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Post

1984-04-06 – NRC – ORAU report on berm erosion surey at the West Lake Landfill

Oak Ridge
Associated Post Office Box 117
Universities Oak Ridge, Tennessee 37830
Telephone (615) 576-3305
Manpower Education.
Research, and Training
Division
April 6, 1984
Mr. William Crow /
Div. of Fuel Cycle & Mat. Safety
MS-SS396, Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Washington, DC 20555
Dear Mr. Crow:
Enclosed is a copy of the report on the survey of the
berm at the West Lake Landfill in St. Louis County, Missouri.
Please let me know if you have any questions concerning
this information.
Sincerely,
James D. Berger
Program Manager
Radiological Site Assessment Program
pz>
JDB/jm
Enclosure
cc: Wyngarden, NRC {3-,.:..,.)
O’Connor, Univ. of MO
McCullough, West Lake Landfill
40249270
SUPERFUNI) RF.COKDS
8405240319 840406
PDR ADDCK 0400880J
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SURVEY FOR BERK EROSION
WEST LAKE LANDFILL
ST. LOUIS COUNTY, MISSOURI
A.J. Boerner
*. INTRODUCTION
On March 12-13, 1984, representatives from Oak Ridge Associated
Universities (ORAU), Oak Ridge, Tennessee, performed a radiological survey
along a section of the benn bounding the West Lake Landfill. The objective
of the survey was to determine if erosion of the benn was occurring,
resulting in the spread of contamination to adjacent property. Information
collected included exposure rates, concentrations of radionuclides in
surface soil, and locations of elevated contact radiation levels relative
to the surface topography.
PROCEDURES
1. A scan of the north face of the benn was performed with Nal(Tl)
scintillation detectors to determine general areas of elevated
radiation levels. The area selected for further investigation is
shown in Figure 1. The walkover scan also identified an elevated
region along a short unpaved access road situated just west of the
Shuman Building and leading to the perimeter road; however, no further
measurements or sampling were undertaken at this location.
2. A 5 m grid system was established on the benn in an area identified by
the scan.
3. A sketch of the topography in each grid block was prepared.
Work performed by the Manpower Education, Research, and Training Division
of Oak Ridge Associated Universities, Oak Ridge, TN, under interagency
agreement DOE No. 40-770-80, NRC Fin. No. A-9093-0, between the Nuclear
Regulatory Commission and the Department of Energy.
April 6, 1984
4. Surface scans were conducted over the grid using portable Nal(Tl)
scintillation detectors. Locations of elevated contact radiation
levels were noted.
5. Exposure rate measurements were made at the surface and at 1 m above
the surface at each grid line intersection and at selected locations
•• of elevated readings. A Nal(Tl) scintillation meter calibrated with a
pressurized ionization chamber was used.
6. Surface (0-15 cm) soil samples were collected at twelve grid line
intersections and at five locations of elevated surface contact
radiation levels identified by the scan (refer to Figure 2). Two
additional samples were collected from the adjacent field.
7. Exposure rates were also measured at several locations near the
Landfill office building and a soil sample collected from an area of
elevated contact readings.
8. Soil samples were analyzed by gamma spectrometry. Radium-226 and
Th-230 were the major radionuclides of concern, although spectra were
reviewed for Pa-231 and Ac-227. One soil sample from the berm area
and the sample from near the office building were analyzed by neutron
activation to determine trace element composition.
RESULTS AND DISCUSSION
Topography
Figure 2 is a sketch of the berm area surveyed, indicating the grid
system and the major surface features. The slope of the berm is estimated
to be approximately 40°. The soil on the face of the berm appears quite
loose and only sparsely vegetated. There are several small ditches which
follow the slope; these suggest erosion or slippage of the surface soil
layer. Several small mounds of earth were also noted at the base of the
berm.
Direct Radiation Levels
The walkover scan identified levels ranging up to 600 uR/h near the
top of the berm. Levels were generally highest in a region near grid
coordinates C2 and C3 and in a ditch down-slope from these coordinates.
Contact exposure rates at C2 and C3 were 360 yR/h and 570 pR/h,
respectively. Elevated measurements (up to 280 pR/h) were also noted on
contact with a mound of soil between grid coordinates D4 and D5 at the base
of the berm. Specific “hot spots” were not present along the perimeter
road or the adjacent field; however, ambient radiation levels were
generally elevated – possibly the result of residues in the landfill berm.
Figure 3 indicates the contact exposure rates measured on the berm.
An area near the landfill office had been identified by a previous
survey as containing contaminated residues and having an elevated direct
radiation level.* Random measurements in that area (see Figure 4) indicate
exposure rates at 1 m above the surface ranging up to 45 yR/h. The maximum
level is near a small drainage ditch. The extent of the area exceeding
20 pR/h is smaller than that shown in the Radiation Management Corporation
report. This is probably the result of additional fill (1-1.5 m) which has
been placed on portions of this area, since the previous survey.
Radionuclide Concentrations in Soil
Radionuclide concentrations in surface soil samples are presented in
Table 1. With one exception, i.e. the sample from coordinate A5, these
samples all contained elevated levels of Ra-226 and/or Th-230. Ratios of
Th-230 to Ra-226 were in the range of approximately 25:1 to 40:1. Pa-231
and Ac-227 were also present in most of these samples. The maximum
concentrations of Ra-226 were 699 pCi/g and 662 pCi/g. These were in
samples S4 and S5 from areas having the highest direct radiation levels.
* L.F. Booth, et al., Radiological Survey of the West Lake Landfill.
St. Louis County. Missouri. Radiological Management Corporation,
May 1982.
Highest Th-230 concentrations were also noted in these two samples. A
sample (S7) from the mound of soil at the base of the berm contained
185 pCi/g of Ra-226 and 6720 pCi/g of Th-230.
Samples from grid line 5 along the base of the berm and from grid
line 6 along the perimeter road also had elevated radionuclide
concentrations; however they were lower than the concentrations in samples
from areas of elevated direct radiation. Samples B5, C5, and D5 were the
highest; these locations are downslope from the areas of highest residues
and in the vicinity of ditches and mounds of eroded soil. The two samples
(SI and S2) collected in the adjacent field, about 10 meters north of grid
coordinates B6 and D6, also contain elevated Ra-226 and Th-230
concentrations.
Sample S8 from the ditch near the office area contained 5.19 pCi/g of
Ra-226 and 344 pCi/g of Th-230. Neutron activation results for this sample
and the sample from coordinate E,6 indicate similar trace element contents.
Based on the Ra-226 to Th-230 ratios and other elemental contents it
appears that the residues are from the same source.
SUMMARY
A survey of a small area at the West Lake Landfill in St. Louis
County, Missouri, was conducted by ORAU to determine if erosion of the
landfill berm is resulting in spread of radioactive residues buried on this
site. Measurements of direct radiation levels and radionuclide
concentrations in soil and the physical condition of the berm area indicate
that erosion is occurring and that there are elevated concentrations of
Ra-226 and Th-230 at the base of the berm and extending into the adjacent
field.
Measurements performed at another area of known radioactive residue
burials, near the office building, indicate that there has been 1-1.5 m of
additional fill added to portions of this area during the past 3-4 years.
This added fill hs reduced the direct surface radiation levels at some
locations by approximately a factor of 2. Analyses suggest that the
residues from the berm and office areas are from the same source.
TABLE 1
RADIONUCLIDE CONCENTRATIONS IN SURFACE SOIL
Radionuclide Concentrations (pCi/g)
Location3
A5
B5
C5
D5
E5
F5
A6
B6
C6
D6
E6
F6
SI
S2
S3
S4
S5
S6
S7
S8 (near office
building)
Ra-226
1.05 +
11.3 +
6.77 +
23.2 +
1.35 +
1.32 +
2.36 +
3.98 +
3.93 +
2.84 +
5.15 +
0.98 ±
4.27 ±
4.49 +
38.3 +
662 +
699 +
72.3 +
185 ±
5.19 ±
0.30b
0.7
0.53
1.1
0.19
0.20
0.37
0.51
0.51
0.51
0.51
0.17
0.44
0.61
1.6
7
6
2.3
3
0.59
404
241
1006
13.
8.
99.
132
142
109
181
11.
132
178
1601
16170
19130
3280
6720
344
Th-230
<7.67 + 45 + 21 + 140 0 + 5.7 49 + 5.3 3 + 35.5 + 75 + 70 + 70 + 57 1 + 5.1 + 17 + 82 + 240 + 810 + 220 + 290 ± 480 ± 84 Pa-231 <0.59 <1.16 <0.89 7.54 + 3.07 <0.68 8 <0.57 <0.86 <0.81 <1.03 <0.98 <0.77 <0.71 <0.76 <1.22 7.16 + 3.47 140 ± 13 <10.1 18.3 + 5.1 34.9 ± 7.3 <1.70 Ac-227 <0.50 3.79 + 1.00 1.03 + 0.75 11.0 + 1.6 0.50 + 0.49 0.15 + 0.33 <0.46 2.82 ± 0.84 2.35 + 0.88 2.65 + 0.56 1.37 + 0.48 <0.59 <0.57 <0.23 5.78 + 2.23 207 +11 29.1 + 8.3 11.1 + 4.4 49.8 ± 5.0 2.44 j+ 0.86 a Refer to Figure 2. b Errors are 2a based on counting statistics. o o o o o o o o o o o o o q o o o • < a u O w u . O X - - > – –
FIGURE 1. Portion of North Edge of Landfill Indicating Survey Area.
B
F I E L D
N W
METERS
FIGURE 2. Map of Berm Area Indicating Berm Features, the Grid
System, and Soil Sampling Locations.
B
FIELD
N W
METERS
FIGURE 3. Areas of Elevated Contact Radiation Levels.
N
FIGURE A. Area Near Office Building Showing Region Exceeding 20 yR/h at
1 m Above the Surface and Soil Sampling Location.

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1980-11-17 – MDNR – West Lake Landfill – Reason for contamination in northermost area of West Lake Landfill unknown at this time

Page 1
UPDATE ON WESTLAKE LANDFILL NOV J 7
HISTORY OF WESTLAKE LANDFILL
Westlake Landfill, located in Bridgeton Missouri (St. Louis County) has been the
subject of recent inquiry. This landfill began operation prior to state regulation.
As far as our records show, this landfill first opened in the med-1960’s. Part
of the landfill lies in an old quarry and part of the landfill lies in the Missouri
River floodplain, approximately 1 1/2 miles from the river. Witnesses to this
operation, when the area of the landfill which lies in the floodplain was in
operation, note that the fill area was often actually beneath the level of the
water table. Leachate from the old quarry area of the landfill is collected and
hauled to MSD treatment plants. Construction of onsite treatment is underway.
About 48,000 gallons of leachate per day is currently being collected.
CHEMICAL WASTES
Aside from normal landfill materials, there are chemical industrial wastes and
radiologically contaminated materials deposited in this landfill. The chemical
wastes, that we know of, include about 4,000 tons of residues from the production
of insecticides and herbicides. These pesticide wastes were deposited .by Chevron
Chemical Company. Also included in the chemical wastes are waste materials from
ink manufacture and from the manufacture of glue. Among the chemical wastes that
we know of in Westlake Landfill are:
waste ink pigments oily sludges
esters alcohols insecticides
halogenated intermediates -wastewater sludges aromatics
oils -asbestos herbicides
heavy metals
RADIOACTIVE WASTES
In addition to the hazardous chemical wastes in Westlake Landfill, there are
radioactive wastes. During early 1973 Cotter Corporation buried radioactive Barium
Sulfate Slag material and rad.iologically contaminated building rubble. There are
approximately 43,000 tons of this material which contain about 7,000 tons of natural
Uranium. •
Page 2
In October, 1977, an aerial radiological ‘survey was done to determine the location
of the burial of this contaminated material (see attached map). ‘It was determined
from the aerial survey that there are two areas within the landfill which are
emitting abnormally high levels of radiation. The southermost area is the
result of the burial of contaminated Barium Sulfate Slag from the Mallinkrodt area
of the Destrehen street Uranium processing plant. (This facility in downtown St.
Louis is where material for the original nuclear weapons tests was produced.)
The northermost area contamination is on the edge of the floodplain area which is
the boundary of neighboring farmland. The reason for its elevated gamma radiation
is unknown at this time. The U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission has contracted
Radiation Management Corporation to do extensive on-site radiological surveys
which include groundwater analysis, core sampling, test boring, and other tests
as deemed necessary. This study should determine the reason for the elevated gamma
radiation (see attached NRC announcement).
CURRENT DNR MONITORING ACTIVITY
Geological reports from DNR’s Division of Geology and Land Survey indicated that
the local groundwater flows Northeast from the landfill into the Missouri River
alluvial floodplain. Therefore, it is highly probably that leachate from the
landfill is contaminating local wells and entering the waters of the Missouri River.
As a result, DNR has initiated sampling and monitoring activities. On September
20 and October 1, 1980, a groundwater investigation was conducted in the vicinity
of the Westlake Landfill. Two monitoring wells on the landfill site and three
*>
provate wells located Northwest of the landfill were sampled (see attached report).
The Division of Geology and Land Survey groundwater experts have evaluated data
from this sampling and determined that levels of several pollutants were significantly
higher than what ‘one would expect as background levels. Chloride, Sodium,
Lead, and Manganese showed particularly high levels. Except for Manganese, the
levels were not in violation of drinking water standards, but were high enough for
Page 3
concern.* Because of this concern, additional sampling is being conducted in
the last week of October.
Since the NRC will be conducting investigations on radioactive contamination,
DNR has requested permission to use some of their facilities to aid in our hazardous
chemical waste investigation.
The NRC has given DNR verbal permission to utilize the monitoring wells which
Radiation Management Corporation will be digging, in order that DNR may test for
the presence of chemical hazardous wastes. On October 1, 1980 DNR sent a written
request to the NRC asking for written confirmation of this permission. No reply
has been received yet.
All data collected so far has been given to the St. Louis County Health Department
for review and possible action regarding drinking water supplies.
* Manganese levels violate a secondary drinking water standard which is not a
health related standard.
10/27/80
-S.
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r • yK\”>—Vi
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1980-10-02 – MDNR – West Lake Landfill – Memorandum – History of Operations

MEMORANDUM
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Date: October 2, 1980
Jo: Bob Schreiber
From: Burt McCullough
Subject: Westlake Landfill
Westlake Landfill, located in Bridgeton Missouri (St. Louis County) has been
the subject of recent inquiry. This landfill began operation prior to state
regulation. As far as our records show, this landfill first opened in the
mid-1960’s. Part of the landfill lies in an old quarry and part of the landfill
lies in the Missouri River floodplain, approximately 1^ miles from the
river. Witnesses to this operation, when the area of the landfill which lies
in the floodplain was in operation, note that the fill area was often actually
beneath the level of the water table. According to file materials from
Missouri Geological Survey, it is “highly probable that leachate from the
landfill is entering the waters of the Missouri River. . . ” Leachate from
the old quarry area of the landfill is collected and hauled to MSB treatment
plants. Construction of onsite treatment facilities is underway. About 48,000
gallons of leachate per day is currently being collected.
Aside from normal landfill materials, there are chemical industrial wastes and
radiologically contaminated materials deposited in this landfill. The chemical
wastes, that we know of, include about 4,000 tons of residues from the production
of insecticides and herbicides. These pesticide wastes were deposited by
Chevron Chemical Company. Also included in the chemical wastes are waste
materials from ink manufacture and from the manufacture of glue. Among the
chemical wastes that we know of in Westlake Landfill are:
waste ink pigments
esters alcohols
halogenated intermediates
oils wastewater sludges
heavy metals asbestos
oily sludges
insecticides
aromatics
herbidices
Joseph
Fred A
Besides chemical hazardous wastes, in Westlake Landfill, there are radioactive
wastes. During early 1973 Cotter Corporation buried radioactive Barium
Sulfate Slag material and radiologically contaminated building rubble. There
are approximately 9,000 tons of this material which contain about 7,000″tons
of natural Uranium. In October, 1977, an aerial radiological survey was done to
determine the location of the burial of this contaminated material. The report
from this survey indicates that there are two burial sites. One is in the
center of the old quarry area, and the other is on the edge of the floodplain
area which borders adjacent farmland. The U.S Nuclear Regulatory Commission
has contracted Radiation Management Corporation to do extensive on-site
radiological surveys which include groundwater analysis, core sampling, test
boring, and other tests as deemed necessary. The NRC has given DNR verbal
P. Teasdale Governor Division of Environmental Quality
Lafser Director Robert J. Schreiber Jr., P.E. Director
Westlake Landfill continued
Page 2
October 2, 1980
To: Bob Schreiber
permission to utilize the monitoring wells which Radiation Management
Corporation will be digging, in order that DNR may test for the presence of
chemical hazardous wastes.
There is little known about what went into Westlake Landfill prior to State
regulation. Analysis needs to be done to determine: 1) what wastes are
deposited in Westlake Landfill, 2) if any of these pollutants are leaving
the landfill via groundwater, and 3) what threat does Westlake Landfill pose
to drinking water supplies.
cc: Fred Lafser
Ron Kucera
Jim Long
Robert Robinson
Bob Miller
Tom Doan

Post

1980-01-15 – MDNR – Concerns related to West Lake Landfill

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January 15, 1980
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Mr. W. T. Crow
Office of Nuclear Materials
Safety and Safeguards
Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Washingtoii, D.C. 20555
Dear Mr. Crow:
This letter will confirm our telephone conversation of January 7,
1980 concerning the Westlake Landfill. I’m attaching to this
a copy of my Decrmber 31 letter to Mr. Earl Harvison, Oakridge,
Tennessee.
I would appreciate your early response to the questions raised
in that letter. I’m also attaclng a copy of the resolution
submitted by the Lity of Bridgeton to us in this matter. If we
can be of assistance to you, please let me know.
Very truly’ yours,
,eJames P. Odendahl
Director
Division of Environmental Quality
JPO;,,
cc: Senator Edwin Dirck
Keii Mille-. Dept. of Health
Solid Waste ,nagement Program
30
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9710070121 970930
PDR FOJA
VOOGT97-272 PDR
Joseph P. Teasdale Governor
Fred A. Lafser Director
Division of Environmental Quality
James P. Odendahl Director
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02
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012
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December 31, 1979
Mr. Earl Harbison
Departmcnt of Energy
Oak Ridge, Tennessee 37830
Dear Mr. Harbison:
Please find attached my letter of response to the City of Bridcet.cn
regarding their resolution relative to the disposal of radic..:tiýe
waste materials in the vicinity of the city. Mr. Rick koberts, with
the Department of Natural Resources, Solid Waste Mariagement Program,
is been in telephone comniunication with you during recent months
requesting that your office provide us with the res,:lt, of the
technical study which was conducted to determine the l.)cation ana
levels of radiation emitting from the wa;te disposed of at the
Westlake Land’ill in St. Louis County. This aerial survey of th’e
Westlake Landfill and other areas in the St. Louis Couity was cocducted
at least a year ago. The Department of Natural R_:scurces
would appreciate this information being made available in order that
we can assess the potential public health effects.
If there are reasons why the study cannot be released to the
Department of Natural Resources, I would appreciate teinc, so advisec.
Sincerely,
James P. Odendahl
Director
Division of Environmental Quality
JPO/RMR/jc
Encl.
Joszph P. Teasdale Governor
Fred A. Latser Director
Division-of Environmental QualIty
James P. Odendahl Director
December 28, 1979
IL llonorable E. I’J. (Bill) Abram
Mayor
tv ) City of Bridgeton
11955 Natural Bridge Road
0 Iq Bridgeton, Missouri 63044
cV) “-” Dear Mayor kram:
— C%4
0 Senator Edwrn L. Dirck ha, forwarded the City of Bridgzton’s Resolution
0_ R-79-12 relative to dispo:.al of radioactive material to the Department
of Natural Resources for response relative to Missouri’s role in control rr
the disposal of radioactive waste materials.
0
D • You are probably aware that the Federal Nuclear Regulatory Commission ha.,
< the primary responsibility for controlling the disposal of radioactive < • waste materials. The State of Missouri is not an agreehient state and U his no arrdnrements with ithe Nuclear Regulatory Cormission to enforce th, C re2gulatioe• within the Stdte of Missouri. At the pres2nt time the Solid 0 ý2iste Regulations of the Department of Ndtural Resources prohibit the 2 acceptance of radioactive v..a=-te materials at permitted sanitary landfill,. The:'eforL, the Westlake L.inc-fill in St. Louis County does nut have autno z ization to arcept radioactve waste materials. The Department of Nature _2,ources is interested in %..hat radioactive waste materials maý have be(: di, pcsed of -.t the Westla'e Landfill in the past and has been in corurinni - cat-on with the Departtmen. of Lnergy in Oakridge, Te!nnessee requestinc 3)- tiat they privide us with wiiat informaL ion they liiv c..btained relitt'e Q 2 tie dispoual of the waste at the 4estl (4e Landfi 11. 'r. Earl Harh iscn <• > .with the Leý…tinent of Eneýrgy has assured us he will provide us with a c
‘0 ,of the inves.iaation repo-t ,.s soon as it is availaiii(.
0 It has been indicated triat ,,’ry lo.i lev, 1 radioactive ,.*,,te materiai w-.
involved in :he disposal it the Westlakc Landfill, an( there should he ‘;
rV danijer to th.. citizens of i;ridjetor., lh. ,;ver, th; :)e( artment of Na’.uro 1
-o e’,uurces wa:its to revieq -i .uccnni’aý djt, fro,- tCie ili’partment of z:iV 6C) in/vstigatici, and stuJy b2 “e makinj .1i v recorw-nd~tt ins as to wha..
;nruld be talen.
U~) CC
Joseph P. Teasdale Governor .Divisiion o? Enviror’m .’al (ucij’y
Fred A. Lafser Director James P. Odenclani Dirzcior
• j I~Q’ I
NJISSOUJUl SEX’A’rE
j K; FIVF I.JIYO.* GI Ty
.EzDWv r L. D jRcI.&
SINATOR, 24TH DIscrIC
CAPITOL IUILDINO
.ILFFEP60N CITY. MISSOURI 69101
TELEPHOMNE 1314) 721.2540
November 8. 1979 1074t. ~l.
TEL.IPM~N’. ill
Mr. James Odendahl, Director
Division of Environmental Quality
P. 0. Box 1368
2010 Missour- Boulevard
Jefferson City, Missouii 65101
Dear Mr. Odendahl:
Attached please find a copy of a letter and rcz3c
lution that I received from Mayor bill Abram of
the City of Bridgeton, St. Louis County. Although
I realize the Nuclear Regulatory ‘Commission has
responsibility for disposal of radioactive waste
materials, I would appreciate your responding to
Mayor Abram and advising with regard to Missouri’s
role, if any, in this area.
Thanks for your help.
Sincerely,
Ewi
Edwin L. [Dirck
ELD:1s
Enclosures (2)
IF A 4 OF
CITI Y OF 1R1I[)G F-TON
Octobor 33, 1979
E.W. (1:111) AIJRAM. Mayor
M.AR T, Ili(. COF-CRAN. Admrimisttstivo Asis~sant
MARY E:.O E LLfRIMANN. City I
honorable E&.Ain L. Dirck
Stite Capitol ‘ld,).
Jefferson Ci:y, Mo. 65101
I A
(Oear Senato Di rck:
T~he City Co. rcil at its r…t’g of h’tcji)er- 24. H-79, ýass2d tf’e
crlclcsed Reclutien P-79-12, which I (iree with aid ,s of great
cencern to the residents of thre City of 3ridgeton.
fAry help )’:u can give in 1lis matter Wi II be gret ly appreciat,:.d.
Sincerely,
E. B4i( B1lAblra)m ., Mayo
EWA tp
E~ncl osure

Post
Post

1995-03-09 – NRC – EPA – West Lake Landfill – Policy Issue – Deferral of Regulatory oversight to EPA

