count ieta-Gamma Count Rate Rate w/window Rate w/o window
(uR/hr) (c/min) (c/min)
15
21 50 50
27 40 40
27 940 1000

640 2100 2200
55 70 120
25 140 140
17 40 80
24 50 50
11 40 60

400
15
19
22
35 80 80
60 80 90
35 50 50
44 40 50
55 80 90
21 60 70
13 30 40
13 30 60
16
17
20
23
32
14 30 40
14 40 50

210 680 1020
25 30 30
14. 40 50
13 30 50
16
15
18
18 50 60
13 40 40
14 40 50
13 20 40

840 4800 5200
19 50 50
10 20 20
15
16
14 40 60
14 30 50

49
~~-(!-31
Table 2, cont.

Na! Exposure Beta-·Gamma Count 8eta-Gamma Count Grid Count Rate Rate Rate w/window Jtate w/o window Location (c/min) (uR/hr) (c/min) (c/min)
POOH 1100 14 30 50 POOI 1000 14 50 60 POOJ 1000 14 400 50 POOK 20000 115 240 300 POOL .3300 32 130 130 POOM 500 9 POON 500 9 QOOE 1000 14 QOOF 900 13 QOOG 1000 14 30 4·0 QOOH 1000 14 30 40 QOOI 800 12 30 60 QOOJ 800 12 30 40 QOOK 800 12 30 40 QOOL 1200 16 40 40 QOOM 1300 17 70 70 QOON 600 10 20 40 ROOF 1000 14 ROOG 900 13 ROOH 900 13 40 40 ROOI 1000 14 30 30 ROOJ 800 12 40 40 ROOK 900 13 40 40 ROOL 1000 14 60 60 ROOM 700 11 40 40 ROON 700 11 40 50 ROOO 600 10 20 30 SOOG 800 12 SOOH 900 13 30 60 SOOI 900 13 40 50 SOOJ 1000 14 50 60 SOOK 900 13 40 40 SOOL 1200 16 40 40 SOOM 6000 48 BO 80 SOON 500 9 30 30 6000 2300 25 90 90 SOOP BOO 12 30 40 TOOG 800 12 TOOH 1100 15 TOOI 1000 14
~ ‘l’OOJ 900 13 30 50
TOOK 1000 14 30 40
TOOL 1000 14 40 40

· TOOM 1600 60
20 70″· TOON 2500 27 180 200
TOOO 3100 31 70 70
TOOP 16000 98 600 700

50
Table 2, cont.

Na! Exposure Beta-Gamma Count ‘. Beta-Gamma Count Grid Count Rate Rate Rate w/window ‘ Rate w/o window
Location (c/min) (uR/hr) (c/min) (c/min)
TOOQ 1500 19 30
40
TOOR 500 9 30 40 TOOS 700 11 UOOH 700 11 0001 900 13 UOOJ BOO 12 UOOK 700 11 40
50
UOOL 900 13 50 50
ODOM 1000 14 40 50 ODON 2800 100
29 140
0000 3500 34 20 BO
* UOOP >50000 450 1300 1500
0000 35000 170 400 720
ODOR 1500 4019 40
uoos 1000 14
VOOJ BOO 12
VOOK 900 40

13 40
VOOL 1000 50
14 50
VOOM 900 13 40
40
VOON 900 13 40 40 vooo 13000 85 500 500 VOOP 4700 42 70
70
VOOQ 12000 BO 170 190 VOOR 5000 44
100 100
voos 700 11
WOOK BOO 12
WOOL 800 12 30

30 WOOM 800 12 30 30 WOON 900 4013 50
wooo 1000 14 50 50 WOOP 2100 120 600 800
wooo 40000 190 900 1100
WOOR 20000 115 140 170
woos 1100 15
XOOK 900 13
XOOL 1100 15
XOOM 1100 15 40

40
XOON 1000 14 40 40 xooo 1100 15 30
50 XOOP 4000 37 120 160
xooo 12000 BO 300 400
* XOOR >50000 740 1900 2000
xoos 1500 19
{
YOO! 1000 14
\~,;__.
YOOJ 1300 17
YOOK 1600 20
YOOL 1600 20

51
‘.
Table 2, cont.
Grid Location ——– Nal Count Rate (c/min) ———. Exposure Rate• (uR/hr)——-. Beta-Gamma Count Rate w/window (c/min) —————. • $eta-Gamma Count Rate w/o window (c/min) —————.
YOOM YOON 1100 3000 15 30 40 30 40 50
YOOO 1700 20 40 50
YOOP 2100 24 40 60
YOOQ 9000 66 200 280
YOOR 40000 190 1000 1400
YOOS 3600 35
ZOO! 800 10 40 40
ZOOJ 1000 14 40 50
ZOOK 1800 21 70 90
ZOOL 3200 32 80 BO
ZOOM 3700 35 120 150
ZOON 5000 44 110 130
zooo 3300 32 80 120
ZOOP 1900 22 50 60
ZOOQ 2400 26 50 60
ZOOR 12000 80 300 380
zoos 2600 27
aOOI 900 13 40 50
aOOJ 900 13 20 40
aOOK 1300 17 50 90
aOOL 1800 21 60 80
aOOM 1900 22 120 140
aOON 1200 16 90 100
aOOO 1300 17 40 40
aOOP 1000 14 20 30
aOOQ 2200 24 60 60
aOOR 2300 25 70 100
aOOS 2600 27
bOOI 900 13
bOOJ 900 13
bOOP 800 12 40 50
bOOQ 700 11 30 70
bOOR 2400 26 60 90
bOOS 2400 26
cOON 700 11
cOOO 700 11 40 40
cOOP cOOQ cOOR 1000 1300 1900 14 17 22 50 60 50 50 80 80
coos 1800 21
dOOO dOOP 1400 18 40 30 60 50
,, dOOQ dOOR 2000 23 30 60 60 70
dOOS 2000 23
dOOT 900 13

52

t-

Table 2, cont.