RECEIVED
2 2 1995
‘***
March 9, 1995
FOR:
FROM:
SUBJECT:
POLICY ISSUE
(Notation Vote) SECY-95-056
The Commissioners
James M. Taylor
Executive Director for Operations **
DEFERRAL OF REGULATORY OVERSIGHT TO THE U.S.
ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY FOR TWO
SITES WITH RADIOACTIVE CONTAMINATION AND
LANDFILL DISPOSAL OF LICENSED MATERIAL FROM
REMEDIATION OF A THIRD SITE
PURPOSE:
To obtain the Commission’s approval for the staff to defer to the U.S.
Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) for the oversight of remediation
activities involving radioactive contamination at two sites and for staff’s
intent to allow disposal of licensed radioactive material in a hazardous waste
landfill.
SUMMARY:
The Nuclear Regulatory Commission and EPA conduct regulatory programs for site
remediation under the Atomic Energy Act (AEA) and the Resource Conservation
and Recovery Act (RCRA), and the Comprehensive Environmental Response,
Compensation, and Liability Act (CERCLA), respectively. Under certain
conditions, NRC staff believes it would be appropriate for NRC to defer to
EPA, or an authorized State environmental protection program, for the
oversight of remediation of radioactively contaminated sites under NRC
Contact: Heather M. Astwood, NMSS
415-5819
NOTE: TO BE MADE PUBLICLY AVAILABLE WHEN THE FINAL SRM IS MADE AVAILABLE.
Enclosure
The Commissioners – 2 –
jurisdiction. The staff is proposing to defer, to ERA and an authorized State
environmental program, regulation of remediation of two unlicensed sites:
E.I. DuPont, Newport, DE; and West Lake Landfill, Bridgeton, MO. In addition,
the staff intends to authorize disposal of licensed material generated from
remediating Dow Chemical sites in Midland and Bay City, MI, in a hazardous
waste landfill regulated by the Michigan Department of Natural Resources under
the EPA-authorized RCRA program. Remediation activities at these sites are at
various stages of completion. Based on reviews to date, the staff believes
that the remedial actions and disposal required by ERA, or the authorized
State program, will be sufficient to protect the public and the environment
from the risks associated with the radioactive contamination at these sites.
Deferral would conserve Federal and licensee resources, streamline the
remediation process by eliminating duplicative agency reviews, and simplify
the review process by consolidating regulatory oversight within a single
agency. If the Commission approves deferral and disposal, the staff would:
continue to provide limited technical assistance to ERA or State agencies, on
request, for all sites (licensed and non-licensed); monitor remediation
activities; and review all relevant documents developed by the licensee and
ERA or State for each site with an NRC license.
BACKGROUND:
As part of NRC’s decommissioning program for nuclear facilities under the AEA,
some contaminated facilities pose special problems because of the presence of
both non-radiological and radiological hazards, limited technical and
financial viability of licensees, and concurrent regulatory jurisdiction over
various aspects of decommissioning. Some of the sites are being, or w i l l be,
remediated under EPA’s Superfund Program, in accordance with CERCLA and the
National Contingency Plan in 40 CFR Part 300. Other sites involve assessment
and disposal of hazardous waste under EPA’s RCRA Program. Similar interfaces
exist between NRC and State regulatory programs, in which EPA’s authority
under CERCLA and RCRA has been delegated to States. ERA actively promotes
delegation of the RCRA program to authorized States and tends to defer to
States that are w i l l i n g to oversee preparation of the Remedial
Investigation/Feasibility Studies (RI/FS) for individual sites.
Although the RCRA and CERCLA Programs both address hazards to the environment,
CERCLA is the more comprehensive statute because it addresses both operating
and inactive facilities and includes hazardous materials, as well as source,
special nuclear, and byproduct material as defined in the AEA. The staff
previously discussed EPA’s RCRA and CERCLA Programs in SECYs 93-235 and
93-322. RCRA uses a general regulatory program to manage hazardous waste from
generation to ultimate disposal. CERCLA provides authority to respond
whenever there is a release or potential release of hazardous material. The
facility owner or operator implements RCRA corrective action, whereas CERCLA
responses may be implemented by a number of different parties, including
private or public responsible parties, States, or Federal authorities. CERCLA
“hazardous substances” include RCRA “hazardous wastes,” as well as toxic
pollutants under the Clean Water Act (CWA), Clean Air Act (CAA), and Toxic
Substances Control Act (TSCA). Although source, special nuclear, and
byproduct materials are excluded from regulation under CWA, TSCA, and RCRA,
they are included under the CAA, so they are included within the scope of
CERCLA. Consequently, ERA can require remediation of both non-radiological
The Commissioners – 3 –
and radiological contamination, including source, special nuclear, and
byproduct material, in accordance with CERCLA.1
As a general policy, ERA has declined listing NRC-licensed sites for
remediation on the National Priorities List (NPL), in deference to NRC
regulation under the AEA, provided that remediation is progressing under an
NRC license. However, ERA has required remediation under RCRA or CERCLA at
sites that exhibited non-radiological contamination (e.g., chromium
contamination at the Shieldalloy facility in Newfield, NJ) or that were
licensed by Agreement States (e.g., Homestake uranium mill in Milan, NM).
Based on the most recent version of the NPL (February 1994), the total number
of sites listed on the NPL is 1191. The Superfund Program is wellestablished,
and has defined remediation procedures and criteria, including
those that address radioactive materials. Although the remediation process
and criteria are not identical to NRC’s, they are parallel in scope and
purpose, and in the staff’s judgment, are generally adequate for the
protection of the public and the environment. A detailed explanation of the
Superfund site remediation and closure process is given in Enclosure 1 of
SECY-93-235.
The Commission has previously considered staff recommendations to establish
procedures for transferring sites from NRC to EPA, for remediation under the
Superfund Program. In a staff requirements memorandum (SRM) concerning
SECY-89-224, dated August 22, 1989, the Commission stated that it w i l l decide
whether to pursue the transfer of sites, to EPA, for remediation, on a
case-by-case basis, or through a memorandum of understanding (MOD). The
March 16, 1992, general MOD between EPA and NRC explicitly excludes matters
arising under CERCLA and RCRA. Since the general MOU was signed, NRC staff
has negotiated site-specific cooperative agreements for remediation of the
Homestake uranium m i l l , under CERCLA, and the Sequoyah Fuels and Engelhard
Corporation facilities, under RCRA. The staff is also currently discussing
cooperative agreements with State agencies in Ohio and Pennsylvania.
In another SRM dated December 21, 1989, the Commission rejected the staff’s
recommendation to develop a protocol with EPA to govern the application of
Superfund to contaminated sites. Instead of developing a protocol, the
Commission directed the staff to provide, for each site the staff proposes to
defer to EPA or a State agency, under Superfund, analyses of: (1) the cleanup
standard that would apply under Superfund, and the differences between that
standard and the AEA standard; (2) the rights and authorities the State would
have if Superfund were extended to the site; and (3) the rights and
authorities that private citizens would have to sue the Federal Government or
the licensee(s), using the citizen-suit provisions of Superfund.
More recently, the staff proposed to the Commission, in SECY 93-235, to
communicate with EPA about transferring the Safety Light Corporation (SLC)
site at Bloomsburg, PA, to EPA, to supervise site remediation under Superfund.
The rationale for the transfer was to accelerate the remediation of the site
1 CERCLA does not cover releases that are subject to NRC required
financial protection pursuant to Section 170 of the AE Act (i.e., Price
Anderson), nor releases from a processing site under Title I of the Uranium
Mill Tailing Radiation Control Act of 1978.
The Commissioners – 4 –
and limit the Federal resources devoted to the litigation to compel SLC to
remediate the site. The paper explained that during the first half of 1993,
the staff and the licensee tried unsuccessfully to settle the litigation and
the staff believed, as of the date of the paper, that further negotiations
would be futile and litigation would resume shortly. While the Commission was
considering SECY-93-235, the parties resumed negotiations; and in an SRM dated
November 2, 1993, the Commission returned SECY-93-235 to the staff,
“…pending the outcome of the negotiations,” and instructed the staff to
“…keep the Commission informed of further developments and, based on the
outcome of the negotiations, submit recommendations for further action to the
Commission, should that be necessary.” The staff recently completed
negotiations with SLC and successfully concluded a settlement agreement that
governs characterization and remediation planning for the Bloomsburg site.
In a related matter, SECY-93-136 presented the Commission with an analysis of
the State of Utah decision to allow Envirocare of Utah to use only
institutional controls as a means of reducing the risk to the public health
and safety after closure, without government land ownership. ERA regulations
do not always require government land ownership of sites such as these. The
Commission determined that this approach was adequate for protection of the
public health and safety in this particular case, and in a Director’s Decision
under 10 CFR 2.206 issued by the Office of State Programs on January 26, 1995,
the Commission did not revoke Utah’s Agreement State status.
DISCUSSION:
At sites where radioactive and non-radioactive materials are located in
distinct and separate areas, NRC and ERA oversight and regulation of remedial
actions can proceed effectively and efficiently. Although the effectiveness
of the government’s response and oversight can be strengthened through
interagency cooperation, each area can be remediated independently in
accordance with each agency’s requirements and administrative process.
However, independent regulation of remedial activities is not always possible.
There are some sites that contain commingled radioactive and non-radioactive
contamination. At other sites, the contamination is not commingled, but
remediation of one type of contamination would affect the responsible party’s
ability or approach to characterization and remediation of the other type of
contamination. In other cases, although the predominant hazard may be
associated with one type of contamination, the licensee or property owner is
not capable, technically or financially, to remediate either type of
contamination, thus preventing timely and effective completion of necessary
decommissioning or remedial actions. In yet other cases, the responsible
party desires a coordinated government response to reduce overall costs,
improve efficiency, and promote a compatible solution for both types of
contamination.
Under certain circumstances, the staff believes it would be appropriate for
NRC to defer to ERA or authorized State oversight of remediation efforts,
under CERCLA, RCRA, or State statutes. Deferral at these sites would reduce
the amount of duplicative effort by both agencies and by the site owners. For
example, the types of analyses performed by ERA as part of the development of
the RI/FS, under CERCLA (40 CFR 300.430), are very similar to the analyses
The Commissioners – 5 –
conducted by NRC in developing an Environmental Impact Statement (EIS) under
the National Environmental Policy Act of 1969 (NEPA) and 10 CFR Part 51. Both
agencies require submission of fairly extensive information on the
environmental characteristics of the contaminated sites and the nature and
extent of contamination. In addition, the agencies require preparation and
submission of a plan for implementing remedial measures found necessary to
remove or contain contamination in accordance with applicable remediation
criteria. EPA’s plan is called a Remedial Design; NRC calls this a
decommissioning plan.
Without cooperation between the agencies, therefore, it is conceivable that
site owners could be required by the government to develop separate reports
for each agency on site characterization, assessment of remediation
alternatives, projected environmental impacts, plans for remedial measures,
and documentation that the remedial measures were appropriately implemented.
Such an approach could result in an unnecessarily duplicative and burdensome
effort by the site owners and by the agencies.
At worst, the requirements of one agency could explicitly conflict with those
of the other agency, thus frustrating the government’s overall intent to
ensure protection of the public and the environment from residual
contamination. If, for example, EPA decided to allow hazardous waste to
remain onsite, to avoid excessive worker exposure and cost, and NRC decided
that commingled radioactive waste would have to be exhumed and disposed of
offsite, it would be difficult and burdensome, if not impossible, for the site
owner to simultaneously comply with-the requirements of both agencies. The
conflict would be especially significant if one action preceded the other
(e.g., EPA requires a cover to be placed over the waste; NRC later determines
that the radioactive waste needs to be removed for off-site disposal).
The staff believes that it is appropriate to rely on EPA’s environmental
remediation programs to ensure protection of the public and environment at the
DuPont and Westlake Landfill sites. Both cases may rely, at least in part, on
institutional controls to ensure long-term protection. As discussed
previously and in the attachments, such reliance on institutional controls is
somewhat inconsistent with NRC’s established policies for low-level
radioactive waste disposal (cf. State or Federal land ownership requirement
for low level waste disposal in 10 CFR 61.59(a)). However, the staff believes
that EPA remediation will be sufficient to provide adequate protection under
the Atomic Energy Act.
In addition, deferral to EPA provides numerous savings in terms of reducing
the administrative and regulatory burden on responsible parties conducting the
remediation and in conserving NRC staff resources. The staff estimates that
deferral of each site should save between 0.25 and 0.5 FTE per year in direct
staff resources required to oversee remediation at the sites. These resources
would partially duplicate the oversight functions that EPA staff will provide
in overseeing the safe and protective execution of the planned remedial
actions. In addition, deferral should save NRC an additional 0.5 FTE per year
and S600K in program support that could be necessary at each site to prepare
an Environmental Impact Statement (EIS) to support consideration of exemptions
from NRC’s existing requirements for decommissioning for unrestricted use.
The Commissioners – 6 –
Since November 1993, the staff has initiated several EISs to consider
exemption requests as appropriate considering the requirements in 10 CFR Part
51. Deferral should also improve the timeliness of remediation by avoiding
the potential delay that could be associated with administration of
independent and complementary regulatory approval processes for remediation.
Remediation could be further delayed by opportunities for legal challenges to
NRC approval of remedial actions.
Allowing disposal of the Dow wastes in the hazardous waste landfill cells in
Midland may also allow a small increase in the long-term risk to the public
and environment due to some reliance on institutional controls. As previously
described for the Westlake and DuPont site remediation projects, however, NRC
staff believes that such disposal would provide adequate protection of the
public, and any small increase in the associated risk is counterbalanced by
the improvements in efficiency, reduction in regulatory and administrative
burden, and savings of NRC and responsible party resources.
The staff does not consider, however, that these cases would necessarily
establish a precedent for resolution of other waste disposal and
decommissioning cases or establishment of general requirements in these areas.
The decisions on deferral and on approving waste disposal are specific to
these cases. In the cases of DuPont and Westlake Landfill, the radioactive
components appear to be intimately mixed with non-radiological contaminants
and wastes that are not subject to the Commission’s jurisdiction. In fact, at
least for some of the wastes, the dominant risks to the public and environment
may be attributable to the non-radiological contaminants. In addition, both
sites are already listed on the National Priorities List for remediation under
CERCLA, and the basis for listing and selection of the remedies included
consideration of the radiological contaminants.
In the Dow case, the staff has considered the merits of disposing of the
specific wastes present at the Dow sites and under the specified conditions
for disposal as proposed by the licensee and the State. Staff has already
approved other disposals of radioactive waste in or adjacent to hazardous
waste landfill cells in accordance with the provisions of 10 CFR 20.302 and
20.2002. Each of these disposals has been based on a site-specific review by
the NRC staff to ensure adequate protection of the public and that potential
radiological doses do not exceed NRC’s limits in 10 CFR Part 20. In most
cases, the staff has assured that the potential doses do not exceed a small
fraction of the public dose l i m i t . The Dow case is especially significant,
however, because it involves the disposal of a relatively large volume of
radioactive waste that will be generated in decommissioning an SDMP site and
that intrusion into the waste, if it were to occur, could result in doses that
may exceed the public dose limit (e.g., if the intruder were to live on top of
exposed waste for an extended period). The staff believes that the likelihood
of such intrusion is remote in the Dow case because of the design of the
disposal cells and the use of the general area for disposal of hazardous
waste. It is likely that an intruder into the waste would recognize that a
waste disposal cell had been breached and could suffer risk from the nonradiological
contaminants in adjacent cells even if the NRC did not authorize
disposal of the radioactive waste.
The staff would be prepared to entertain similar requests to the Dow request
from licensees to dispose of licensed material in hazardous waste landfills or
The Commissioners – 7 –
other suitable disposal facilities (e.g., monofills, sanitary landfills) in
accordance with the requirements of 10 CFR 20.2002. In such cases, as with
the Dow case, the burden would rest with the licensee to demonstrate that the
requirements of 10 CFR Part 20 will be satisfied, specifically that the
potential doses will be consistent with the Part 20 limits and are as low as
is reasonably achievable. Credit for institutional controls, such as those
that accompany Dow’s proposal, would also be considered on a site-specific
basi s.
For these reasons, the staff believes that NRC should defer to EPA or State
oversight regulatory programs for specific aspects of the remediation of two
contaminated sites: E.I. DuPont, Newport, DE; Cotter Corporation (West Lake
Landfill), Bridgeton, MO; and allow disposal of radioactive waste from
remediation in a RCRA permitted landfill for Dow Chemical, Midland and Bay
City (Salzburg Landfill), MI. By deferral, the staff means a variety of
approaches depending on the specific status of the contaminated sites.
For the DuPont site, the staff proposes to recognize EPA’s approved remedial
measures under CERCLA as being sufficiently protective of the public and
environment. The site is not currently licensed by NRC; NRC licensing and
oversight of the remediation of a small quantity of thorium waste in a
landfill would not be necessary, nor required, under the AEA. No further
action would be taken by the NRC staff, unless specifically requested by EPA.
For the West Lake Landfill site, EPA has already agreed to assume lead
responsibility for the site. The West Lake Landfill is listed in NRC’s Site
Decommissioning Management Plan (SDMP). The NRC staff is proposing to defer
to EPA oversight of remedial measures under CERCLA. EPA’s remediation of the
site already considers both radioactive and non-radioactive materials. The
site is not currently licensed by NRC; the staff would take no further action
at the site after deferral, unless specifically requested by EPA. NRC would
remove the site from the SDMP after EPA completes remedial measures at the
site.
Regarding the Dow Chemical sites in Midland and Bay City, Michigan, the staff
proposes to allow the licensee to dispose of thorium-contaminated waste in a
licensee-owned and permitted hazardous waste landfill designed and operated in
accordance with the RCRA requirements administered by EPA and the State of
Michigan. The staff would authorize disposal in accordance with NRC
requirements in 10 CFR 20.2002 and support the decision with an Environmental
Assessment that would presume the effectiveness of RCRA controls in ensuring
protection of the public and environment. Regulatory responsibility for the
management and long-term control of the thorium in the disposal site would, in
theory rest with NRC. However, in terminating the license, NRC would
recognize that controls for the hazardous waste, developed under RCRA, while
relying on land use restrictions which are not dependant on State or EPA
regulatory power, w i l l be adequate for the thorium as well. In allowing
disposal in the Salzburg Landfill, NRC would be recognizing that disposal of
thorium-contaminated wastes in a hazardous waste landfill may be acceptable
under the AEA, instead of requiring offsite disposal at a licensed radioactive
waste disposal facility. The Dow storage sites are listed in the SDMP and are
being remediated under an NRC license. NRC staff would continue to license
and regulate the remedial measures directed at removing the thorium waste from
its present locations. At such time as all waste has been satisfactorily
The Commissioners – 8 –
disposed of in the hazardous waste landfill and residual radioactivity has
been reduced in accordance with existing criteria, the staff would terminate
Dow’s license for the Midland and Bay City sites and no further action would
be taken by the NRC staff.
Background information for the DuPont, Westlake Landfill, and Dow sites is
provided in Attachments 1 to 3, respectively. The potential advantages and
disadvantages of deferral for each site are summarized in Attachment 4.
Requested Analysis:
In accordance with the Commission’s previous direction on information to
support deferral decisions, the staff provides the following analyses of:
(1) the cleanup standard that would apply under Superfund and the differences
between that standard and the AEA standard; (2) the rights and authorities the
State would have if Superfund were extended to the site; and (3) the rights
and authorities that private citizens would have to sue the Federal Government
or the licensee(s), using the citizen-suit provisions of Superfund. The
following analyses are presented in generic terms that would apply to all
three sites. The discussion about remediation criteria is only pertinent at
this time to the West Lake Landfill site; ERA has already decided to stabilize
the thorium waste in place at the Dupont site, and the thorium waste from Dow
would be disposed of in an RCRA-regulated landfill cell. To compare specific
EPA and NRC remediation standards for the West Lake Landfill, more information
would be needed on the remediation criteria EPA intends to implement at that
site. EPA will determine these criteria through the RI/FS and Record of
Decision (ROD) process, as described below.
(1) Remediation Standard
As previously stated, both NRC and EPA have been granted the authority
to regulate radioactive materials, in certain situations. To determine
what remediation standards would govern the remedial actions at a
specific site, EPA would perform a Feasibility Study (FS). This study
is the basis for the development of a ROD that establishes remediation
standards and remedial actions for each site. EPA would prepare the FS
after the site had been scored and entered on the NPL, as explained in
Enclosure 1 of SECY-93-235.
EPA’s requirements for FSs in 40 CFR 300.430(e)(2)(i) require that the
lead agency establish remedial action alternatives, including
remediation objectives and goals. The remediation goals establish
acceptable exposure levels to protect human health and the environment
and are developed considering: applicable or relevant and appropriate
requirements (ARARs) under Federal or State environmental laws,
drinking-water standards and goals, water-quality criteria, and other
factors. For known or suspected carcinogens (including ionizing
radiation), acceptable exposure levels are generally concentration
levels that represent an excess upper-bound lifetime cancer probability,
for an individual, of about 10″A and a cancer probability of 10″6 for as
many in the population as practical. The 10″6 probability is used as
the point of departure for determining remediation goals when ARARs are
not available or are not sufficiently protective, because of the
presence of multiple contaminants or multiple pathways.
The Commissioners – 9 –
These risk goals do not necessarily take into account human intrusion in
the future. If human intrusion were to be considered in the dose
pathway analysis, the calculated dose for thorium contaminated sites
could be in excess of 100 mrem/yr assuming standard exposure scenarios
(e.g., resident farmer scenario). Therefore, sites with significantly
elevated thorium concentrations would not necessarily meet the
provisions of the proposed NRC rule on radiological criteria for
decommissioning (proposed amendments to 10 CFR Part 20; 59 FR 43200).
The statement of considerations for the proposed rule acknowledges that
some sites could not meet the limits proposed in the rule. Deferral to
the Federal Superfund/RCRA approach is a possible way to address these
cases.
NRC risk analyses differ from ERA risk analyses in several ways. ERA
calculates risk based on the chance of developing cancer. NRC relates
risk to both the chance of developing cancer and the chance of a
fatality as a result of cancer. NRC staff calculated the risk to a
maximally exposed member of the public who at some time in the future,
could reside on top of the site. By using a general risk estimate of
5xlO”2 fatal cancers per sievert (5xlO~4 per rem) of received dose
developed for exposure of a large population, NRC can estimate a
potential risk, to an individual, produced by a specific exposure.
Nevertheless, were an actual measured exposure to occur, the staff
recognizes that it would be more appropriate to estimate the risk to
that individual using the cancer risk tables developed by the National
Cancer Institute.
In general, NRC has not relied on institutional controls as a means for
protecting the public or the environment for decommissioning purposes.
However, ERA and DOE have relied on institutional controls to prevent or
reduce the likelihood for human intrusion and otherwise protect the
public (e.g., restrictions on groundwater use). Staff compared
regulatory considerations of institutional controls in SECY-93-322,
dated November 26, 1993. Reliance on institutional controls directly
affects projected risks to exposed humans.
Based on information provided by the ERA staff, NRC has reviewed 19 RODs
for sites that include some radiological contamination. Most cases
involved contamination by radium-226 and its decay products and other
naturally-occurring radionuclides. In most of the RODs, ERA selected
ARARs based on EPA’s standard, for remedial action, at uranium mill
tailings sites in 40 CFR Part 192. In many cases, ERA also identified
NRC guidance in Regulatory Guide 1.86 “Termination of Operating Licenses
for Nuclear Reactors,” as an ARAR for surface contamination on buildings
and equipment. Other sources of ARARs for radiological contamination
include: NRC’s air concentration limits in 10 CFR Part 20, Appendix B;
State guidance on acceptable surface contamination; DOE orders for
acceptable public and worker doses; Federal and State water quality
standards; and Federal and State air-emission limits.
The Commissioners – 10 –
(2) State Authority under Superfund
For facilities covered by CERCLA, 42 USC 9605, et sec?., the States are
encouraged to enter into cooperative agreements to enable them to
undertake certain actions, under the National Contingency Plan (NCR), as
the lead agencies. State and local response organizations are expected
to initiate measures necessary to protect the public health and safety,
consistent with the containment and cleanup requirements in the NCR.
The RI/FS required under 40 CFR 300.430(d) and (e) are to be performed
by a lead agency, in coordination with any support agencies. Under
40 CFR 300.5, the State may be designated as the lead agency to plan and
implement a response, if it is operating pursuant to a contract or
cooperative agreement, under Section 104(d)(l) of CERCLA, or designated
as the lead agency in a Superfund Memorandum of Agreement (SMOA) or
other agreement. In addition, even if the State does not serve as lead
agency, the lead agency is required to consult with the local officials
and community representatives before commencing field work for the
remedial investigation. Under 40 CFR 300.430(c), support agencies are
afforded an opportunity to identify their own ARARs, under 40 CFR
300.430(d)(3). Support agencies are to be notified, by the lead agency,
of the alternatives that will be evaluated in detail, to facilitate the
identification of ARARs and any appropriate guidance to be considered,
under 40 CFR 300.430(e)(8).
In addition to the above, 40 CFR 300.430(e)(9)(iii)(H) requires that the
State’s concerns be assessed, including its views on the preferred and
other alternatives for remedial action and the ARARs or proposed use of
waivers.
Further, 40 CFR 300.430(f)(1)(i)(C) provides that the lead agency must
consult with the State, and that State and community acceptance are
modifying criteria that are to be considered in the remedy selection.
Section 300.430(f)(4)(i) provides that the State’s views are to be
considered by the lead agency in its final remedy selection from among
the various alternatives.
(3) The Rights of Private Citizens under Superfund
As discussed above, ERA is to solicit community participation in the
identification of ARARs and other aspects of the RI/FS process. In
addition, private citizens are authorized under CERCLA to undertake a
response action to eliminate a release of a hazardous substance,
pollutant, or contaminant, subject to the citizens’ compliance with the
provisions of 40 CFR 300.700. Various mechanisms are provided in CERCLA
for a private citizen to recover the cost of such response action.
These mechanisms are summarized in 40 CFR 300.700, and include:
(a) recovery of the response cost, plus interest, from the
parties found to be liable; and (b) recovery from Superfund of the
private citizen’s reasonable costs, plus interest.
In addition, “citizens suits” are authorized under Section 310 of
CERCLA. Private citizens are authorized to commence a civil action, on
The Commissioners – 11 –
their own behalf, against: (a) any person who is alleged to be in
violation of any standard, regulation, condition, requirement, or order
under CERCLA; and (b) any Federal official who is alleged to have failed
to perform a required duty, under CERCLA. Judicial relief, in such
actions, may consist of an order to enforce and/or correct the violation
or an order imposing any civil penalty provided for the violation; and
the court may award the prevailing party his costs of litigation,
including reasonable attorney and expert witness fees.
RECOMMENDATIONS:
That the Commission:
1. Approve deferral to EPA’s CERCLA program for the remediation of the
thorium waste located on the E. I. DuPont Superfund site in Newport, DE.
2. Approve deferral to EPA’s Superfund program for remediation of the West
Lake Landfi11/Cotter Corporation site in Bridgeton, MO.
3. Approve staff’s plans to pursue a request submitted by Dow
Chemical Company for an exemption from the unrestricted release
provisions of 10 CFR 40.42(f)(3) and to authorize disposal of
thorium waste from remediation in a landfill in accordance with
10 CFR 20.2002. The landfill would be regulated under Michigan
hazardous waste regulations that implement the RCRA program for
long term control of the waste in the Salzburg Landfill cells,
including reliance on institutional and State control and longterm
monitoring of the Salzburg Landfill site in Midland, MI.
4. Note:
a. That although EPA is authorized to regulate byproduct, source, and
special nuclear material under CERCLA and CAA, the State agencies, if
they are not NRC Agreement States, are not authorized except under CAA.
That even though NRC is allowing disposal under the RCRA program
administered by EPA and Michigan Department of Natural Resources, NRC
staff will continue to regulate remediation of the Dow Chemical storage
sites in Michigan, which are currently licensed by NRC. With respect to
the disposal in the Salzburg landfill, the staff will continue to review
pertinent documents to ensure Michigan is not applying significantly
less stringent waste disposal requirements than NRC.
b. That reliance on institutional controls over the long term may not
provide as high a level of protection for the public health and
environment as that attained if there were no reliance on institutional
controls. This lower level of assurance results from the lack of a
guarantee that there will always be a responsible party to maintain the
controls.
The Commissioners – 12 –
COORDINATION:
The Office of the General Counsel has reviewed this paper and has no legal
objection. NRC staff consulted with ERA and the States of Delaware, Missouri,
and Michigan in preparing this paper. Neither ERA nor the States objected to
the staff’s proposed approach.
~2^1/L~
x , „„ /A- -^*yl^-^
/J^mes M. Ta/lor
(ecutive Director
for Operations
Attachments:
1. Bkgd Info for E.I. DuPont
2. Bkgd Info for Cotter Corporation
West Lake Landfill
3. Bkgd Info for Dow Chemical
4. Adv/Disadv of Prop Options by Site
Commissioners’ comments or consent should be provided directly to the Office
of the Secretary by COB Friday, March 24, 1995.
Commission Staff Office comments, if any, should be submitted to the Commissioners
NLT March 17, 1995, with an information copy to the Office of the Secretary.
If the paper is of such a nature that it requires additional review and comment,
the Commissioners and the Secretariat should be apprised of when comments may
be expected.
Distribution:
Commissioners
OGC
OCAA
DIG
OPA
OCA
ACNW
Region I
Region III
EDO
SECY
BACKGROUND INFORMATION FOR THE
E.I. DUPONT NEWPORT, DELAWARE, SITE
The E.I. DuPont site is located in Newport, Delaware, near 1-95, 1-495, and
the Christina River. The entire site is approximately 485,600 m2 (120 acres)
and contains a paint pigment production facility, a chromium dioxide
production facility, and two industrial landfills (North and South) which are
closed.
DuPont was licensed by the U.S. Atomic Energy Commission (AEC) and began using
radioactive materials at this site in 1961, for the processing of thorium into
metal alloys. The alloys consisted mostly of nickel, some chromium and
molybdenum, and thorium (approximately 2 to 5 percent by weight thorium-232).
Waste materials from this process were buried in the North Landfill,
reportedly, in accordance with 10 CFR 20.304 regulations that were in effect
at the time. According to DuPont, the thorium waste was placed in glass jars
that were subsequently placed in 55-gallon barrels together with disposable
protective clothing and debris from the waste-handling operations. The
barrels were then buried in a specific, although uncertain, section of the
North Landfill and covered with 3 m (10 feet) of soil. The area where the
thorium was buried is estimated to be 40 m by 10 m (130 ft by 35 ft) and
contains approximately 20 tons of thorium metal, which were placed in the
North Landfill over a 7 year period.
DuPont believes most of the thorium in the North Landfill consists of thorium
oxide, a relatively insoluble form of thorium. However, DuPont’s records, as
well as information in the Nuclear Regulatory Commission’s docket files,
indicate that thorium nitrate, a more soluble form of thorium, and other salts
could also have been disposed of in the North Landfill. Long-term releases
from these other forms of the thorium waste could be greater than from the
thorium oxide. They could also pose a greater threat to shallow groundwater
beneath the North Landfill site, because of leaching and subsequent transport.
The thorium burials comprised a small portion of the North Landfill area. The
remaining portion of the North Landfill was used for the disposal of
lithophone wastes (an inorganic paint pigment based on zinc and barium),
organic pigment wastes, chromium wastes, and other miscellaneous wastes,
including the off-specification thoriated nickel and other thorium wastes.
The Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) initiated the Comprehensive
Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act (CERCLA) Program for
remediation of the site in the 1980s and proposed the site for inclusion on
the National Priorities List (NPL) in 1987. EPA proposed the site for
remediation under CERCLA because of extensive non-radiological contamination.
DuPont used historical records and interviews with retired employees to
estimate the quantity of thorium that was buried in the l a n d f i l l . However,
the records are not complete and the exact quantity and form of the thorium
are not known. Although the entire DuPont site is currently undergoing
remediation, remediation of the North Landfill is of the most concern to NRC
because of the thorium buried in the landfill. The North Landfill is only a
small section of the entire 120-acre site.
Attachment 1
-2-
Based on available records of the burials, NRC staff believes that at least
some of the thorium wastes in the North Landfill exceeds the concentration
criteria in Options 1 and 2 of the 1981 Branch Technical Position (BTP)
entitled: “Disposal or Onsite Storage of Thorium or Uranium Wastes from Past
Operations” (46 FR 52061). NRC identified these criteria as the pertinent
release criteria in the Site Decommissioning Management Plan (SDMP) Action
Plan of April 16, 1992 (57 FR 13389) coupled with the principle that residual
radiation be reduced to as low as is reasonably achievable (ALARA). Because
thorium concentrations are expected to exceed these criteria in some areas by
a substantial margin (e.g., 10,000 pCi/g thorium-232), the NRC staff would
generally not consider onsite disposal as a viable disposal action.
In addition, as described above, it is possible that there are soluble forms
of thorium in the landfill, which could become mobile and enter the
groundwater beneath the site or the river adjacent to the site. DuPont has
not attempted to characterize the thorium waste in the landfill for the
following reasons: (1) the exact location of the thorium in the landfill is
not known; (2) intrusive and extrusive sampling may be necessary because the
waste is very heterogeneous, which would make accurate sampling through a
limited number of boreholes difficult; and (3) exposure to the hazardous
material in the landfill would cause risks to workers during the
characterization and sampling process.
Monitoring well sampling found slightly elevated levels of radium-226 and
radium-228 in the groundwater adjacent to the landfill. DuPont believes the
elevated levels are representative of background. Elevated levels of radium
were not found in surrounding wells or in wells located between the landfill
and the well containing the elevated readings.
EPA w i l l require DuPont to place a low-permeability cover system over the
landfill, capable of reducing infiltration by over 99 percent, to minimize
groundwater contamination below the site. In addition, DuPont is required to
construct a physical barrier wall extending from the top on the landfill,
along the river bank and down to the base of the Columbia aquifer. This wall
w i l l cause mounding of the groundwater in the landfill. Groundwater
extraction wells w i l l be installed to control this mounding. The recovered
groundwater shall be treated. This wall will prevent the contaminated
groundwater from entering the river. Monitoring will be needed to ensure
there will not be erosion of the river bank and the potential for erosion from
the river into the landfill itself.
The potential risks produced by the thorium contamination are small compared
with the risks posed by the other hazardous waste in the North Landfill, as
well as the materials on the remaining portions of the site. EPA’s risk
assessment supporting the ROD concluded that non-radiological risks
predominate over radiological risks associated with the thorium waste buried
in the landfill. EPA requires in the ROD that DuPont: monitor groundwater to
detect any potential migration of thorium or its decay products; apply
institutional controls to restrict public access to the waste and to
groundwater beneath and adjacent to the site; and assess the existence of
radiological contamination at other locations onsite. The remedial action
identified in the ROD was developed through a public process that involved
DuPont, State of Delaware, local community officials, members of the public,
and other interested parties.
The NRC staff believes that the remedial action required by EPA, under CERCLA,
-3-
would be sufficient to protect the public and the environment from the risks
associated with the thorium waste. Although NRC and ERA staffs suspect that a
majority of the thorium is in the relatively insoluble oxide form, there is a
possibility that some more soluble thorium compounds exist in the landfill.
However, with the cap, wall along the river bank, groundwater monitoring,
institutional controls, and groundwater use restrictions, the staff believes
that any significant contamination of the groundwater by thorium is unlikely
to occur. However, if it does, the staff believes the contamination would be
accompanied by other contaminants, promptly detected, and mitigated before
causing any significant health or environmental hazards.
Since the site is not currently licensed by NRC, the staff would not undertake
any other activities directly related to remediation of the site, including:
performing reviews of licensing (Superfund-required) documents; undertaking
site visits or inspections; monitoring ERA progress on the remediation; and
examining the completion of cleanup activities.
BACKGROUND INFORMATION FOR THE
WEST LAKE LANDFILL/COTTER CORPORATION
BRIDGETON, MISSOURI SITE
The West Lake Landfill is a 809,000 m2 (200-acre) tract located in St. Louis
County, Missouri, approximately 16 miles northwest of downtown St. Louis.
Beginning in 1962, portions of the property were used as an unregulated dump
for solid and liquid industrial wastes, municipal refuse, and construction
debris. In 1973, Cotter Corporation, a Nuclear Regulatory Commission
licensee, disposed of over 39,000 metric tons of uranium ore processing
residues and contaminated soil in two areas covering about 64,750 m2 (16
acres) of the site. This is a relatively small portion of the larger
809,000 m2 (200-acre) site. In 1976, the unregulated landfill was closed, and
in following years, the Missouri Department of Natural Resources issued
several permits for various portions of the 809,000 m2 site. Efforts to
remediate the site included NRC survey and site characterization work in the
1980s. In 1990, the Environmental Protection Agency (ERA) listed West Lake
Landfill as a Superfund site by adding it to the National Priorities List.
Under Superfund, EPA is now regulating remediation of the site for both
radiological and other hazardous wastes.
The radioactive wastes in the two soil areas are mostly covered by other
landfill materials. The site poses no immediate radiological threat to the
public. Radioactive wastes, in concentrations greater than the current NRC
standards for unrestricted release, are found in two soil piles and include
uranium-238, thorium-230, and radium-226. Elevated levels of radioactivity
(gross alpha particle contamination) have been detected in groundwater
monitoring wells onsite, indicating slight contamination above background.
The NRC staff proposes to defer to EPA’s Superfund Program for the remediation
of uranium contamination. NRC staff has already acknowledged that EPA’s
Superfund Program is responsible for the remediation of the radioactive waste
on this site. A letter dated May 1991 states that “. . . EPA is taking the
lead for site remediation activities . . . .” NRC staff has performed limited
reviews of EPA-required documents, including the Remedial Investigation/
Feasibility Study for the site, that included considerations of both
radiological and non-radiological material onsite. The NRC staff believes the
remedial actions that would be required by EPA, under the Comprehensive
Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act (CERCLA), would be
sufficient to protect the public and the environment from the risks associated
with the uranium contamination.
Under this deferral scenario, NRC staff would continue to provide certain
technical support to EPA, at the specific request of EPA. In addition, NRC
would retain a copy of the Record of Decision in the permanent files for the
site. The staff would take no further action at the site after deferral to
EPA, since the site is not currently licensed by the NRC.
Attachment 2
BACKGROUND INFORMATION FOR THE DOW CHEMICAL COMPANY
BAY CITY AND MIDLAND, MICHIGAN, SITES
Dow Chemical Company possesses thorium-contaminated waste under a Nuclear
Regulatory Commission license at two sites in Michigan: Bay City and Midland.
The Bay City site is located 1 mile south of Saginaw Bay and is 20 miles east
of Midland, Michigan. The thorium-contaminated waste at this site is stored
in a fenced-in area owned by Dow Chemical Company. Approximately 30,500 m3
(40,000 yd3) of thorium-contaminated waste is estimated to be stored at the
Bay City site. This waste has an average concentration of 188 pCi/g thorium-
232, with a range of from 2 to 7000 pCi/g thorium-232. Dow estimates that
there are about 9.2 Ci of thorium-232 and an equivalent amount of thorium-228
at the Bay City location.
The estimated volume of the thorium-contaminated waste at the Midland site is
over 9000 m3 (12,000 yd3). The area where the waste is stored at the Midland
site measures 50 m by 90 m (160 ft by 300 ft) and is roped off. The waste is
covered by a clay cover that is approximately 1-meter thick. The thoriumcontaminated
waste storage area is located within a larger industrial complex
that Dow owns and controls access to. The radioactivity in the waste varies
substantially and ranges up to 2000 pCi/g, with an average of 29 pCi/g
thorium-232 and an equivalent activity concentration of thorium-228. Dow
estimates that there is approximately 0.46 Ci of thorium-232 in the waste at
this site.
In 1956, the U.S. Atomic Energy Commission gave Dow Chemical Company a license
to use thorium metal and compounds to produce thorium-magnesium alloys. The
alloying process produced a thorium-contaminated waste. In 1973, the license
was amended to authorize storage only at Dow’s Bay City and Midland sites in
Michigan, and at the Madison site in Illinois. The Madison site is now under
the regulatory authority of the Illinois Department of Nuclear Safety.
Thorium-contaminated waste and associated contaminated soil are currently
being stored at both sites. Dow proposes to dispose of its thoriumcontaminated
waste in two dedicated disposal cells at the Dow-owned and
operated Salzburg Landfill in Midland. The Salzburg Landfill is permitted by
the Michigan Department of Natural Resources and the Environmental Protection
Agency (ERA), for the disposal of hazardous and non-hazardous solid wastes.
The Salzburg Landfill, is relatively large [615,100 m2 (152 acres)], and is
located 1.5 miles from the Midland site and 20 miles from the Bay City site.
The proposed disposal cell design, for the thorium-contaminated waste, would
be comprised of, from the bottom, a 6 meter clay underliner with a hydraulic
conductivity of less than 10″6 cm/s; 1 meter of recompacted clay with
hydraulic conductivity of less than 10″7 cm/s; a synthetic liner with a leak
detection and removal system consisting of a 0.33-meter sand drainage layer;
1.5 meters of clay; a geosynthetic liner; and a 0.33-meter sand leachate
drainage layer. This liner would underlie the thorium-contaminated waste
which would be covered by 1 meter of clay; a 100-mil HOPE synthetic liner;
0.33 meters of drainage medium; almost a meter (91 cm) of a frost protection
layer; and 0.66 meters of top soil. No liquid wastes are allowed to be
disposed of at the Salzburg Landfill. The approximate design area for one of
the proposed thorium-contaminated waste disposal cells is 61 m (200 ft) long
by 40 m (125 ft) wide, and the other is 221 m (725 ft) long by 23 m (75 ft)
Attachment 3
-2-
wide. Both disposal cells will be covered by a unified cover. There are 16
shallow monitoring wells around the proposed disposal cells. These monitoring
wells are required under Resource Conservation and Recovery Act (RCRA) and
State of Michigan hazardous waste requirements. Groundwater monitoring wells
and domestic wells in the area are sampled as part of the Salzburg Landfill
monitoring program.
The NRC staff proposes to allow Dow Chemical Company to dispose of licensed
material in EPA-approved RCRA designed cells in accordance with 10 CFR 20.2002
and thereby be exempt from NRC’s unrestricted release criteria of 10 CFR
40.42(j)(3) [Although the amended rule does not refer to unrestricted release,
but to release in accordance with NRC requirements, the criteria of the SDMP
Action Plan apply. These are essentially unrestricted release criteria.] Dow
has requested to bury thorium-contaminated waste in the Salzburg landfill, per
10 CFR 20.2002, at concentrations above NRC’s SDMP Action Plan criteria for
unrestricted release.
There is a parallel between what is being proposed by Dow and the burial of
low-level waste under 10 CFR Part 61. The performance objectives for the
disposal of low-level radioactive waste, as stated in 10 CFR Part 61 and the
Final Environmental Impact Statement for Part 61 (NUREG-0945), are to: 1)
protect public health and safety (and the environment) over the long term; 2)
protect the inadvertent intruder; 3) protect workers and the public during the
short-term operational phase; and 4) provide long-term stability, to eliminate
the need for active long-term maintenance after operations cease. The staff
believes that disposal of the thorium waste in the landfill would be generally
consistent with these objectives, although the staff has not completed the
kind of detailed review that would be required for a license application under
10 CFR Part 61.
For thorium contamination of the type presently stored by Dow under its
license, the dominant exposure pathway is direct exposure from human
intrusion. Thorium-232 has an extremely long half-life (in excess of 14
b i l l i o n years). Thus, the potential hazard will continue to exist whether the
material is excavated and shipped to a licensed disposal site (at an estimated
cost of about $28 million if disposed at Envirocare or significantly more if
disposed at a licensed low-level waste disposal facility) or excavated and
shipped to the Salzburg Landfill (at a cost of about $5 million). The primary
safety issue then becomes how to minimize the potential for human intrusion
over the long term under either disposal alternative. Dilution of the
contamination was not considered due to the significant increases in waste
volume that would be required to substantially reduce thorium concentrations
down to levels approaching natural background for soils in the Midland area.
As a regulated hazardous waste disposal facility, institutional controls would
be required to be maintained over the Salzburg Landfill under hazardous and
solid waste regulations. Dow states that, even though the concentration of
thorium in the waste exceeds NRC’s criteria for unrestricted release, the colocation
of the thorium waste disposal cells with the hazardous and solid
waste disposal cells would offer sufficient institutional control to deter
intrusion over the long term. The institutional controls offered by hazardous
and solid waste regulations involve environmental monitoring and reporting,
maintenance and release control, and controls on the post-closure use of the
land (i.e., no disturbance of the waste or any components of the disposal
unit). There are additional requirements for post-closure financial assurance
and a schedule for closure. Dow estimates that the pre-closure operational
-3-
period for the Salzburg Landfill will extend until approximately the year
2045. The post-closure institutional control period generally lasts 30 years
and can be extended by the ERA Regional Administrator or State agency. The
Salzburg Landfill is not a remote site, but because of the existence of the
hazardous waste already buried there, the land can never be used productively
again for farming and other non-industrial applications without extensive
remediation. Dow has already imposed restrictive covenants in the Salzburg
Landfill deed, in accordance with ERA requirements for hazardous waste
landfills. If the thorium wastes are buried in the Salzburg Landfill, Dow
proposes a requirement (to be inserted into the deed) to notify NRC (or its
successor) before disturbing the landfill.
On balance, the staff believes that disposing of the thorium wastes at the
Salzburg Landfill constitutes an as low as reasonably achievable (ALARA)
approach to remediation of the Bay City and Midland sites, and that the
conditions and restrictions placed on the landfill, combined with the RCRA
regulatory and cell design provisions, provide a comparable level of
protection of human health and the environment, as is provided at other
licensed low-level waste disposal sites. In the Office of the General
Counsel’s opinion, Dow’s proposed restrictive covenants appear adequate to
support an exemption. With one exception, the restrictive covenants, and the
co-location of the thorium-contaminated waste disposal cells with hazardous
and solid waste disposal cells, appear to achieve the same effect as if this
thorium-contaminated waste were buried at a location where State or Federal
control alone is considered sufficient to guarantee institutional care.
Inadvertent intrusion into the thorium waste disposal cells would be
controlled by the restrictive covenants on the deed as proposed by Dow in its
exemption request. The one exception is that, as with the Envirocare facility
in Utah, there is no assurance that, for the very long term, there will be a
responsible party with the obligation to take additional remedial action
should this become necessary.
Therefore, NRC staff proposes to allow disposal of licensed radioactive
material in the landfill operated by Dow and regulated by ERA and the State of
Michigan. This decision would be supported by an appropriate Environmental
Assessment, which would presume the adequacy of the cell design and
institutional controls (including ERA and Michigan regulation) in protecting
humans and the environment. NRC staff would notice in the Federal Register
its intent to issue a license amendment to allow the disposal of the waste in
the Salzburg Landfill, including the exemption. Pursuant to Subpart L of 10
CFR Part 2, the notice will offer an opportunity for an informal hearing. The
hearing would include approval of the decommissioning plan and the transfer
and disposal under 20.2002 at the Salzburg l a n d f i l l . Following completion of
the necessary safety and environmental reviews, NRC staff anticipates issuing
the amendment, provided the safety and environmental reviews are favorable.
Because the Dow storage sites are currently licensed by the NRC, the staff
would monitor the remedial activities being performed by Dow to ensure that
NRC requirements are satisfied. The staff would review all pertinent
documents and would terminate the license after disposal of the radioactive
material currently in storage at the Bay City and Midland sites and the
storage sites are cleaned up to unrestricted use standards.
ADVANTAGES AND DISADVANTAGES OF
PROPOSED OPTIONS FOR EACH SITE
Attachment 4
E. I. DUPONT CORPORATION
Administrative Alternatives for the
Remediation of the Newport, Delaware, Site
Deferral to EPA Superfund NRC Maintains Responsibility
Advantages
• Allows DuPont to continue remediation activities
in a timely and effective manner.
• Reduces delays and expense produced from
duplicative regulation.
• Ensures consistency in remediation decision for
both radiological and non-radiological waste.
• Avoids need for an NRC license.
• Promotes interagency cooperation and consistency
in selection of remedial actions.
Advantages
Remediation of the thorium contamination down to
Option 1 or 2 levels2 would reduce risk to
inadvertent intruders.
Provides higher level of assurance that remediation
is conducted in a satisfactory manner, from NRC’s
perspective.
2 Option 1 or 2 of the 1981 Branch Technical Position “Disposal or Onsite Storage
of Thorium or Uranium Wastes from Past Operations.”
-2-
Disadvantages
Relies on institutional controls for protection
of the public.
Could require removal at some point in the
future, if the thorium contaminates the
groundwater.
Reduces assurance of satisfactory remediation
from NRC’s perspective.
Disadvantages
May ultimately find that current proposed
remediation is acceptable and preferable, after
additional expense and time.
If exhumation would be required, could result in
increased risk to workers from exposure to nonradiological
and radiological wastes in the landfill
and extended storage of waste pending access to
disposal facilities.
Increases costs for DuPont, ERA, and NRC.
May require additional effort to establish location
of thorium waste in landfill.
Could require NRC license.
Could delay or impair remedial actions for the other
wastes onsite, pending resolution of the thorium
waste disposal issue._____________________
-3-
WEST LAKE LANDFILL/COTTER CORPORATION
Administrative Alternatives for the
Remediation of the Bridgeton, Missouri, Site
Deferral to ERA Superfund NRC Maintains Responsibility
Advantages
• Continues established lead responsibilities
between NRC and ERA (ERA lead).
• Reduces costs and delays produced from duplicative
regulat ion.
• Avoids need for an NRC license.
• Promotes consistency in NRC and ERA remedial
deci sions.
Advantages
• Maintains NRC control of the remediation under Atomic
Energy Act.
• May result in lower risk to public and environment if
site is remediated to Option 1 or 2 levels.
• Avoids reliance on institutional controls.
Disadvantages
• Reduces assurance that NRC w i l l find the remedial
action satisfactory because ERA has not yet
selected remedial action for the uranium
contamination.
• Introduces possibility that additional remediation
may be necessary in the future.
• Places remediation outside of NRC control; no
assurance when remedial actions w i l l occur.
Disadvantages
• Increases costs and duplicative effort for regulating
agencies and Cotter Corporation.
• May delay the remediation of the non-radioactive
materials onsite.
• May produce conflicts for Cotter if NRC and ERA
approve inconsistent remedial actions.
• May require imposition of a license through order, if
Cotter objects to license and one is required.
DON CHEMICAL COMPANY
Administrative Alternatives for the
Remediation of the Midland and Bay City, Michigan, Sites
Approve Site Disposal Request Removal & Offsite Disposal
Advantages Advantages
Reduces costs and delays from duplicative
regulation.
Allows timely completion of remediation and
termination of NRC licenses for the Midland and
Bay City sites.
Could reduce public and worker risks
from near site disposal as compared to
transporting waste across country.
Promotes consistency between NRC and ERA in terms
of remediation decisions.
Maintains NRC control of the disposal of the
radioactive waste.
May reduce long-term risks if wastes were disposed
of at a licensed disposal facility for radioactive
waste that does not rely on institutional controls.
Reduces by one the number of radioactive waste
disposal sites in the country.
Disadvantages
Additional remediation under NRC control may be
necessary at the Salzburg Landfill at some point
in the future, if warranted.
Establishes precedent for disposal of radioactive
wastes in hazardous waste landfill and for
reliance on institutional controls.
Disadvantages
• Relies on limited disposal capacity for radioactive
waste.
• Increases costs for regulating agencies and Dow
Chemical.
• May delay remediation of the Midland and Bay City
sites, pending resolution of waste disposal
location.
-5-

Post

1995-09-07 – NRC – Press Release – NRC defers to EPA on regulatory oversight for cleanup of West Lake Landfill Site in Missouri