Na!
Exposure Beta-Gamma Count B~ta-Gamma Count
Grid Count Rate Rate Rate w/window Rate w/o windowLocation (c/min) (uR/hr) (c/min)
(c/min)
dOOU 1800 21
dOOV 2200 24 50 50
dOOW 2500 27 100

100dOOX 700 11 30 30
eOOL 600 10 70 70
eOOO 1700 14
e950 1000 14
eOOP

70 100e95Q 1000 14 40
40
e95R 1300 17 40 80
e95S 1800 21
e95T 2500 27
e95U 3500 34
e95V 3400 33 100

100e95W 4000 37 120 140e95X 3000 30 100 100e95Y 1500 19 50 60
e95Z 1700 20 70 80
eOOa 2300 25

90 100fOOK 600 10 60 60
fOOL 700 11 50 80
fOOO 1100 15 40

60
f57Q 3400 33
fOOR 2700 28 60

60
f00S 2700 28
fOOT 4500 41
fOOU 6000 50
fOOV 50000 230 1060

1080fOOW 6000 50 120 140fOOX 6000 50 100 100fOOY 1500 19 50 60fOOZ 1000 14 40
40
fOOa 1000 14 30 50fOOM 60 60gOOK 700 11 50 50gOOL 600 10 80 90
gOOM 600 10 60 90
gOOO 2000 23

80 110gOOP 2000 23 50 90gOOQ 3300 32 70 100
gOOR 21000 120 300 420
g00S 8000 62
gOOT 6000 50

gOOU 15000 95
gOOV 11000 77 180 260
gOOW 7000 56 110 140
gOOX 2500 27 50 60

Table 2, cont.
NaI Exposure Beta-Gamma Count Beta-Gamma Count Grid Count Rate Rate Rate w/window Rate w/o window
Location (c/min) (uR/hr) (c/min) (c/min)
gO’OY 2200 24 90 120
gOOZ 1500 19 50 70
gOOa 1000 14 30 30
hOOK 700 11 30

30
hOOL 800 12 70 70
hOOM 900 13 70 80
hOON 1000 14
hOOO 3100 31 70 70
hOOP 17000 105 180 280
• hOOQ >50000 1050 4200 4200 hOOR 27000 140 560
660
h00S 45000 205 900 1080
hOOT 4000 37 150 150
hOOU 6500 52 170 190
hOOV 10000 72 240 250
hOOW 3800 36 200 300
hOOX 1000 14 60 80
hOOY 1800 21 50 50
hOOZ 700 · 11 20 30
hOOa 700 11 40 40
h72P 8000

9400
iOOK 800 12 40 50
iOOL 900 13 60 60
iOOM 1700 20 90 110
iOON 8000 60 110 110
iOOO 36000 175 1000 1100
• iOOP >50000 1600 7200 8400
• iOOQ >50000 1170 2800 3600 iOOR 30000 155 900 1120 i00S 800 60 180 300 iOOT 1600 20 40 40 iOOU 3000 30 130
180
iOOV 2200 24
iOOW 1400 18 40 60
iOOX 1000 14 40

60
iOOY 1500 19 70 70
jOOK 800 12 60 60
jOOL 900 60

13 80
jOOM 2000 23 90 90
jOON 6000 49 130 160
jOOO 10000 70 130 180
jOOP 20000 115 400 420
jOOQ 16000 98 410 500
jOOR 21000 120 560 700
j00S 1900 22 70 90
jOOT 1200 16 50 60
jOOU 1000 60

14 60
54
J

Table 2, cont.

Na! Exposure Beta-Gamma Count Beta-Gamma Count
Grid Count Rate Rate Rate w/window Rate w/o window
Location (c/min) (uR/hr) (c/min) (c/min)

jOOV 1800 21 70 70
jllOW 1200 16 70 BO
jOOX 1000 14 50 50
jOOY 1100 15 60 60
kOOL 1000 14 70 70
kOOM 1100 15 90 110
kOON 1000 14 60 90
kOOO 1000 14 70 90
kOOP 1100 15 80 110
kOOQ 1400 18 40 40
kOOR 7500 58 140 180
k00S 1100 15 50 50
kOOT 1100 15 30 50
kOOU 1700 20 60 60
kOOV 1700 20 50 60
kOOW 700 11 40 40
kOOX 700 11 40 50
kOOY 1000 14 40 50
lOOL 900 13 70 70
100M 900 13 70 80
100N 800 12 70 70
1000 900 13 80

90
100P 700 11 60 70
1000 900 13 50 50
lOOR 800 12 40 40
100S 1200 16 40 50
100T 1200 16 60 70
lOOU 1100 15 60 80
100V 900 13 30 40
mOOO 800 12 80 80
mOOP 700 11 60 60
mOOQ 700 11 40 40
mOOR 900 13 30 50
moos 1000 14 40 40

(;:}Reading >50 ,000 on Na!, reading was made with end window GM tube with beta shield.
55

Table 3
Surface Soil Sample Radionuclide Concentrations (pCi/g), by Gamma Analysis
Location Sample K-40 U-23S Ra-226 Pb-214 Bi-214 Ra-223 Rn-219 Pb-211 Pb-212
GOOC Area 2, Berm 2 .4El —–2 .lEO 2 .lEO 2 .lEO ——————-.
iOOO Area 2, Near Shuman Bld —–3 .OE2 S.6E2v’ 9.6E2 7 .6E2 l.6E2 3 .1E2 3.6E2 —-.
ZOON Area 2, Road Surface —–4 .4El 6.0E2” 6.6E2 S .4E2 2 .OEl 2.0El ———.
OOOJ Area 2, Near Berm —–S.7E2v 2.3E3-‘ 2.SE3 2.0E3 6.0E2 7.SE2 9.6E2 ·—-.
OOOG Area 2, Near Berm 2.lEl —–1.0El.l 1.lEl 9 .6EO ——————-.
NOOI Area 2, Near Berm —–S .SE2/ 2 .OEJ• 2 .OE3 2.1E3 4.9E2 7.9E2 S.9E2 —-.
MOOE Area 2, Berm 1.3El —–3.9El-‘ 4.2El 3 .6EO ——————-.
FOOC Area 2, Berm 1.4El —–1.7EO 1.9EO 1.SEO ——————-.
SOOK Area 2, Near Gravel Pile 3 .2El —–3 .9EO 3 .9EO ————————.
u, iOOP Area 2, Near Shuman Bldg —–S. 3 E2• 4 .OE3• 4 .4E3 3 .6E3 9 .6E2 9.6E2 l.SE3 —-.
“‘ SOOL Area 2, Near Gravel Pile 2.SEl —–2 .SEO 2 .4EO 2.6EO ——————-.hOOO Area 2, Near Shuman Bldg —–1.SE2 11 3 .OEl-‘ 3.4E2 2.6E2 1.7E2 1.9E2 1.SE2 —-.SPEC Off-site Bkg Earth City 2.6El —–2 .SEO 2 .SEO 2 .SEO ——————-.iOOP Area 2, Duplicate —–6 .4E2> 2. 7E3′ 3 .OE3 2 .4E3 2 .3E3 l.2E3 1.1E3 —-.SPEC Off-site Bkg Earth City 1.9El —–2. 7EO 2 .SEO 2.9EO ——————-.zooo Area 2, Road Surface —–2.SEl S.2El” S.7El 4 .SEl . 3 .lEl 3 .lEl 3 .4El —-.SPEC Leachate Treatment Sludge ———-6 • 9 EOv 7 • 9 EO S.9EO ——————-.NOOI Area 2, Near Berm —–7.6E2• 7.1E3′ 1.0E4 4.2E3 2.2E3 2.0E3 l.SE3 —-.SPEC Area 1, Base 6 Near Road —–6. S E2 • 2 .4E3′ 2.7E3 2 .1E3 l.6E3 1.4E3 l .OE3 —-.POOI Area 2, Near Berm 1.7El 1.0EO 7 .OEO• 7 .3EO 6 .SEO ——————-.SPEC Area 1, Base 7 Near Road —–3.7El 2. 7E2′ 3 .4E2 2 .1E2 2.9El —–S.SEl 2.2EO SPEC Leachate Treatment Sludge ———-2.JEO —–2.JEO ——————-.SPEC Area 1, Base 6 Near Road —–6 • S E2J 2. 7 E3• 3.lE3 2. SE3 1.2E3 1.1E3 9.SE2 —-.SPEC Area 1, Base S Brown Soil —–3 .9E2J l .1E3′ 1.6E3 S.2E2 2.SE2 3. SE2 ,,3 • .,7E2 —-.SPEC Area 1, Base S Black Soil —–3 .1 E2′ 6. SE2’ 7.SE2 S.SE2 3.1E2 3 .2E2 3.2E2 —-.SPEC Off-site Bkg Taussig Road 3.2El —–2 .SEO 2 .4EO 2.6EO —————2 .4EO SPEC Area 1, Base S White Soil —–2 .1 EJ”‘ 2 .1 E4~ 2. 3 E4 1.9E4 S.3E3 S.3E3 S.OE3 —-.iOOP Area 2, Duplicate —–6 .2E2,; 3 .SE3″‘ 3.7E3 3 .2E3 1.3E3 1.3E3 1.7E3 —-.JOOG Area 1, Hot Spot —–3 .4El 9. 7El• 1.1E2 S .3El 4 .3El 4 .3El 4 .6El —-.MOOH Area 1, Low Level Area 2.2El —–2.7EO 2.6EO 2.SEO —————3 .OEO KOOF Area 1 2 .OEl —–3.7EO 3 .6EO 3 .SEO —————2.lEO SPEC Area 1, East Berm 2 .4El —–2 .6EO 2.2EO 2.9EO ——————-.
—·