No. 95-110 FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE
Tel. 301/415-8200 (Thursday, September 7, 1995)
Internet:[email protected]
NRC DEFERS TO EPA ON REGULATORY OVERSIGHT
FOR CLEANUP OF WEST LAKE LANDFILL SITE IN MISSOURI
The Nuclear Regulatory Commission has deferred to the
Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) the regulatory oversight
for cleanup of contamination at the West Lake Landfill site in
Bridgeton, Missouri. The property, which contains both hazardous
and radioactive waste, is currently being cleaned up by EPA. it
is not covered by a current NRC license.
The NRC will remove the West Lake Landfill from its Site
Decommissioning Management Plan (SDMP) list of sites that receive
special agency management attention. Accordingly, NRC plans no
further action concerning the site unless specifically asked to
do so by EPA.
Under the national Superfund program, EPA has lead
responsibility for cleanup at West Lake. EPA added the site in
1990 to its Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation
and Liability National Priorities List for Uncontrolled Hazardous
Waste Sites and ranked it as number 1003.
Based on the reviews to date, NRC has concluded that the
program being administered by EPA is adequate to protect the
public and the environment from the risks associated with
radioactive contamination. NRC therefore believes that its
oversight of remediation at the site, in addition to that of EPA,
would be burdensome and duplicative.
The West Lake Landfill property, owned by Laidlaw and
Rockroad, Inc., is located on the outskirts of St. Louis.
Radioactively contaminated soil from the Cotter Corporation’s
Latty Avenue site was placed in the landfill in 1973. Two areas
on the site have a layer of radioactively contaminated soil,
mostly covered with 3 to 20 feet of other waste. The
contamination originated with residues from extraction of uranium
and radium from very rich uranium ores for the former Atomic
Energy Commission.
#
2

Post

1988-10-25 – MDNR – West Lake Landfill – Letter to EPA requesting determination of Hazard Ranking Score

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FREDERICK A. BRL’NNKR “”X” “”VM-m ,» M.in^-tm-m x-rvuvi)
irix.t,,r STATI: (>i MI>S(>riu nm>i,,n ,,f |.arkv R^…^,,,,.
DEPARTMENT OF NATURAL RESOURCES “” “1N”W”””Jllim
Di\’isioN OF I:NVIRONMI;NTAL gi’Ai.nv
I’.O. Box 176
Jefferson City. MOdSI()2
October 25, 1988
Mr. David Wagoner, Director
Waste Management Division
U.S. EPA Region VII
726 Minnesota Avenue
Kansas City, KS 66101
Dear Mr. Wagoner:
The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Conmission (NRC) staff recently released
a report (NUREG-1308, June, 1988) on the radioactive wastes at the
Westlake Landfill in St. Louis County, Missouri.
In the report the NRC staff concludes that “(1) measures must be
taken to establish adequate permanent control of the radioactive
waste and to mitigate the potential long term impacts from its
existing storage conditions and (2) the information developed is
inadequate for a determination of several important issues, i.e.,
whether mixed wastes are involved, and whether on-site disposal is
practical technologically, and, if so, under what alternative
methods.” However, the report does not indicate whether the NRC will
take any further action at the site and informal communication with
the NRC staff indicates that NRC does not intend to take further
action.
The suggestion has been made by a number of state and local officials
and citizen’s groups that the U.S. Department of Energy should
undertake action at the site under the Formerly Utilized Sites
Remedial Action Program (FUSRAP). However, a letter from DOE was
received by the Missouri Department of Natural Resources on
October 30, 1987 which states that [‘the DOE has reviewed the
possibility of the Westlake Landfill being designated as a FUSRAP
site and has concluded, based on the criteria used to designate
FUSRAP sites, that the Westlake Landfill is not eligible for
consideration as a FUSRAP site. The radioactive waste was under
Nuclear Regulatory Commission license when it was brought to the
landfill and, consistent with current DOE policy, would not be
disposed of at a DOE site.”
Mr. David Wagoner
October 25, 1988
Page 2
Since no further activity is planned at the site by either the NRC or
the DOE, I request that the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency
(EPA) determine the Hazard Ranking Score (HRS) for this site and, if
appropriate, place the site on the National Priorities List (NPL).
This ranking should be conducted using all currently available
information on the site. Further, I request that EPA initiate the
Superfund process to determine potentially responsible parties and,
if necessary, initiate enforcement action to begin an appropriate
remedial action.
The Missouri Department of Natural Resources believes that the
current uncontrolled condition of the radioactive waste at the
Westlake Landfill is unacceptable and we are interested in expediting
action at this site. Please contact me if you have any questions
regarding MDNR’s position on this matter.
Sincerely,
DIVISION OF ENVIRONMENTAL QUALITY
William C. Ford/Director
WCF/dbc
cc: Mr. Jim Fiore, DOE
Mr. Germain LaRoche, NRC

Post

1980-10-02 – MDNR – West Lake Landfill – Memorandum – History of Operations

MEMORANDUM
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Date: October 2, 1980
Jo: Bob Schreiber
From: Burt McCullough
Subject: Westlake Landfill
Westlake Landfill, located in Bridgeton Missouri (St. Louis County) has been
the subject of recent inquiry. This landfill began operation prior to state
regulation. As far as our records show, this landfill first opened in the
mid-1960’s. Part of the landfill lies in an old quarry and part of the landfill
lies in the Missouri River floodplain, approximately 1^ miles from the
river. Witnesses to this operation, when the area of the landfill which lies
in the floodplain was in operation, note that the fill area was often actually
beneath the level of the water table. According to file materials from
Missouri Geological Survey, it is “highly probable that leachate from the
landfill is entering the waters of the Missouri River. . . ” Leachate from
the old quarry area of the landfill is collected and hauled to MSB treatment
plants. Construction of onsite treatment facilities is underway. About 48,000
gallons of leachate per day is currently being collected.
Aside from normal landfill materials, there are chemical industrial wastes and
radiologically contaminated materials deposited in this landfill. The chemical
wastes, that we know of, include about 4,000 tons of residues from the production
of insecticides and herbicides. These pesticide wastes were deposited by
Chevron Chemical Company. Also included in the chemical wastes are waste
materials from ink manufacture and from the manufacture of glue. Among the
chemical wastes that we know of in Westlake Landfill are:
waste ink pigments
esters alcohols
halogenated intermediates
oils wastewater sludges
heavy metals asbestos
oily sludges
insecticides
aromatics
herbidices
Joseph
Fred A
Besides chemical hazardous wastes, in Westlake Landfill, there are radioactive
wastes. During early 1973 Cotter Corporation buried radioactive Barium
Sulfate Slag material and radiologically contaminated building rubble. There
are approximately 9,000 tons of this material which contain about 7,000″tons
of natural Uranium. In October, 1977, an aerial radiological survey was done to
determine the location of the burial of this contaminated material. The report
from this survey indicates that there are two burial sites. One is in the
center of the old quarry area, and the other is on the edge of the floodplain
area which borders adjacent farmland. The U.S Nuclear Regulatory Commission
has contracted Radiation Management Corporation to do extensive on-site
radiological surveys which include groundwater analysis, core sampling, test
boring, and other tests as deemed necessary. The NRC has given DNR verbal
P. Teasdale Governor Division of Environmental Quality
Lafser Director Robert J. Schreiber Jr., P.E. Director
Westlake Landfill continued
Page 2
October 2, 1980
To: Bob Schreiber
permission to utilize the monitoring wells which Radiation Management
Corporation will be digging, in order that DNR may test for the presence of
chemical hazardous wastes.
There is little known about what went into Westlake Landfill prior to State
regulation. Analysis needs to be done to determine: 1) what wastes are
deposited in Westlake Landfill, 2) if any of these pollutants are leaving
the landfill via groundwater, and 3) what threat does Westlake Landfill pose
to drinking water supplies.
cc: Fred Lafser
Ron Kucera
Jim Long
Robert Robinson
Bob Miller
Tom Doan

Post

1979-11-08 – Senator Dirck – Letter to MDNR – Missouri’s role in cleaning up radioactive waste at West Lake

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Jli:tl”t:Hs0:-1 CITY
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CA,.ITOL :JUILDINO
JU”ll’llON CITY. MISSOUlll 111101
TILl,.HONI I J 14 I 711.z … 0
November 8. 1979 1014t· •r. •··.
a;. J..N,_.._ …. i.. ‘:io’J’-
TIL.IP’H .:JN’. I JI.a .
Mr. James Odendahl, Director
Division of Environmental Quality
P. 0. Box 1368
2010 Missour _ Boulev.L:·d
Jefferson City, Missouri 65101
Dear Mr. Odendahl:
Attached please find a copy of a l~tter and re~~·
lution that I received from Mayor Bill Abram o[
the City of Bridgeton, St. Louis County. Although
I realize the Nuclear Regulatory ~orrunission has
responsibility for disposal of radjoactive waste
materials, I would appreciate your responding to
Mayor Abram and advising with regard to Missouri’s
role, if any, i~ this area.
Thanks for yo~r help.
Sincerely,
(~u/.AJ~
Edwin L. flirck
CLO: ls
Enclosures (2)

Post

1979-12-28 – MDNR – West Lake Landfill – Letter to City of Bridgeton – Response to Resolution R-79-12

•.
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December 28, 1979
llonorable E. 1-1. (Bill) Abram
MJyor
City of nrid9eton
11955 Natural Bridge Road
Oriugeton, Missouri 6304~
Dear Mayor Al~ram:
S1~nator Edw;r, L. 01rck ha:.. fort.·arded tl1e City of nridg~ton’s Resolution
R-79-12 reliltive to dispo~.Jl of radioacti\’e milterial tc the Depa!”trnent
of ~latural Resources for re~ponse relativE· to Mi~souri’s role in control rr;
tlte disposal of radioactive wilste rnrlterials.
You are probc.bly aware thilt the Federa~ riuclear Regulatory Corm1ission fia’..
tile primary responsibility for controllinu the disposal of radioactive
w~ste materiols. The Sta:c of Missouri is not an agree1.1ent state and
h1s no arrdn~_·ement” with the :luclear Regulatory Comrnis~ion to enforce ‘:.hr!
r~ ~·ithin d.e St.1tc of t1i>souri. At the pres·:?nt tir.ie the Solid
·,J1~te Regulations of the f>cpurtnient of ildtural Resources prohit:it the
accrptance of radioactive ~d~te materials at per~it:ed sanitary lan~fil~ ..
The,.cforl’, the l·lestlake L.111dill in St. Louis County does nut lia·,ie autho
izJt.ion to accept radioac:i·.-c 1·1ast.e rnat.er~als. Tt1e DEpartment of ~at~.ir..i,
;t~~ourccs is interested in 1:hat radioac:t ive 1~aste mat!Jials r.ia1 hdve be1:;
di~.pc:;ec1 of ;.t the Wc~tla’:f’. Landfill iri tt1e past un1 hds been in corn11niC.
l’:.’on .,Jith the Oepartmen~ of Lnergy in 1).lkridge, T·~nn~c;see reciue:;tin~1
t 1tlt the; pr11vide us ~1ith 11i1Jt inf0rr:1a:.ion t~ey i1,1vr: ctitainc:d rel.1t~vc : 1
tw disp0·.3J of the v1aste i1l tl1e .Jec;tL•~’? L.:indfill. ~·r. Earl Harl 1 iscn
1·1ith the (Je~ .. ~·tment of En-~rt:Jy llas assured us he vii 11 ~rovide u~. w1 th d r ·
•)f ~lie inves·.iuation rc;:>0″~ .~s soon clS it is availa111c.
lt l1us Geen ;ndicated triat .’l’ry lo.” lr.-t l rudioacli 11c t1u::.te n.dter·iai w.1·
in·1olved in ·:he disposal H the ~.Jcstlal:f Landfiil, anc there sho•1ld her:·
·jJrl’Jer to th .. citizens of i;r·id·.1et•Jr .. 111· .. 1,!vcr, t~w :>c~.irtrnent of rla 0.:.Jr2l
~e··,uurces via:rts to 1·evicH :1l Ll.!cr1nii:ai J.Jli: fro:? t:1t r1l:parl1;1e11t of ::1r.
in·1·~stigaticr1 ar:d stuJy Li:·’.:· t: 1.akir.·J .11 -1 rf’c01m1~!rl(~.1t .inc; as to 1·1lia·. 1 .. ·
>11·1uld be tai.en.
Joseph P. Teasdale Gov;;-rnor
furd A. Lafser Director
Divi’.ii0n ot Enviror~m . , , !al (luclPy.
James P. Odendonl u1rictor

Post

1976-06-02 – MDNR – West Lake Landfill – Letter from Director Karch to NRC after Post-Dispatch Series

CHtKTOPHE* S BOND A /\ JAMES I WIISON
COVEKNOI K (l) DIRECTOR
missouri department of natural resources
P.O. »•« 1368 J.«l.f.»n City. Mifiowfi 65101 314/751-2815
June 2, 1976
Mr. James G. Keppler
Regional Director
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
799 Roosevelt Road
Glen Ellyn, IL 60137
Dear Mr. Keppler:
In articles published May 30 and June 1 (copies enclosed) St. Louis
Post-Dispatch reporter Margaret W. Freivogel presented evidence that
some seven tons of uranium were dumped in 1973 at the West Lake Landfill
in St. Louis County by an Atomic Energy Corjnission subcontractor
removing radioactive waste material fror. a site in Hazelwood, Missouri,
The area was closed as an industrial and sanitary landfill by this
Department in 1974 (a new sanitary landfill in an adjacent area protected
from groundwater contact now operates under DNR permit). The
closed area where the dumping allegedly occurred may be in direct
contact with groundwater. It has no monitoring wells to permit
evaluation of groundwater contamination.
In your letter to me of February 19, 1976 you stated that “a review by
the then AEC showed there was no significant health or environmental
hazard associated with the burial”. The letter to Cotter Corporation
from John G. Davis you enclosed stated, “It is our understanding from
your contractor that the material was then deposited under about
100 feet of refuse and earth at St. Louis County sanitary landfill
No. 1.” The investigation by the Post-Dispatch indicates that AEC_did
not know the correct location of the dumping, the local geology, nor
the actual concentration of uranium dumped. The depth cited must
also be incorrect since no landfills in the St. Louis area contain
100 feet of fill. I must therefore question the validity of the AEC
“review” of the burial operation.
I respectfully request that in view of the concerns of this Department
and the people of the St. Louis area, that the Nuclear Regulatory
Commission takes steps to:
1. Provide me with all documents which might assist me in verifying
the Post-Dispatch report, and in establishing the exact amount
and chemical form of radioactive materials allegedly dumped at
Vest Lake.
Exhibit A
1 of 4
Mr. Kcpplcr
Page 2
June 2, 1976
2. Require the Energy Research and Development Administration,
as successor to AEC’s source material operations, to
a) Include the West Lake Landfill in the areas it has selected
for intensive aerial and ground level radiation monitoring.
b) Locate the uranium precisely within the landfill, both as
to position and depth.
c) Install appropriate groundwater monitoring wells and implement
a monitoring program to determine the extent, if any, of
groundwater contamination.
d) Recommend actions to be taken to protect landfill workers
and the public from any potential hazards associated with
this material.
3. a) Advise •£ on who would be liable in the event that cleanup
costs are involved.
b) Ascertain whether federal laws or regulations were violated
by either the Atomic Energy Commission or its subcontractor
in the disposal of source material at an unlicensed site.
In a related matter, I was disappointed to learn that you do not maintain
records of radioactive waste burials carried out by licensees under
authority of Section 20.304 of Title 10 CFR. I hereby respectfully
request that your office obtain such records from all Missouri licensees
who have made such burials and make these records available to me.
Kenneth M.
Director
Division of Environmental Quality
KMK:JE:jhb
cc: Robert J. Koke, EPA Region VII
Enclosure
Exhibit A
2 of k

Post

1980-09-25 – MDNR – West Lake Landfill – Source of Contamination in Area 2 is unknown at this time

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MEMORANDUM
* ^*wt
SEP 2 5 1980
SOLID
Date: September 25, 1980
To: Robert J. Schreiber. through Richard F. Rankin
From: Burt McCuiiough
Subject: Westlake Landfill
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On Wednesday, September 4, 1980 I joined officials from the Nuclear
Regulatory Commission in an on-site inspection of Westlake Landfill.
The purpose of this trip was to give representatives from Radiation
Management Corporation, who has been awarded a bid to do extensive
surveys of the area, the opportunity to become familiar with the site.
It was determined from an aerial survey that there are two areas
within the landfill which are emitting abnormally high levels of
radiation; The Southernmost area is the result of the burial of
contaminated Barium Sulfate Slags from the Mallinkrodt area of
Destrelen Street Uranium processing plant. The Northernmost area of
contamination borders onto neighboring farmland. The reason for
its elevated gamma radiation is-unknown at this time. The report
which will be done by Radiation Management Corporation should answer
this question.
Westlake Landfill is a large facility. About 48,000 pounds of leachate
per day are shipped by tank truck to St. Louis Metropolitan Sewer
District to be treated.
Geological reports indicate that groundwater flows Northeast from the
landfill into the Missouri River alluvium.
Information which has been printed in newspapers on the radiological
aspects of Westlake Landfill has not necessarily been accurate.
CC: Fred Lafser
Ron Kucera
David Bedan
r’Kbbbie Robinson
40056883
SUPERFUND RECORDS
Joseph P. Teosdale Governor
Fred A. Lafser Director
Division of Environmental Quality
Robert J. Schreiber Jr., P.E. Director
73
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Post

1978-06-16 – NRC Memorandum – Removal of Contaminated Soil from Latty Avenue to Weldon Spring

MEMORANDUM FOR:
THRU:
FROM:
SUBJECT:
JUN 1 6 1978
Chairman Hendrie
Cofonlssloner
Commissioner Kennedy
Coranissioner Bradford
JSlpwd) Lee V. Gossi*
iv
Distribution:
FCPF
NMSS
ixOocket 40-8035
LVGossick
CVSmith,Jr.
SMeyers
RECunningham
JBMartin
LCRouse
EDO r/f
SECY
PE
GC
Volgenau
Shapar
Lee V. Gossick, Executive Director
Clifford V. Smith. Jr., Director
Office of Nuclear Material Safety and Safeguards
REMOVAL OF CONTAMINATED SOIL FROM HAZELWOOD TO WELDON
SPRING, MISSOURI (REF: SECY -78-1 69)
The staff has been 1n contact with the DOE staff at Geraantown,
Maryland,-who has the responsibility for answering your letter to
Mr. O’Leary dated April 24, 1978. In this letter, we reconcended
that the contaminated soil be moved to the Wei don Spring raffinate
pit area in orcier that the property on Latty Avenue can be
decontaminated and released for unrestricted use. The staff’s conversations
with the DOE staff indicate that DOE is contemplating a
neoative response to our suggested use of Heldon Spring and 1s
preparing a memorandum suggesting that the material be consoldated
on site until a permanent low»level waste burial ground is picked,
which could be years from now.
In the discussion of remedial action alternatives, which was enclosed
in your April 24 letter to Mr. O’Leary, the staff rejected on-s1te
storage because the contaminated material would not be removed to an
isolated area, the material would have to be moved at a later date
(this would mean moving the material twice 1n a densely populated area),
and finally the site could not be released for unrestricted use.
Nothing has happened since that letter to change the staff’s position
that movement of the material to the Wei don Spring pit area 1s the
best solution because the site is remote, it is controlled to provide
restricted access, it is owned by the Federal Government, and last but
far from least, it is already contaminated, and the residues from Latty
Avenue would be only a rainiscule increase in the volume of contaminated
soil and rubble presently existing at Weldon Spring.
OFFICE>-
SURNAME>-
DATE>-
•-— ‘ ”
ISTRC FORM 318 (9-76) NRCM 0240 T^ 111 a. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICEl 1976 — 628-824
If DOE insists on their Indicated course of action, 1t could significantly
delay the cleanup of the site because of the complex negotiations
required with the former licensee, Cotter Corporation. The Cotter
Corporation has Indicated that they might be willing to pay for the
movement of the material to a nearby site, but they would resist having
to move it twice or move it a long distance. We view our proposed
solution as the raost reasonable of the available alternatives which
is both technically sound and would also release Mr. Jarboe of a
predicament that was not of his making and 1s currently costing Ma
an estimated $60,OOC/year in cash and an Indeterminate amount 1n lost
business because of the delay in building his chemical plant.
I therefore recorwend that Mr. O’Leary be contacted by phone to
reitterate the need to solve this problem as rapidly as possible
and that disposal to a site other than Wei don Spring would only
cause additional delays.
Clifford V. Smith, Jr., Director
Office of Muclear Material
Safety and Safeguards
6/15/78
. FCPF
WTCrow SEE
6/ /78 ATTACHED FOR
PftWr
OFFICERSURNAME
>-
DATE^-
FCPF
LCRouse
67 778
FCSL
JBMartin
67 778
CVSmith,Jr. LVGossick
6/7F/78
NEC FORM 318 (9-76) NRCM 0240 “£? Ul 3. GOVERNMENT PRINTINO OFFICE! 1S78 –
\
,6/15/78
If DOE 1nst«ts on their indicated course of action. 1t could significantly
delay the cleanup of the site because of the complex negotiations
required with\he former licensee, Cotter Corporation, The Cotter
Corporation has\1nd1cated that they might be willing to pay for the
movement of the Arterial to a nearby site, but they would resist having
to move 1t twice 6r move 1t a long distance. Since our legal hold on
Cotter Corporation Ms tenuous, the litigation posslblltles could keep
a staff of lawyers ttasy for years and still not get Mr. Jartoe out of
a predicament that wa\not of his making and Is currently costing Mm
an estimated $60,000/year 1n cash and an Indeterminate amount 1n lost
business because of the\elay 1n building his chemical plant.
I therefore recossnend thavtlr. O’Leary be contacted by phone to
reitterate the need to solve\th1s problem as rapidly as possible
and that disposal to a site other than k’eldon Spring would only
cause additional delays. \
\
S\
Cl\fford V. Smith, Jr., Director
Office of Wuclear Material
SaV>ety and Safeguards
FCPF
WTCrow^-
6//’>/78
OFFICERSURNAME
^~
DATE^-
FCPJ?/^
LCRousk < 6//4/7S K3L ItyjKjtfa -u....:.. FC RECunningham 6/ /78 . FC SMeyers 67 778 NMSS CVSmith,Jr. 67 778 EDO LVGossick 67 778 NRC FORM 318 (9-76) NRCM 0240 Ul 8. GOVERNMENT PSilNTINO OF.FICEi 1976-

Post

1977-06-10 – NRC – Latty Avenue – IE Special Investigation Report No. 76-01 – Full Version from MDNR

”’
Mn. Carolyn A.ahfozod
Director, Hi!!lsouri Departttel’lt
of Natur4l F~sources
P.o. Boz 1363
. Jeffenon .City, HO 65101
Deu Mrs. Aahfo1Xl2
JUN 10 197T
th1a refera to a epeeial inveatia&tion conducted by this office
to obtain infor.cation pertaining to the disposal of natural
ut>aoium on residues in a. St. Louia Cowty landfill area by
‘the Cotter Corporat:iou during 1973. ‘l’hilil also refers to the
diaeus•ions held witb t!essr.s. K. V. Miller and G. MacUutt of
the State of P4.aeouri l!ureau of Rca.iolog:!.cal Health 1n
St. Louis on Juna 6 and 7. 1977 t at which tir.lc a c:opy of our
:l.nvestination report waa furnished to them. Althoush there
were uo items of none=plianca w-ith NRC requint:tents f ouud
during this investigation, the lillC balieves that a more detaile ‘ .
Company and continued until about November 1970.’ During the August
to November period, all of the residues were shipped to Canon City with
the exception of approximately 10,000 tons of Colorado raffinate and
8700 tons of leached barium sulfate. There was no further activity
at the Latty Avenue site until mid-1973.
During an inspection conducted in April 1974, a Region III inspector
was informed that during the period July-Dctober 1973, the remaining
Colorado raffinate was shipped to Canon City without drying and the
leached barium sulfate along with 38,000 to 39,000 tons of soil had
been disposed of in a landfill area in St. Louis County. The leached
barium sulfate contained from 0.05% to 0.1% uranium as u3oR. Twelve (12)
to eighteen (18) inches of the topsoil was stripped from tne Latty Avenue
site and disposed of with the leached barium sulfate.
Visit to Cotter Corporation, Lakewood, Colorado
On June 22, 1976, the following information was obtained during a visit
to the Cotter Corporation, Lakewood, Colorado offices. Mr. David P.
Marcott, Executive Vice President of Cotter Corporation, stated that
all of the source material once stockpiled at the Latty Avenue site had
been shipped by rail to its facility in Canon City, Colorado, except the
approximate 8700 tons of leached barium sulfate. The material had very
low concentrations of uranium, from 0.05% to 0.1%, and it was considered
commercially impractical to further process this material to remove
./the uranium. He indicated that it would be necessary to process the
material with several hundred pounds of hydrochloric acid to leach a
pound of uranium from each ton of the barium sulfate. !f the uranium
could be leached out using water the licensee would certainly have
processed the material rather than disposing of it. He indicated that
for this reason he was confident that the uranium remaining in the
\ leached barium sulfate now located in a landfill would not leach out
\ ~into the groundwater. He said that the average uranium content of ore
currently being processed by the mining industry was 0.16% which is
greater than that disposed of in the St. Louis area. He indicated that
some ore being processed by Cotter Corporation contains 0.65% uranium.
He indicated that in his opinion the uranium contained in the leached
barium sulfate did not constitute any threat to the environment
wherever it is now located.
Marcott further advised that he visited the site on more than one
occasion in 1973. He indicated that on one occasion Mr. Robert Davis
of B&K Construction Company drove him around the area and pointed out
to him the landfill area where the material would be dumped. He said
he could not recall the name or location of the area. It was his
recollection that the landfill area had a large deep pit. It was on
this basis that he had expressed the opinion that the material was
probably buried under 100 feet of soil and garbage. He indicated that
he also visited the Latty Avenue site on another occasion and personally
saw the trucks removing the dirt from the premises.
– 6-
n
WLLFOIA4312- 001 – 0018545
Marcott stated that B&K supplied weight sheets along with the invoices
submitted for payment for disposing of the barium sulfate and dirt
from the Latty Avenue site. These invoices also included charges for
the Colorado raffinate shipped by rail to Canon City during the same
period of time.
Mr. Duane A. Dughman, Vice President-Finance of Cotter Corporat’ ion,
provided copies of 11 invoices for the period July to October 1973.
These invoices showed a total of 48,544.70 tons of material were trucked
to a disposal site which is not identified on the invoices. The invoices
also showed that 10,763.41 tons of material were shipped by ra.il during
the same period.
Dughman stated that he had reviewed all related records in Cotter’s files
and none of them identified the landfill area to which B&K Construction
had taken the material. Dughman stated that the only papers relating
to the Latty Avenue site not contained in the master files in the
Lakewood, Colorado offices were the weight sheets that had accompanied
B&K’s invoices. He indicated that these had been retained at the Canon
City facility. He made an inquiry by telephone of personnel at the
Canon City facility concerning the wei~ht sheets and was advised that
they couldn’t be located. It was indicated that Mr. Warren Goff, who was
away and not scheduled to return for several days, was the only one
who could locate them.
Copies of the 11 invoices were obtained and copies of them, with the
cost entries deleted, are attached to this report as Exhibit c.
Visit to West Lake Landfill, Bridgeton, Missouri
On June 23, 1976, the following information was obtained from Mr. Vernon
Fehr, Superintendent of Plant No. 1 West Lake Landfill.
Fehr indicated that he recalled that about three years ago, B&K
Construction Company had dumped what he understood to be clean fill in
an area adjacent to the office building. He indicated that he had seen
the material being dumped and it looked like ordinary dirt to him.
Since clean landfill is useful as cover, there is no charge for dumping
it and no records are maintained of its receipt. It was his recollection
that the dumping of the material did not involve any formal arrangements.
The truck drivers just came to the site and he told them where to dump
it. He stated that he could identify the specific location where the
material was dumped and estimated that it was three feet down. While
he recalled that a large quantity of material was dumped, he was somewhat
doubtful that it totalled 39,000 tons.
Fehr advised that in 1974 the Missouri Department of Natural Resources
advised West Lake to discontinue dumping in two areas on the site,
one of those being the area where the B&K material was located. He
indicated that this area was full anyway. He went on to say that the
State required them to sink \.;ells around the area so that samples of
the groundwater could be obtained. He indicated that the State
– 1 –
r1 WLLFOIA4312- 001 – 0018546
obtained and analyzed groundwater samples from the wells and did not
report any problems regarding their findings. He said the wells are
still there.
Telephone Contacts with Ryckman, Edgerley, Tomlinson & Associates!
St. Louis Missouri

On June 23, 1976, telephone contacts were made with Dr. E. Edgerley
and with Mr. Phillip K. Feeney of Ryckman, Edgerley, Tomlinson &
Associates, an environmental engineering firm that provided consultant
services to Cotter Corporation on health physics and site decontamination.
Dr. Edgerley stated that while he had visited the Cotter Corporation
Latty Avenue site when the residues were being dryed and shipped to
Canon City, Colorado, he had no personal knowledge concerning ·the
disposal of the material remaining onsite after these operations were
discontinued.
Mr. Feeney stated that he was aware that the topsoil was stripped from
the Latty Avenue site and trucked to a landfill but he did not know which
one. He indicated that arrangements regarding the disposal operations
were made directly between Cotter Corporation’and B&K Construction
Company. Feeney stated that he visited the site to perform a termination
survey after being informed that the disposal operations were completed.
During the first survey he made he found one small spot above 0.6 mR/hr.
He instructed B&K to remove some dirt from this area which he indicated
would be a truckload or less. Subsequently, he returned to the site and
found less than 0.1 mR/hr. By letter dated May, 1974, the results of
Feeney’s survey were furnished to Cotter Corporation. A copy of this
letter with ~ts attachments appears as Exhibit D in this report.
Visit to B&K Construction Company, St. Ann, .Missouri
On June 24, 1976, Mr. Robert S. Davis, Vice President, B&K Construction
Company, was interviewed.· Davis stated that the amount
of material shown on the invoices submitted to Cotter Corporation was
disposed of by trucking to the West Lake Landfill during the period
July 16 to October 9, 1973 with the exception of 5,000 tons. He indicated
that this 5,000 tons represented topsoil stockpiled in one corner of
the Latty Avenue site. He had removed it and then returned it to the
site after disposal operations were completed. This topsoil along with
other topsoil was used to dress the site. He felt that he should be
paid for handling the stockpiled topsoil and that the 5,000 tons was
included in the amounts on the invoices sent to Cotter Corporation.
Davis stated that while there was no charge for dumping the material
at West Lake, he had arranged to have the individual operating the scales
there to record the weights of each truck on sheets of paper. He indicated
he was required by Cotter Corporation to submit these weight sheets with
the invoices. Davis provided copies of the weight sheets which bear
the heading “B&K Dirt Hauling” and the date. The following information is
– 8 –
n WLLFOIA4312- 001 – 0018547
‘ \
recorded: truck number, gross, tare, and net weights. A spot check
was made of the totals of the net weights shown on the sheets as well
as the totals of the net weights for a billing period with the weights
on the covering invoice. No discrepancies were found. There were a
total of 104 weight sheets associated with these invoices. The total
weight of material trucked to the disposal area shown on the invoices
was 48,544.70 tons. Subtracting the 5,000 tons of topsoil referred to
above, the amount of material trucked to the disposal area was 43,544.70
tons. ‘The invoices also show a total of 10,763.41 tons of material were
shipped by rail to ~anon City.
Although the above invoices and weight sheets did not indicate the
disposal area to which the material was taken, Davis stated that it
was taken to the West Lake Landfill. He offered for review a job card
record relating to the Latty Avenue site and several entries were noted
for the period July 16, 1973 to October 10, 1973 which indicated
residue was taken to West Lake from Cotter, Latty Avenue.
Davis also stated that in addition to using his own trucks, he arranged
for much of the hauling to be done by other trucking firms. He made
available for review from his records, bills from these firms. Weekly
billing statements, with drivers time tickets attached, covering the
period August 3, 1973 to October 12, 1973 were noted from Walker
Trucking Service, Ferguson, Missouri. These billing statements contain
the notation “Latty Avenue to West Lake.u Billings were also reviewed
which had been received from the following: Bruce Barnes Truck Service,
St. Louis; Vic Koepke Excavating and Grading Company, Bridgeton; and
H. Reeder Hauling, Inc., St. Louis. On at least some of these billings,
there are entries showing that material was hauled from “Latty Avenue”
or “Cotter” to West Lake.
It is concluded that the material in question is now buried under
about three feet of clean soil at the West Lake Landfill. While little
significance was attached to the actual location of the disposed
material at the time of the 1974 inspection, the licensee was notified,
by letter dated November 1, 1974, that the disposal did not appear
to be within the intent of the Commission’s 10 CFR 40 regulations
(Exhibit E) concerning alteration of source material to obtain a mixture
no longer subject to licensing.
Visit to Latty Avenue, Hazelwood, Missouri Site and West Lake Landfill,
Bridgeton, Missouri Site
On August 11, 1976, two Inspection and Enforcement Region III inspectors
visited the Latty Avenue site and West Lake Landfill site for the purposes
of performing radiation surveys and collecting environmental samples.
The Region III inspectors were accompanied by Mr. Stephen Nagle to the
Latty Avenue site and Mr. Clarence Stein to the West Lake Landfill site.
Messrs. Nagle and Stein represented the State of Missouri Division of
Environmental Quality, Department of Natural Resources.
– 9 –
n
WLLFOIA4312- 001 – 0018548
..
The results of the August 11, 1976 surveys of the Latty Avenue site and
the West Lake Landfill site with a narrative and reference material are
attached to this report as Attachment A.
Results of the analyses of the environmental samples taken on August 11,
1976 from the Latty Avenue site and West Lake Landfill site are attached to
this report as Attachment B.
Measurements performed at the West Lake Landfill and analyses of samples
from the area have been reviewed. The following hazard analysis is based
on the measurements and analyses and on information derived from personnel
of the former licensee.
Direct Radiation – West Lake Landfill
Beta-gamma measurements made at three feet from the surface indicate two
general areas where readings above background were noted. These measurements
indicated 0.06 mrad/hr maximum. The measurements at contact
indicated 0.8 mrad/hr maximum, and about 0.1 mrad/hr average. Thus, for
continuous exposure the maximum gonadal or whole body dose would be:
0.06 mrad/hr X 8.76 x 103 hrs
500 millirems/year. year 500 millirads/year or approximately
However, the area has been closed for dumping by Missouri DNR and is
essentially unoccupied.
Calculated Atmospheric Concentrations of Rn-222 at West Lake Landfill
West Lake Landfill area sample analytical results do not indicate the
presence of significant natural uranium activity. These surface samples,
however, would not be expected to be representative of material which
is reportedly covered by overburden with a thickness of approximately
one meter.
According to information provided by the licensee, the covered material
consists of approximately 7 tons of natural uranium in about 8,700 tons
of barium sulfate and about 39,000 tons of soil. Thus, an approximate
natural uranium weight percentage of the mixture woul~ 7be 0.015 percent.
With a natural uranium specific activity of 6.77 x 10 Ci/g, th~ 10 specific activitl4of the mixture would be approximately 1.0 x 10
Ci/g or 1.0 x 10 uCi/g. Analysis of two surface samples from the Latty
Avenue site (source of the covered material) ind!~ated natural
uranium concentrations of approximately 1.0 x 10 uCi/g, which supports
this estimate of average mixture concentration. !~e Ra-226 analysis
showed an average concentration of about 1.0 x 10 uCi/g for the two
samples.
– 10 –
n WLLFOIA4312- 001 – 0018549
Calculations have been performed to estimate radon-222 emanation from
the ground,_1ue to buried material with an average Ra-226 concentration
of 1.0 x 10 uCi/g below a depth of 100 em. These calculations indicate
a total release of approximately 0.1 uCi/sec of radon-222 from the
ground due to the covered tailings mixture. It should be noted that
the assumed depth of burial yields a reduction of about a factor of
three below what emanations would exist, assuming no cover.
Additional calculations were performed using the ‘·’virtual point source”
method for determining average air concentration of radon-222 above the
covered material. The area was estimated to be approximately square,
lith a dimension of forty meters. This calculation yielded an approximate
0 atmose2eric d!spersion coefficient in the center of the area of
f.7 x 10 sec/m •
Applying this coefficient to the release rate of 0.1 uCi/sec_~ields jn
average increase in background air concentration of 1.7 x 10 uCi/m
directly over the covered tailings, which is about one-half of the
10 CFR 20 unrestricted area concentration limits. This Rn-222 contribution
in air, due to the buried materials, would be indistinguishable
from backcround within a few hundred meters from the landfill. Based
on the conservatism of assumptions, this atmospheric concentration of
Rn-222 is considered an upper limit. Calculations are appended to this
report as Attachment c.
Other Pathwa;ts
Pathways other than direct exposure and inhalation of radon-222 and progeny
do not appear to be significant. No likely means of an ingestion
pathway were identified, and inhalation due to fumigative dusting can
be discounted since the material is covered and not subject to b~coming
airborne. An evaluation of the potential for groundwater contamination
could not be made in the absence of information concerning the hydrogeologic
character of the local area. Three shallow (about 20 feet)
wells in the area were all found to be dry at the time the IE:III
inspectors visited the site, precluding collection and analysis of
groundwater samples. As noted above, barium sulfate and u3o8 are known
to be insoluble in water.
Future Development
It is noted that the radium 226 concentration of materials
presumed buried at the West Lake Landfill approximates that found
in tailings materials used for leveling, aggregate and backfill
under or around the foundations of dwellings in certain western
Colorado communities. Some of these Colorado dwellings experience
indoor radon 222 concentrations capable of yielding exposures
approaching those implied in the occupational limits of 10 CFR 20.
Differences in the physical and chemical natures of the West Lake
Landfill and the western Colorado tailings, however, suggest a
lower radon release fraction for materials of the type buried
at the land fill. Recognizing the potential for radon buildup in
– 11 –
n WLLFOIA4312- 001 – 0018550
/'”
dwellings and the uncertainties concerning certain parameters needed
to estimate that potential at the West Lake Landfill, a complete
environmental impact assessment is necessary to accurately evaluate
the hazard potential for this pathway.
Comparison with 10 CFR 20 Criteria
Finally, it should be noted that a licensee may bury up to about two
tons of natural uranium per year (in twelve increments) within criteria
contained in 10 CFR 20 concerning depth (4 feet) and spacing (6 foot
spacing between locations). Thus, in four years, eight tons could be
disposed of in forty-eight one-sixth ton batches buried in a grid with
six foot centers: Such a grid would comprise an area significantly
smaller than that found in this case, while containing about the same
quant~ty of disposed uranium.
0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 .o 06 ot 0 0 “‘ 0 0 06 ot 0 0 0 36 ft “‘ 11 m
0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0
“M·–~~ y 36 ft :’~ 11m …. “:c..;. —-·-.. ~
Conclusion
Seven tons of. uranium could be disposed of by burial in accordance with·
10 CFR 20.304 in an area significantly smaller than that now existing
at the West Lake Landfill. Based on our estimates of maximum potential
exposure conditions by various pathways, it is concluded that the
material now present at the West Lake Landfill does not represent a
radiological hazard by any pathway yet identified. Based on studies of
the use of uranium tailings for backfill and leveling under and around
residence foundations in Colorado, it is estimated that increased indoor
radon and radon progeny concentrations could be experienced in structures
built directly in or on the disposed tailings. An environmental
impact analysis is required for an accurate estimate of the hazard
potential for this pathway.
Attachments:
l •. Attachments A, B, C and D
2. Exhibits A-E
3. References 1-4
– 12 –
r1
WLLFOIA4312- 001 – 0018551
·.
ATTACHMENT A
During a survey performed by this office on August 11, 1976, to
determine the effectiveness of Cotter Corporation’s decommissioning
of their Hazelwood, Missouri (Latty Avenue) site, a difference in
the radiation readings supplied by Cotter and those found by this
office was noted.
On May 10, 1974, Cotter reported exposure rates which ranged from
0.01 to 0.4 mR/hr measured at three feet above grade (type of instrument
unknown). (Reference 1) These values were the basis for
·termination of the license by the Directorate of Licensing.
(Reference 2) The Region III August 11, 1976 survey, made at the
same distance, yielded readings ranging from 0.3 to 0.8 mrad/hr
beta-gamma. (Reference 3) Additionally, a survey at one centimeter
revealed t~o areas reading 1.2 and 1.8 mrad/hr beta-gamma. The
instrument used by IE:III inspectors in performing these measurements
was an Eberl~ne E-SOOB with an end-window Model HP-190 Hand Probe
(1.4-2 mg/cm ).
The presently acceptable limit for release of ground areas, as implied
in the “Decontamination Guide” (Reference 4) is 0.4 mrad/hr, total,
or 0.2 mrad/hr, average, with a maximum of 1.0 mrad/hr, all of which are to be measured at 1 em with a probe of not more than 7 mg/cm 2
of total adsorber. Thus, the NRC Region III survey of August 11, 1976 ·
showed radiation levels at the Latty Avenue site exceeding the acceptable
release limits, while the survey performed by Cotter Corporation
showed levels within the guidelines. Both surveys indicate a low, nonhazardous
radiation level. The difference in results might be
artributable to differences in instruments and procedures used. The
August 11, 1976 surveys were the first independent examination by NRC
of radiation levels at the Latty Avenue site.
..
n WLLFOIA4312- 001 – 0018552
:2: r
r
11
0
~ .w…..
N
0
0
0
.0.. …
OJ
01
01 w
….
..
~