·1

Table 3 cont.
Location Sample K-40 U-238 Ra-226 Pb-214 Bi-214 Ra-223 Rn-219 Pb-211 Pb-212 I00L Area 1 ———-2 .9EO 3 .2EO 2 .6EO —————2 .3EO
SPEC Area 1, East Berm 1.BEl —–2 .4EO 2.2EO 2 .6EO ——————-.
POOH Area 1, Near Road 3 .OEl —–4.3EO 5.2EO 3.3EO —————1.BEO
N62H Ares1 1 2 .5El —–4.lEO 3 .4EO 4.7EO —————3 .OEO OllJ Area 1, Near Berm —–9 • 4 E:z-14 • 2 E3v 4 • 6 E3 3 .9E3 2 .OE3 2.1E3 2.1E3 —-.L73E Area 2, Side of Hill —–3.BE2v l.1E3v l.2E3 l .OE3 4 .5E2 4.6E2 3.BE2 —-.KOOF Area 1 3.9El —–4. 4EO 5. 2EO 3 .SEO ——————-.
N62H Area 1, Fill 2.7El —–3. lEO 3 .lEO 3 .lEO —————1.3EO
NOOF Area 1, Fill ———-2.6EO 3 .OEO 2. lEO —————2. 6EO
JOOG Area 1, Fill ———-2 .3EO 3.5EO 1.lEO —————1.5EO
K66E Area 1, Near Parking Lot ———-1.5El.; 1.7El 1.3El ——————-.
IOOI Area 1, Fill 3.lEl —–3 .BEO —–3.BEO —————1.6EO
IJ1
_,
,,…..
Soil Radiochemical Analysis
Table 4

Bi-214 from Gamma Spectroscopy —————–Activity pCi/gm—————–.Sample U-238 Th-230 Bi-214
(All +/-25%) ————————-.
(All+/-25%) (All+/-25%) Area 1 Surface (1980)
3.8 82
2.1 Area 1 Surface (1980)
12 597 25 CD Area 1 Borehole 1 (1980)
U1 21 188 44 Area 2 Surface (1980) 175
6,095 1,488 Area 2 Surface (1980) 18
338 9.4 Base 5 Surface (1981) 101 178,000 ,/ k 19,000 Base 6 surface (1981)
54 46,100 2,600 Borehole 11 (1981)
82 29,200 1,800 NllJ Surface (1981) 127
27,200 2 ,ooo.· • OllJ Surface (1981)
1.0 52,000 3,900
~,50,000 l.6El l.6E2 l.7E2 l .6E2 ————————.
01 >50,000 7 .5E2 6.5E2 9E2 l,7E2 ————l,4E2 ——.
02 >50,000 2 ,2E4 2 ,4E4 ( l,2E4) ——————4,2E3 ——.
03 >50,000 4 ,OE3 3 .OE3 4,BE3 ——l .1E3 ——2 .1E2 ——.
04 >50,000 l,3E3 l.2E3 l .4E3 9 .3El ————————.
05 20,000 2 .4El ——-2 .4El ————8 ,

Post

1981-10-05 – NRC – RMC Report – Site Visit – West Lake Landfill, St. Louis County, Missouri

liOoAr REPORT ON SITE VISIT – WEST LAKE LANDFILL ST. LOUIS COUNTY, MISSOURI (j 4°249268 Radiation Management Corporation Midwest Division 3356 Commercial Avenue Northbrook, IL 60062 (312)291-1030 TABLE OF CONTENTS Page LIST OF FIGURES i LIST OF TABLES ii INTRODUCTION 1 SITE CHARACTERISTICS 2 RADIOLOGICAL SURVEY 5 SUMMARY 9 APPENDIX A – Draft Site Survey Plan. Figure 1 Figure 2 Figure 3 Figure 4 Figure 5 LIST OF FIGURES West Lake Landfill Aerial Survey External Radiation Survey, Landfill External Radiation Levels at 1 Meter Above Surface, Area 1. External Radiation Levels at 1 Meter Above Surface, Area 2 Location of Air, Water and Soil Samples I- •’) LIST OF TABLES Table I Radon Daughter Air Sample Results Table II Water Sample Results Table III Soil Sample Results INTRODUCTION Iii fI III I1I I. INTRODUCTION In September and November, 1980, Radiation Management Corporation (RMC) visited the West Lake Landfill in St. Louis County, Missouri. The purpose of these visits was to obtain sufficient data to allow RMC to prepare a detailed site radiological survey plan. This survey has been scheduled for spring 1981, and is designed to clearly define the radiological conditions at West Lake Landfill. All work has been performed under Letter Contract: NRC-02-20-034 (Radiological Evaluation of Burial Grounds) between RMC and the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC). Two visits have been made to this site, the first of which occurred on Sep tember 24th. During this visit RMC met site personnel, discussed past, present and future site activities, performed a visual inspection of the site, and arranged for a second, more detailed site visit. This second visit took place November 12-14, 1980. The visit had been delayed over one month due to ongoing landfill operations in an area of interest to RMC. During the second visit, a series of preliminary radiological measurements were made. These measurements included external dose rates, grab air sample evaluations and water and surface soil analyses. The purpose of these measurements was to better define the location of buried material, and to demonstrate that no significant radiological hazards to site personnel exist at this time due to the buried material. As a result of these visits, two extensive areas of contamination have been defined on the landfill site. These areas are not normally occurpied, with one exception as noted in the report. Based on preliminary measurements, RMC concludes that radiation exposures to site workers are minimal. ri rt II. SITE CHARACTERISTICS Although extensive studies of the West Lake Landfill site characteristics have not yet been completed by RMC, the preliminary visits have yielded the basic site information provided below. The radiological history of the site has been traced through discussions with site personnel and review of documents obtained from the NRC, State of Missouri and St. Louis area firms and agencies. (A) Site Profile The West Lake Landfill is located on St. Charles Rock Road just west of the Tausig Road intersection in Bridgeton, MO. The site is about one (1) mile northwest of Route 270 and approximately 1*5 miles east of the Missouri River. It is located in a combined rural-industrial area, and is bounded on three sides by farm land and on the fourth by St. Charles Rock Road, beyond which are located several commercial and industrial establishments. The nearest residential area is a trailer park located about 3/4 of a mile southeast of the landfill. The site is approximately 200 acres and consists of a quarry, stone and limestone processing and storage areas, and several active and inactive landfills. The sanitary landfills are open to the public anytime during normal working hours. West Lake Landfill keeps track of entries for the purpose of assessing fees for disposal, however access is not controlled for any other purpose. J n Preliminary discussions with the Missouri Department of Natural Resources n confirm that at least a portion of the site is within the Missouri River I floodplain. In addition, alluvial ground water level appears to be very near the surface in this area. These considerations prompted the Missouri Geological I. Survey, in 1973, to propose to classify the site as hazardous under the then 1 1 current operating procedures. In addition, samples from perimeter monitoring wells taken in 1977 and 1978 indicated some movement of leachate into those i wells, based on chemical (not radiological) analyses. However, recent studies by the Department of Natural Resources indicate little or no surface or sub- I surface movement of leachate from the site. Leachate from the active sanitary _ landfill is collected in an observation well, pumped to trucks and transported • to a sewage treatment plant in St. Louis. At this time, there is no evidence | of significant ground water contamination, although geological reports indicate a potential for such problems. 1 p (B) Site Radiological Hisotry I In June 1976, the St. Louis Post-Dispatch printed a story alleging that radio3 active material had been erroneously dumped in the West Lake Landfill in 1973. The source of this material was identified as the Cotter Corporation, Hazelwood J . Missouri, Latty Avenue Site. I I An NRC investigation conducted by Region III in 1977 concluded that about q 7 tons of UsOe, contained in 8700 tons of barium sulfate leachate, had been mixed with about 39,000 tons of soil at Latty Avenue and the entire volume disposed of at the West Lake Landfill. The earlier study by the Post-Dispatch (1976) claimed only 9000 tons (presumably the barium sulfate leachate) had been buried, and that the remaining material had not been disposed of at West Lake. The Post-Dispatch alleged that the contractor hauling the dirt had admitted falsifying invoices for about 40,000 tons of soil. Discussions with the site superintendent, Mr. Vernon Fehr, have indicated that he recalls the specific shipments and could accurately locate the material. No records were kept of the disposals, but Mr. Fehr recalled that a large quantity of material was dumped, although he doubted it totaled 40,000 tons. A fly-over radiological survey (ARMS flight) performed in 1978 showed external radiation levels as high as 100 uR/hr in the area indicated by Mr. Fehr as containing the Latty Avenue material. In addition, this survey revealed another possibly contaminated area in a fill previously believed to be “clean”. Mr. Fehr is certain Latty Avenue material was not dumped in this second “hot” area. Apparently the second area is at least 10 years old, and no one had any idea what radioactive material might be present there. Figure 1 shows the results of the 1978 aerial survey. The area in the southeast fill is believed to contain Latty Avenue material, while that on the northeast boundary was previously unidentified. RADIOLOGICAL SURVEY ;r if r i I r i r r c r J III. RADIOLOGICAL SURVEY AND EVALUATION (A) Methods and Measurements 8 A series of measurements and samples were taken on and near the site over a three