Sample No.
L-1
·L-2
L-3
L-4
W-1
W-2
.. Note: 1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
ATTACHMENT B
ENVIRONMENTAL SAMPLE
Analytical Results by HSL
Results (uCi/g)
Sample Description
Soil
Soil
Vegetation
Wet Sediment From
Cold Water Creek
Soil
Soil

L-1 through L-4 collected at Latty Avenue Site
W-1, W-2 collected at West Lake Landfill
Natural Uranium
1.2 + 0.1 E-4
7.5 + 0.1 E-5
2.6 + 0.2 E-5
5.3 + 0.4 E-6
5 + 2 E-7
5.3 + 0.4 E-6
L-3 vegetation dried, analyzed dry, reported as wet weight
L-4 dried prior to analysis
A systemic error of + 20% should be assigned to Ra-226 analysis
due to uncertainty of the equilibrium between Rn-222 and Rn-226.
An 80% equilibrium ratio was assumed.
Ra-226
1.4 + 0.03 E-3
5.14 + 0.14 E-4
t.~
·.
ATTACHMENT C
RI\-222 Emanation Calcula’tions
1. Rn-222 at the Spoils/Cover Interface
Total release • (area) ~ (source flux) ~
• (1600 m ) x DC (A/(DS))
. 0
Assume:
Kraner. et al, the Natural
Radiation Environment, 1964
D • 1.5 x 10-2 cm2/sec 1 x 10 -1 == 10% “emanation power”
. 3
C • (1.0 nCi/g)(1.6 g/cm )(1 x
0 . 3 3
• 0.16 nCi/cm = 160 pCi/cm
(fraction escaping solid soil gas)
Tanner, The Natural Radiation
Environment, 1964
A • 2.099 x 10-6 sec-1
s – 0.25 0.25 • soil “void fraction”
‘Total release= (1.9 x 107)(1.5’x 10-2)(160)(2.099 x 10-6/(1.5 x 10-2 /0.25))~
• (3.84 X 107)(3.5 X 1~-5 )~
Total release = 2.3 x 105 pCi/sec over 1.6 x 107 cm2
area release= 1.44 x 10-2 pCi/cm2• sec
2. Rn-222 at the Surface of the Cover
c2 • c1 exp (-Z(A/D)~
Assume:
cl
D
>.
. -2 . 2 = 1.44 x 10 pCi/cm •
• 1.5 x 10- 2 em 2 /sec
• 2.099 x 10 -6 sec -1
Z • 100 em
sec
Tanner, The Natural Radiation
Environment, 1964
C2 a (1,44 X 10-2) exp (-100 (2,099 X 10-6/1.5 X 10-2 )~)
• (1.44 x 10-2) exp (-1.18)
• (1,44 X 10-2) (0.31)
C2 • 4.4 X 10-3 pCi/cm2• sec
Entire area: (4.4 x 10-3) (1.6 x 107) = 7.0 x 104 pCi/sec
Therefore, the total emanation rate is about 70 nCi/sec, or about
0.1 pCi/sec.
.n ‘
WLLFOIA4312- 001 – 0018554
… 2
3. Atmospheric Dispersion Coefficient
•,
X/Q • 1/rra y a z u
a and a are calculated using the “virtual point source” method
d~scribea in Workbook of Atmospheric Dispersion Estimates, as
follows:
a. for a square area with 40m sides, a yo • S/4.3 • 40/4.3 • 9.3m
b. in the area, ay o = aY • 9.3m
c. at 20m (center of area from side), stability class E, and
ground-level release, o z = 1m
d. assume annual avg. windspeed is 2 m/sec
X/Q • 1/(3.14)(1)(9.3)(2) = 1.7 x 10-2. sec/m3
4. Concentration in Air
Concentration= (0.1 uCi/sec)(l.7 x 10-2 sec/m3) • 1.7 x 10-3 uCi/m3
&……. .•
n WLLFOIA4312- 001 – 0018555
. ·. ….
..
INVESTIGA’f10:i FOR URANIUH/TllORIUH
.
COTTER CORPORATION. I..ATTY AVENUE SITF., ST. LOUIS, HISSOUlU
OCTOnER 20, 1976
‘Pursuant to the ongoing investigation of possible uranium/thorium
contamination at the Latty Avenue site, Hes::a :{. J. A. Pagliaro and
G. T. Gibson performed a site inspection on October 20, 1976. The
pu~pose of this inspection was to identify the property owner from
·county tax records, to survey the property w:i.th bi:~tn-gamma and
alpha survey instrrnncntaticn, and to obtain selected soil and
·vegetation samples for laboratory analyses,
I
The records rev:te-v1ed at the St. Louis County Buildine, 41 South
Central, St. Louis, Missouri, were the current county property tax
rolls. County personnel. stated the tax records t!Xmnined were
dated as of July 1976. The record indicated the following:
Address: 9200 J..atty Avenue
Owner:
Size:
Cotrunerd.al Discotmt Corporstion
55 East Honroc Street
Chicago, Illinois 60602
3.5 acres
‘ ………….
Telephone communication t-lith IE: III was performed to ascertain
whether thta prpp,!rt)’ had since been transferred. Additional
information \-1&3 received t·lhich indicated Commercial Discour.t
Corporation had tnmsferred m·mership of the prop~rty in Augunt 1976
to the Bayless Company~ 175 Outer Road Uest • Valley Park, Hissouri.
..
A site investigntion was then performed and samples were obtoincci.
Figure 1 indicates the relative podtion of vadous buildings,
landmarkc, and locntions of collected samples. The area in Fiuure 1
encompassing the abandoned garage, abandoned warehouse building~
and the abandoned and boarded-up burned bu:i.lding wns estimated to be
approximately three (3) acres. The entire area, in~luding t.:hw
warehouse arc::1 anJ plowed field, y,•as estimated t:o be in e>:cess ~
surface” chunks ranged in size from 4 x 4 x l inches to small flakes.
The material was somctvhat fibcrous in texture. The “yellow surface11
material had an apparent beta-gamma flux of ·10 mR/hr at contact.
Approximately 1. 5 pounds of the “yellot.J surfnce11 was collected for
~·laboratory analysis. Several holes were dug to a depth of 15 inches
but no subsurface yellow material was excavated. ·
I
Selected soybeans were collected from the plotved field, \1as surveyed with beta-gamma and alpha
instruments. The floor of the wnrehousc was composed of dirt and
broken concrete. Several elevated readings above background activity
were recorded. The highest apparent location was in the.center of
the “mrehouse, beside a suppc>rt column. Readings of up to 0. 8 mli/hr
beta-gamma and 30,000 DPH alpha \>Jere observed. A 11 ~arehouse dirt”
sample, consisting of approximately 2 pounds of topsoil was obtained
for ~~boratory analysis.
Preliminary radiological analyses were performed at IE:III using
beta-garmna, alpha, and gam.111a-spec troscopy instrumcnta tion. The
samples Here then fon:arded to ERDA: Health Services Labo~:atory (HSL),
Idaho Falls, Idaho.
The results of the IE:III analyses showed no detectable activity
in either soybean smnplc. The 11 yello\<.' sul·face" sample shm·1ed · 10 tnR/hr beta-gamma and 4,000 Dl'H alpha at contact with a fm.J grams of materinl. Gcnuna scanning \vith an unshielded Nai crystal indicatcct the presence of unmium isotopes but not thorium and thor.ium daught<~rs. Tho "warehouse dirt11 sample showed 0.3 tnR/hr bcta-gnmma and 26,000 DPH alpha at contact \dth a sample of about 250 g. Ganuna scanning tvith Nai indicated both uranium and thorium and their decay chain produds to ba prcwent • ,v ... I WLLFOIA4312- 001 - 0018557 ... ' ·~· - 3- 'I .. The results of alpha spectroscopic analyses of the two soil samples by • HSL are present~d in T~blc !.below. HSL analyses of the two soybean samples showed only small quantities of naturally-occurring K-40. TABLE I Alpha Spectroscopic Radionuclide Concentration (uCi/u) Th-230 3.61 ++ 0.05 E-02 Th-227 I 4.4 + 0.2 E-Olt U-238 6.64 + 0.06 -g,...o4 U-234 6.52 + 0.06 E-04 U-235 3.09 + 0,07 E-05 Ra-226 5.2 - 0.1 E-0'• Warehouse Dirt U-238 0.3 ++ 0.1 U-231• 0.3 + 0.1 U-235. 0.3 - 0.1 E-02 Ye11D\>~ Haterial
_… …
.. ..
. · * .
t
~ •
WLLFOIA4312- 001 – 0018558
&,I … ‘ ..
.. .
~
AbA•’Mn::J
ll.:.n’-.!1″
·.
r-r·· ‘S0~\3.£;./lr.i….:_fJ t!J .. ‘i;>, __ ___._,
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Lct.•Ll4Y>S: .:tr. Keppler:
June 2, 1976
In articles published May 30 and June 1 (copies enclosed) St. Louis
Post-Dispatch reporter }iargaret H. Freivogel presented evidence that
some seven tons of uranium were dumped in 1973 at the \·lest Lake Landfill
in St. Louis County by an Atomic Energy Commission subcontractor
removing radioactive Haste material from a site in Hazeh>lood, Hissouri.
The area tvas closed as an industrial and sanitary landfill by this
Department in 1974 (a new sanitary landfill in an adjacent area protected
from ground{>later contact now operates under DNR permit). The
closed area where the dumping allegedly occurred may be in direct
contact with groundwater. It has no monitoring wells to permit
evaluation of groundwater contamination.
In your letter to me of February 19, 1976 you stated that “a revie\>l by
the then AEC showed there was no significant health or environmental
hazard associated with the burial”. The letter to Cotter Corporation
from John G. Davis you enclosed stated, “It is our understanding from
your contractor that the material was then deposited under about
100 feet of refuse and earth at St. Louis County sanitary landfill
No. 1.” The investigation by the Post-Dispatch iudicates that AEC. did
not know the correct location of the dumping, the local geology, nor
the actual concentration of uranium dumped. The depth cited must
also be incorrect since no landfills in the St. Louis area contain
100 feet of fill. l must therefore question the validity of the ABC
“review” of the burial operation.
I respectfully request that in view of the concerns of this Department
and the people of the St. Louis area, that the Nuclear Regulatory
Commission takes steps to:
1. Provide me with all documents which might assist me in verifying
the Post-Dispatch report, and in establishing the exact amount
and chemical form of radioactive materials allegedly dumpeJ at
West Lake.
Exhibit A
1 of 4
L
WLLFOIA4312- 001 – 0018560
• \
.Mr. Keppler
Page 2
June 2, 1976
2. Require the Energy Research and Development Administration,
as successor to AEC’s source material operations, to
3.
a) Include the West Lake Landfill in the areas it has selected
for intensive aerial and ground level radiation monitoring.
b) Locate the uranium precisely within the landfill, both as
to position and depth.
e) Install appropriate groundwater monitoring wells and implement
a monitoring program to determine the extent, if any, of
groundwater contamination.
d)
a)
b)
Recommend actions to be taken to protect landfill workers
and the public from any potential hazards associated with
this material.
Advise me on who would be liable in the event that cleanup
costs are involved.
Ascertain whether federal laws or regulations were violated
by either the Atomic Energy Commission.or its subcontractor
in the disposal of source material at an unlicensed site.
In a related matter, I was disappointed to learn that you do not maintain
records of radioactive waste burials carr{ed out by licensees under
authority of Section 20.304 of Title 10 CFR. I hereby respectfully
request that your office obtain such records from all Hissouri licensees
who have made such burials and make these records available to me.
/~-K.;;~Ce:;..-n~e,…th…….,M””l. .K~,-< arch fh. ~._..---Director K.MK:JE:jhb ee: Robert J. Koke. EPA Region VII Enclosure Division of Environmental Quality Exhibit A 2 of 4 J. .... ~- •• rWLLFOIA4312- 001 - 0018561 :2: r r 11 0 ); ~ .w.... N I 0 0 0 .0.. .. OJ 01 0) N - 1 ~ ~./- _J w~ ~ 0 lLJJ ~ ~ ~dJ£~TC~~ ""._. ~ .. .....,. 1 ,_......,...... , .. ......_~ ...... • .,..,,..\k ...... !-"""" t ~;;.;&x. ( :, .... .~..·,. ,... ......... !i•»• (:.,< ,.,..... e.,., ..... ~. ·--"-·~ ,.,_ • T. u ••• o, .. ;...; ''" -,.. -....... ~:::.7';.._ t ...._.. _..._ t ...,. .~ ... -:. '. \ ......... -... ,h .. --. '!.,:, ·t:.-; t''~ --.~- .1 /' .. .. - .- • f • : . .. t\ Y. ~lAY :~o. I tho.! in
s clc:.rly
ln::ccur!
l t\ucle.
aid this
!c px~d
~e:;u!ato·
· Ato::lic
tra~~ or
In ac!ditlon to being v:ron;:: about the
vo!!.!::::! or th: ‘”:::!::~, f~c!~:::t recc:;o:ltcd at ••st. Loul!l County LondCUl
No. 1 0:1 Old Crldgc no:td.” No such
p!:l~c cxls:s.
Tl:c U t: K vice prcs!!!cnt, D:l\’ls,
cc::!irr.’:c:! lh::.t til:! m:l:~tia! !’;~c! r:o::~ 😮
th~ West L:::.b~ L:::.::d!ill on St. Cl’::::.:-l:s
Roc!: r.oad. St. Louis Cocr.ty ta!l~ml
r:o. 1 is on D::r:;ctt <:!!'!~ t.die noo.C:s, rr.o:~ tt:n !.::::- r:!~!!5 :'..'·~·~:'. Th~ \'lest L.::::~ L:::-:::::~1 \i::!!: e!~:::d tcr:-:~'lr~ri!y in 1'7·! fer irz:prc-.·.:::::::::s bcc~u:c st::tc c::ic!=:!s fC'..:..--:1 t!:::: c~r:~!:: pc!!~::1r.ts ,,·ere lc::!:~::~ fro::-: it in:o the s:.:rrm:::d!::z r.c:::! p:::!:1 ::c!!. t!o tcs~ ror r::~:e::.cth~;!j· \"~·:::: r.::::!.:J !:~:::~=~ r!!ic:~!;; were unaware tl'::lt an}' radio::u:tive m::terials wera in tl:.:! !::::~nil. Bcror~ tlae imprcv~u:c:::.s '\\·~r~ ~~!. II would h:sve ta:er. "irresp::::tlh!e .. to put an)' h:u2rdous \;·.u:! at Wes: Ldke, s:tld J os.:ph Eigner, who tt.:r.s the ~~iSSOt::'i h::.:i::ri!o:;,.; ~·~z!e r:o:;:-::.rn. The pr::!i!e:::l ::< \'.'es: La}:e t::.lj' b·;e been comy~u:.~~~ b:: cs:::~ t~: r~~i::;~ ... ti\·e m:ltcri::!l as a ::-..!: S~!!.
Tt:! t::iu::-: s~!~.1:~ a:.! c:!’:!: -;.:s:c
~:-:-C:.:::s c::;:::~!~i· ~r~:-! s:.::z:! z: I…l~·
b~::. Fie~:!. La:e:. s:;=e c! t:”:c: ,;;e:-i
c~-.-e:! to 3 st:~ a: ~:;;J :.a::r R:.:~ ..
Ha:~:-:.·~. in p;-e;.:::-:;.:;.-:: ::.r r~::x:~
S…””e Ct~:::.:’.:G. F:;~ f
~yin~
~r i~s
!d.
•rt~nt
r:-:t’re
ho.t is
sarr:p!cs c! tl:c tmc::b::!:; t:::::::;; sz:;t to
the lanc:m. hut he ~’.:l:r.awl:::c;;:::d that
tt:cy, teo, eol!ld h:wo t:::::t i:l::cc1.::::::::!.
Fe:!~=-::.! ~uthor!!i~s m:11c no f~C:;:t~r..d …
ent r::c:::surcmc~ts cf the strength of
tr.:lt~r!::l ~nd nor~:!!y net in a case
!il:e tl~is, a s~::!:c!:~:n for the t~uclc:tr
Re:.;t:btory Cor::r::is$::m said. Rc!:,·l::3 0:1
Cotter’s rccorrl.;, a federal inspector
ccncludcd that the eoncen: ratio;~ of
uran:um in the matcri:.t! bdn:; C!.::::lpcd
·was .o~:n per cc!1!–::el! t:::ow the .05
per cent limit set in the rcgu!aticns.
the l!aze!~-:ocd site for rac!!ation ar.d
found it c!c:::’l.
AEC im:cs:i;:ato:s did fin~ !ac!t w:th
one :xs;:;~ct of the was:c disr:o~:.!!. The
agency rcp:ir:::.!:-:~::-d Co:ter Co:p. in a
letter Co: di!c:wly watched by lw; co::•;;.:r.y, llle C~C;Ot,.Ci’r\,”i:; \’:,’A!:ii: storoCjO crccs. t:.cp inoicctes where ‘~
cngln1\.crini~ 111r~~~;-~~ :1 \1vc ‘,~.E~~·.~~-~c,·t.o! the barium sul!cf~ wcs cricir:;il·,· stored, tha ~ite en 92w lc:::/ .J .of
4 ~ th{‘ t 1rcf’t’ ac u'”l ‘ .. “‘””‘ \.. …. …. \\..’li ~… .iiJ ~ .. ‘·t..
,..,,,·,.,;.1 n r .. f.: m,;.,-.. .J 1•: t:n· l<:n:dfill. Rood. ond where 1t v:os moved. the West lcke lcncfill ot St.:...;.~~-:::-_ · t :2: r r "'Tl 0 ~ .w..... N 0 0 0 0... ... OJ 01 ~-··-, ,. ' " .. 1{jj ·lo A o _((l:E}~ J·1D~~J,l~\a E1L~~r~®ll-ofr~IT~: CCfu~~n~§ -tfllillsrl1F~ra1t; E:.· =':!.~:!G.\nET w. fREl\'OGEL • I l.egblature w enact a radiation protection ..~.~t tno~ ur ·.,a,re .md ,.. ..1 : tn i~7; t•> !h”” : … :
Cf :.!le P::s:-O:Sjlatcb Staff f.. ·1·7 ‘-
So :.~nt: ::l!t..~J!!dy rr.1mitvrs radicactive mal~·
rJal:> Ill ~.!., ;.,;t::l :u::l ;!;;: ~:a :c is U:Jjiri!parcd to
h~’!’:C:!e :~cc:c!c::t.~! r~!cases of radJatinn, two
sta:e :.!~:=:a!$ !J::il!lar ‘»’1:h t!le :;itu.~uon ~;ay.
‘T::i: c!:.::;:;!::z :.! SC’.’I7!r:d tMusar.d tens of low.
1!:’~·~ 1 r “‘:!:::;.:.:<~~·r: wa~tr: at tbe \':est Lake ta::~!;ll ::~ s:. l.;;u;:; Co:.mt:;. dt<.clcS<:d S::nday in tiH Pr;s:-!):£paah - l.i only one or :if:\'eral m.:.:le:.r-:~!..o: .. d pr1.l;,!·~:n->, sau.l Kenneth M.
Y…I:C!’: ;::-;:! :.!.l:.’IO !\…d1f!.
};.;;.:.~ .; ..:;:.,.:::vr -.: .:r.1;ironmer::al GU:!Iity for
1!:1: :>::m· :’)e;::trt:r.em uf Natural Rt·sources;
!’to;!;:; ::> :::e c!c;:;.:a:men:·s ~irectcr of planning
::.:::! ;;ell.::: de·;e:<:p::ler.r~ T::~re ;s ::o .:~·1der.c:e t!':at the West take C::.::::;:;:~g ~z..:,ec J !-.!':.:::h hlza:d, bur it ap?are: a:\· ::c::-.~:.:s.::d !ec!e:ll aut!:.orities wllc were s:.:;;)oscd ~o te #:~e;::r=o~ tr;.t~k of t!u! materi:ll. F l;~e ::,..; .. ::::;:. re<. d~·:~e.
·Tm .;.:..:: uf :te A:om:c Energy Co::::nis$JtiO·s
n::..::>t c.:::;-:<:::o .::::!:cs." s.Jid O:!v:d P. :\ta::-cou. e:.:ttc:::·.:<: ·;:c" :-:,·~:c!t:r.! of Cott!.'r Corp . whicn ·h.,.! ;: -r•::-;t-c :~c ·x;;,re rr. a ~•·::t;,u::;ed.
..:
·”‘
.. Ninety-nine per cent of the time they
(f..,Jeral authorities) don’t know wb:u·s gomg on
tven ‘o.l!ht•n th~y havr: someone !\landing there
… As a citizen and as a member of !hls
.ndu:.lry. I’d like tu see them do .J beucr F·:S:•
Maitvll sa1d.
f\vd1!f Jl:.d Karch said they were dl!lturhc:d by
the W .:~t luke incident because It was, In their
opulion, inchcati>e o( serioUS gaps lhal e«iSI in
&he munitorina uf low-lt:vcl waste.
rh~ federal Nuclear ltcuut:uury t:umrrilsslon,
·,\llich replaced ll;e rww cuf:.tncl Atomic E;~ergy
1 Commt:>sioa is too s~orthan~c-d 10 tn-.:cst:~a:e
:c•lrr.prchcnsi\·ely, tbe oHidal.s said. State offtcials
ha\·e no authority to ftll in for the federal
agcmcy, they said.
Thcj’listcd sever~! ;>ro!.:!cms, ir.cluding:
(1) ln:to•.vcr plants situated near
enough to J’.lJsscuri w cause injury tn the sta~e
a::1 fr<1m Union Ell'ctr!c Comp:my·~ Callaway ·Cou:o:y plam ::ow u:-:der •:onstr~wtton. 0} lnadequ:t!c al!ent10o w tilt' transpnrtal!on of r;,dinartive mawri:tl~ throur!h the sratc. TriSt. ll.: ~totor Co .• the largest mmsporter of nucle:u m ba~::d in
Joplm. >tn HQ’Nevcr, mnst •>f Its c::rgo dP~S not
~J<;S lhn>o)!~ ‘.1!sso:Jri. a study by the Dt•p:lrt·
nwn; ‘•I ~; .;\.nl R~sr,urces (oun:J.
!(::rch ‘”ttl :\odrff [ailt’d t(l cunvi!!r~ th::o
dorms th~: !;txt :;ession. II would have t:rr.pu;~.- :-rtt!Jitd at St. Ch .• r:..-:. Ruck R~,;.:;c J:;-! ;,J
ered :;rate ufhcials to m•mitur morl! t>UI!flin:lv Ru:~c!
\\’.ISh.• dl~pusal and lranspor~auon. The ;,;!Jt~ ln. 1· .• 1 . 8″·'” ·•t1·, .. r , ···tt’··’ • . . ••..
-u (f ICi.t ~ls pt. an til orge cnactm~.:nr of r”. . e lll’gt!>’. l!· l•~m ‘.•. f, ‘tt..· ·• ‘ “··” ‘h” ‘ J’· ·r .• ,.\ .u• .:,t .. ,..~~ ”’~. ····.•· • . . …. u ._,,i. • ..,. hu s:u lt..’\:t utJ.O :1\.t\’V
t:an ~g;un next :.t-:.smn. . Rl.’l’.’lll;l ur. iht· ;::.;.lrrn: :::~·m~~·, .11\ ·, “1 he f.-dt•ral a~ent·l~li just arcn’l mannc·~ •., · · ·’·
~~o~ttt·!~ tn~pt· …. :or .:cr.~l •. h.!t·.! t:t~t. the ·•..s:Ht:
&.· …. ;; ~;L::\·~ ~’ ah ~utl t.1 r::..lu..:”· tb u..!:l·-·~:•
do a tliorucgh and t·ompr … hcnsiw Jnb, .. ~oc.ilU
saul. ”Tht-y’re forced to !>rl priuri\it’S un \\bl .
they lll”~Pt·t:l. Tlwy ~tan With Mry :!0 y•:ar~.”
:\ fctlt-ral .:tomic salety official saia t:e
thmtght th£’ mcnitorlng program was corr.pret:
en~in· enough. · ·
Con:-~qut·1;tl~, Ill.: u;.,;>.:n· r·:- i’c;:••rl 11..
,t:rrur ttfl tl!l’ :-!r.·r.,.:tl:. \ ~·!· .. !’::t- .1:0:..! lu(“‘!” :to
W .. i~tf·. O,! .. p!!e ih’l..~ l:!C.~:·· .. :e\!cr..l! ..lO.! :
u!fH::at~ :;..::.! lt11: :no.k~l;l. r;.:.,J no !:e
~:..z:ml
S.lt·::•: ch:d .\1!::-~ .J
wnrrtt’d abcut ih·: ‘.0…1:>1~ ~:.::: .. : ,;.;:~: <.!< 51:':1 . F~r:n.o: ne~!~ t"•th.t:rtbtJ. ~.rd. t~~ $Hte.:- t;:~ll;:;t:e!:.:;l
!!H.· h!·. .• .. ~l!·\·er \\:~ … ~.: m.:tt:r:::! tJ …t feJ
ct>;·1s.t: :m~a ::1 Shdf;dd, :n .
All.·rt l-a!t! :h<.· m:t!t!'r: .. !l. 'J:tgtn;.~_r,ng f r€''":lrch pr:;,..,.
v.. J;o; \t”‘r\ ”~;\ 1:1 ~·\:t!!a:!~!: ·:::·’.: ~:::C .. t’ :;’J “”;.
~tl”,:t·:·~-:d !’ly f·/~.!t•:’ :~ !’* .. “~.!…:!~:: 1;.;,
.. ,,.s d1~l!lfbing th:H WI! might ‘h:w~: got
incnrn·ct tnformation (about the ·west Llk~
dis;>osa!).” ~aid James Allen, chief -of the fuel ·
bclltt\’ and material s:tfE-ty branch at th-e
:\ud(•;ir Rt•gu!awry Commission’s rt>gwn~l uffa
·\· 111 f;!en Ell•:n, I!L “Rut whcr. thl’fl··~ :1~
!\t.”.dth ~ta;urJ tn•:oh·t•tl m a situatto:l, stnct bt:! K .• rrh ~;!!<:: ~·: w,:, .!.-· .. :: •. ..: rt .• : ::i:::·: mnnnunng or it W!Hold be takmg Pl'Ople ;r.~ay F:t:'TI· 1::!! nu: !Jn:l ;b ~ ·~.:~::::; :>~:l …. :oJ t~
from mun· 1m;wnan1 ht•a!th lS!>t:e~.” bur: a I w·t~ •nr:t·:! :!’~ ” .:< -. ::;. ,::1,..1 .:I •. • Alkn ..,ald he was nnl <'tmcerned ab()Ut th:: h·Jt"r.!: dho:.t:~ r~l:t"d ~"' ~;..,v::-.: .. :: !·" agcnry bcmg du;wd. Th<' We;;t Lake t·pisode ~a;. i::,!••.tu t1f mO.:··tl:·~d' r.; ·:-\·:·· . .:. ··:··~- ·t "' ·l an l""l:tlt·Ubmlll••d ~::!~r mvu:ees tok (vile: !-‘.;:~, :. i’• , :,·!’•·: ·,~: .. : ~ · :-: :· ··~·. =.• .:: < C<•rp •!• 1.• :!'~ t!:.H tf !;ad m•·\'t"\1 r.•:.u!y !0. J~ ·.\·J~ "':•": ···~~·r~h ·.,r :n· .... ,. Exhibit A 4 of 4 I • UNIT£0 STATES NUCLEAR REGULATOHY COMMISSI"' . .J REGION Ill '7U ROOSI:Vt:L T AOI\0 OLEN ELL VN, ILLINOIS tO I 37 JUN 1 7 1976 Mr~ Kenneth M. Karch Director, Division of Environmental Quality Missouri Department of Natural Resources License No. SUB-1022 P. 0. Box 1368 Jefferson City, Missouri Dear Mr. Karch: 65101 This is in response to your letter dated June 2, 1976, requesting additional in£ormation and follow-up action relative to the burial of some seven tons of natural uranium in a St. Louis County land£111 in 1973. The information published in the St. Louis Post-Dispatch on May 30 and June 1, 1976, which was enclosed with your letter of June 2, 1976, is new to this Office and, as you pointed out, conflicts with the information obtained by our inspectors in 1974. Based on this apparent discrepancy, the NRC plans to initiate a full investigation into this matter during the week beginning June 20, 1976. The findings from this investigation, which w211 be made available to you, will determine the need for further NRC action. At the conclusion of the investigation, all documents relative to this burial will be provided to your Office .. With respect to your June 2, 1976 letter, I would like to clarify one apparent misconception at this time. The Cotter Corporation, which was responsible for this burial, was an AEC licensee --- not an AEC subcontractor. Consequently, the ~nergy Research and Development Administration has no responsibility with regard to this material. As a former licensee, the NRC will look to Cotter Corporation to correct any safety or environmental related problems identified through our investigation. Regarding your other request that this office obtain from materials licensees in the State of ~tlssouri records of low level radioactive waste burials under 10 CFR 20.304, I must reiterate that there is no NRC regulation that requires reporting waste burials under 20.304. Therefore, there is no Exhibit B 1 of 2 r 1 WLLFOIA4312- 001 - 0018564 . . . •. Mr. Kenneth M. Karch JUN 1 7 1976 basis for such a requeot to the licensees. If you believe that the NRC's current regulations concerning auch burials are inadequate, you may petition tho NRC for consideration of a chtinge of the regulations. l'hia rulcmnl~ing petition should be submitted under the provisions of 10 CFR 2.802. a copy of which is enclosed • U you have any questions concerning the above • please let me know. Enc.looure: 10 CFR 2,.802 cc w/o encl, w/ltr dtd 6/2/76! R. J. CokeEPA l'..e.g:t.on VII Sincerely yours, JQmeB G. Keppler Regional Director , .. M., Y. l<"reivogel, St. Louis Post-Dispatch D. P. Marcott, Cotter Corporation bee w/o e.ncl, w/ltr dtd 6/2/76: :J. G. Davis, Deputy Director ·D. Thompson, IE:HQ ·L. Rouse, NMSS S. Schwartz, SLR ·J. Fouchard, PA Central Files IE Mail and File Unit PDR NSIC .. . ' . ·: Exhibit B 2 of 2 i JJ,... WLLFOIA4312- 001 - 0018565 •. ---·---.. -.::~ -:-...:: l•tuho••' ·• ·• .• ,NVOJCt ... HArrison 7-5666 r L .. . . ' .. ____ , ___ ----.--1 Cotter Corporation · ··. =: ~ .. • · :/ • •. -:··· ·.: >·
• DliVlWAYS
P.O. Box 751 : · – …. · · · … )
Cannon City, Color:ado ‘81212 .’ ~·
‘;;:-·:~:;~~~ ·..,.,··; ! .. ~~ … :…, __
JOBSITE: Latty Avenue, St Louis County
Material trucked to disposal site
Material shipped by railroad
• nuns
4981.85 tons @$
2341.75 tons @$
• SUUIIVISION$
• fACtOU’ HOOU
• tUKING LOU
THIS INVOICE IS DUE AND PAYABLE WITHIN 10 DAYS AS PER AGREEMENT.
Exhibit C
1 of 11
N~ 10B5~
[
········.- Y”f’OI’~ .# •• 1–:,. …….
• I I •’ “‘•)’Ji .. \
. . . . • \; \”1. ..#·.~~.1’~’-“”~
-… •• ,. ··- ~ fl

WLLFOIA4312- 001 – 0018566
…. ,. … .,., . INVOICE S-.~’!.i>-

HArrison 7·5566 …. t (f ·-·
r
L
\ t· (· ‘ ( f •
• OllVtWAYS
• lftUtS
• SVJOIVISION$
• fACton noo•s
o ,AilKING lOT$
8/10/73
JOBSITE: Latty Avenue, St. Louis County
Material trucked to disposal site Aug. 1st thru Aug. 9th -8373.75 tons
@$.
Material shipped by railroad Aug. 1st. thru Aug. 9th- 846.70 t.nn~
@S
8373.75 tons @$.02 .(scale charge)
r ___ ,_.—·-·—–~•··-·–·–··-·—— •• -~
( THIS lNVOIOE DUE AND PAYABLE WITHIN TEN { 1~2 -~!~—–II j:?
~– . -n- .Jif”
. .;!../ t )-
Exhibit C
2 of 11
r~
WLLFOIA4312- 001 – 0018567
r
L

…. – ··–·-
… ·t .,.,
f ( I f INVOICE (
JV}G 21 ·l· .c.. :I :~,:1t
.4000 7·5666 ( t •••• (· t
c • • t c ..
B. &. K. :Con ~.: -~- G · .. u.. any, Inc.
! f: . .::;!:ff.Y.f..: i~J ~~ ~H B & K”
I {?§jj_..,;;
f ~-! ,.~ .r: … , ·i,..,v f ‘ … .,-. • .,. …… ·’~’— ·—-
f,·~c:.;:;p ::: –~-…:…——:.,/’:;
fjs!r. :.:e~~ V_ , I • OliVfWA’U Cotter Corporation
P.O. Box 7.51
Canon City, Cplorado
j jll.o> “””‘ 1.::;.:.–t”·~=- ~- -~
1 ~t ‘ •• “.-. ·r~c• ~ I .~~p:o>:~d . ·- . . . t1TJ
JOBSITE: Latty Avenue – St. Louis County
August 10 through August 16:
6,304.10 tons hauled to disposal area by truck @S
lJ86. 95 tons shipped by rail @ S
6,304.10 tons ® S scale charge
THIS INVOICZ DUE Al~u PAYABLS WITHIN TEN (10) days.
• nuns
• SVlOIVISION$
• fACTO~Y HOOU
• I’AII

Post

1989-04 – NRC – NUREG-1251 – Implications of the Accident at Chernobyl for Safety Regulation of Commercial Nuclear Power Plants in the United States – ML082030501

NUREG-1251
Vol. I
Implications of the Accident
at Chernobyl for Safety Regulation
of Commercial Nuclear Power Plants
in the United States
Final Report
Main Report
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory
Commission
p.
o
AVAILABILITY NOTICE
Availability of Reference Materials Cited in NRC Publications
Most documents cited in NRC publications will be available from one of the following
sources:
1. The NRC Public Document Room, 2120 L Street, NW, Lower Level, Washington, DC
20555
2. The Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office, P.O. Box 37082,
Washington, DC 20013-7082
3. The National Technical Information Service, Springfield, VA 22161
Although the listing that follows represents the majority of documents cited in NRC publications,
it is not intended to be exhaustive.
Referenced documents available for inspection and copying for a fee from the NRC Public
Document Room include NRC correspondence and internal NRC memoranda; NRC Office of
Inspection and Enforcement bulletins, circulars, information notices, inspection and investigation
notices; Licensee Event Reports; vendor reports and correspondence; Commission
papers; and applicant and licensee documents and correspondence.
The following documents in the NUREG series are available for purchase from the GPO Sales
Program: formal NRC staff and contractor reports, NRC-sponsored conference proceedings,
and NRC booklets and brochures. Also available are Regulatory Guides, NRC regulations
in the Code of Federal Regulations, and Nuclear Regulatory Commission Issuances.
Documents available from the National Technical Information Service include NUREG series
reports and technical reports prepared by other federal agencies and reports prepared by
the Atomic Energy Commission, forerunner agency to the Nuclear Regulatory Commission.
Documents available from public and special technical libraries include all open literature
items, such as books, journal and periodical articles, and transactions. Federal Register
notices, federal and state legislation, and congressional reports can usually be obtained
from these libraries.
Documents such as theses, dissertations, foreign reports and translations, and non-NRC
conference proceedings are available for purchase from the organization sponsoring the
publication cited.
Single copies of NRC draft reports are available free, to the extent of supply, upon written
request to the Office of Information Resources Management, Distribution Section, U.S.
Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, DC 20555.
Copies of industry codes and standards used in a substantive manner in the NRC regulatory
process are maintained at the NRC Library, 7920 Norfolk Avenue, Bethesda, Maryland, and
are available there for reference use by the public. Codes and standards are usually copyrighted
and may be purchased from the originating organization or, if they are American
National Standards, from the American National Standards Institute, 1430 Broadway,
New York, NY 10018.
NUREG-1251
Vol. I
Implications of the Accident
at Chernobyl for Safety Regulation
of Commercial Nuclear Power Plants
in the United States
Final Report
Main Report
Manuscript Completed: April 1989
Date Published: April 1989
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Washington, DC 20555