day period in November 1980. These measurements were designed to estimate I the extent of on site contamination, to evaluate possible existing radiological hazards to site personnel, and to make a preliminary assessment of the possible movement of material off site. Based on these measurements and known site characteristics, a detailed site survey plan has been developed to precisely define the site radiological conditions. External gamma dose rates were used as an indication of the extent of buried material. Measurements were made with a 2″ by 2″ Nal detector and an end window GM tube, at a height of one meter above ground. Nal count rates were converted to yR/hr exposure rates using a previously established factor for radium and daughters in soil. The GM tube was used only in areas where levels exceeded the range of the Nal detector. A series of particulate grab air samples were taken on site, in the areas of highest external radiation levels, and inside one building. These samples were counted for gross activity within one hour and again several days later. The short lived activity was attributed to radon daughters, and working levels were calculated from these activities. Water samples were collected from the leachate observation well, from two freshly dug monitoring wells at the site perimeter, and from a pond located just north of the site. These were analyzed for gross alpha and radium activity. Several surface soil samples were also collected. These came from the berm along the northwest boundary and were taken where the external radiation survey indicated possible surface or near surface activity. These have been analyzed for gamma activity in an effort to identify the contaminants in this previously unknown burial. (B) Results Figure 2 shows the West Lake Landfill and the two areas of buried material. As can be seen, the on-site ground measurements reveal that the initial fly over survey mislocated the actual contamination slightly. Both contaminated areas are located north and east of the aerial survey locations. The burial identified as Area 1 is located along the southern edge of the site access road, extending from the eastern boundary of the fill to the recently constructed parking lot. The total area of readings above background is about 112,00 ft2(2.6 acres). Two areas where levels exceeded 100 uR/hr were identified, each about 7500 ft2(0.2 acre each). The highest levels measured in Area 1 were about 200 uR/hr. A detail of this area is shown in Figure 3. The second burial, Area 2, is shown in Figure 4. This area extends along the Northwest boundary of the site, starting at the boundary berm and extending into the site as far as 300 feet in some directions. The total area of readings above background in this case is about 360,000 ft2(8.3 acres). This estimate assumes that contamination extends under existing stone and gravel piles, where readings could not be made. The highest levels recorded were 5 mR/hr, along the berm in a normally unoccupied area. The fill containing Area 1 is. known to extend to a depth of 30 to 40 feet. The radioactive material is presently covered with an estimated 6 feet of fill, and the operator is planning to cap and seed it shortly. This fill is known to be essentially a sanitary fill, containing no industrial waste or construction or demolition materials. The fill is located over a quarry, and the fill leachate is collected from the quarry floor via a sump well located in the northeast corner of the landfill. Approximately 50,000 gallons of leachate are collected each day and sent to the Metropolitan St. Louis Sewer District Bissell Point Plant. The landfill containing Area 2 is older and less is known about it. However, it is certain that large objects such as building rubble are buried there, along with quantities of rocks from the quarry. In addition, it appears possible that some toxic chemicals (PCB’s, dioxane, etc.) may be buried here. This fill extends to 30-40 feet and is placed on top iof existing land.. Ground water monitoring wells are located near this fill, at the property boundary. Grab air samples were taken in five locations during the site survey. Gross activities were counted 35 minutes after sampling and working levels calculated using a modified Kuznetz method. Samples were taken at the location of highest external radiation levels in an effort to represent the worst case conditions. Measured levels ranged from 0.014 WL to 0.038 WL. Results are shown in Table I. A total of four water samples were collected. Two were taken from monitoring wells dug by the Missouri Department of Natural Resources in October, 1980, one from the on-;site leachate observation well and the final from a pond near the site. These sampling locations are shown in Figure 5, and the analytical J results shown in Table II. Monitoring Wells 3 and 4 were sampled since they are in the general direction of movement of ground water from the landfill. In general, all off-site levels are within EPA drinking water standards (al though these standards do not apply here) and there is no evidence of conta minant movement through water off site for these preliminary measurements. Soil samples were taken at three locations in and around Area 2, in an effort to identify the contaminants in this area. These were surface samples, taken at sites where external radiation measurements indicated the possibility of surface activity. One sample was taken at a hot spot on the berm, a second from loose dirt where a road has been dug through the berm, and a third from the field adjacent to the site berm. Results are listed in Table III and show that elevated concentrations of uranium and daughters exist in soil on the landfill (Area 2) site. No unusual levels were detected in the off-site field soil, and no isotopes other than naturally occuring radionuclides were detected in any of the samples. Activities in the “hot spot” sample were so high that quantitative determinations using the initial analytical techniques were not possible, and further analyses will be required. SUMMARY IV. CONCLUSIONS Two areas of apparently buried contamination have been identified. The first (Area 1) is located immediately south of the landfill access road and comprises about two (2) acres. The second (Area 2) is along the northeast boundary and totals about eight (8) acres. Material in Area 1 is believed to have come from the Latty Avenue site, and would therefore contain uranium ore (UsOe) in barium sulfate leachate. Material in Area 2 is also known to contain uranium and daughters, and is therefore similar to Latty Avenue residues, although the origin of this material cannot be substantiated. Several normally unoccupied areas of the landfill have external radiation levels in excess of 20uR/hr, the target criteria for remedial action. Working levels in these areas may approach MFC for unrestricted areas, based on very limited sampling data. There is no initial indication of movement of material via ground water off site. One occupied facility has been