ABSTRACT
This report was prepared by the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) staff to assess
the implications of the accident at the Chernobyl nuclear power plant as
they relate to reactor safety regulation for commercial nuclear power plants in
the United States. The facts used in this assessment have been drawn from the
U.S. fact-finding report (NUREG-1250) and its sources.
This report consists of two volumes: Volume I, Main Report, and Volume II, Appendix
– Public Comments and Their Disposition.
NUREG-1251, Vol. I iii

CONTENTS
Page
ABSTRACT. …………………… ………………………. 1
INTRODUCTION…………………………… …………. 1
SUMMARY ………………………………….. ………………….. 2
Chapter
1 ADMINISTRATIVE CONTROLS AND OPERATIONAL PRACTICES ……………….. 1-1
1.1 Administrative Controls To Ensure That Procedures Are Followed
and That Procedures Are Adequate ……. …………………… 1-2
1.2 Approval of Tests and Other Unusual Operations ……………… 1-7
1.3 Bypassing Safety Systems….. ….. 1-11
1.4 Availability of Engineered Safety Features……………….1-15
1.5 Operating Staff Attitudes Toward Safety …………………… 1-19
1.6 Management Systems ………………………………………. 1-22
1.7 Accident Management ……………………………………… 1-23
2 DESIGN …………………………………… ………………… 2-1
2.1 Reactivity Accidents ………………………………. 2-1
2.2 Accidents at Low Power and at Zero Power …………………… 2-9
2.3 Multiple-Unit Protection..* ………………………………. 2-12
2.4 Fire Protection…… ………………… ……………….. 2-15
3 CONTAINMENT ………….. ……………………………. 3-1
3.1 ContainmentPerformance During Severe Accidents …………….. 3-2
3.2 Filtered Venting ………………………………………… 3-4
4 EMERGENCY PLANNING ……………………………………………. 4-1
4.1 Size of the Emergency Planning Zones ………………………. 4-1
4.2 Medical Services ………………………………………… 4-4
4.3 Ingestion Pathway Measures …. ………………………….. 4-7
4.4 Decontamination and Relocation ……………………………. 4-9
5 SEVERE-ACCIDENT PHENOMENA ……………. ……………………… 5-1
5.1 Source Term ……. … …………………………… 5-1
5.2 Steam Explosions …………. I ……………………………. 5-10
5.3 Combustible Gas …………………………………………. 5-14
6 GRAPHITE-MODERATED REACTORS …………………………………… 6-1
6.1 The Fort St. Vrain Reactor and the Modular High-Temperature Gas-
Cooled Reactor ……………………. …………………… 6-2
6.2 Assessment …………….. … ……………………. 6-2
6.3 Conclusions and Recommendations …. ……………………… 6-7
REFERENCES ……………… . …………………………………….. R-1
NUREG-1251, Vol. I

INTRODUCTION
This report was prepared by the staff of the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
(NRC) to assess the implications of the April 1986 Chernobyl accident in the
Soviet Union as they relate to commercial nuclear reactor safety regulation in
the United States. Most of the assessment focuses on light-water-reactor power
plants. A final chapter addresses graphite-moderated reactors.
With respect to studying the Chernobyl accident, U.S. Government agencies have
expended their energies on determining the facts, as well as on assessing those
facts in terms of how the accident may affect U.S. policies and practices in
the nuclear power field.
The work was divided into two major phases. The first phase, fact finding, was
a coordinated effort among several U.S. Government agencies and some private
groups; this phase was completed in January 1987 and has been reported in
NUREG-1250, “Report on the Accident at the Chernobyl Nuclear Power Station.”
The second phase, an assessment of the implications of that accident with regard
to U.S. policies and practices, is being pursued separately by each organization
that participated in NUREG-1250. The present report, as part of this
second phase, addresses the safety regulation of commercial nuclear reactors
under NRC regulatory jurisdiction. (Department of Energy reactors, not subject
to NRC regulation, are not addressed in this NRC study.)
In developing the assessments presented in this report (NUREG-1251), the NRC
staff depended on NUREG-1250 and its two major source documents (USSR, 1986;
INSAG, 1986) for the facts of the Chernobyl accident. The Soviet document
(USSR, 1986) is an official Soviet report to the International Atomic Energy
Agency (IAEA) Experts’ Meeting held in Vienna August 25-29, 1986; the second
(INSAG, 1986) is the report to the IAEA prepared by the International Nuclear
Safety Advisory Group at a second meeting in Vienna on August 30 to September
5, 1986.
The assessment of the implications of the Chernobyl accident with regard to
commercial nuclear reactor safety regulation in the United States is supported
by detailed assessments of a number of particular issues, grouped in six subject
areas. The particular issues selected for evaluation were those that are associated
with significant factors that led to or exacerbated the consequences of
the Chernobyl accident.
A draft of this report was issued for public comment in September 1987. The
comments received, together with further work within the NRC, were taken into
account in preparing this final version. The passages that have been changed
(except for those with minor editorial changes, such as the spelling out of
acronyms) are marked by vertical lines in the margin. A separately bound appendix
to this report contains the comments received, provides the staff’s response
to significant issues raised in the comments, and identifies the nature
and basis of the resultant changes to the draft report. The changes correct or
clarify specific items of information and modify asspssments in some areas pertaining
to specific issues; they do not substantially change the major aspects
,of the assessment.
NUREG-1251, Vol. I 1
SUMMARY
General Conclusions
A study of the Chernobyl accident has ledthe NRC staff to the following gen-.
eral conclusions about its effect on safety regulation of commercial nuclear
power plants in the United States:;
(1) No immediate changes are needed in the NRC’s regulations regarding the
design or operation of U.S. commercial nuclear reactors.
Nuclear design, shutdown margin, containment, and operational controls at
U.S. reactors protect them against a combination of lapses such as those
experienced at Chernobyl. Although the NRC has always acknowledged the
possibility of major accidents, its regulatory requirements provide adequate
protection against the risks, subject to continuing vigilance for
any new information that may suggest particular weaknesses, and also subject
to taking measures to secure compliance with the requirements.
Assessments in the light of Chernobyl have indicated that the causes of
the accident have been largely anticipated and accommodated for commercial
U.S. reactor designs.
Yet, the Chernobyl’accident has lessons for us. The most important lesson
is that it reminds us of the continuing importance of safe design in both
concept and implementation, of operational controls, of competence and
motivation of plant management and operating staff to operate in strict
compliance with controls, and of backup features of defense in depth against
potential accidents.
Although a large nuclear power plant accident somewhere in the United States
is unlikely because of design and operational features, we cannot relax the
care and vigilance that have made it so. Accordingly, further consideration
of certain issues is recommended, as discussed.
(2) Some aspects of requirements and regulations that already exist or are
being developed will be reexamined, taking into account the accident at
Chernobyl.
Areas that may warrant further study include operator training, emergency
planning, and containment performance.
(3) Study of areas related to certain aspects of the Chernobyl accident will
be extended and will provide a basis for confirming or changing existing
regulations.
These areas include reactivity accidents,”accidents at low power or at
zero power (when the reactor is shut down), and characteristics of
radionuclide release.
NUREG-1251, Vol. I 2
(4) The Chernobyl experience should remain as part of the background information
to be taken into account when dealing with reactor safety issues in
the future.
Conclusions About Specific Areas
The accident at Chernobyl suggests that the following specific areas be examined
in direct response to that event. (Cross-references in parentheses refer’to
correspondingly numbered detailed assessments in the body of this report.)
(1) Administrative Controls Over Reactor Operations (Chapter 1)
In general, regulatory provisions at nuclear plants in the United States,
if properly implemented, are adequate with respect to administrative controls
to ensure that reactor operations are conducted within a safe range
of operating conditions. These controls address procedural adequacy and
compliance, approval of tests and other unusual operations, bypassing of
safety systems, availability of engineered safety features, operating
staff attitudes toward safety, management systems, and accident management.
However, the benefits of the followi~ng additional provisions should be
examined:
(a) Programs for accident management, including training and the development
of procedures for coping with severe core damage and for the effective
management of the containment. This provision will be addressed
and resolved as part of the implementation of the Commission’s
Severe Accident Policy.
(b) The review of administrative controls to seek ways of strengthening
technical reviews and the approval of changes, tests, and experiments.
(c) The review of safety system status displays and the availability of engineered
safety features for potential worthwhile improvements.
(d) The review of current NRC testing requirements for balancing benefits
versus risks.
(e) Measures that might further increase assurance that violations of procedures
that could be instrumental in causing an accident or emergency
situation or compromising safety margins will not occur.
(2) Reactivity Accidents (Section 2.1)
Positive void reactivity coefficients, which are a characteristic of the
RBMK graphite-moderated water-cooled reactors, played a central role in
determining the severity of the Chernobyl accident. Commercial reactors
in the United States are designed very differently from the RBMK reactor
at Chernobyl, and have generally a negative void reactivity coefficient.
This provides assurance that the kind of superprompt critical excursion
that took place at Chernobyl will not occur. However, the NRC should
reconfirm that vulnerabilities and risks from possible accident sequences
have been adequately factored into safety analysis reports on which design
approvals are based.
NUREG-1251, Vol. I 3
(3) Accidents at Low Power and at Zero Power (Shutdown) (Section 2.2)
Regulations for commercial nuclear power plants in the United States require
that potential accidents that could occur during all conditions of
operation (full, low, and zero power) be considered and provided for in
the plant design. Such provisions are considered in safety analyses required
in support of licensing. Often, analyses assuming full-power operation
are found to be limiting cases–bounding accident risks at low-power
operation or when the reactor is shut down. The Chernobyl accident suggests
that accident sequences beginning at low power and under shutdown conditions
should be reviewed, particularly for situations in which not all engineered
safety features are considered-necessaryo.to be available.
(4) Multiple-Unit Protection (Section 2.3)
For multiple-unit plants that are operating or are under construction, the
Chernobyl experience shouldbe considered in assessing the adequacy of protection
of control rooms in the event of an accident at one of the units.
This assessment should be performed on the basis of recent research information
on radionuclide release.
New multiple-unit plants should not share.systems required for shutting
down each unit unless designed to enhance the overall level of safety.
(5) Fires (Section 2.4)
Provisions for fighting fires when radiation levels are high should be
reviewed to confirm that the current provisions are adequate.
(6) Containment (Chapter 3)
The Chernobyl accident demonstrated the importance of containment performance
for mitigation of the risks of nuclear power plant operation. Even
before the Chernobyl accident, research programs and regulatory initiatives
in the United States addressed the issue of containment performance during
severe accidents. A systematic search for plant-specific vulnerabilities
(i.e., potential failures that result in unacceptably high risk) is scheduled
to begin in 1988, as part of the implementation of the Commission’s
Severe Accident Policy. This search will include reviews of containment
design. The Chernobyl experience should be taken into account in these
reviews wherever that experience is relevant.
Filtered venting of containment as a means of limiting offsite consequences
of core-melt accidents is being pursued in a number of countries and is
being examined in the United States. Anticipated international technical
exchanges will enhance U.S. research and evaluation efforts concerning
this potential measure.
(7) Emergency Planning (Chapter 4).
Partly because the radionuclide release in the Chernobyl accident is
specific to the RBMK design, the size of the 10-mile plume exposure pathway
emergency planning zone, which specifically includes the concept of
NUREG-1251, Vol. I 4
protective actions outside it if necessary, continues to be viewed as
adequate. However, in light of new research information (NUREG-0956,
“Reassessment of the Technical Bases for Estimating Source Terms,” and
NUREG-1150, “Reactor Risk.Reference Document”), the planning bases for
relocation and decontamination and for protective measures for the food
ingestion pathway are being reexamined in cooperation with’the Federal
Emergency Management Agency.
(8) Severe-Accident Phenomena (Chapter 5)
The phenomena of the Chernobyl accident were greatly influenced by the
design features and materials in-the RBMK reactor, which differ in many
respects from those of U.S. reactors. The only radionuclide release
aspects identified to date that are not currently considered in U.S. ana-‘
lytical models involve two mechanisms of fission-product release from fuel
debris. These are mechanical dispersal and chemical stripping (removal
of the fuel surface layer, as through chemical change of the uranium oxide).
Although it is not clear that these mechanisms will have any effect on
accident sequences relevant to U.S. reactors, it is recommended that the
need for additional research be assessed.
(9) Graphite-Moderated Reactors (Chapter 6)
The Fort St. Vrain high-temperature gas-cooled reactor (HTGR) is the only
licensed and operating commercial graphite-moderated reactor in the United
States. A study of the potential for a Chernobyl-type fire and explosion
at Fort St. Vrain was initiated immediately after the Chernobyl accident.
It should be noted, however, that the licensee for Fort St. Vrain, the
Public Service Company of Colorado, has notified the NRC that it will
discontinue operations on or before June 30, 1990.
Although the only shared features between the HTGR concept and the Chernobyl
design are the use of a graphite moderator and gravity-driven control rods,
the 330-MWe Fort St. Vrain’HTGR andza proposed modular HTGR concept were
reviewed against the Chernobyl candidate issues and the conclusions presented.
in this document for light-water reactors. This assessment confirms
that the concept of the HTGR (because it uses-helium coolant in a fully
ceramic core, has an overall negative reactivity coefficient, and has completely
diverse alternate shutdown and cooling systems) has no direct association
with the identifiedweaknesses of the Chernobyl design. In the
areas at issue of operations, design, containment, emergency planning, and
severe-accident phenomena, NRC assessments conclude that the implications
of the accident at Chernobyl generate no new licensing concerns for HTGRs
and both the overall and specific`area conclusions are the same as for
light-water reactors. The assessment did not raise any new concerns regarding
HTGR severe-accident phenomena. It did reinforce the desirability of
undertaking a limited probabilistic risk assessment of Fort St. Vrain. It
also suggested consideration of the merits of the possible reinitiation of
experiments in graphite thermal stress to enhance confidence in the longterm
integrity of the Fort St. Vrain structural graphite. However, no
work with respect to Fort St. Vrain is now warranted, in view of the
imminent termination of operations.
NUREG-1251, Vol. I 5

CHAPTER 1
ADMINISTRATIVE CONTROLS AND OPERATIONAL PRACTICES
In the United States, administrative controls over plant operations include NRC
rules and regulations, facility license conditions, Technical Specifications,
and plant procedures. The overall administrative control framework requires
that safety-related activities at nuclear power plants be conducted in accordance
with approved written procedures. These activities include, for example,
operations, tests, inspections, calibrations, maintenance, experiments, modifications,
safety review and approval functions, and audits. The safety design
basis of the plant is based on assumed initial conditions for transients and
emergencies. These assumed initial conditions (e.g., temperatures, pressures,
control rod positions, and equipment availability) establish a “safe operating
envelope.” Effective administrative controls are needed to ensure that reactor
operations are conducted within this safe operating envelope. Clearly, for
administrative controls to be effective they must be technically accurate and
complete, they must be understood by those responsible for implementing specific
procedures, and management must ensure that they are enforced. A key finding
from the Chernobyl accident is that such administrative controls in place at
Chernobyl were not effective in maintaining conditions within the safe operating
envelope.
In this chapter, the NRC staff reviews the administrative controls over plant
operations in the United States to determine if adequate controls are in place
to maintain plant conditions within the safe operating envelope. This review
includes an assessment of procedural adequacy and compliance, approval of tests,
bypassing of safety systems, availability of engineered safety features, operating
staff attitudes toward safety, management systems, and accident management.
The results of these detailed reviews are reported in the following sections.
The staff confirmed that some ongoing activities with a nexus to the Chernobyl
accident should continue. In addition, a few new issues requiring staff attention
were identified and are presented below.
Emergency operating procedures (EOPs) are intended to ensure safe shutdown and
to mitigate the effects of accidents and transients. Facility EOPs are designed
for coping with accidents and transients that initiate from within the safe
operating envelope. The ability of operators to successfully implement EOPs
depends upon plant safety parameters initially being within the safe Operating
envelope. As a result of the Three Mile Island accident, NRC required that
new symptom-based EOPs be developed. These new procedures have not been
implemented at all facilities, and NRC audits have identified deficiencies in
implementation at several facilities. Thus, licensees must expend significant
effort to complete implementation of new EOPs.
Operator training needs to stress fundamentals of reactor safety, how the plant
should function, and the underlying danger if plant conditions move outside the
safe operating envelope. With adequate training and knowing the possible
NUREG-1251, Vol. I 1-1
consequences, personnel would be less likely to succumb to pressures to speed
up, take shortcuts, or defeat safety functions. Operating experience and the
Chernobyl event suggest that additional attention to training in the areas of
maintenance of safety-parameters and plant conditions within the safe operating
envelope, emergency operating procedures, and accident management should be
considered.
The Chernobyl accident has emphasized the need for contingency planning assuming
core damage has occurred to ensure that appropriate controls, training, and
planning have prepared the plant staff to manage plant assessment activities,
response actions, and emergency actions. Significant effort has been expended
to prepare for events involving degraded-core cooling and to upgrade emergency
planning. However, more work needs to be donein training and procedure development
for coping with severe core damage and for effective management of
containment.
Management attention and diligence are required to ensure that plant operations,
testing, and maintenance are conducted within the safe operating envelope. Management
must focus on ensuring that all of the administrative control systems are
effective and enforced. To obtain feedback on the quality of safety activities,
the operating staffs must continue to perform audits, internal inspections, and
reviews of operating data and events. .Qualified and informed individuals must
control reviews of changes, tests, and procedures. Experience has shown that
some of these reviews have not been of consistently high quality and, in some’
instances, design changes have been made and testing has been conducted that
place the plant outside the safe operating envelope. Industry has acted to
improve the review process required by NRC; however, more needs to be done to
sharpen the focus on responsibility for safety.
1.1 Administrative Controls To Ensure That Procedures Are Followed and That
Procedures Are Adequate
Are controls at-U.S. reactors adequate to ensure that operations and other
activities at nuclear power plants are performed in accordance with approved
written procedures?
When, in order to complete the test, the operators deviated from the approved
test procedures and-the established administrative procedures, they initiated
the Chernobyl accident. Although the test procedure called for the test to be
run at 700 to 1000 MWt, the operators could only achieve 200 MWt, but decided
to conduct the test anyway. In addition, they violated the fundamental administrative
requirement to maintain enough control rods at the proper degree of
insertion to be effective in an automatic scram. The operators should not have
raised the-control rods beyond their administrative limits so that the reserve
shutdown reactivity margin limits were violated; they should have terminated
the test and shut the reactor down. This violation resulted in the inability
to insert enough negative reactivity in the required time by a scram to overcome
certain reactivity transients..
The operators violated another administrative procedural limit when they activated
and operated two additional main circulating pumps while the other main
circulating pumps were running. Such actions (1) violated limits protecting
against pump cavitation damage and (2) yielded an abnormally high core flow rate.
NUREG-1251, Vol. I 1-2
The conditions created by running all of the main circulating pumps would also
have caused an automatic scram if the operators had not intervened and defeated
the scram function. Subsequent operation with the high flow rate resulted in
voids being swept from the fuel element channels. This caused a large reactivity
loss which was compensated for by control rod withdrawal to an extent that the
rods were initially less effective when scrammed.
Other deviations from administrative procedures occurred, such as bypassing
safety systems. These are discussed separately. Such deviations and procedures
violations are influenced by operator attitudes (also discussed separately).
This issue concerns (1) controls by licensees and-regulators to ensure that procedures
are appropriately written, known-to the operators, placed at the worksite,
and followed and (2.) the adequacy of these controls for some safety functions.
Such controls involve plant policies and procedures, industry standards,
and regulatory rules and enforcement policy. The specific administrative controls
applicable to changes, tests, and experiments are provided in Section 1.2.
1.1.1 Current Regulatory Practice
(1) NRC Requirements and Guidance for Procedure Development and Use
The NRC has a large body of guidance and requirements that includes general and
specific measures for development and use of administrative procedures and controls.
These controls govern all operating activities at nuclear power plants,
and are designed to avoid the types of violations that occurred at Chernobyl.
Violations of procedures do occur at licensed plants, but in relation to the
number of procedural steps taken at plants, such violations are infrequent, and
only rarely do they occur with the knowledge that a violation is being committed.
Errors have also been committed because of operator failure to use or refer to
procedures. In its program to ensure safety and quality, the NRC has developed
and published quality assurance requirements for activities affecting nuclear
safety. Criterion V, “Quality Assurance Criteria for Nuclear Power Plants and
Fuel Reprocessing Plants,” of Appendix B to Part 50 of Title 10 of the Code of
Federal Regulations (10 CFR 50) governing procedures states:
V. Instructions, Procedures and Drawings
Activities affecting quality shall be prescribed by documented instructions,
procedures, or drawings, of a type appropriate to the
circumstances and shall be accomplished in accordance with these
instructions, procedures, or drawings. Instructions, procedures, or
drawings shall include appropriate quantitative or qualitative acceptance
criteria for determining that important activities have been
satisfactorily accomplished.
This criterion prescribes the general requirement for having procedures and for
following them. A second level of administrative controls for procedures is.contained
in each plant’s Technical Specifications-, which are a part of the license.
Plant Technical Specifications require licensees to establish, implement, and
maintain procedures. Both Technical Specifications and Criterion V have the
force of law.
Technical Specifications require procedures to be reviewed by the Unit Review,
Group when initially written and before being changed, except for temporary
NUREG-1251, Vol. I .1-3
changes made on the spot that do not alter the intent. The Unit Review Group
is made up of key plant supervisory personnel who are knowledgeable about plant
safety. The objective of this review is to ensure that experts from the various
technical disciplines review the procedures for operations or changes that could
affect safety. This review backs up the technical procedure writer and his/her
supervisor’s decisions on safety. There is a further screening of procedures
and changes to procedures to determine whether or not they may involve an unreviewed
safety question or a technical specification, in which case prior NRC
approval is required by 10 CFR 50.59. The NRC requires that all of these activities,
including compliance with procedures, be periodically audited, and audit
results be provided to appropriate management; corrective action is required
when deficiencies are found.
(2) Required Procedure Coverage
Technical Specifications require that licensees commit to develop and implement
applicable procedures listed in Appendix A to Regulatory Guide 1.33, “Quality
Assurance Program Requirements Operation.” Licensees make this commitment in
their applications. This list of applicable procedures covers essentially all
operating and administrative activities (e.g., startup, shutdown, refueling)
and requires the development of specific procedures for activities, such as tests
and maintenance, at the approximate.-time-but before the test or maintenance
activity is performed. Test and administrative procedures undergo the same
review as other procedures.
(3) Guidance in Standards
Additional guidance on procedures is provided in American National Standards
Institute/American Nuclear Society (ANSI/ANS) Standard 3.2-1980, “Administrative
Controls and Quality Assurance for the Operational Phase of Nuclear Power
Plants.” The guidelines of this standard provide much more detail than other
documents on the measures needed for the development, review, control of changes,
and implementation of the procedures. This standard is endorsed by the NRC
through Regulatory Guide 1.33, and licensees have committed to comply with Regulatory
Guide 1.33 in their license applications.
ANSI/ANS 3.2 requires that procedures be written for all plant safety activities,
that they be followed, and that the requirements for use of the procedures be
prescribed in writing. It further requires written guidance for operators to
contain elements describing when a procedure is to be memorized, when it is to
be in hand while the operator is conducting the operation, and when signoffs
are required. It identifies’situations in which temporary changes can be made
and the conditions under which such changes can be made if proper controls are
met.
(4) Training on Procedures
Operators must be licensed by the NRC. Since plant operation requires extensive
use of procedures, operators are trained in both the technical details of procedures
and what is expected of them in terms of using procedures and following
procedural provisions. The NRC examines operators in these areas.
NUREG-1251, Vol. I 1-4
(5) NRC Inspection and Enforcement
Important elements in the overall regulation of nuclear power plants are the
inspection of licensee activities and the enforcement actions taken when the
licensee fails to comply with NRC requirements.
Since a requirement exists in the Technical Specifications that licensees follow
procedures, licensed operators must use procedures and must abide by them or
face possible disciplinary action from their own management and possible enforcement
action by the NRC. Citations and significant fines havebeen imposed on
utilities for such violations of procedures. Licensees’ activities are inspected
routinely and after each significant event to determine compliance with procedural
requirements. These inspections are often done unannounced on backshift
and during weekend periods. More severe actions are usually taken for violations
of procedures if the act has been willfully performed. Operators are very reluctant
to deliberately commit such acts. In an emergency, a licensee is permitted
through 10 CFR 50.54(x) to deviate from a procedure or even from a technical
specification if the licensed operator determines such deviation is needed
to protect the public. When appropriate (e.g., as a result of decreasing Systematic
Assessment of Licensee Performance ratings), additional emphasis will be
placed on inspectors monitoring the quality and use of procedures.
1.1.2 Wrrk in Progress
(1) Technical Specifications Improvements
The NRC has a priority effort under way to improve Technical Specifications
through the Technical Specification Improvement Program. Current Technical
Specifications have grown in volume because of lack of guidance on which
requirements should be included in them. A Policy Statement defining the
scope and purpose of Technical Specifications (52 FR 3788) has been approved
by the Commission. Technical Specifications that have been revised in accordance
with this Policy Statement will be more closely oriented toward the
operator’s job and will be rewritten to improve clarity. Bases for requirements
will be improved. Technical Specifications ‘that appear in procedures
will be easier to understand and to follow.
(2) Symptom/Function-Based Emergency Operating Procedures
One of the lessons learned from the accident at Three Mile Island Unit 2 was
the need for symptom/function-based emergency operating procedures (EOPs) for
coping with transients and accidents. The NRC has a program in place that is
sponsored by vendor owners groups to develop EOPs- based on reanalyses of transients
and accidents. All licensees are required to implement symptom-based
EOPs incorporating good human factors practices. Operators are receiving
training on these procedures. The ability of operators to successfully implement
these procedures is directly related to their knowledge of whether or not
the plant is initially operating within the safe operating envelope.
(3) Refocusing NRC Inspection Activities
The NRC initiated an inspection program to reward good licensee performance by
reducing inspections for good performers; below-average performers were inspected
more frequently.
NUREG-1251, Vol. I 1-5
In the staff’s judgment, a high level of overall compliance and a high level
of compliance with procedures go hand in hand. To achieve the coveted high
performance rating, licensees will need to have (a) effective administrative
controls over procedure development and use as well as (b) good performance in
other management and technical areas.
1.1.3 Assessment
Good administrative controls are essential for the safe operation of nuclear
power plants. The staff has carefully examined these controls. The assessment
of the adequacy of these controls at U.S. reactors is discussed below.
Over the past 15 years, a body of American Nuclear Society standards has been
developed and put into place to provide criteria and guidance for procedures
and for controls over the procedures. Several key standards have been in use
for much of this period; furthermore, these key standards have been revised and
refined, becoming effective standards. They address administrative controls,
qualifications for nuclear power plant personnel, training, and quality assurance.
The NRC has encouraged such standards development, endorsing it through
the NRC regulatory guide series. The standards have become the recommended and
accepted programs in their respective areas.
These standards contain excellent requirements and guidance for control over
administrative and technical procedures. They are geared toward ensuring that
technically sound procedures are developed that have been reviewed by a multidiscipline
review body, and that have management endorsement and authorization.
They also require the use of approved written procedures for essentially all
activities at the plants. Required training emphasizes how these procedures
are to be used and followed. Management directives and administrative procedures
state the philosophy and expectations, i.e., procedures will be written
and followed.
The NRC has. published guidance and has issued plant-specific Technical Specifications
stating requirements in the use of procedures. Although these procedures
and specifications allow removal of a single train of redundant systems for test
or repair, they prohibit defeating safety systems and prescribe minimum operability
requirements for important safety equipment. NRC personnel inspect procedural
activities and’take enforcement action, when appropriate, against utilities
and licensed operators who violate these requirements. The industry-sponsored
Institute of Nuclear Power Operations evaluates performance in these same areas
and strives for excellence in writing, use, and control of procedures through
its evaluation feedback process to management.
Although the staff recognizes that errors and violations will occur, the measures
taken by the NRC and industry should keep violations to a minimum. Since
Technical Specifications containing, the operability requirements for safety
equipment are so prominent in operators’ and management’s minds, the staff believes
that operators, because of their concern for safety, will not willingly
violate these requirements and put the reactor in jeopardy. It should be recognized,
however, that since violations of procedures do nevertheless occur, a
study that would characterize the nature, severity,-and frequency of violations
could be of value. It might provide a firmer basis for a reassuring conclusion
or lead to a consideration of additional means of-reducing inadvertent violations
and deterring willful ones.
NUREG-1251, Vol. I 1-6
Recent audits by the NRC have’identified deficiencies in the implementation of
the new symptom-based emergency operating procedures (EOPs.) In addition, NRC
examinations have identified the need for additional training on the use of these
procedures. Therefore, the staff believes work should continue to achieve full
implementation of the new EOPs and to provide associated training to operating
personnel. Furthermore, the staff believes that the concept of maintaining plant
conditions within the safe operating envelope should be emphasized in operator
training.
1.1.4 Conclusions.and Recommendations
The staff recommends that increased emphasis be placed on implementing symptombased
EOPs and related training. Full implementation of symptom-based EOPs is
expected to ensure that procedures are adequate. The staff also recommends an
increased emphasis on NRC inspections to determine if those administrative controls
needed to-ensure that procedures are being followed have been prepared and
are in place. Further, the staff recommends initiation of a research program to
analyze the frequency, nature, and severity of violations in order to provide a
basis for the consideration of measures that might increase assurance that violations
that could be instrumental in causing an accident or emergency situation
or compromising safety margins will not occur. These measures are intended to
reinforce assurance that operations and-other safety-related activities will be
performed in accordance with approved written procedures.
1.2 Approval of Tests and Other Unusual Operations
Are administrative controls at nuclear power plants adequate to ensure that
changes are made safely and that tests and experiments at plants are conducted
safely and within the safe operating envelope?
The testing being performed at Chernobyl at the time of the accident was stated
to have been prepared by an individual not familiar with the RBMK-1000 type of
reactor. Moreover,,’the Soviet report (USSR, 1986) stated that “the quality of
the program was poor and the section on safety measures was drafted in a purely
formal way.. .. ” In addition to the test program being poorly constructed, its
intent was violated in a number of ways. The test power level was chosen to
avert control difficulties that would result from changes to the thermal, hydraulic,
and nuclear characteristics at low power levels. The test also presumed
an automatic trip of the reactor by closing the turbine stop valve when
the test was initiated. The trip circuit for this function was defeated by the
operators to expedite a retest if the original test failed. An adequately
constructed test procedure would establish the prerequisites, including power
level, with a warning or caution against lower power levels and would have
established in advance any permissible bypasses of-safety features.
U.S. standards and administrative control requirements minimize the potential to
conduct a test without an adequate safety review. Multiple Federal regulations
would have been violated had Chernobyl Unit 4 been a licensed U.S. plant.
In the United States, all changes, tests, and experiments planned to be performed
in reactors licensed by the NRC are evaluated against the requirements
of 10 CFR 50.59, “Changes, Tests, and Experiments.” This regulation establishes
which changes, tests, and experiments may be done solely under a licensee’s
NUREG-1251, Vol. I 1-7
administrative procedures and which must get prior NRC approval. iThe NRC staff
must review, approve, and authorize any change, test, or experiment that involves
an unreviewed safety question or a technical specification.-.
If the change, test, or experiment does not involve an unreviewed safety-question
or a-technical specification, but does involve reactor safety,.it must be done
under the administrative control system discussed in Section 1.1 and be submitted
to that review and approval process.
The controls to ensure that changes, tests,-and experiments are properly dealt
with are discussed in this section. These controls. are a part of the administrative
controls discussed in Section 1.1 and relate topoperator attitudes
toward safety as discussed in Section 1.5.
1.2.1 Current Regulatory Practice
10 CFR 50.59 requires Commission approval for any change to the facility or to
procedures described in the Safety Analysis Report and any test or experiment
which involves a change to the Technical Specifications or to an unreviewed,
safety question (USQ). A USQ is defined as a change which increases the probability
or consequences of. an accident or malfunction-of-equipment important to
safety previously evaluated, creates the possibility of an accident or~malfunction
of a different type than that previously evaluated, or reduces, the margin
of safety as defined in the basis of the plant Technical Specifications. The
licensee may make the change, which could.consist of a new test or experiment,
without prior Commission approval if it does not involve-a change to the:Technical
Specifications or a USQ. If such a change, test, or experiment affects
nsuticllle amr ussat febtey ,p robpuet rldyo es not involve a USQ, the change, test,,or experiment reviewed and approved before implementation., The safety
evaluation required by 10 CFR 50.59 is but one of several ‘reviews required
either by Technical Specifications or by other plant administrative controls.
Figure 1.1 charts the flow of changes, tests, or experiments required to receive
proper authorization.
After authorization of the change, test, or experiment has’been obtained,’the
test details have to be converted into a procedure.. The process of converting
test details into a procedure follows the controls discussed in.Section 1.1 for
writing, reviewing, approving, and implementing procedures. ,.
mNReCn tsp etroso ncnoenlf irmin spect selected activities involving changes, tests, or experi- that 10 CFR 50.59 requirements were satisfied. Resident
,inspectors at each site stay abreast of licensed activities and periodically
confirm that changes, tests, and experiments have been appropriately reviewed.
Each plant has an NRC project manager assigned to its main office who also
stays abreast of licensed activities. The project manager’s.role has recently
been expanded to include routine review of documentation summaries and selective
audits of 10 CFR 50.59 activities. ‘
1;2.2 Work in Progress .
Some reviews conducted in accordance with 10 CFR 50:59-hiVe6been found inconsistent
in depth of review and quality of documentation.. On May 27, 1986, NRC
management requested that industry develop review criteria:and guidelines for
NUREG-1251, Vol. I 1-8
CHANGES TO FACILITIESAND
TESTS (OR EXPERIMENTS) 10 CFR 50.59
Change Pmroposalmmm Most Technical Specifications (TS) require the Unit Review Group
(1) to review all procedures and changes thereto that affect nuclear
safety, all proposed tests and experiments that affect nuclear safety,
and all proposed changes to the facility that affect nuclear safety;
and (2) to recommend in writing to the Plant Superintendent approval
or disapproval of these proposals.
Is the Safety Analysis Report (SARI)affected?
0)l Does the proposal change the facility or procedures from their
description in the SAR?
1(2 ) Does the proposal involve a test or experiment not described in the SAR?
(3) Could the proposal affect nuclear safety in a way not previously
evaluated in the SAR?
Any answer Yes All answers. No
Is a change in the TS involved?
No Yes
10 CFR 50.59 no longer applies. It is still
necessary, however, to ask: Is a change
in the TS involved?
I
Is an unreviewed safety question involved?
(I1) Is the probability of an occurrence or the consequences
of an accident. or malfunction of equipment important to
safety previously evaluated in the SAR increased?
(2) Is the possibility for an accident or malfunction of a different
,, type than any previously evaluated in the SAR created?
(3) Is the margin of safety as defined in the basis for any
technical specification reduced?
Most TS require the Unit Review Group to
inm 1 render determination in writing with regard
‘ constitutes an unreviewed safety question.
All answers No Any answer Yes I I Most TS require the Company Nuclear Revie
Group to review proposed changes to procedu
equipment or systems, and test or experimen
that involve an unreviewed safety question.
I
Document the change. Include in these
records a written safety evaluation .
providing the bases for the determination
that the change, test. or experiment does
not involve an unreviewed safety question.
ures,
•ts
Submit the proposal to the
NRC for authorization.
Authorization received.
Proceed with the change
U
A
I ‘ Most TS require the Company Nuclear Review Group to review the safety evaluations I L m – 1 for changes to procedures, equipment, or systems, and tests or experiments completed I under the provisions of 50.59 to verify that such actions did not constitute an unreviewed I
safety question.
Figure’ 1.1 Approval of changes, tests, and experiments
NUREG-1251, .Vol,. I 1-9
licensees conducting reviews of changes, tests, and experiments under the regulatory
provisions of 10 CFR 50.59. This work was initiated by the Atomic Industrial
Forum (AIF), now a part of the U.S. Council for Energy Awareness, and is
now being conducted under the auspices of the Nuclear Management and Resources
Council with participation by AIF and the Electric Power Research Institute’s
Nuclear Safety Analysis Center. This group presented a draft set of criteria and
guidelines to NRC management in November-1987. The NRC has reviewed these guidelines
and provided comments to the industry. Once these criteria~and guidelines
are acceptable, they will be used by the NRC–as well as the licensees–to review
changes, tests, and experiments by licensees under the provisions of 10 CFR 50.59.
1.2.3 Assessment
Each year licensees conduct thousands of reviews under the provisions of
10 CFR 50.59. Some of the review items should have received prior NRC review,
as later determined by inspections and licensee audits. Enforcement penalties
have been levied for some of these violations. Nevertheless, considering the
large number of changes, tests, and experiments involved, this activity has
been mostly successful. The staff has observed some inconsistencies in the
level and quality of reviews performed by licensees in making the judgment as
to the identification of an unreviewed safety question and thus the involvement
of the NRC. Moreover, documentation associated with some of these reviews has
sometimes been inconsistent and insufficient.
On occasion, because the unreviewed safety question determination was too
narrowly drawn, the licensee determined incorrectly that a unreviewed safety
question was not involved. Therefore, the NRC did not review the item. As
stated in a memorandum to Commissioner Asselstine (Malsch, 1986), “the Agency’s
regulatory scheme recognizes that it is neither necessary nor manageable for
the Commission to undertake prior review and approval to all subsequent changes
to the design or operation of the facility….” It is clear that those items
needing prior NRC review should be limited, but the most important items should
be reviewed. Also, the resident inspector has access to the lists of all tests
for all phases of plant operation to help ensure his/her awareness of tests of
potential safety significance.
The fact that the Chernobyl accident was initiated by a test-intended to assess
equipment capabilities raises a concern about the balance between the benefit
of testing and the risks introduced by tests. Although safety reviews are
intended to ensure that tests are conducted within the safe operating envelope,
equipment and design deficiencies have, in a few instances, led to unacceptable
plant conditions (e.g., rapid cooldown during testing at Catawba). However,
without such testing, these deficiencies may not have been identified.
Therefore, tests should be evaluated to determine the potential risks associated
with testing versus the benefit or need for the test.
1.2.4 Conclusions and Recommendations
The NRC should review the results of the joint Nuclear Safety, Analysis Center/
Atomic Industrial Forum efforts to produce criteria and guidelines for licensee
reviews of changes, tests, and experiments to ensure that (1) appropriate depth
and quality of reviews will be required, (2) review documentation will be adequately
prescribed, and (3) the distinction as to which of these should receive
NUREG-1251, Vol. I 1-10
prior NRC review is appropriately defined. The additional controls thus provided
should ensure that operations within the safe operating envelope are maintained.
If deficiencies in this review are identified, the NRC should correct them and
should publish the criteria and guidelines as the regulatory position on reviews
required for changes, tests, and experiments. Also, consideration should be
given to an evaluation of whether current NRC testing .requirements (e.g., surveillance
testing required by Technical Specifications) appropriately balance
-risks and benefits.
1.3 Bypassing Safety Systems
Multiple safety systems that could prevent or mitigate the consequences of the
accident at Chernobyl were intentionally disabled by the plant operators before
they initiated a test procedure that ultimately led to the accident. The test
procedure apparently called for the bypassing of certain safety systems. It is
known that the operators deviated from the test procedure in order to complete
the test, and it is suspected that some of the deviations involved the bypassing
of additional-safety systems. It is apparent that administrative controls governing
the availability of safety systems did not exist or were blatantly violated
by the operators. Thus, a safe operating envelope was.not maintained. In assessing
the implications of the Chernobyl event with respect to U.S. commercial
reactors, a question raised is whether the ability of operators to override or
bypass safety systems,’during modes of plant operation in which they should remain
operable, is a safety concern. This issue is discussed below. The scope of
this discussion is limited to the typical administrative controls and hardware design
features used to ensure the availability of sufficient safety systems to respond
to transient and accident conditions. The unavailability of safety systems
because of sabotage and human error (i.e., Unintentionally disabling a safety
function versus taking conscious deliberate actions based on poor judgment to
override or bypass a safety function) arewnot within’this scope.
Definition of Bypass
The bypass or override of a safety or protection system is typically any action
taken by the operator that inhibits or prevents the system or some portion of
the system from performing its safety-related protective function(s). In general,
two types of bypasses are used at U.S. commercial reactors, both of which
are typically initiated manually by the operators in the control room. The
first type of bypass is referred to as a “maintenance bypass” and is used to
preclude inadvertent or unwanted system actuations when routine testing, maintenance,
repair,.or calibration activities are being performed during reactor
operation. The use of maintenance bypasses allows routine surveillance testing
of plant safety systems to detect component failures that may have occurred,
and to verify system operability, thus providing assurance that the system will
perform as designed when called, upon to perform its safety function(s). A maintenance
bypass may temporarily reduce the degree of redundancy of equipment, but
will not cause the loss of a safety function. The second type of bypass is
referred to as an “‘operating bypass” and is used to permit operational mode
changes. An example of an operating bypass is the blocking of an engineered
safety features actuation when low reactor coolant system pressure (indicative
of a system break during power operation) is detected during a controlled
NUREG-1251, Vol. I 1-11
reactor shutdown, where pressure is intentionally reduced to below the actuation
setpoint and safety system actuation is not desirable. Therefore, bypasses are
necessary to prevent inadvertent actuations of plant safety systems that might
otherwise disrupt plant operation or result in unnecessary challenges to safety
systems, and if used correctly, actually contribute to the overall safety of
the plant.
1.3.1 Current Regulatory Practice
(1) Technical Specification Restrictions on the Use of Bypasses
The use of bypasses at U.S. commercial reactors is controlled by plant-specific
Technical Specifications. These specifications are a part of each reactor operating
license, and compliance with them is required. Before granting an operating
license, the.NRC requires that an analysis be performed to determine the
plant response to prescribed bounding design-basis transient and accident events.
This is a conservative analysis which assumes the “worst case” initial plant
conditions (i.e., the mode of operation, initial parameter values, control system
status, etc., that would lead to the most severe design-basis transient or
accident) and identifies the safety systems whose successful operation is relied
on to prevent or mitigate the consequences of the events so that safety limits
are not exceeded. The Technical Specifications require the operability* of
safety systems consistent with the transient and accident analysis. They include
required actions considered appropriate when a redundant portion (or train) of
a safety system is bypassed (or rendered inoperable for any reason) during modes
of plant operation for which it is normally required to be operable. These actions
require that the bypassed or inoperable portion of the safety system be
restored to an operable status within a specified time. This is referred to as
“out-of-service time,” i.e., an interval of short duration considered sufficient
to allow completion of necessary repair activities without unduly restricting
reactor operation, and without causing unnecessary risk because-part of the system
is unavailable for a prolonged time. If the repair cannot be done in the
alloted time, the reactor must be shut down or its operation must be restricted
to a condition where the system is no longer required to ensure plant safety.
The Technical Specifications for many U.S. commercial reactors include a small
number, of special test exceptions which permit safety systems to be bypassed by
the control room operators in order to perform the tests. These are infrequently
performed tests which are carefully staged with significant involvement by the
licensee in the control and execution of the tests. They are usually conducted
at reduced power with some reactor trip settings lowered. NRC resident inspectors
often monitor these tests.
(2) NRC Criteria and Guidance Regarding Bypasses
Requirements for the design of safety systems concerning the use of bypasses are
stated in 10 CFR 50.55a(h) and the Institute of Electrical and Electronics
Engineers (IEEE) Standard 279-1971, “Criteria for Protection Systems for Nuclear
Power Generating Stations.” Two of these requirements, applicable to all U.S.
commercial reactors, are summarized below.
*The state of being capable of performing their specified functions.
NUREG-1251, Vol. I 1-12
Where operating requirements necessitate the use of an operating bypass,
the design shall be such that the bypass condition is automatically
removed (i.e., system operability automatically restored) when the plant
enters a mode of operation for which the safety system is required to be
operable in accordance with the Technical Specifications.
If the protective action of a portion of a safety system has been bypassed
or deliberately rendered inoperable for any purpose, this fact shall be
continuously indicated in the control room.
The first requirement ensures that a safety system bypassed to permit reactor
mode changes will not remain inadvertently bypassed when the plant is returned
to a mode of operation for which the system is required to be operable. The
second requirement is intended to ensure that sufficient information concerning
the inoperable status of safety systems is provided in the control room so that
the operators will be continually aware of the status of redundant portions of
the protection system. Information on the status of safety systems is typically
provided in the control room through a combination of administrative
controls (e.g., manually updated status boards and logs) and automatic indication
systems (e.g., annunciators and plant computer printouts).
Additional guidance concerning the use of bypasses and the design of bypass
circuits is provided in IEEE Standard 338-1975, “IEEE Standard Criteria for the
Periodic Testing of Nuclear Power Generating Station Safety Systems,” as supplemented
by Regulatory Guide 1.118, “Periodic Testing of Electric Power and
Protection Systems,” Regulatory Guide 1.22, “Periodic Testing of Electric Power
and Protection System Actuation Functions,” and Regulatory Guide 1.47, “Bypassed
and Inoperable Status Indication for Nuclear Power Plant Safety Systems.” This
guidance emphasizes the importance of providing (a) sufficient redundancy within
the safety system so thatwhen a portion of the system is bypassed for maintenance
or testing purposes, that capability still exists to accomplish the safety
function if required, (b) positive means to prevent a concurrent bypass condition
on redundant or diverse safety systems/equipment, (c) automatically actuated
continuous indication in the control room of each bypass condition that renders
a portion of a safety system inoperable during a mode of plant operation for
which the system is required to be operable, and which is expected to occur more
than once a year, and (d) measures to ensure that upon completion of work activities
which required the bypass condition (e.g., maintenance or testing), the
affected systems and equipment are restored to their normal operational status.
1.3.2 Work in Progress
The current effort under way at NRC to revise Regulatory Guide 1.47 was recommended
in NUREG/CR-3621, “Safety System Status Monitoring.” NUREG/CR-3621
identifies some of the tasks associated with monitoring the status of bypassed
safety systems (e.g., updating status boards and determining system status
during all modes of operation) whichare prone to human errors. These human
factors considerationsare being reviewed for possible inclusion in Regulatory
Guide 1.47.
Another staff effort under way is the implementation .of the Maintenance and
Surveillance Program Plan (MSPP). The MSPP examines the commercial nuclear
NUREG-1251, Vol. I 1-13
industry work and control processes associated with maintenance and surveillance
activities.’ This includes administrative controls used to ensure the
availability of redundant safety’systems/equipment.
A related area’of activity is-work to resolve the generic issue of wrong-unit
or wrong-train events.(Generic Issue 102). An NRC staff report on this subject
(NUREG”.1192) was issued in 1986. The .report indicated that inadequacies in
equipment labeling (absent, illegible, or unclear labels) were the primary contributor
to such errors, with deficiencies in training and procedures being additional
factors. The effectiveness of voluntary industry efforts, coordinated
by the Institute for Nuclear Power. Operations, is being evaluated by the NRC
staff.,
1.3.3 Assessment
(1) Bypass Design Features
In most nuclear power plant designs, the bypass of safety-related equipment is
initiated by the plant operators from the control room,.or by plant service personnel
or instrument technicians from instrument or switchgear cabinets after
the bypass-has been approved by the control room operators. Before the bypass
is effected, procedures require that the operators verify the availability of
redundant safety equipment to ensure the bypass will not result in the loss of a
safety function. The bypass is typically accomplished by actuation of a bypass
or test switch. Operation of the switch will disable a portion of the safety
system, and will usually provide inputs to status monitoring points in the control
room such