located on an area where material has apparently been buried. This is the Shuman Equipment Service Building on the north section of the landfill. External exposure rates inside the building range from 15 to 50yR/hr, while radon daughter activities are estimated to be near MFC for unrestricted areas under some circumstances. Results of this preliminary site visit have been used in the development of the Draft Site Survey Plan which appears in Appendix A. i’:-r FIGURES AND TABLES •’ t I I 1 I tdttMBB 0 4OO 800 1200 1600 2000 FEET 0 100 200 300 400 500 600 METERS I-HTIMATHD LANDFILL OUTLINE wnnr LAKE LANOFIU AERIAL SURVEY ISOPLETHS onoss COUNT CONVERSION SCALE OAMMA EXPOSURE RATE* LETTER 1 m LEVEL LABEL JliR/tnl A -• C 8-10 o 10- 13 C 13-17 r 17-24 o 24*33 M 33-49 1 4S-82 J •2-84 K 84-11* ritio.or-viiw AT «o m ALIITUDI AND IXTRAPOLATCO TO THC 1 m LEVEL. INCLUDES J.7 fiH/kr COSMIC RADIATION. FIGURE 2 DOERNAL RADIATION SURVEY, LANDFILL A FIGURE 3 1 1 EXTERNAL rtADIATION LB/ELS AT 1 HFTER ARWF qiRFAPf. All readings are in pR/hr. Bkgd. 10 pR/hr. pR/hrv AREA 1 25 ft. x 25 ft. grid pattern L] J 1 • 1 Ali readings are viR/hr. BXgd. = 10iiR/hr. RADIATION LfVELS AT 1 rtlER ABWE SURFACEN AREA 2 5 >! >lOO(jR/hr. ^ ^ >SOOyR/hr. 30 ft. x 30 ft. grid pattern * j FIGURE 5 <*> LOCATION OF AIR, WATER AND SOIL SAMPLES ca Table I Radon Daughters Air Samples Results Sample1 Location Area 1 near road Date S Time Nov.13,8:45am ConditionsDry, wind S-lOmph60*F Working Level 0.017WL Area 1 over highest external level Nov.13,10:30am Dry, wind S-lOmph62 °F 0.014WL Area 2 over highest external level Nov,13,2:45pm Dry, wind S-lOmph70°F 0.019WL Area 2 over suspected Nov.13,3:07pm Dry, wind S-5mph 0.038WL surface material 70°F Inside Shuman Equipment Nov.14,7:35am Bid sealed overnight 0.031WL Service Bid no ventillation Table II Water Samples Collected in October and November 1980 – Results Sample # Location Leachate Observation Well Sample Well #3 Sample Well #4 Settling Pond (1) RMC (2) ANL (3) Missouri DNR Activity Gross a < 7.3 Gross 6 80121 Ra-226 1.0910.29 (2) Gross a 15.612.6 pCi/1 (2) Gross 6 41.314.3 pCi/1 Ra-226 0.610.1 pCi/l(3) Gross a 2.910.7 pCi/l(2) Gross B 7.612.0 pCi/l(2) Ra-226 0.510.1 Ci/1^ Gross a < 2.9 Gross B < 26.3 Table III Soil Sample Results Sample Location Activity pCi/g(dry) Area 2 over suspected Pb-214 PresentM surface material Bi-214 Ac-228 Pb-212 U-235 U-238 Th-227 Ra-226 Th-228 Roadway from berm to Pb-214 4.5EI ± 4, 5EO offsite field Bi-214 3.3EI ± 3, 3EO Ac-228 1.2E1 ± 6.3E-1 Pb-212 3.5E1 ± 3.8EO U-235 1.6E1 ± 1.6EO Th-237 2.3E1 ± 3.0EO K-40 1.3E1 ± 2.3EO Ra-226 3.3E1 ± 3.3EO U-238 Present(2) Off-site field Bi-214 4.1EO ± 4.1E-1 Ac-228 9.6E-1 ± 4.3E-1 U-235 1.5 EO±3.8E-1 U-238 Present(2) K-40 2.2E-1 ± 8.3E-2 Ra-226 4.1E1 ± 4.1E-1 Th-228 1.4E1 ± 5.2E-1 Pb-214 5.3E1 ± 5.3E-1 (1) Activity too high for quantitative determination using initial counting method. Levels are greater than 100 pCi/g for Bi-214 and Pb-214. (2) No quantitative determination of U-238 was made. 'r j: _ f f -.. DRAFT SURVEY PLAN FOR THE WEST LAKE LANDFILL Draft Survey Plan for the West Lake Landfill I. INTRODUCTION Based on preliminary site visits and predetermined survey criteria, a comprehensive radiological survey plan for the West Lake Landfill site has been prepared in draft form for review. The objective of this survey is to define the present radiological status of this site. Based upon the survey results, the Nuclear Regulatory Commission will perform engineering evaluations to determine if remedial actions are required. To this end, survey measurements are designed to determine the identity, concentration and extent of contaminants on site, and whether these contaminants are moving off site. Several types of measurements are required for this survey. These proposed measurements are listed below and described in the following paragraphs. Survey Methods A) Measurement of External Gamma Exposure Rates and Beta-Gamma Dose Rates B) Measurement of Surface Radioactivity C) Measurement of Subsurface Radioactivity D) Measurement of Water Radioactivity E) Measurement of Airborne Radioactivity Al II. SURVEY METHODS (A) Measurement of External Radiation Levels The two areas of contamination which have been previously identified will be gridded and surveyed for both gamma radiation levels at one meter above the surface and beta gamma levels at the ground surface. The basic pattern at each contaminated area will be survey blocks defined by a 10 meter grid system. External gamma levels at one meter will be recorded at each grid point (i.e. at each intersection of two grid lines). Initially, precise gamma measurements at a few specially selected grid points will be made with sensitive Tissue Equivalent lonization Chamber System. At the same time, Nal scintillation detector measurements will be made and a conversion factor for the Nal count rate versus yR/hr established. Once this factor is confirmed, the scintillation detector will be used for all grid measurements at relatively low exposure rates. For higher rates, an ion chamber type portable survey instrument will be used. At each grid point, an end window G-M tube will be used for surface measurements. An open and closed window reading will be made at 1 cm, and the ratio of the two used to indicate surface contamination. A more closely spaced grid (i.e. 5 meter) will be employed to define known hot spots or where evidence of non-representativeness is presented. A2 (B) Measurement of Surface Radioactivity Based on the external surface measurements, surface soil samples will be collected for analysis. This sampling is not considered likely in Area 1, since it is known that buried radioactive material has been recently covered with sanitary fill and capped with "clean" dirt. Therefore, surface deposits are highly unlikely in this area, and were not detected during the preliminary site visit. However, preliminary measurements in the older fill area (Area 2) indicated the possibility of surface deposits, and these will be investigated. Samples to a depth of a few inches would be collected and analyzed. Surface drainage ways will be evaluated wherever the possibility exists that radioactive materials have been carried or washed away from original storage or burial locations. Again, the most probable area of concern is Area 2, where the probability of surface deposits exists and where the dike enclosing the landfill on the north and west is failing. Here, water may be seeping through these faults. Surface drainage is not apparent in the vicinity of Area 1, with the possible exception of some drainage along the landfill access road. Vegetation on site consists only of grass and common weeds. Off site, crops are grown on farm land immediately north and west of the site, adjacent to Area 2. Since the possibility of contamination exists here, crop samples will be collected where indicated by surface measurements. A3 (C) Measurement of Subsurface Radioactivity Since it is known that most, or all, of the radioactive material at the West Lake