Post

1993-09-13 – NRC – Chernobyl – Fire at Chernobyl Unit 2

,,; .. -.
UNITED STATES
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
OFFICE OF NUCLEAR REACTOR REGULATION
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20555
September 13, 1993
NRC INFORMATION NOTICE 93-71: FIRE AT CHERNOBYL UNIT 2
Addressees
All holders of operating licenses or construction permits ·for nuclear power
reactors.
Purpose
The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) is. issuing this information
notice to alert addressees to the fact that extensive fires may produce
unanticipated challenges such as happened at Unit 2 of the Chernobyl Nuclear
Power Station. It is expected that recipients will review the information for
·applicability to their facilities and consider actions, as appropriate, to
avoid similar problems. However, suggestions contained in this information
notice are not NRC requirements; therefore, no specific action or written
response is required.
Description of Circumstances
On October 11, 1991, Unit 2 of the Chernobyl Nuclear Power Station was
operating at 70-percent power. Each Chernobyl unit has two twin, independent
turbogenerators and all four units share a common turbine hall (see
Attachment 1). In order to perform minor repairs and adjustments on
turbogenerator 4 (TG-4), operators reduced Unit 2 reactor power and isolated
the steam supply to TG-4. At 7:46 p.m., the operators switched off the
generator excitation field and opened disconnect breakers 1, 2, and 3 in the
330 kV switchyard to electrically isolate TG-4.
At 8:10 p.m., TG-4 had coasted down to about 150 rpm when disconnect breaker 2
spuriously closed and reconnected TG-4 to the electrical grid. The generator
rotor motorized on the reverse-power condition and accelerated to synchronous
speed (3000 rpm) in under 30 seconds. The influx of current to TG-4
overheated the conductor elements and caused a rapid degradation of the
mechanical end joints of the rotor and excitation windings. A centrifugal
imbalance developed and damaged generator bearings 10 through 14 and the seal
oil system allowing hydrogen gas and seal oil to leak from the generator
enclosure. Electrical arcing and frictional heat ignited the leaking hydrogen
and seal oil creating hydrogen flames 8 meters [27 feet] high and dense smoke
which obstructed the visibility of plant personnel.
When the burning oil reached the busbar of the generator it caused a
three-phase 120,000 amp short circuit. Within 0.07 seconds, the generator
fault protective circuits sensed the short and opened disconnect breaker 2,
PDR 93-0/J
.~
/ ‘
IN 93-71
September 13, 1993
Page 2 of 3
which spuriously closed again 0.25 seconds later. The protection system
reopened the breaker 0.2 seconds after the closure and again the breaker
spuriously closed. Finally, protection circuits in the 330 kV electrical grid
disconnected the generator 0.27 seconds after the closure by opening a remote
breaker located in the town of Korosten, about 120 kilometers [72 miles] away.
Unit 2 control room operators shut down the reactor and initiated the maximum
allowable cooldown rate to achieve a safe reactor configuration.
Fire fighting efforts focused on containing the fire and preventing it from
spreading to adjacent equipment. There was little concern for·the turbine
hall roof catching fire because the asphalt coating on the roof had been
removed after the 1986 accident at Chernobyl Unit 4. However, the local
ventilation systems, which were the only method available for heat and smoke
removal, were unable to cope with the smoke and heat generated by the fire.
The fire brigade was concerned for the structural integrity of the roof
because the roof supports had no heat retardant coating and because sprinkler
systems in the turbine hall were not designed to cool the structural supports.
The fire brigade attempted to cool the supports by spraying them with water
from below but were unsuccessful because the plant fire pumps could not
provide adequate flow to the area sprinkler systems and the local
fire-fighting efforts at the same time. The metal trusses of the roof
structure reached a temperature greater than 900°C [1650°F] and collapsed at
8:35 p.m.
A 50 meter by 50 meter [165 feet by 165 feet] section of the roof collapsed
onto the turbine deck and also onto an adjacent pit that contained the main
feedwater pumps, the auxiliary feedwater pumps and their associated control
cabinets. Damage to the pump systems and a fire in one control cabinet
disrupted makeup water flow to the reactor cooling system. The operators cut
the electrical power to the pump motors and the control cabinets to remove
them as a potential ignition source. Because of the significant amount of
damage, the operators believed that the main feedwater and auxiliary feedwater
pumps could not be readily restored. Therefore, the operators added water to
the reactor primary coolant circuit by opening the steam relief valves to
reduce pressure and aligning a low-pressure nonsafety-grade condensate pump to
the auxiliary feedwater system piping. This arrangement made controlling the
steam separator drum water levels difficult but allowed the operators to
provide core cooling throughout the event. The fire was extinguished by
11:30 p.m.
Discussion
An investigation of the event later determined that a short circuit in the
control wiring for generator disconnect breaker 2 caused the repeated failures
of the breaker to remain open. This condition was critical because there was
no redundant on-site isolation breaker for the generator output such as is
included in the more recent design of Chernobyl Unit 3.
I
I
IN 93-71
September 13, 1993
Page 3 of 3
A notable safety significant aspect of the Chernobyl fire was the complete
loss of the main feedwater and auxiliary feedwater systems. Because redundant
safety components were not truly independent (i.e., there were no separate and
protected cubicles for the auxiliary feedwater pumps), a single structural
component failure led to the common failure of all feedwater pumps. The
proposed corrective actions include: (1) installation of three additional
emergency feed pumps outside of the turbine hall, (2) installation of an
automatic sprinkler system for the metal structure of the turbine hall and
roof, and (3) a review of the design of the smoke removal system in the
turbine hall and installation of a more effective system.
This event illustrates that extensive fires may place unanticipated loads on
fire protection systems and that structural failures could cause failures of
multiple trains of safety-related systems and challenge the true separation,
independence, and redundancy of safety-related components.
This information notice requires no specific action or written response. If
you have any questions about the information in this notice, please contact
the technical contact listed below or the appropriate Office of Nuclear
Reactor Regulation (NRR) project manager.
K. Grimes, Director
Division of Operating Reactor Support
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
Technical contact: Eric J. Benner, NRR
(301) 504-1171
Attachments:
1. Chernobyl Turbine Hall Layout
2. List of Recently Issued NRC Information Notices
)
Attachment 1
IN 93-71
September 13, 1993
CHERNOBYL TURBINE HALL LAYOUTPage 1 of 1
REACTOR
BUILDING
UNIT 1
D
UNIT3
• q I
.:.··uNJT 4
LJ
LJ
LJ /
ALJ .–i—+–TURBOGENERAT OR TG-4 ) I
~—-TURBINE HALL
Information
Notice No.
93-70
93-69
93-68
92-16,
Supp. 2
93-67
93-66
93-65
93-64
93-63
LIST OF RECENTLY ISSUED
NRC INFORMATION NOTICES
Subject
Degradation of Boraflex
Neutron Absorber Coupons
Radiography Events at
Operating Power Reactors
Failure of Pump Shaft
Coupling Caused by
Temper Embrittlement
during Manufacture
Loss of Flow from the
Residual Heat Removal
Pump during Refueling
Cavity Draindown
Bursting of High
Pressure Coolant
Injection Steam Line
Rupture Discs Injures
Plant Personnel
Switchover to Hot-Leg
Injection Following
A Loss-of-Coolant
Accident in Pressurized
Water Reactors
Reactor Trips Caused
by Breaker Testing
with Fault Protection
Bypassed
Periodic Testing and
Preventive Maintenance
of Molded Case Circuit
Breakers
Improper Use of Soluble
Weld Purge Dam Material
Date of
Issuance
09/10/93
09/02/93
09/01/93
08/23/93
08/16/93
08/16/93
08/13/93
08/12/93
08/11/93
OL = Operating License
CP = ~o~struction Permit
– ‘ ‘
·’
v
Attachment 2
IN 93-71
September 13, 1993
Page 1 of 1
Issued to
All holders of OLs or CPs
for nuclear power reactors.
All holders of OLs or CPs
for nuclear power reactors
and all radiography
licensees.
All holders of OLs or CPs
for nuclear power reactors.
All holders of OLs or CPs
for nuclear power reactors.
All holders of OLs or CPs
for nuclear power reactors.
All holders of OLs or CPs
for pressurized water
reactors.
All holders of OLs or CPs
for nuclear power reactors.
All holders of OLs or CPs
for nuclear power reactors.
All holders of Ols or CPs
for nuclear power reactors.
IN 93-71
September 13, 1993
Page 3 of 3
A notable safety significant aspect of the Chernobyl fire was the complete
loss of the main feedwater and auxiliary feedwater systems. Because redundant
safety components were not truly independent (i.e., there were no separate and
protected cubicles for the auxiliary feedwater pumps), a single structural
component failure led to the common failure of all feedwater pumps. The
proposed corrective actions include: (1) installation of three additional
emergency feed pumps outside of the turbine hall, (2) installation of an
automatic sprinkler system for the metal structure of the turbine hall and
roof, and (3) a review of the design of the smoke removal system in the
turbine hall and installation of a more effective system.
This event illustrates that extensive fires may place unanticipated loads on
fire protection systems and that structural failures could cause failures of
multiple trains of safety-related systems and challenge the true separation,
independence, and redundancy of safety-related components.
This information notice requires no specific action or written response. If
you have any questions about the information in this notice, please contact
the technical contact listed below or the appropriate Office of Nuclear
Reactor Regulation (NRR) project manager.
orig /s/1d by BKGrimes
Brian K. Grimes, Director
Division of Operating Reactor Support
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
Technical contact: Eric J. Benner, NRR
(301) 504-1171
Attachments:
1. Chernobyl Turbine Hall Layout
2. List of Recently Issued NRC Information Notices
* s ee previous concurrences
OFC OEAB:DORS SC/OEAB:DORS PUB:ADM SPLB:DSSA
NAME EBenner* EGoodwin* Tech Ed* CM for West*
DATE 05/13/93 05/19/93 05/13/93 08/25/93
OFC C SPLB:DSSA CEP:OIP C OEAB:DORS OGCB:DORS
NAME CMcCracken* JERamsey* AChaffee* JBirmin ham*
DATE 08/25/93 08/26/93 08/27/93 09/02/93
OFC C OGCB:DORS
NAME GMarcus*
DATE 09/02/93 09/ ~ /93
[OFFICIAL RECORD COPY]
DOCUMENT NAME: 93-71.IN
I
v IN 93-XX
September xx, 1993
Page 3 of 3
This information notice requires no specific action or written response. If
you have any questions about the information in this notice, please contact
the technical contact listed below or the appropriate Office of Nuclear
Reactor Regulation {NRR) project manager.
Brian K. Grimes, Director
Division of Operating Reactor Support
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
Technical contact: Eric J. Benner, NRR
(301) 504-1171
Attachments:
1. Chernobyl Turbine Hall Layout
2. List of Recently Issued NRC Information Notices
* See previous concurrences
OFC OEAB:DORS SC/OEAB:DORS PUB:ADM
NAME EBenner* EGoodwin* Tech Ed*
DATE 05/13/93 05/19/93 05/13/93
OFC C/SPLB:DSSA CEP:OIP C/OEAB:DORS
NAME CMcCracken* JERamsey* AChaffee*
DATE 08/25/93 08/26/93 08/27/93
OFC C/OGCB:DORS D/DORS
NAME GMarcus* BGrimes
DATE 09/02/93 I /93
./}-1~1 J
[OFFICIAL RECORD COPY]
DOCUMENT NAME: S:\DORS\CHERNOBL.JLB
SPLB:DSSA
CM for West*
08/25/93
OGCB:DORS
JBirmingham*
09/02/93
IN 93-XX
September xx, 1993
Page x of x
This information notice requires no specific action or written response. If
you have any questions about the information in this notice, please contact
the technical contact listed below or the appropriate Office of Nuclear
Reactor Regulation (NRR) project manager.
Brian K. Grimes, Director
Division of Operating Reactor Support
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
Technical contact: Eric J. Benner, NRR
(301) 504-1171
Attachments:
1. Chernobyl Turbine Hall Layout
2. List of Recently Issued NRC Information Notices
* See previous concurrences
OFC OEAB:DORS SC/OEAB:DORS PUB:ADM
NAME EBenner* EGoodwin* Tech Ed*
DATE 05/13/93 05/19/93 05/13/93
OFC C/SPLB:DSSA CEP:OIP C/OEAB:DORS
NAME CMcCracken* JERamsey* AChaffee*
DATE 08/25/93 08/26/93 08/27/93
OFC C/OGCB:DORS D/DORS
NAME GMarcus r:;+J-ff BGrimes
DATE 1I2./93 I /93
[OFFICIAL RECORD COPY]
DOCUMENT NAME: S:\DORS\CHERNOBL.JLB
SPLB:DSSA
CM for West*
08/25/93
OGCB:DORS
JLBirmingham
09/ /93
IN 93-XX
August xx, 1993
Page 3 of 3
structural component failures may cause failures of multiple trains of safety
related systems and may call into question the true separation, independence,
and redundancy of safety-related components.
This information notice requires no specific action or written response. If
you have any questions about the information in this notice, please contact
the technical contact listed below or the appropriate Office of Nuclear
Reactor Regulation (NRR) project manager.
Brian K. Grimes, Director
Division of Operating Reactor Support
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
Technical Contact: Eric J. Benner, NRR
(301) 504-1171
Attachments:
1. Chernobyl Turbine Hall Layout
2. List of Recently Issued NRC Information Notices
* See previous concurrences
OFC OEAB:DORS SC/OEAB:DORS PUB:ADM
NAME EBenner* EGoodwin* Tech Ed*
DATE 05/13/93 05/19/93 05/13/93
OFC C SPLB:DSSA
NAME CMcCracken*
DATE 08/25/93
OFC C/OGCB:DORS D/DORS
NAME GMarcus BGrimes
DATE I /93 I /93
[OFFICIAL RECORD COPY]
DOCUMENT NAME: G:\EJBl\CHERNOBY.IN
SPLB:DSSA
CM for West*
08/25/93
OGCB:DORS
93
IN 93-XX
June xx, 1993
Page 3 of 3
structural component failures may cause failures of multiple trains of safety
related systems and may call into question the true separation, independence,
and redundancy of safety-related components.
This information notice requires no specific action or written response. If
you have any questions about the information in this notice, please contact
the technical contact listed below or the appropriate Office of Nuclear
Reactor Regulation (NRR) project manager.
Brian K. Grimes, Director
Division of Operating Reactor Support
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
Technical Contact: Eric J. Benner, NRR
(301) 504-1171
Attachments:
XXXXXXXXXXXXXX, NRR
(301) 504-XXXX
1. Chernobyl Turbine Hall Layout
2. List of Recently Issued NRC Information Notices
* See previous concurrences
OFC OEAB:DORS SC OEAB:DORS PUB:ADM
NAME EBenner* EGoodwin* Tech Ed*
DATE 05 13 93 05 19 93 05 13 93

OFC C/SP(i:

Post

1987-01 – NRC – Report on the Accident at the Chernobyl Nuclear Power Station – ML071690245

Report on the AMcclint’ at the’
Chernobyl Nuclear PoWer. Station
0UE-1250
(TU.S.) Nuclear Regulatory .Comission
Washington, DC
Jan 87
.7 – 7.
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k ago”* * touinin
BIBL00RPHI DAASHEE NIJREG- 125-0
1. TITL. ANO S”TITLE I i
Report on’ th~e Acc’ident at the
Chernobyl Nuclear Power Statior I
I
3 LIAVI OL8%k
………….~……………………….. ______4 -.
January 198
a Dore “,P1UImO I
I AUT”0• IS
Multiple Authors
9 i MONT”
Januar
1.ya”
1987
Department of Energy -Inst., of Nuclea wr–,——– ….—- .—— Electric Power Research Institute V .. .ow M% Oft W-Pasi Environmental Protection Aoency
Federal Emergency Managemet, Agency. . – i—
Nuclear Regulatory Commission ._”_._
_ __•
U. S. Nuclear,, RegulatoryE c ot ssnion d.ed r i ilty A cy WashingtonD. C.ý “20555- ~ ~ ‘i’.
oSWO”P”A”N~T&ARN OTES
A5YRAC-I .,.ae
This report presebts the CoiAM~e .,finfogatias obtained by various organ- izations regarding the accideot (MWd -the comsq8*eces 04: the accident) that occurred ý.t uikt 4 of the-nuclear power station at Cberasbyl in the USSR on April 26. 1986. Each organistation baa indepeodently accepted responsibility for one or more chapters. thre various authors are identified in a footnote to each chapter. Chapter provides a8 overvieW of the rteprt. Very briefly the other chapters cover: desi f. teei l nuCclpetracr2 ,te Uiit 4; Chapter station 3, safety analyses for E3t.1 ; .Chaappttse r the accident scenario; Chapter 5, the role of tbhe operator; Chapter 6, a-a ssesneat of the rad.oactive release, dispersion, an tsanport;-Chaterd 7L,2 e a tiLes. associated with muergency actions; emid-Chte6-ifatiem t-e health and environmental consequences from the accident. ltes8e subject cover the major aspects of the a.ccident that have the pote• •il to’pcOet n;w sjnfe*Mation and less•os for the nuclearlindustry in seomral.et;Z
The task Of evaluatingft”_M ‘4igo~~u ta6 kaaiiw tedte -‘s
pursue according to the relevace ofmthe suJect to thei o ,. To..s findings will be Loased” qrtlb h emiatog~”~ The basic purpose of this report s -to pr•vide -the; afomettif ýo wb.kcn such 1ssfsnments can be ,.ade.
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1.
Chernobyl Accident, Russian Reactor, Severe Accident, Core Melt.,
Radioactive Release, Reactivity Accident, Graphite Fire, & Pressure Tube Reactor
OW044sw e”Aft”D, te•~aim $t*l
Unlimited
UnZcl assi fled
Unclassified
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-. : ; ” :aII– c u ~
.,,n7-‘Cernbvi uclar
dv t o
a9

Report on,&t Accid-ent C-htehv ~iNucdear~
PowerSS tation
SS
U.S. NUCLEAR
..REGULATORY
,COMMLSION
-‘,Prepared by:
ent ofý Energy
I’.. -Electric Power Research Institute
‘ :Environmental Protection Agency
Federol Emergency Management Agency
Institute of Nuclear Power Operations
Nuclear Regulatory Commission
-ABSTRACT
_This report presents the compilation of informatix-,* obtained by’ various organizations
regarding the accident (and the consequences of the accident) that
occurred at Unit 4 of the nuclear power station at CbernobyiL in the USSR on
April 26, 1986. Each organization Ls independentl7 accepted responsibility
for one or more chapters. -The various authors are identified in a footnote to
each chapter. Chapter 1 provides an overview of the report. Very briefly the
other chapters cover: Chapter 2, the design of the Chernobyl nuclear station
Unit,4; Chapter 3, safety Chapter 5, the role analyses for Unit 4; Chapter 4, the accident scenario; of the operator;Chap-ter6,.an assessment of the radioactive
release, dispersion, sandtruasport;-.Chapter 7, the activities associated with .emergency actions; and Chapter, infoat:ionm on the health and environmental
consequences from the accident ,•,••These subjects cover the major aspects of the
accident that have pthepont, -pew. information and lessons for the
nuclear industry ,in-.general’.
The task of evaluating .the iufomtion i-obtained in these various areas and the
assessment of the potential Aiplications bas been left to each organization to
pursue according to the relevance.of the subject to their organization. Those
findings will be issued separaLely by the cognizant organizations. The basic
purpose of this report is to provide the information upon which such assessments
can be made.
ttI
Pagte
Abstfract …………………………………………………… …. iii
Acknowledgments ……………………………………………….. ix
ýýater T:-;
IO verview …………………………………………………. 1-1
2 Plant Design ……………………. . . . . . 2-
2.1 Reactor, -Fuel,-a nd Fueling z.-achinei i’…. …4. …………… —
2.2 Fluid and Heat Transport ,Systems……………………….. 2-18
2.3 Reactor Physics …………………………………………. 2.24
2.4 Instrumentation ands.Control. ……………………… 2-27
2.5 ElectricalPower System…………………………….. .2-36
2.6 Safety Systems ……………….. ……………………… 2-37
2.7 Reactor Operations…………………………….*.. ….. :2-49
2.8 References ……… ……………………………. 2-51
3 Safety Analysis …………………….. …………………….. 3-1
3.1 Introduction………………………… *.. ……………. 3-1
3.2 Soviet Safety Analysis of the Chernobyl Unit 4 F.,.;actor ……. 3-3
3.3 Independent Safety. Review .. . 3-27
.3.4 References…………………………………………….. 3-53
4 Accident Scenario… ……. ……………. …………………… 4-1
4.1 0,verview… ; –. ;; . … …. . … -,.. . .. . . . . . . . . .
4.2 -Event.x1ed tbi h4eiAc•cdent.. . I …….. 4-2
4. 3 EZvents:Vurift.-sa*d Atr( thel-c~dde. ……………… …….. 49;
4.4 References ………. … . . …………………… 4-12
5 Role of Operating Personnel …….. ……………….. 5-1
5.1 Operator Actions and Plant Activities Before the Accident… 5-2
5.2 Immediate and Short-Tern Operator Actions ………………. 5-3
5.3 Sumary of Key Operational Events and Errors ……………. 5-6
5.4 Operator Actioms Following tha Accident ………………… 5-9
5.5 References …………………………… 5-10
6 Radionuclide Release and Ataospheric Dispersion arid Transport 6-1
6.1 Radionuclide Release …………………………………. 6-1
6.2 Atmospheric Dispersion and Transport ………… …………. 6-8
CO:TENTS (Continued)
Chapter f Page
6.3 Consistency of Soviet Estimates of Rad’.onuclide, Release
With Observed Data From Other Countries …………… …… . ,10
References…………6-12
7 Emergency Preparedness and Response…… …………………… 7-1
7.1 Emergency Plans. ……………………………… :7-1
7.2 Emergency Organization and Facilities ………………….. 7-6
7.3 Alert and Notification System ………………………… .7-7
7.4 Protective Actions Taken…….. ………………………. 7-8
7.5. Radiological Monitoringand Exposure Control,……… ……. 7-10
-76.- ‘.ed ical Treatment. …………….. 7-14
7.7. Soviet .,Guidance _,on.’Acep ble•-i vels. of Public
Radiation Eposure.. 4 .. v :. …………………………. 7-16
7.8 Decontandtio………………………..7-18
7.9 Site :Recovery. ….. . ……………………….
7.10 Relocation-and Xeienr (Off Site) …………………….. ‘7-21
7.11 Public.-EducAtionaadImoxmtion Prog•rams…..:. “. …..- §7-21
7.12 Training. rram………………………………………………… 7-22
7.13 Summary. . .. -. ……………………………. 724
7.14 R7.elf4eRreefrnecnceess .. …… …………………………………….. 772-27
8 Health and Environmental Consequences …………………. ……. 81
8.1 Pathways of hNmaaExposure ……………………………. 8-1
8.2 Health Effects …………………………………. 84
8.3 Radiological Effectsa on the Soviet Union ……………….. 8-6
8. 4 Radiological.Effects on turoFe Outside the Soviet Union ….. 8-11
8.5 Radiological Effects on the Umited Etates ………………. 8-14
88..76 Global Effects on Agricultwre and Food …………………. 8-24. .-.kological•Iffects,•, ,:……….. ……… ………………….. 816
8.8 References. ….. .. -…. *…* 8416
Figure Pg
2.1 Cross-sectional vievofR -000 ………………………….. 2-9
2.2 Fuel channel 2………………………………………………2.3 Zirconiui-to-stainless ‘steel transition Joint. ………………. 210
2.4 Assembly of graphite riags on pressure °ube and graphite block
cooling ………………………………….. …………..-……. 211
2.5 Cross-sectional view of reactor cavity……………………… 2-12
2.6 Cross-sectional view of reactor building elevation, Chernobyl
Units 3 and 4 ………………………….. 2-14
2.7 Layout of main building of Chernobyl Units 3 and 4 ………………… 2-15
2.8 Scbematic drawing of the 36-rod fuel element ………………… 2-17
2.9 Cross-sectional view of the fueling machine …………………. 2-19
2.10 Grab book of refueling machine …………………………….. 2-20
vi
‘A_,iý,COrflNTS. (Continued)
Figure Page
2.11 Normal and .emergency cooling system of the Chernobyl Unit 4
Leactor. …. ………I ……………………….. … ………. … 2-21
2.12 Schematic drawing of control rod cooling system …………….. 2-232
2.13 Gas circuit system ………………………………………. 2-24
2.14 Effect of reactor Operation on the coolant void, fuel
temperature, and moderator temperature reactivity coefficients… 2-27
2.15 Control rod design …………… ……….. i …………… 2-31
-2.16 Schematic drawing of fully withdrawn and fully inserted
control rods……… ………………………….. 2-32
12.17 Functional diagram of a*.control rod irlyc.. 2-35
of-the reactor:_.ergency. +cooling system…… …. 2-38
2.19 Schematic drawing of themsystem for discharging steam from
the main safety -valves inteo’tepreslure suppression pool of
the accident locAllitlastis .,ta , …………………. 2-41
2.20 Systep .o protect the eactor vault from excess pressure ……… 2-43
2.21 Schematic diagram of the accident localization system ……….. 2-45
2.22 Evolution of reactorparsmeters during startup ………………. 2-50
3.1 Nuclear safety regulatory bodies and docume-ts in the-USSR …….. 3-6 I
4.1 Chronology of the accident at the Chernobyl Nuclear Power
Station …………………………………………………. 4-3
4.2 Key reactor parameters for the last five.minutes before the
accident ……………………………………………… 4-6
4.3 Chernobyl data evaluation of power vs. time during core
destruction phase ……………………………………… . 4-. 10
4.4 Photographs of the residues from model fuel pins (SPXN rods)
nfter tests in the +CDC.,(capsule driver core) siz/.Iting power
.excursions fnr mre acuivity laseitio c.id……… …. 4-1
5.1 Schema tic diar O0……………….. 5-2
6.1 Daily radionuclide release In the ataoephfte from the – –
damaged unit ……. 6-3………………….
Table Z +e
2.1 Development of Soviet-graphbltmodarated, -water-cooled
reactors ………… ……………………….. ….. 2-2
2.2 Chernobyl Unit 4 design parameters ……… …………………. 2
2,3 Fuel assembly desigp parsmeters forCharnobyl Unit 4 …………. 2-18
2.4 Calculated reactivity coefficieuts for R …………………. 2-26 I 2.5 Types of :ontrol rods ….. … * ………. . …………………….. 2-29
2.6 Control rod specifications ………………………………… 2-32
4.1 Chronology of tbh accident at the Chernobyl Nuclear Power
Sta o …….. …………………………………………. 4-13
, •. .. •• ll l ~ eo le l le ll ll 1. ,. l ~ ~ l lll.l4 ~
CONTENTS (Co tined)
Table mage
5.1 Operator violations of ýprocedures ………………………… 5-8
6.1 Core inventories and total releases, at he time of the
Chernobyl accident ………………………………………… .6-2
6.2 Daily release of radioactive substances into the atmosphere
from the damaged unit……….. ,;•……………………………..6.
6.3 Radionuclide composition of release from the damaged unit of
Chernobyl Nuclear Power Station ……………………………. 6-6
6.4 Estimates of percent of core inventory released based on
measurements outside the Scviet Union… 6_12
7.1 griultralprouct in-_c’tepermitted: radioactive_
Contamination was-found-to beexceeded………………………… 7-13
•7.2 Levels of 1-131 in milk, Ny 196. ………………………… 7-13
7.3 Criteria for makig erProttaibn of thepopulation.. 7-17
:11 …..
f.
8.1 Radionuclide contributions- .to external dose based on
spectrometric measuraemntse lin southern-Finland on
May 6 and 7, 1986. …… ………………………………….
8.2 Radionuclide deposition in two U.S. areas ……………………
8.3 Maximum radiation levels found in Europe following the
accident, by country …………………………………….
8.4 Haximum individual doses tosgroups in the United States
due to exposures or-,intakes.,•n the first.year after the
accident ………………………………………………
8-2
8-3
8-12
8-15
– 1
The following individuals have :contributed substantially-in the production
of this report: From the U.S,. Department of Energy – S. Rosen, E. Purvis,
D.. -HcPherson, ‘F., -Tooper and their contractrs-,, otably PacifiNoirthwest .
Laboratories (J. McNeece and L. Dodd); from the. Environmental,.,Protection
Agency – S. Myers, D. Janes, J’. Puskin, C. Nelson, and*N. Nelson; from the Electric
Power Research Institute – G. Vine; from the Federal Emergency Hanagement
Agency – .- Sanders and V. Adler; from the Institute of Nuclear Power Generation
– W. Conway and S. Visner, and from the Nuclear Regulatory Commission –
Sheron, C. Allen, F. Congel, and S. Archarya…
the Nuclear ‘Regulatory Commission provided a cordinti ‘function, wih regard
to the production, of ,the repirt.. C. ‘Allen’fromthe IR¢acted “..manager as ther project for coordinating the production oftthe report.-‘The Nuclear Regulatory
Comission also provided substantial editorial (1. -arwell and staff), graphics
(J. Thot-Thombson-u •ai staff)’ :.:typig ý(L. ffcKenzie and word-processing staff),
and printing.(N. Dsgttdand staff) -services supporting the publication of this
report. . .
,Ix
CHAPTER 1
OVERVIEW
in response to the Chernobyl Nuclear Power Station acciden°. in April 1986, a
group comprised of representatives from the Federal Government and the nuclear
power industry met to compile factual data and information relevant to understanding
that accident. Specific organizations, as noted below, prepared descriptions
of the accident. The, individual inputs are herein compiled and
represent, therefore, the views of the responsible organization.
iThe effort drew heavily on th:ze sources during the preparation.ofits report.
The first: source is a report prepa’ed in the Soviet Union (USSR’ 11986); that was
presented to the Internatioral . ic Energy Agency (IAEA) at a meeting held
August 25-29, 1986, in Vienna, Austria (IALA Experts’ Meeting). The second
mzjor source of information came from discussions with Soviet representatives
attending the IAEA Experts’ Meeting in August 1986. The third major source is
a report prepared by the International Nuclear Safety Advisory Group (INSAG,
1986) for the Director General of IAEA (Post-Accident Review Meeting,’
August 30-September 5, 1986).
The focus of this report is limited to the factors bearing directly on the
accident at Chernobyl. It does not extend to all aspects of the design and
operation of the Chernobyl plant. As such, the report includes information
on the relevant areas of plant design, plant safety analysis, the accident
scenario, the role of operating personnel, radioactive releases, emergency
response, and health and environmental consequences..
Chapter 2 was prepared by the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE). It describes
the unique design of the Soviet high-power, graphite-moderated boiling-watercooled
reactor at the Chernobyl Nuclear Power Station. This uniquely Soviet
design evolved “rom early demonstration and plutonium production reactors.
General characteristics of the RM1 and its predecessors include the use of
graphite as a neutron moderator and light wate-r as the coolant. Pressure
tubes, contained in vertical channels in the graphite, either contain lowenriched
uranium oxide fuel or are used as locations for control rods and
instrumentation.
The use of boiling wser as a coolant ia a pressure-tube, graphite-moderated
reactor distinguishes the RBIK desiar, from any other reactor design. Other
distinguishing features of the RBHI design include:
• on-line refueling
* single uranium enrichment level
* separation of core cooling into independen. halves
* use of computerized control systems
• separate flow control for eac’ pressure tube
* positive void reactivity coefficients under most operating conditions
slow scram system
1-1
steam suppression ssystet .
programmed power .setbacks (rather than scrams) for various abnormal
clcoj•x aic to ooiolnas nt–.f'”u•*e+i+.•r at’•i o.: -.i.•”.-.
accidenL localization systems
%.hapter 3,-prepaied by the Blertric Power Research Institute (EPRI), is directed
at a safety ana•lysis .of…Chernobyl- _Unit4 one of 14 operating. RBMK-.1000 reactorplants.
Significant differences exist in RBMK-1000 designs, as they h:ve
evolved from the early Leningrad design (first-generat4in RBtK, eight tctal
units) to the more 2odern Smolensk design (second-generation RHBK, six total
units, including Chernobyl Units 3 and:4). ‘-This evolution of the RBHK design
is often difficult to-discern in Soviet literature, and details of the plantspecific
differences among the 14 plants are not available. However, descrip-
.. tive.material of second-generation RBK-lO00 reactors is more: complete:
especiaAlyass a .result -of information in-the Soviet :report… on .the-, act.ident,
(US,18),The *Afety analy*sis, in this- chapter ýsometimoes .%present 0scm
* ri…, enri aalsi fý _second-generation- PSNK-460 r’easc’tors.–here -known
differences exist betveen first- .and s&cond-generation reactors, a brief dis
cassion is included of teeff+ctsof thosedifferences o.2 the RNK safety
analysis, but ean. a”nlysis-oft,,e olde+:-d esin is not included in this report.
Since many of the- design feitures’unique to the second generation do not appear
to Lave been backfitted into .the,-first generation, the reader is:cautioned
against assuming that•safety capabilities discussed here apply to the eight.
older RBmK-1000 reactors.
Chapter 4 was prepared .by :the r.S..Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC). It
presents the. events leading to the accident at Chernobyl Unit 4 on April 26,
1956. The events are detailel-in narrative form and are summarized in
Table 4.1. The.accident-.chronology.includes relevant information on several
aspects of tae plant design characteristics and operation and includes the
operator and procedural errorsethat contributed to the accident. These factors
were important in the.sequence of-events that. ultimately resulted in an uncontroll(
d power excursion that destroyed the reactor and breached the integrity
of the reactor buildine. -he-fociuns -t he chapter is on the response of the
syslte to the ai’rJus mats. zts Upotln used in reconstructing the sequence
of events was 9 Of mry reports cn the Chernobyl accident
prepsreA by the WI 3`ttitta OR the U1tilization of Atomic Energy (USSR,
1986) and the Intermatio”mLl,_1earSafety Advisory Group (INSAG, 1986).
Chapter 5, prepared by .t.be_.titute for Nuclear Power Operations (INPO), explores
the role of operatitS.personnel at Chernobyl Unit 4. During the performance
of a turbineVgnerator test eo April 26, 1986, Chernobyl ‘iit 4
experienced a core-damagin&gaccident._- A severe excursion was accompanied by a
pressure surge and fire that..destroyed the reactor and breached the surrounding
building. The test procedures had not bean adequately reviewed from a safety
stanepoint. Nanagenrat control of the performance of the test was not maintained;
thebtest.procedure was not followed;-safety systems were bypassed; and
control rods were misoperated. Operators lost control of the reactor during
the performance of the test. Chapter 5 focuses on the operator actions during
the event and on the breakdowns to management/administrst.ve controls.
I:
[
.4
~-C-,
Chapter 6 wps prepared by the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NC). It has
as Its firet topic the magnitudes and timing characteristics of release of radlonuclides
iron the Chernobyl Unit 4 plant. Its second topic is the atmospheric
1-2
. dispersion and transport, of th r-released radionucl ides-.reult.inginenviron
mental contaminatin within nd- Outside- of the Soviet geographic bundary,
-Radionuclide release -ana.aitmospheric -dispersion adtriansport fro”m’• C•eribl as
described in Chapter tare derived from the i&formation contained primarily :in:
the two reports cited.(INSAG -1986; SSR, 1986). –T-he last section:of Charter 6_
offers a short discussion on ctousistency of the estimates of the radionuclide
release providedin- the Soviet-, xr t-,with.the observeddats from-:-
side the Soviet boundary. osvd. forin o.t_
Chapter 7, prepared by the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEHA), documents
the av.ilable offuite- and 0nsite emergency plans and preparednessmeasures
that were in place for the Chercobyl-nuclear facility. also0 Ite scribes
the Soviet response to the accident, and relates it, where feasible, to the
-preaccdent-emergency planning and preparedness activities. Where: known,
.eme~rgency .response .orga’iizations re identified and their.. .r oles,a re’ described.
._The a~lert and. notif icatilon _4yste sd by theSvesi aaned The po
ýýtective actions-take byl thAve r ls ecied, incuing’evacUation,-
sheltering, use of radioprotective drugs., and medical arrangements.. -PYinally,
Soviet information -pertinent •todecontmntion, relocation, .and re-entry is
documented.
Chapter 8 was prepared: bytheEnvir’omntal Protection Agency `(EPA). It.examines
the radiological, health and environmental consequence” associated with the
Chernobyl accident. “adiation doses and their reported or calculated health .7.1 effects are discussed for populations at the site, within 30 km (18.6 mi) of
the site, in the balance of the European Soviet Union, in other European countries,
ano in the United States. Because of limitations in the exposure data, however, most of these estimates must be regirded as tentative.
Data for the Soviet Union were -drawn chiefly from the Soviet report to the IA-.
(USSR, 1986). Estimates for other. European countries were based largely on
information reported by the World -Health Organization (WHO, 1986a and 1986b)
and individual European governmental agencies. For the United States, measuremerts
made by or reported to EPA were ..employed.
References
INSAG, 1986 International Nuclear Safety Advisory Group, “Summary Report on
:the Post-Accident •Review. Meeting on the Cherrobyl Accident,”
August 30-September 5,. 1956, GLC(SPL.I)/3, IAEA, Vienna,
September 24, 1986.
USSR, 1986 USSR State-Committee on the Utilization of Atomic Energy, “The
Accident at tte Chernobyl .Nuclear Power Plant and Its Consequences,”
Information compiled for the lAEA Experts’ Meeting,
August 25-29, 1286, Vienna;’ 1986.
WHO, 1986a World Health Organizetionj Regional Office for Europe, “Summary
Review of Measurement Results Relevant for Dose Assessment,”
Update Revision No. 7, Copenhagen, June 12, 1986.
1-3
WHO, 1986b World .H~ealth.O rganizatin 1eOifofi cE frErpe Smr
Report of Workin.g Groupo !”6iAssessment of Radiati6n- Dose Cmi’t-.
mentei E7u rope D9,.; ote ahern, byA ccident, Bilth.”ven,
June:!ý 25-2, 1986, Copenhagen, Septemiber. 8, 1986.
1 5
SCHIAP:E’ 2R
-‘?LPANT DESIGN
The Soviet high-power, -esuei-eitbo r (Soviet designation: • )BIiKs ) a
graphite-moderated, ýboiling-water-cooled ..reactor. -,This unique design, which
has been constructed only:in’ the ,tSoviet Union, evolved from early demonstration
and plutonium production reactors General characteristics of the RBIK and its
predecessors include the use of’ granphite as a ne•-. rir uioderator and light water
as the coolant. Pressure tubes, contained in vertical channels in the graphite,
either contain low-.enriched uranium oxide fuel or are used-as locations for
control rods ani iastkrentation.
•The.: use.! of boili$ngwater• •as a coolant i•n iapressurerttube- giraphit&m.derated
*”reactor distinguishes i~the design from any other reactor design. Other distinguishing
featiures-.ofthef ý R deajwg include
* on-line refuel.ing.
* single uranium enrich tlevel
• separation Of corecoling into in endent halves
* use of computeri-ed control ..systems
separate flow control-for each pressure tube
positive void reactivity coefficients under most operating conditions
* slow scram system
* steam suppression. system
* programied power setbacks,(rather thaný,acrams) for various abnormal
conditions
low coolant-to-fuel ratio
accident lccalizatioa .syste”s
These features are described An detail-1ater in this chapter.
The Soviet ,nuclear;;og m arch ‘sa,dd eelc ment .onse0eral
types of reactors 1Wd thecostruction4ad• operaition of
various prototypes.i tihde- ;l96Oa, -t-he Soviets decided to develop two types
uf power reactors: thbe VVXl.:(pressurized-water reactors) and the IBlKa
(boilins-water reactors).
The evolution of the general design parameters related to Soviet graphitemoderated,
water-cooled -reactors s-ýpresented in Table 2.1 (SMenov, 1983;
Rlimov, 1975). The units at thetiberim Atomic Power Station were built as
dual-purpose reactors .:(J•iv, 1975).to produce both plutonium and electricity.
The Beloyarsk reactors are demonstration plants and are unique because they
superheat the steam in the reactor-. core.__,
S. Rosen, 1. Purvis, D. McPherson, and F. Tooper of the U.S. Department of
Energy (DOE) and DOE contractors, notably Pacific Northwest Laborstorief
(J. ;Neecre and L. Dodd) cqpiled this chapter.
2-1
Table 2. 1 Development of Soviet graphite-moderated, wuter-cowoled reactors
Item
Year of operation
•lectrical capacity (mle)
Thermal capacity (“WtO
Nmber of fuel channels
(equilibrium loading)
Ymber of stem superheat
chaunels
, S(ateta.m) prelsure at tumbise
Stem teortUre (0C)
Total uranium loading
(tonne)
Average’ enrichment (%)
Burnup (“WARg)
Specific power (kl/kg)
Fuel cladding material
Obainsk
1954
5
3.0
Ii.
54.6
Stainle~ss
s’t•.e
SAPS*
1958
>100
Peloyarsk-l
1964
100
286
0
998
268
87
500
Beloyarsk-2
1967
200
‘530
998
.266
87
560
48
3.0
14’.6
16.7 •
Stainlesse
steel
Chernobyl-4
1983
1000
3140
1661
0.i”..
BMKs
Ignalina-1
1984
1500
0
4.3
Aluminum
67
1.8
4.0
11.3
Stainless
steel
65
280
189
2.0
22.3
25.4
Zirconium
1% niobium
65,
280″
19
2.0.
21.6
Zirconium
1% niobium
*Siberian Atomic Power
generators.
Station – SZx identical units using double coolait circuits with steam
I
TAhtec jifci rsPto wReBr HKSt awtaiso na lO•” O.O–tHWhCeh erplnaenbty.lb rUoungijt ht4 roena. clitoner – iiin .c1 o97n3s idaetr,e tdh e,a Lseeci•ognrd-ad
generation plant because, etdhees ign includes a number of safety features- not
present in Leningra•dU nit. –
At the time of the accident,:-•1 RBMK- 000- ractors were In operation adi.d. ition
to a 1500-NWe REII. plantoperatingat. Ignalins (Table 2.1). The M ” 1500
design differs little tra•uM t-e1 000-design. The, cores are, :essentially
identical. ‘,ýP]ahs:e:esLx ias -t: to !butilXd eeven larger plants vith electrical capacities
as large as 2400 lIe.
The Soviets had seve reasons -for pursuing the RBWK design. Theýe reasons
included .(Semenov ‘1983)
an extensive engineering experience base with graphite-moderated, boiling- X
water-.cooled-reactors .
* ,existing, madufatua g lants’ coud’.fabricate -major.ccI o nets
the reactor sizeoii liktedibi c•o nsiderations related to fabrication,
transportati, or.insa•tion, of. co• nents
a serious loss-of-coolant accident larger than that considered as design
basis thought tobe .virtully.ibpossible because of the use of numerous
pressure tubes .rather than a single pressure vessel
• very efficient fuel use
• use of online refueling could achieve a very high plant capacity factor
The Soviets considered-the MW to ýbe their “national” reactor and showed con.
siderable pride in thedevelopment of the design. A number of design issues
were identified by the Soviets and. addressed in newer designs. Economies of
scale, control, and safety vre ,three such issues:
• Economies of cae..• ,he .economica were -recognized to improve substantially
by going to -ger desips. Asae t, one 1500-1BWe RBM iswcurrently
operating aa-.ye-mg 4W in construction.-“”,Plans -exist for ”
plants as large as -2400 MIe.
Control: The 83IS-1000 -was recognized to have stability problems and was
difficult to-control, particularly at low power levels. The approach to
resolving these problems was to place increased rel.iance on automatic control
systeas and adopt a-slightly higher fuel enrichment and slightly
lower graphite moderator density in order to decrease the positive void
coefficient..
Safety: The Soviets. re-evaluated the safety systems of their reactors.
– As a result, later -3J -desigpns, incliding Chernobyl Unit 4, incorporated
improvements in emergency core cooling systems and steam suppression pools.
A summary of the key design p4rameters of the Chernobyl Unit 4 reactor is liven
in Ta,’1r 7.2 (USSR, 1986).
2-3
Table. 22 hernobyl — 7t design parameters
I tern -D ecript Ion
General Design Characteristics
Reactor type ‘ Vertical pressure tube, boiling water,
moderated
Refueling .. On-line
Design power generation. .W 3200
Total reactor coolant flowrate 37,600 tonnes/hr (23,026 lbm/sec)
Core Description
Core- dimensions (active .”zone).
Height 1 0 A (23. 0 ft)
Diameter .- 11.8. “(38.7 ft)
Volume 7ý5•0O: 4 (20,655 ft3)
Total number of fuel channels 1661
Lattice spacing 25 cm z 25 cm (9.8 in. x 9.8 in.)
Moderator material Graphite
Maximum allowable measured -7500C (1382°V)
temperature
Material density 2./6cii•-s (103 lb/ft3)
Reflector.ý dOmentonai -.
Top and bottom .84 a (1 -,64f t)
Sides 0-OA.8 8 (2.89 ft)
Graphite core weight 1700 tonnes (3.74 x 106 lb)
“-6s
J-a
Q4
g-A
Fuel Description
Design
Uranium aterial
Cladding material
Enrichment
-Two 18-rod elements connected in series
U 2
Zr-li Wb
2.0 vt% V-235
2-4
Table 2.21 (Continued)
DeesItcermip tion
Fuel Description (Conti.ý.d-)
Fuel A8 ssembly” eSieolnt ent -‘,6.9 * (22.61 ft0
Maximum cladding temperature 3230C (613 0 F).
Maximum fuel. temperature -2100*C (3812*F)
Total uranium weight 140 tonnes -(418,500 lb.)
-`-Maximm fuel exposure 2. iDk
Wate , R ecirculartion System,
System material Abstenitic stainless steel
Independent flow loops 2
Steam drums -. , total, 2.per loop
Pumps 8 total, 6 normally operating
Pump dynamic head 1.96 HPa (284 psi)
Net positive suction head – .6 lia (87 psi)
Main pump suction anddischarse -90 co (35.4 in.)
header diameters
Main pump capacity 5500 to 12,000.1 3 /hr
(24,200to 52,100 Via)
Dirensions of indivi&dsua-l pres sure 5.7 z 0.35 cm (2.2 x 0.14 in.)
tube inlet piping (010:z vall)
Dimensions of individual pressure 7.6 x 0.4 cm (3.0 x 0.16 in.)
tube outlet piping (OD z wall)
Fuel Channel
Number . 1661
Pressure tube diameter (0D) 1.8 ecm (3.46 in.)
Pressure tube wall thickness 0.4 cm (0.158 in.)
Materidl Zr-2.5% Kb
Connection Diffusion welded Zr to stainless steel
joint in core sone
T,4’~
* .- AR
M,
* ~ 4 ‘g
2-5
-1T-ah annel2le. (Continued
• I em-,.,.,• ,.,:.,•.-,_.•;:• ….. ,• …. D]escription.. .
Fuel Channels (Continued)
Individual channeljflov – Manually-#adnjtursotel d regulatng”valve,
Inlet temperature -270°C?(518°F)
Ou-;ýet temperature (avg. 28140C f(5430F3
Operating pressure .- 6.8 HPa (986 psig)
-Quality , – . 4. ,(average steam), 20. mxmm
Average tube power– 1890 kWt
Axial peak/avg.. powerratio1 40
Radial peak/avg. power -ratio .48
Steam Secondary System,
Steam collector yPdsmyssr tem steam drum separators
Number of collectors 4 total, 2 per loop
Collector (ID x lengt.),. .. 2.6 30.984 m (8.5 x 101.7 ft)
Steam flow rate (total) _5800 MT/hr (3552 lbe/sec)
Power generation 1000 Ee (two 500-EWe turbine
g eritors)
Beat rejection. ,wit o atsrý eservotr :(condenser)
generators
. .
Feedwater inlet temperatmre toi_-steas ‘•1-656C A3290F)
separators •”
Control Shutdown and .$fety q hutdown
syste’
-Type
3
4
eets *Acssed is alumintm,
Number of control shutdown assesblite
Neutron absorption materiel
Control rid spacing
ýIoweroid• and retrieved from ab~ove Dy a
belt .6able and motorized drum
211
34 C
500 m x 500 m (19.7 in. x 19.7 in.)
2-6
STable 2.2, (Continued)
Item Description
0ontrol Shutdown` an4Sfety- Shutdown
S- s em (Continued) .,-
Control rod tiravel, 6.425maf (20.5
rod-4.5m
ro-0Om
4..
-~
‘~-
55 4.-
* 452 -~ S -s>-‘ 55.S~
4
(14.8 ft) and axial control
(23f)
L0011U• 0etnoa 5_ernarate.e
do~wnvarf
Contrrod u~ltrertimm time 20seicond,
9O2t reactivity. Insertion timle , 0secod
Owe Epre ssure Control. &ate
Type Partial 4sti
ster-cooling syistem with
low ‘in iAndividual chnnlso
a Ahr (15Yt ~ tlr
Z
san suppfression of releases
Enclosure
Function
Design press
Operationandthe
reactrs cavity, ilet.pipin
-Reactor core inlet and piping system
-C-ten steamtr from piping break or
steam separator relief valves
ure rUclosure areasdesigned for either
0.-4S MPa (65 psig) or 0.18 HPa
(26ipsig) beko. ta
…….. •:..•. …•,•.,••; • ter- from pip• resko~tn••….. ….
740 epastor relief ‘-vale irectdo
– – ,t&6dinwg ater in bubbler pond below
” .a•Csctor. Water spray above bubbler
Pond helps condensation process.
2.1 Reactor, fuel., a uua chine
2.1.1 Iighlights
Chernobyl Unit 4 is-!& 1000-,e, vertical pressure tube, boilini-water reactor
that uses online refueling. Tbe core and reflector are in a cylindrical
graphite stack witb a diameter of 13.56 m and a height of 8 a. The reactor is,
penetrated by about 2000 channels that provide locations for fuel, control rods,
and instrumentation. The fuel is 2% enriched uranium oxide clad with zirconium
containing 17 niobium (Zr-lI b). Fuel elements are constructed in 18-element
clusters connected to a ceatral support tube. There are two subassembly
clusters approximately 3.5 w (11.5 it) long in each fueled pressure tube. The
2-7
fueling machine is. a massive piece of e u “ipmentt hat operates over the reactor
operating• ‘floor and’ is’Ides-igned tfolad ful while the reactor is at full poer.- –
2.1-.2 Reactor (Dollethal 1980b usS 1986)
Chernobyl Unit 4 is ‘aI’1000-We, vverticl•. pressure-tube, boiling-water reactor
that uses online reiueling. -The plant contains two independent primary.,, recir- culation coolnt loops-tr•t{ . ere separae h&lves of the reactoar. Figure 2.1
shows a schematic cross-section of the Leningrad first-generation RBIMK-1000,
which is representative: f -Chernobyl Unit 4. Each loop has four primary
recirculation pumps (with three -functioning under normal operating conditions)
and two steam separators..
The primary coolant from these pumps discharges to a common header to.-which:. 22 group distributi1on`,ihe aders are'” c”onnected., Supply lines for individuAl.ýprei6sure -tubes originate at onaeneheduply line. containmsaanu•a llyoperat
flow-regulatings” valve andilov melter. The ‘coo-lant is..dirce upte16 ue!’
channhels pa st -the “fuelasmle (see FIigure’ 2.2). T he JinlIe’t water reaches the saturation temperatureit-a-bout one-third-of the-length of the fuel.element. Nucleate boiling occurs– ove zrte idif -the fuel length.
The pressure tubes in the ýcore sare made of z=irconium containing 2.5% niobium.
The Zr-2.5% Nb is diffusion -weldedto.stainless steel piping by heating it -to
600°C under a vacum ý(see Figure 2.3) .-The joints are constructed- separately
and joined to the tube- 8ass8 ly before installation. The top and bottom transition
joints are located immediately above and below the graphite reflector.
A permissible rate of heating and cooling of 10 to 15°C per hour has been
established on the basis of thermal and strength tests.
.Chernobyl Unit 4 has 211 cont.rol dishutdown rods. The rods are functionslly ” divided into manual control rads,”automatic control rods, emergency power reduc- tion or scram rods sho~ bsorbi g rods, and compensating rods.
The 1700-tonne graphite moderator-is stacked in the shape of a vertical cylinder 11.8 m (38.7 ft). in diameter and 77″ (23 ft) high. -Each column is composed of 25 cm z 25 tm (9.inz9. laa.) apbitebloc Teuiblcks are60
(23.*6 in)high, -anid b,iki 4bU1edo sat. Latalled An the-SO-cu (19.7-in. top -and- bottom reflectors a toa rai 1foter skheightof800 i(26 -2 The outer side reflector a ft). ” 088 (.9 1t) .t1h. ick, making a total stack diameter of 13.6 m (44.5 ft). The :aide reflector graphite columns are pinneo with cooled steel tubes to enhance rigidity and provide reflector cooling. The -moderator and reflector -columns are-capped• n both top and bottom with a thermal shield. The top caps are steel-blocks 250 ‘ (9.84 in.) thick and the bottom caps are also steel but 200 ‘-m (7-87 4a.) thick.
A gas mixture, nominally 80% helium and 201 nitrogen, is fed into a chamber below the reactor where it is distributed across the bottom face of the reactor. The gas mixture flows between the graphite columns, providing a heat-conducting medium for transmitting the graphite heat to the coolant channels. The space between the tubes in the channels is fitted with graphite rings, which are fitted alternately to the tube and graphite chanoel opening (see Figure 2.4). During reactor startup operations a pure nitrogen cover it used. The graphite temperature can reach 7500C (13820F) under these conditions. The gas mixture is monitored for moisture to detect leaka&e from the tubes.
2-8
I
Figare, 2.1 Cross-Aectional iie’w of RIMAtA
~ 7~p11
I
* 4h
~’1
C4
ap
lN
I –
P:
V
2-10
I
Centerline
)662*Fl
)I f6OSIF)
,o(590*F)
284*C
1543*Fl
‘Pressute Tube
0 4 6Sm n0. )
cm (3 46 re
n13 68efin
V… … …… .
• i~• .•
Figure 2.4 Assembly of graphite
rings on pressure tube and
graphite block cooling
2.1.2.1 Reactor Core, Reactor Cavity and Vessel (Dollezhal, 1980a, b;
Dubrovsky, 1981; Dollezbal, 1q77; .USSR-, 1986)
A-cross-section of the reactor ccre,
The reactor ic located in a cavity 2K
(7! ft x 71 ft x 84 ft). The reactoc
cylindrical vessel forr.ed by a 14.:-,:.
steel shell. This shell is bou”dcl
biological shields. The shell, Lop’,
shields, forms the closed reactor si,
:vy.-nd vessel is shown in Figure 2.5.
x 21.6 m long x 25.5 a deep
ILe core is located in a sealed
(47.6-ft) x 9.75-m high (32-ft)
and bottom by upper and lower
the top and bottom biological
The 16-mr (0.63-in.) thick reactor v(. servee sairly as a gas barrier and
structural restraint for the graphite. reactor vessel contains the circulating
helium-nitrogeu atmosphere for L’. graphite moderator at a pressure of
about 0.0015 KPa (0.22 ps•g). The spat outside the reactor vessel is filled
with nitrogen at a pressure of’0.0017 MI’a (0.25 psig), which is greater than
the oressure in tCe reactor vessel.
‘e
U
Wtided
Tube Ducts
UBP i.opleorgical .. … < :, ':. .. Rollersf Graphite Reactor Vessel Nitrogen Annular Wiwe Tank . -Lower J Shwid -Sourp port ~8l1 t) in dia """ ided to a Irical tube grate. The er1 to ical sbioedrive -. 79 7 Pre. su. Boun.ar,.!. Figue 2.5iCt~as~ct!fioi_*tl i.,<.f -reactor cavity 2.1.2.2 Upper and Lover.Shield vand eactor Suppott (Dubrovsky, HS Dollezhal, 1977; Dollehal, l:980b• USSR, 1986) The upper biological shield is a.cylindrical shell about 17 a (56 1 meter and 3 a (10 it) thick. -It consists of two circular plates ie cylindrical outer shell. :Additional strength Is provided by vertic ing ribF. 0peninsP for Lhe pressure tubes consist of welded cylind ducts. The space between the ducts is filled with serpentine sggre entire assembly, whichiweijhi '1000 tonii(2.24O05 lb), retts onto accommodate thermal expansion. Xs addition to providing for bioloi ins, it also supports the weight of the fuel channels, control rod channels, the upper reactor outlet piping, and, tioe removable fl.vr covering. The lower biolotiral shield is 14.5 m (48 it) to dism'ter sod 2 m (6.5 ft) thirk. It is similar tn construction to the upprr binollfcal thield. This 2-12 shield- transmits' theis.d'; the, graphite Anil" lower pipin$- toý the main reacto'r su~pport immediately,, under it. The main reactor support 4s made ot two steel platsi stiffening ri o.3 " Theflorse~s S •0•h•s,81dto6g~b ''l~d plate wi sthe f enriegr. 's- 5.3 ' (17 ft) high placedperpendicular to each other (cruciform, shape). This sWupport transduits the, weight of the lover shield and threi eol r to thelding foundation. 2.1.2 3 Uipper Flo Sa (urovaky,18;Dleza,18 USR 1986) The floor of the reactor haila-cotrteofremovable eCti'ons tfr. e allow, access to the fuelnchanes;t io-!r6--m-iit .iieoiedansd, controdsl r drives. The floor set..ves as she aAnbdo i(o logiinl.aJ barrierk. 1The re.- movable sections are made of steel, structnres filled with iron-bariumt-serpfentine concrete and rest onpthe -et% s -nel du biologicaldsh ield. r' is extracted from th 6ý reacto§ th5q~n hgp ntefoo opoiefrc ing inle theh firoe r,. t. prvd 'end to preventsthTpossbnterintiv ste building;iym nein h eco 2.1.2.4 Sidet io icat d--198; SolleS9h al, 90,b USSR 1986) 'double-walled vess(eDl , 66 m( )nside d4iaimeter (l ) -zh 19.0, (62ik t outside diameter (OD) su obste reactor' edvessel inside the reactor'cavity. The vessel consists of-16 wa ter-fied compartments and prov des shielding in the lateral direction. I-c e V,e ssel Wlls ,are 30m (02 in.) theTichek . space between the water-filled-shield and the walls of the reactor cavitytis fill8d with sand. The space between the water-filled shield and the reactor vessel is filled with nitrogen. 2.1.2.5 Reactor Cavt li-s (brovaky, 191 USSR 198) The reactor cavity walls are msde offte force concrete 2 a (6.5 ft) thick. 2.1.3 Reactor Nall .(Dubrovid 11 'hielifa- 1981; Dollezhal,.. .198c,: eý.; Usike 1984; USSR-,,18)>K~;i
‘A cross-section of b .ild 8pet fuel d4toL sh esh oonl ns Figure 2.6. A
plan view of-Units 3 and 4 asonA iue2.7.
26 hall (the the reAlddtrnega ctor -caoveear, bofo vth e reactor) is a
lUrge open workspace containing the refueling machine and an upper, higbh-ay
area with a 50-tonne-capacity overead travelint crane. The refuelin& machine.
which weighs about 350 -tounmesq,1,_m Fo1na e on a traveling bridge. The inside
dimensions of the reactor -ball ýare about 24 a -wtde x 80 a lons a 35 a high
(79 ft x 262 ft- z 125 ft). -Th1e lever bay As- constricted of reinforced concrete
&and has, walls about 1.3 a (5 ft) thick. T1he massive walls and columns support
the fueling machine and provide shielding- -for the ate&* separators- located
adjacent to the reactor hall. A–s pent fuel storage pool, 1,9 located in each
reactor ball. The bigh-bay portion of the reactor hall is of steel frame
construction using precaat concrete panel sheathing for the walls. Tbe reactor
hall roof, atop the high bay, is supported by steel trusses about 6 m (20 ft)
deep. The mass of a preassembled roof block is 50 tonnes. The reactor has
four roof block&, and each block is 20 a x 24 • x 6 a (66 ft x 79 ft x 20 ft).
2-13
as
tg-vmfFmuw 2. 12’20t ins auln aw. 3 l metaw wUm-S3mWsuu-wst6n.WICn4m wO-Adma o~ 1 ~ ‘west. S. 0.u~ 5 60 104 -mi-edti-m-lfige tane: 10 -Main citculatng-YMn II Elgetrc temok in cwlculoftlpump.; 12, OniinSepaf sta. 3W. *at e.sp omulswd 8si9wedts=s:qwija 14 m-hnim IS5 tfen SMK1tO00OMec-s, 6S-. AcII cottdmi~nmet avsO9. 17- Sut1s pnD.A 0%”e ýs* Mgw eir Coeilali i6 1ws w 2 om;2beard w.h~o oalns 2Eaas ~mato latlcaens 3 Pau
Figure 2.6: Ckroe-sectional view of
,,Chernobyl Units 3’and 4.
ieaftorý buildingelevation,
” .4
2~
– ~ I ~4WA Ii ,
51 1 .~1wA
hit taxWis
Figure 2.7 Layout fi nbil OfCherobyl Units 3 and 4
.So•~c •~Dubrovsky, 11981, p. 95.
21.4 -Reactor- Building and Turbine Generator aill (Dubrovsky, 1981; Konviz,
1981; USSR, 1986)
rk~e• overal-l-dimensi~ons”-of be-ctoruild~~tins, not including the turbine
generator hall and conneLting mounting fframe, are about 72 m wvde x 160 m long
x 50 a high (236 ft x 525 -ft., ••164 ft) (see. Figure 2.6). The distance fromground
elevation to the top oftei ghb ay-is 71 a (233 ft). The reactors are
Separated by a wall and shared ventilation .systems. A ventilation stack is
mounted between the- two units drectly above the ý-enera1 –ventilation equipment.
Mke control rooms of’ýC& 1ro~ 3nt r eaaeylctdiSdg@ 41d e
Large room.
rhe ‘reactor building is enelly -constracted. of veintorced co:•crete, most of
ihich is precast, but thick walls o10aer: 70 cm (2.3 ft)] are bi t by the
3recast cast in situ” -metbod usiagprefabricated reinforred forr. panels.
Aore than 200,000 m2 (2 million ft’) of building surface on each power unit
As a special protective coveritg stated• to be polyethylene, presumably for
!ase of surface decontamination. *
turbine generator hall, about Wec wide x 400 a long x 30 a high (167 ft x
312 ft x 98 ft), adjoins the reactor building. The saace between the turbine
Square brackets denote information believed to be ty.je but not found in Soviet
2-15
generator hall and’the reactor buatiding is oiccupied . an intermedie bul ing.
Theuperflor floor. are ae ccpied-b y d&-arator and f pipe aisleý, and- ihe lower occupie by a ‘,entral control. board, unit control ba-ds h .. switchgear, stor age an f.sth elveel.e,c t ricale +u.ii.smeent –
21.5 Fuel Assemblyo esign (Dollezhal’, UWS9R81 ; 96
The fuel assembly onits of, two circular.lb-rod clusters, connected by at cen- +. l r r o d . • E a ch ,4 “: -i-ý+” ” • • , .. .. .dt •f+- . + – :••. . . – . . . . – . . . . . .: .. ..+. l r fEt ) c n adConsists ring of 6 rods and of an inner. an-outer rino~f12 rods,held by: stainless steel spacer grids and 2 end plates. Th ulrd r opsed ofcldigtbs(rl ) containing sintered aium ozd pellets. ‘The central rod is made of Zr-2.5•, . Nb. A schematic dawn oth asebysshowninFgr2..Dtlso the design are given in Tablea, 2.3……..
21.6 Fueling
.achine
(Dollethal, c, Sb, 1986)
The refueling aystem-includes.. a-W @’tlune cran t at spans .the re ctor area; a
carriage tht opeaes along the crane;-ils; and the refueling mchine, which Is held by the carriaie-.-V is by~ th~ ca~ri ag ~ h(Felg 1 r i-•.•••….::..- :-. _i c (770,0_0 . Tbe ) h hole assembly weighs about 35ý0 tonne fuel channels and positioned over any of the 1661 over,: th . t g aa. T .n .machineisdsned to refuel five fuel channels: dui .a .24-oi o l at l … re…f. ulin is,ý&….a… o-ed’ atprmgi~- The refueli d-l -. .. system is designed-toefuel -lte ast period while 10 channels every 24-hour the reactor iabtdown. Aefueling at full powrprisrpae gseenner atioonff dd e.feetf ive fufuele limnelg, m t se amnado-n dnral rruehf•uwetoliuntrg Pnermits relae ..n n Ti. without interrupting power m n .caUbe used to move -irradiated fuel assem- blies from storage to the rasctor or from ome reactor position to another.
Wh ile centered over a fuel channelth’ e refueling tha Cotan a qelýkc ……. 6q&mma•aucch hiinnee . ll owers aa ccyylilndienr der
tha caostaeias , wichfit vr-the. outside of the fuel channel nozzle.
TThh e ccyyliinndeerr , whic :L*,+.osrt ‘ +i whc ht i par. of te preessuVe vessel, can on-board ve- is filled with water from — ank-. h st- – is , .Pressuriraet dw, hich cap isaready for remval. A grbab time the nozzle hook,o loated inside the pressurized cylinder
grab hook are rmntely-ci•eed ao4 +h-em la,-+ – nova ug Ozten actuating of thesios : device, ” lotIM-Ahe outside of the lug is t h e n r o t at e d . T hik” + . . .+ – P , I ” then otatdT.i s rtatin ineals the nMOzzl -plug gasket and b l g. e tt he:m e :p. lu in place. The releases the pressurized refuelng pressure in the Internal, low;.. prf~ hi •.e.h ns cytol ader i9 hh ilbee r tthan the pressure tn the iN, the shieldt hpuls; , – ‘ t ozzle Plus frCi being ejected. The nozzle
pl~a,s hteeld plu~ th suPeaO”10 r~od and the fuel assembly are lifted into the Pressurized cylinder of.,the refuelig machine and reandwtia cartridge bolder. The cartrid.geis rotated tpemtisronfa gauge (used to check the f”el ch”-i . er. The fresh fuel assembly, with attached nozzle and shield plug, 12 tm lowered Into the fuel channel.
)uring-.this entire refueling operation wster is pumped at a crntr-lied rate rro. the pre1surizd cylinder inO the flchannel to cool the discharged fuel tlenrnts. After the fresh fuel is in place., the nozzle plus locking device is ‘Sal engaged, sealing the plus gasket. The refueling machine seals are then Irpressurixed and the cylinder is retracted. A biological shield plug is moved
2-16
‘4
-J-6
ote- that the fuel le*Sth i,e ci.+Ib asembIy- .- 3.43a (11.2 wth aa- t2),0 -rm
(0.79-in.) Sap between the subassemblies. T•be upper and lover assemblies have
their rod plenums at the upper and lower ends, respectively.
Figure 2.8 Schematic dravi*g of tbe 36-rod fuel element (18 rods ica ech
of two subassemblles)
Source: Dollezhal, 1981.
.2-17
Table 2.’3: Fuel ii’se.b•y• design pa.am ekt iit” fo,r. Ch enin Init 4 – ,.”•
Parameter . Value
Subassembl ies per assembly 2
Number of ro-ds-:pe–r 46 asikblo~~.~-
Assembly out.er diiamete’r 9 mm (3.1 in.)
Length of assebly fe reion 6.9 a*t ) (23.0
Length of active, fue per rod 3’ 43 . (11.25 ft)
Plenum length 17 5 cm (6.9 in.)
Cladding tube outer diimeter 13.6 – (0.5 in.)
Cladding radial vall.thickness 0.9 -m (0.035 in.)
Cladding material
Fuel material ‘0
Fuel enrichment – 2 0 wt 7. U-r—3253-‘
.Fuel pellet.diamete’11.5 – (0.45 in.)-
Fuel pellet length -`.15. 0 (0.59 in.)
Minimum pelle 46e8sit -&104/,cc (0f.37.6 lb/in.)
Pellet end Ds-hed
Fuel cladding gap –0. 18 to 0.38 m-
(0. 007 to 0.015 in.)
Fill gas compositi’on”. Be
Fill gas pressure 0.1 P&P (14.7 psi)
Water-to-fuel volume .ratito 1.23
-V.– ~
9-V<* ,$ IA,' .9 9A9~ * 7. into, position belov the .refuting -machine, and the discharged fuel, element. is transported to the spent fue•l -.storage pool. -2 fluid and deat lTrawort. Sysltes '.2.1 Highlights - - Three principal f udn'saw .- aerytm are usedinteCroylUt4 reactor: (1) Vthep i 7 i g ytem, ehhcoolsthe core- and-produce .. -power; (2) the. rod cooling system, wwohnictlh provides cooling to the control rods and the reflectors; ,a (3) the .reactor gas circuit, which enhances heat transfer from the :graphite.moderator. -Ito the preasnre tubes. 2.2.2 Primary Cooling. System (Sedov, 1979; Novosel'skii, 1984; Dubrovsky, 1981; Dollezhal, 1951;-loromn, 1980; Kulikov, 1984; tVSR, 1986) 'The Chernobyl Unit & reactor contains two-1ndependent primary coolant loops, each of which cools half of the reactor. .-A schematic drawing of the cpoling system. is shown in Figure. 2.11.. Ech loop._ .as four _primary coolantpump s, three of which are normally i tn-t the fourth acts as a backup. Each pump has a capacity of 5500 Lo 12,000 us/hr (about 24,200 to 52,800 gm) and a dynamic head of 1.96 MPs (284 psL). -The discharge line from each pump also has a check valve, to prevent backflow should the pump fail, and a flow-regulating valve. The pup.ps are fitted with heavy flywheels to provide a 120-second rundown time in cant of a loss of electrical power to the pump, and to provide interim cooling until nA'tural circulation can be established IFtural circulation is expectrd to be established 30 to 35 seconds after &in pumps are deenersized. 77 LZGEND: 2-Cartridge; -2fSupport *Itoipm t; 3ý-Upper Pressure ,4-Grab Vessel Seonion; Drive; 5-Grab Actuating Chains; 6-Framevork; ?-Chain Winding Necbanimo; S-Cartridge Rotation Drive; 9-1,dd. e-rssure Vessel Section; 10-Shutoff Device;. li-Planual ?ube Location Device; :12-2elevision Tube Location Device; 13-lovable Lower Shielding; 14-Lower Pressure Vessel Section; 35-Special Book; 16-Se.lng• Drive;. 17-Shieldi..; 18-Cram-; 19-Carria.e. Figure 2.9 Crouu-soctional view of the furlifig "Cahinie 2-19 .... .. .. , ,R e.. '•it•t:•Zt. . •" d, .' .. , RM 2ach of these Fall~~ permit natural- _cirutio hugte stalled pumps. -Plilions GooaR,a C* .,.•........................•..•.•......,.•., .... .. ,.!:. ~Jews ,ueling machine. toth eW.. ý,Twom46mWl y ope ft and tbe outlet of the pump after shutdown 5f the four in- :4 zeato 3T2he.5 -ccouo lant from the 'P s flows toA cmon.'header and then co twenty-two (12.8-in.) diaemeter datrai' or hders on each half of the reactor. The individual supply pipes of 5.7-m (2.in.) diameter, and 0.35-cm (0.14-in.) wall thickness to- the presWre tubes are connected to these dis- tributor headers. Lack supply pipe contains a manually operated flow- regulating valve and £fi1• meter. .. Pressure tube coolant flow, and quality, thereby steam is set by adjusting these flow-control valves on the basis of calcu- lated channel power, calculated power distribution, and measured inlet temper- ature. The coolant is directed frm the supply pipes up through the fuel channels. The full core coolant flow at 200% power is 37,600 tonnes per hour. The inlet water, initially at 2700C (51307), is Leated to the average saturstion temperature, 2864C (S43el). 2-20 trator '~2. ", W* CbW'44. Figure 2.-11. Normal and emergency cooling systems of the Cthernobyl -Unit 4..reactor At approximately 2.3-a(755 i.tc).ito-the active core, bulk nucleate boiling' -ýoccurs, and this. pces..continuaes alongthe remainder of the ch*nnel. The average exit steam qnulityot the core is 14.5%, and the maximum exit steam quality Is 20.1%. ~~ '.Tchaer rsieteda mby- va:ptiapre-s 9*W~Aftuz~sfee rsue ue r ~dvdal .... , d ter and-0.4-cu (0.16-u.) wall thickess to four trontd.--,se arators, 2.6 m (8.53 ft) in internal diameter and 31.0 -mi. (10.1. f)A" A& ength. Two separators serve each loop. Steam exits from the tp-:.f ea.chseprator into two 426-rn (16.77-in.) diameter steam headers. BDeteean .theseparator.*outleta and the main turbine or steam dump inlets, these two h*eaders7jijon U .fom a single 630-m (24.8-in.) dimetar header, which passe . 1thf rm e tor building into the turbine gallery. There are four 630-m (24.8-ih.)••headers. T-:hese headers are cross-connected to headers that can f :eedeitrh steam duo or one or both of the 500-eWe turbine generator sets. . The pipe section locatsd :before the-turbine main steam valves contait- various steam discharge devices: eight mim safety valves with a throughput of 725 tonnes (1.5 million Ibm)-of stem per hour, four tutbine condenser fast-acting steam dumv stations with a cavacitv of 725 tonnes (1.5 million lb.) of steam per hour (two per turbine plant), and six service-load fast-acting steam dump stations. 2-21 Steam. at 6. 46 Mls(97pia,20C(3F) n 0i61.11 or ois relative humsidity Sfed: from. the; iin sea.,e'.-aer into the firs.t. ta ofhe four-,s tg•.. higk. pressure tubine. :bSom 1ighIe+ •] essm , :fi, bled•Io- ff Vstjream of te turbine inliet' v'alvet, as well: ~asm f r66m inar-stage #9"i t~hg-pisr turine,- and sent to the heating-side of the reheater/sueraters.,g the jJ et pumps for te ' main condenser air ejectors, a he m'ainn ndt u.rbiee- u.if. a, -tem. After exiting the high-pr~essure turbine, the stea*ass hog oeo h e . . g e s t • d h. o f t e•oe two separator/reheaters and.ia dried and sup`4.oer•h d to 0..4V0OW (58s!ia ).and 2630C (4730F) b+•i tes•i8i f... th f r:: 26(0 7 0F eore entern one ofteor 4-staige low-pressure- tunrbiui. Inter-stage steam is ed fro6 a*rtiaop u in the o turbines.t service condensate .reheaiid:•itersaduiiay the oads. :.:-•.d:.;.;...-.+ :'.rl+i ": " After leaving the low1-pressure turbine, the steam en.t ers one of the four sections of the main conde'nsr where it ondensesa. 04 Ea (5.8 psia),-From the: condensers, the watr s'umpdoac .t o -- _-manztamsear-os(;in-fu ýelectric bigh-pres'sure -feeps a dsi po isher(for pu ificto and water them"iistrIro,' _nd*• '-rwaitthoar attached explosive gas recombiner The feediater entest sfparntors, at 6.964 HPa, (1010 paia) a"nd.6• 56C .(-3290F).-.Iti's4 mixed- with 2oC (U. 3F) .. saturated water to-povdreciltion water 270oC (518).). Twelve downcomer- pip Area-itta-ched to"t-hebottom of :cac seam seprator. .. These .pipes connect .wit~h