Landfill has been buried, extensive subsurface monitoring and sampling will be requried. This activity will consist of drilling and lining holes in and around the known contaminated areas. The purpose of this activity is to determine the depth and lateral extent of subsurface deposits. The principle measurement method will be in situ gamma spectroscopy. Each hole will be "logged" using an intrinsic germanium (IG) detector coupled to a computer based multichannel analyzer. Field analyses can then be made, both qualitatively and quantitatively, thereby eliminating time consuming laboratory analyses and expensive core sampling of each hole. Measurement intervals may range from 6" to 24", depending upon factors such as hole depth, activity, etc. An occasional core sample will be taken to verify the in situ measurements and to confirm the presence or absence of non-gamma emitting nuclides such as Th-230. The exact number and depth of holes cannot be determined at this time, since these will depend to some degree upon the extent of subsurface contamination and the characteristics of the fill. Initial estimates would be based on external measurements made during the preliminary site visit. These measurements indicate that Area 1 is about 2 acres and Area 2 about 8 acres. It is known that material in Area 1 is covered with about 6 feet of sanitary fill and clean dirt. Little is known about the material in Area 2, except that this is an industrial fill with large, solid objects such as rocks, boulders and building rubble. A4 Based on this information, it is believed that drilling and sampling will be relatively simple in Area 1. It is possible that as few as 10 bore holes would define this contamination. It is likely that more will be required for Area 2. (D) Measurement of Radioactivity in Water Wherever possible, water samples will be taken from the bore holes. Additional leachate samples will be collected, along with off site pond water. Samples will also be collected from existing site monitoring wells and those which the Missouri Department of Natural Resources might dig. Run off water will be collected is possible. There are no flowing streams which border the site. (E) Measurement of Airborne Radioactivity Measurements will be made to determine whether the material buried on site is a source of airborne radioactivity. The isotopes of concern are Ra-226, Ra-224 and/or Ra-223, which decay to Rn-222, Rn-220 and Rn-219. This may result in the emanation of radon from the soil, and movement of radon and daughters off site. These measurements will be designed to determine Rn flux emanation as a source term for off-site dose calculations. Additional on site Rn daughter measurements will be made to verify preliminary working devel (wl) determinations. Radon flux measurements which are to be related to off-site dose calculations are of no value for Rn-219, due to its very short (4 sec) half-life. Therefore, only the long-lived daughters are of concern for off-site exposures. In addition, if the parent (Ra-223) is not within a few millimeters of the surface, it is not likely to emanate into the atmosphere. AS Due to these considerations, only Rn-222 and Rn-220 fluxes will be measured. The principle measurement technique will be to collect a filtered gas sample from an accumulator and count it in a radon gas analyzer (scintillation cell). Sequential alpha counting, starting immediately after sampling, will allow separation of Rn-222 from Ra-220 (if present). Numerous samples will be taken from various locations during the survey period, in an effort to reduce the effect of fluctuations between individual measurements due to varying meteorological and soil conditions. If Rn-219 proves to be of concern, its daughter can be determined by collection of a particulate filter paper and subsequent gamma counting. This sample „ can be collected from the accumulator simply by circulating the accumulator * air through a filter and back into the accumulator. The sensitivity will be | limited by the relatively short half-life of the daughters and small volume of the samples. Alternatively, the presence of Rn daughters can be determined I by a or v spectroscopy of high volume particulate samples. 1 However, Rn daughter measurements in the presence of all three Rn parents are difficult or complex to measure in the field, even with spectrometry. The proposed method is for total working levels to be measured directly, from the integral of all short-lived radon particulate-attached alpha emitting daughers. Since the purpose here is to determine exposure, a series of measurements at several locations will be made during the 2 month field project to determine average concentrations. This will be done using simple manual techniques and external counting. A6 III. SURVEY INSTRUMENTATION AND EQUIPMENT The specific instrumentation employed may vary slightly with survey require ments, nevertheless certain items are known to be required and have been dedicated to this survey. These are described below. External gamma exposure rates can be measured precisely to 1 or 2 uR/hr with the Tissue Equivalent lonization Chamber system, which consists of 16 liter Shonka chambers and Keithley vibrating capacitor electrometers. Portable survey instruments include Eberline and Johnson rate meters, sealers, GM tubes, alpha scintillators and Nai detectors and Victoreen ion chambers. Sample gamma analysis will be performed with a 20cc intrinsic germanium (IG) detector and Tennecomp TP-50 computer based MCA system. Bore hole logging will be accomplished with a second IG detector, with a specially adapted cryostat and dewar assembly, and a Tracer-Northern 1750 MCA system. Radon gas will be counted in an EDA Radon Gas Analyzer. If alpha spectro scopy is required, a system such as the Tennelec TC 256 will be used, together with one of the MCA's. This instrumentation, along with various laboratory items such as ovens, drying lamps, sample containers, balance, etc.'will be placed in two mobile vehicles for movement on site. Since one goal of this survey is to determine if remedial action is required, it will be necessary to be able to measure levels established by the NRC as target criteria for remedial action. The lower limits of detection (LLD) have been defined as 20% of target criteria and are shown below. A7 Soil Contaminants Nuclide Target Criteria LLD Ra-226 5pCi/g IpCi/g Total U 15pCi/g 3pCi/g U-238 30pCi/g 6pCi/g U-235 30pCi/g 6pCi/g Th-232 5pCi/g IpCi/g Th-230 15pCi/g 3pCi/g (Criteria for Th-232 assume equilibrium with daughters) Water and Airborne Contaminants Nuclide Target Criteria LLD All MFC Unrestricted 20% MFC External Radiation Nuclide Target Criteria LLD All 20 uR/hr 4yR/hr This survey plan has been designed to provide rapid field evaluations of the radiological status of the West Lake Landfill, and to provide the data needed to determine if remedial actions are necessary. Initiation of this survey is scheduled for early spring, 1981. A8

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