Post

1986-05-06 – NRC – Chernobyl – Information for Licensee Regarding the Chernobyl Nuclear Plant Accident – ML031250016

…….
)
·’;<) I • I LIS ORIGINAL UNITED STATES NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION • OFFICE OF INSPECTION AND ENFORCEMENT WASHINGTON, D.C. 20555 May 6, 1986 SSINS No.: 6835 --IN 86-33 IE INFORMATION NOTICE NO. 86-33: INFORMATION FOR LICENSEE REGARDING THE CHERNOBYL NUCLEAR PLANT ACCIDENT ~essees: Fuel cycle licensees and Priority 1 material licensees. furpose: • The purpose of this notice ts to provide background information only and requires no action on the part of recipients. The reference background information relates . to the Chernobyl nuclear plant accident and fs contained in the enclosed copy o.f Information Notice No. 86-32 sent to NRC nuclear power plant licensees on May 2, 1986. Discussion: As indicated by thr. enclosed information, radioactive material from the Chernobyl accident ts expected to be detected in the continental United States through EPA environmental surveillance, perhaps as assisted by Department of Energy facilities and NRC-lfcensed nuclear power reactor sites. The level·Of activity ta the United States ts expected to be low and should have little, if"any, impact on licensee monitoring programs. As stated in the enclosed notice~ any anomalous detection of radioactive material should be evaluated in ·accordance with your license to assure that any detected materials are properly identified as to source (i.e., licensed activities or the Chernobyl Event). , :J If you have any questions regarding this matter, please contact the Regional Administrator of the appropriate NRC regional office, or this office. Technical Contact: L. Rouse, NMSS 427-4205 Attachments: 1. Information Notice 86-32 "'"'1~ard L. Jod !:f:3 Division of~~.~~ Preparedness and Engineering Response Office of Inspection and Enforcement 2. List of Recently Issued I£ Information Notices ([6oso6os:W g lt0E>OU2
rt>R :t:€ la }Jo\\c.e. ~-~
PRIORITY ATlcNTION f\EQUESTEO
UNITED STATES
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
OFFICE.OF INSPECTION AND ENFORCEMENT
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20555
May 2,. 1986
SSINS No.: b~J~
IN 86-32
Attachment 1
rn 86-33
May 6, 1986
Page 1 of 9
IE INFORMATION NOTICE NO. 86-32: REQUEST FOR COLLECTION OF LICENSEE
RADIOACTIVITY MEASUREMENTS ATTRIBUTED
TO THE CHERNOBYL NUCLEAR PLAHT ACCIDENT
Addressee~:
All nuclear power reactor faC:ilfty licensees holding an operating license (OL)
or construction permit (CP).
Purpose:
The pu·rpose of this information notice is to update licensees of the recent
Chernobyl nuclear power plant accident and to request voluntary reporting of
any licensee environmental radioactivity measurement data probably caused by
that event.
In order to enhance the Federal and state monitoring programs, all nuclear power
rea1;tor facilities with on-going environmental monitoring programs are requested
to consider the NRC request to report confirmed anomalous environmental radioactivity
measurements probably caused by radioactive material released in the
accident at the Chernobyl nuclear power plant in the U.S.S.R. It is requested
that recipients review the attached information and provide the enviro,nmental
data discussed herein.
Description of Circumstances:
Information issu~d by the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) concerning the
recent reactor accident in Chernobyl, USSR is contained in Attachments 1, 2 and 3.
In the week following the accident at Chernobyl, elevated levels of radioactivity
have been detected in air, rainwater, soil and food in many European countries.
The radionuclides that have been detected in air in these countries include:
I-131, Cs-137, Cs-134, Te-U2, Ru-103, Mo-99, Np-239, and Nb-95. Although
estimates of plume arrival time and location of entry into the continental
United States are highly uncertain at this time, the plume may arrive in the
Pacific Northwest United States during Hay 7-10, 1986.
Discussfon:
It appears likely that radioactive material from the Chernobyl accident may
arrive within the continental U.S. in concentrations that are readily detectable.
In order to enhance nationwide environmental surveillance, the EPA (and some
states) have increased the airborne monitoring sampling frequencies to be better
able to detect any traces of the plume. In order to supplement and reinforce
this state and federal nationwide surveillance program, the NRC licensees [as
IN St”-32
Hay 2, 1986
Page 2 of 2
part of their routine Environmental Monitoring Program (EMP)] are requested to
voluntarily provide the following information:
1. Report to the NRC any anomalous environmental radiation or radioactivity
measurement that can be reasonably assumed to have resulted from the
Chernobyl accident. These confirmed measurement results from the
licensee’s routine EMP should be telephonically reported to the NRC
Operations Center (301-951·0550) wf thf n 24 hours of d~termining that
material from the accident has been measured. (Environment air sampling
probably is the most sensitive and thus most likely means of detecting
the airborne materials. Some other less-sensitive potential means of
detection may include personnel whole body counting equipment).
The reporting format should provide for:
1. Sample date(s) and approximate locations(s).
2. Medium or pathway (e.g., air particulate, air charcoal, milk).
3. Type of analysis (e.g., gross beta, iodine-131, other gamma emitter).
4. Statistical data (mean, range, number of samples).
Any data provided by NRC licensees wf 11 be shared with appropriate federal
agencies. The NRC as part a combined Interagency Task Force is providing daily
technical information reports to the Institute for Nuclear Power Operations (I~PO).
This updated technical information is available to member utilities through INPO’s
Nuclear Network system. Because the sensitivity and broad scope of existing
licensee programs, augmentation of the NRC licensee EMPs is not necessary.
Any anomalous detection of radioactive material should be evaluated in
accordance with facility license, technical specifications and applicable
regulations to assure that the detected materials are properly identified as
to source (e.g., either plant operations or the Chernobyl Event).
We appreciate your cooperation with us on thts matter. If you have any
questions regarding this matter, please contact the Regional Administrator of
the appropriate NRC regional office, or thts office.
• ~/;.~ Divf si of Emergency Preparedness
and E gineertng Response
Office of Inspection and Enforcement
Technical Contacts: James E. Wigginton, IE
(301).492-4967
Attachntents:
Roger L. Pedersen, IE
(301) 492-9425
1. EPA Task Force Report (May 1, 1986)
2. Talking Points (April 30, 1986)
3. Fact Sheet (May 2, 1986)
4. List of Recently Issued IE Information Notices
0.
– I f
~ ~-~–~nir1-11m 8:6:-‘3:2″ 1’,–~~—-~~ Soviet Nuclear Mayz.
1986
Page 3 of
Accident
. ‘
ZOR KELEASE: 2:00 P.M., 1’BURSDAY, MAY l, ·1986
. .
A-Task Force Report
CONTACT: · DAVE COHEN
. (202) 382-4355 0n· Tues-‘ay:, thtt tnvtronrnental Protection Ag.,ncy, which
maintains the na~ion’s radiation ~onitoring net~ork,, increased
its Aa”plinQ frequency for airborne ra.,loactivlty to, daily. Results
o~tained thus far show no increase in radioactivity abov~ n~rT-tal
background levels. Th• Canadian air nonltorinQ network has also
increased lts sa~plin; frequency to daily. Results there show no
increase in radioactivity.
The air ~ass containing the radloactlvltf frOI~ t~~ initial
Ch•rnobyl nuclear event ls no~ widalt dispersed throughout
~orth•rn Europe and Polar regions. P~rti~~~ nf radioactivity.off
the north~•st norwe9ian coast yesterday ~ornlng shnulj continue to
disperse with possi~le no~eQent toward the east In the next s~~er&\
days. Other portions of the radioactive air ~ass may nove east~ar~
~hrough the Soviet Union and through th~ Polar regions over the
coning week.
The Soviets ~ave r•ported they t\a~e snoth~re~ the fire. From
our infot’Jllation.tt is not clear whether the fire is out or not. ~~
also cannnt confi CTt n.-•;; r.er>orts of ja.’!laoe at a second react•~L·, ~’Jt
the second hot spot seen in t.he L.,:.ans~T photos ls not a reAc~~c.
The u.~. Government has offered to provide technical
assistance to the Soviet GoverfU’llent to deal with the accident.
O~ Wednesday afternoo”• a senior Soviet official frona their
En~assy in WashinQton delivered a note to the ~part~ent of
State exrsressinQ appreciation for n’1c of fer of assistance and
stating that for the time being, assistanc\! is not n~eded •
. ,t the present tir”e, the! tl.S. no”-tC’n’=’ent has no data ~”
ra~latio” \e~~la oc- conta~lnatlon levels at •~Y location ~ithin
the Soviet Oniof\. Ye slso t\ave no fl rn l nforAat.ion concern t •l’J
the nuMhec- of casualties f co~ the aeci~ent.
(more) –
[)
-.
-2-. .. . . . . .
‘l’he Department of State is not advising ·against travel to the
S.oviet. Union, Scandinavia and eastern !urope. As a ·-result of the
nuclear.accident, the State Department has iaaued a travel advisory
recommending agalnilt travel to Xi•v and adjacent areas. We are
largely dependent on the Soviet• for information on conditions
within tbe USSR and we are doing everything posaible to obtain
relevant information frcn Soviet authorities. Americana plannino
travel to the sovi•t Union and adjacent countries abould carefully
monitor preaa reports on thi• rapidly changing a~tuation to make aa
fully jnfo~ed a decision aa poaalble with respect to their travel
plane. ·They .should bear in mind that many of these countries have
reported ·1nci.·e . aaed level• o-f radiation in ~· environment • . – ‘ .The State Department Off lee of Legia~atlve Affai~s has
commented that customary international law requires the soviet
Union to notify other-States/Countries of the possibility o!
transboundary effecta of the incident and to !urniah them with
the information neceaaa.ry to addreaa those effects.
Tbe Whit• Bouse has established an Interagency Taak Force
to coordinate the Government’s response to the nuclear reactor
accident in Chernobyl. Th• Task Poree is under the direction
o! Lee M. Thomas, Adminlatrator of the Environmental Protection
Agency, with representatives from th• White Bouse, Department of
State, EPA, Department of Energy, Nuclear Regulatory Camn1as1on,
National Oceanic and Atmospheric Adm1n1atratlon, o.s. Air Force,
Department of Agriculture, food and Drug Administration, Pederal
Emeroency Management Agency, Department of Interior, Federal . .
Aviation Adm1n1atratloA, the u.s. Public Health Service, and
other agenci••· ·
• I• •
I I I


— —
.. -,. ‘ . ~
. TAL~ING·POINTs:
CBERNORYL NUCLEAR ACCIDENT”
April 30, 1986: .
. ·- — -· ………. “” …
I~ 86-32
May Z, 1986
o Late Friday, April 25, or early:saturday, April 26, a
serious accident occurred at the Chernobyl· nuclear facility
near ~lev in the Soviet Union. As a result of :an apparent
loss of reactor coolant, the facility experienced a core·
meltdown, explosion, and fire. Causes of the ~ccident ·are .
not known.
o The explosion and resulting fire released a plu=e of
radioactive materials to the atmosphere. So long as the
reactor ~re.fire continues, radioactive gases will be given
off. · . · . · · ·
• – o The facility involved is a graphite-moderated,,
boiling-water-cooled, pressure-tube unlt. It is one df four
such units at Chernobyl. To our knowledge, only this one
unit, known as Onit t4, is involved in the accident.
o The initial plume traveled in a northwest direction
toward Scandanavia. Predictions now suggest it will move in
an eastward direction. Radiation levels above normal background
have been detected in Scandanavian countries. However, these
levels pose no significant risk to human health or the
environment.
o The U.S. government has made an offer of technical
assistance to the Soviets. This good faith offer vas made
out of genuine concern for the health and safety of the Soviet
people. The Soviet government responded April 30 that no ·
foreign assistance is needed. •
o We have also requested specific information on the
accident. To date, ve have not received a full response to
that request. This is also a matter of great concern to the
UnitP.d States.
o The radiation plume emitted as a result of the Chernobyl
accident will disperse over time throughout the Northern
Hemisphere. Eventually, some radioactive contamination will
reach the Onlted States. However, based on the limited
information we now have. there is no reason to believe that
levels reaching this country will pose any significant risk
to human health or the environment. Please see the accompanying
fact sheet on radiation health effects for basic information
on exposure.
Page 5 of
.
~-
·-2-
.•
o It is very· unlikely t._hat any a~gnificant· :amoun~s of
radiation from the accident will reac~ the u.s~ during the
next few days. The Environmental Protection Agency’s •.
Environmental Radiation Ambient Monitoring:syst~ — ERAM$ -~
is conducting daily sampling throughout the nat~on. In
addition to ambient air, the system also monitors radiatlo~
levels in drinking .water., surface water, and milk.
o The White House has established an interagenc:y task
force to monitor the health, safety and environmental consequences
of the Chernobyl accident. T~e task force is chaired-by Lee
Thomas, Administrator of the U.S. Environmental Protection·
Agency. Members represent the following federal agencies:
EPA, DOE, N~C~ NOAA, HHS, USDA, DOD, DOT and others. On a
daily basia, the task force compiles, evaluates, and widely
distributes ·current technical information on the Chernobyl
accident and its environmental and health consequencers.
..

..



0
” .
Fact Sheet-Chernobyl
SOVIET NUCLEAR
ACCIDENT
Attachment 3
IN 86-S
May 2, 1986
FOR RELEASE: 2:00 P.M., FRIDAY, MAY 2, 1986
CONTACT: DAVE COHEN (202) 382-4355
Radiation monitoring networks ~n the United States and
Canada are continuing to analyze for airborne radioactivity •
daily. No increases fn radioactivity above normal background
levels have been detected in either country. Canadian officials
intend to increase the sampling frequency of their milk
monitoring network, which consists of 16 stations near
population centers in southern Canada, to weekly beginning
next week.
It is believed that air containing radioactivity now covers
much of Europe and a large part of the Soviet Union. The distribution
of radioactivity is likely to be patchy. Afr containing
radioactivity detected by aircraft at 5000 feet about 400 miles
west of no,rthern Norway is believed to have moved westward and now
appears to be heading south or southeastward perhaps to return to
western Europe. There is no independent confirmation O·f the radioactivity
in the air moving eastward across Asia.
(A weather map should be attached to today’s Task Force Report.
If you do not have a copy, ft can be picked up in the EPA press
office, room 311, West Tower, 401 M St., S.W. (202) 382-4355.)
Environmental monitoring data have been provided by the Swedish
government for the Stockholm area for April 28-30. Extrapolations
of those data suggest that radiation exposure levels at the Chernobyl
site would have been in a range from 20 rem to hundreds of rem
whole-body for the two-day period over which IDOSt of the radiation
release probably took place. Radiation doses for the thyroid gland
have been estimated to be in a range from 200 rem to thousands of rem
for the same period. These doses are sufficient to produce severe
physical trauma including death. It should be emphasized that these
are estimates subject to considerable uncertainty. The U.S. has
as yet no information from the Soviet Union as to actual radiation
levels experienced at the accident site.
Page 7 of
-2-
The Soviets have reported they have smothered the fire. We
still cannot confirm that the reactor fire in unit 4 has been
extinguished. There fs evidence that the reactor or associated
equipment continues to smolder. We also cannot confirm news
reports of damage at a second reactor, but the second hot spot
seen in the LANDSAT photos is not a reactor.
Based on the fact that no harmful levels of radioactivity are
expected to reach the continental United States, ft is highly
unlikely that potassium iodide (KI) will be needed to minimize
the uptake of radioactive iodine from the Russian nuclear power
plant accident. KI, although relatively harmless, has been
associated with certain allergic reactions; thus, since the use
of KI is not without some risk to the population, the U.S. Public
Health Service recommends against taking KI as a precautionary
measure. Federal authorities do not believe there is any reason
for concern at this time about the safety of either our domestic
food or drug supplies. Nor should there be concern over imported
products already in the United States or on their way to the
United States at the time of the nuclear accident in the Soviet
Union.
The State Department is continuing efforts to obtain relevant
information from Soviet authorities on the nuclear accident and
the potential health dangers that might be posed to individuals
in the Soviet Uni on and adjacent countries. State has noted, f.or
example, recent statements issued by Polish authorities concerning
public health precautionary measures.
The State Department is seeking more information from all the
governments in the region. The U.S. is sending experts to
potentially affected areas for medical consultation and to provide
relevant expertise on which to make appropriate reconnendations
with regard to the health of American citizens.
With the limited data at hand, the Departments of State and
‘- . Health and Human Services have issued an advisory against travel
to Kiev and adjacent areas. To minimize possible exposure to
radioactive contamination, we also suggest that those in Eastem
Europe avoid milk and other dairy products. In addition, State
is recommending that women of child-bearing age and children
i!:k should not travel to Poland until the situation ts clarf fied.
The State Department is receiving reports from our European
embassies, based on their discussions with local officials, as to
the impact of the accident and local reactions to it. We are
still not receiving the necessary technical information from the
Soviets on the details of the accident.
.Page”. cs. of–:~ ·.
,
,_ ….
The White House has .established an Interagency .Task Force
to coordinate the Government’s response to the nuclear reactor
accident in Chernobyl. The Task Force is under the direction
of Lee M. Thomas, Administrator of the Environmental Protection
Agency, with representatives from the White House, Department of
State, EPA, Department of Energy, Nuclear Regulatory Conaission,
National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration, U.S. Atr Force;
Department of Agriculture, Food and Drug Administration,· Federal
Emergency Management Agency, Department of Interior. Federal
Aviation Administration. the U.S. Public Health Service, and
other agencies.
‘ ‘ ‘ •
PLEASE NOTE: THE EPA PRESS OFFICE WILL BE OPEN OVER THE WEEKEND
FOR UPDATING. HOURS WILL BE FROM lOam TO 2PM. 202-382-4355.
Page 9 of 9
1
… ,.. .

~
0
.. . .
LIST OF RECENTLY ISSUED
IE INFORMATION NOTICES
Information
Notice No. Subject
86-32 Request For Collection Of
Licensee Radioactivity
Measurements Attributed To
The Chernobyl Nuclear Plant
Accident
86-31 Unauthorized Transfer and
Loss of Control of
Industrial Nuclear Gauges
86-30 Design Limitations of
Gaseous Effluent Monitoring
Systems
86-29 Effects of Changing Valve
Motor-Operator Switch
Settings
86-28
86-27 Access Control at Nuclear
Facilities
86-26 Potential Problems In
Generators Manufactured By
Electrical Products
Incorporated
86-25 Traceability And Material
Control Of Material And
Equipment, Particularly
Fasteners
OL = Operating License
CP = Construction Permit
Date of
Issue
5/2/86
5/6/86
4/29/86
4/25/86
4/28/86
4/21/86
4/17/86
4/11/86
Attachment 2
IN 86-33
Hay 6, 1986
Issued to
All power reactor
facilities holding
an OL or CP ..
All power reactor
facilities holding
an OL or a CP
All power reactor
facilities holding
an OL or a CP
All power reactor
facilities holding
an Ol or a CP ·
All power reactor
facilities holding
an OL·or CP, research
and nonpower reactor
facilities, and fuel
fabrication & processing
facilities
All power reactor
facilities holding
an Ol or CP
All power reactor
facilities holding
an OL or CP

Post

2013-05 – NRC – Chernobyl Nuclear Power Plant Accident Background

Chernobyl Nuclear Power Plant Accident
Background
On April 26, 1986, a sudden surge of power during a reactor systems test destroyed Unit 4 of the nuclear power station at Chernobyl, Ukraine, in the former Soviet Union. The accident and the fire that followed released massive amounts of radioactive material into the environment.
Emergency crews responding to the accident used helicopters to pour sand and boron on the reactor debris. The sand was to stop the fire and additional releases of radioactive material; the boron was to prevent additional nuclear reactions. A few weeks after the accident, the crews completely covered the damaged unit in a temporary concrete structure, called the “sarcophagus,” to limit further release of radioactive material. The Soviet government also cut down and buried about a square mile of pine forest near the plant to reduce radioactive contamination at and near the site. Chernobyl’s three other reactors were subsequently restarted but all eventually shut down for good, with the last reactor closing in 1999. The Soviet nuclear power authorities presented their initial accident report to an International Atomic Energy Agency meeting in Vienna, Austria, in August 1986.
After the accident, officials closed off the area within 30 kilometers (18 miles) of the plant, except for persons with official business at the plant and those people evaluating and dealing with the consequences of the accident and operating the undamaged reactors. The Soviet (and later on, Russian) government evacuated about 115,000 people from the most heavily contaminated areas in 1986, and another 220,000 people in subsequent years (Source: UNSCEAR 2008, pg. 53).
Health Effects from the Accident
The Chernobyl accident’s severe radiation effects killed 28 of the site’s 600 workers in the first four months after the event. Another 106 workers received high enough doses to cause acute radiation sickness. Two workers died within hours of the reactor explosion from non-radiological causes. Another 200,000 cleanup workers in 1986 and 1987 received doses of between 1 and 100 rem (The average annual radiation dose for a U.S. citizen is about .6 rem). Chernobyl cleanup activities eventually required about 600,000 workers, although only a small fraction of these workers were exposed to elevated levels of radiation. Government agencies continue to monitor cleanup and recovery workers’ health. (UNSCEAR 2008, pg. 47, 58, 107, and 119)
The Chernobyl accident contaminated wide areas of Belarus, the Russian Federation, and Ukraine inhabited by millions of residents. Agencies such as the World Health Organization have been concerned about radiation exposure to people evacuated from these areas. The majority of the five
http://chat.nrc-gateway.gov
Page | 2
million residents living in contaminated areas, however, received very small radiation doses comparable to natural background levels (0.1 rem per year). (UNSCEAR 2008, pg. 124-25) Today the available evidence does not strongly connect the accident to radiation-induced increases of leukemia or solid cancer, other than thyroid cancer. Many children and adolescents in the area in 1986 drank milk contaminated with radioactive iodine, which delivered substantial doses to their thyroid glands. To date, about 6,000 thyroid cancer cases have been detected among these children. Ninety-nine percent of these children were successfully treated; 15 children and adolescents in the three countries died from thyroid cancer by 2005. The available evidence does not show any effect on the number of adverse pregnancy outcomes, delivery complications, stillbirths or overall health of children among the families living in the most contaminated areas. (UNSCEAR 2008, pg. 65)
Experts conclude some cancer deaths may eventually be attributed to Chernobyl over the lifetime of the emergency workers, evacuees and residents living in the most contaminated areas. These health effects are far lower than initial speculations of tens of thousands of radiation-related deaths.
U.S. Reactors and NRC’s Response
The NRC continues to conclude that many factors protect U.S. reactors against the combination of lapses that led to the accident at Chernobyl. Differences in plant design, broader safe shutdown capabilities and strong structures to hold in radioactive materials all help ensure U.S. reactors can keep the public safe. When the NRC reviews new information it takes into account possible major accidents; these reviews consider whether safety requirements should be enhanced to ensure ongoing protection of the public and the environment.
The NRC’s post-Chernobyl assessment emphasized the importance of several concepts, including:
 designing reactor systems properly on the drawing board and implementing them correctly during construction and maintenance;
 maintaining proper procedures and controls for normal operations and emergencies;
 having competent and motivated plant management and operating staff; and
 ensuring the availability of backup safety systems to deal with potential accidents.
The post-Chernobyl assessment also examined whether changes were needed to NRC regulations or guidance on accidents involving control of the chain reaction, accidents when the reactor is at low or zero power, operator training, and emergency planning.
The NRC’s Chernobyl response included three major phases: (1) determining the facts of the accident, (2) assessing the accident’s implications for regulating U.S. commercial nuclear power plants, and (3) conducting longer-term studies suggested by the assessment.
The NRC coordinated the fact-finding phase with other U.S. government agencies and some private groups. The NRC published the results of this work in January 1987 as NUREG-1250.
The NRC published the second phase’s results in April 1989 as NUREG-1251, “Implications of the Accident at Chernobyl for Safety Regulation of Commercial Nuclear Power Plants in the United
Page | 3
States.” The agency concluded that the lessons learned from Chernobyl fell short of requiring immediate changes in the NRC’s regulations.
The NRC published its Chernobyl follow-up studies for U.S. reactors in June 1992 as NUREG-1422. While that report closed out the immediate Chernobyl follow-up research program, some topics continue to receive attention through the NRC’s normal activities. For example, the NRC continues to examine Chernobyl’s aftermath for lessons on decontaminating structures and land, as well as how people are returned to formerly contaminated areas. The NRC considers the Chernobyl experience a valuable piece of information for considering reactor safety issues in the future.
Discussion
The Chernobyl reactors, called RBMKs, were high-powered reactors that used graphite to help maintain the chain reaction and cooled the reactor cores with water. When the accident occurred the Soviet Union was using 17 RBMKs and Lithuania was using two. Since the accident, the other three Chernobyl reactors, an additional Russian RMBK and both Lithuanian RBMKs have permanently shut down. Chernobyl’s Unit 2 was shut down in 1991 after a serious turbine building fire; Unit 1 was closed in November 1996; and Unit 3 was closed in December 1999, as promised by Ukrainian President Leonid Kuchma. In Lithuania, Ignalina Unit 1 was shut down in December 2004 and Unit 2 in 2009 as a condition of the country joining the European Union.
Closing Chernobyl’s reactors required a combined effort from the world’s seven largest economies (the G-7), the European Commission and Ukraine. This effort supported such things as short-term safety upgrades at Chernobyl Unit 3, decommissioning the entire Chernobyl site, developing ways to address shutdown impacts on workers and their families, and identifying investments needed to meet Ukraine’s future electrical power needs.
On the accident’s 10th anniversary, the Ukraine formally established the Chernobyl Center for Nuclear Safety, Radioactive Waste and Radio-ecology in the town of Slavutych. The center provides technical support to Ukraine’s nuclear power industry, the academic community and nuclear regulators.
Sarcophagus
The Soviet authorities started the concrete sarcophagus to cover the destroyed Chernobyl reactor in May 1986 and completed the extremely challenging job six months later. Officials considered the sarcophagus a temporary fix to filter radiation out of the gases from the destroyed reactor before the gas was released to the environment. After several years, experts became concerned that the high radiation levels could affect the stability of the sarcophagus.
In 1997, the G-7, the European Commission and Ukraine agreed to jointly fund the Chernobyl Shelter Implementation Plan to help Ukraine transform the existing sarcophagus into a stable and environmentally safe system. The European Bank for Reconstruction and Development manages funding for the plan, which will protect workers, the nearby population and the environment for decades from the very large amounts of radioactive material still in the sarcophagus. The existing sarcophagus was stabilized before work began in late 2006 to replace it with a new safe shelter. The new confinement
Page | 4
design includes an arch-shaped steel structure, which will slide across the existing sarcophagus via rails. This new structure is designed to last at least 100 years.
Information Resources
United Nations Scientific Committee on the Effects of Atomic Radiation – Chernobyl
International Atomic Energy Agency – Chernobyl Forum
World Health Organization – Health Effects of the Chernobyl Accident
May 2013

Post

2012-09-20 – NRC – Jocassee Dam – History of Oconee Flood Concerns

J
OFt:ICIAL USE ONLY= SEGURln’ RELATEB INl=OBMA”J’.10»
History of Oconee Flood Concerns
Updated 9/20/12 by Jonathan Bartley and John Boska
Agency Actions
• April 1983 – Based on RAI responses, NRC issues Standby Shutdown Facility (SSF SER) SE, which
recognized turbine building flood as the only credible SSF flooding concern …. not Jocassee Dam failure.
(ML 103370444)
• February 1994 – NRC issued a Notice of Violation and Notice of Deviation (Report number 50-269,270,287
I 93-25) which included the identification of the inability of the SSF to mitigate the worst case Jocassee
Dam failure per the recently completed FERC study; and the inaccurate IPE submittal, which stated that
the SSF flood walls were 8 feet in height (they were actually 5 feet).
• April 2006 – NRC inspectors, in documenting a breach of the SSF wall as a performance deficiency, also
note the 1992 Jocassee Dam Inundation Study. Inspectors also identified a new flood flow path via the
building’s sanitary system. Both issues are documented as URls in Oconee report 2006002
(ML061180451 ).
• November 2006 – Final significance determination of WHITE was issued for breached SSF Flood Barrier
(Oconee report 2006017, ML063260282).
• March 2007 – Appeal panel upheld the WHITE finding based on random dam failure alone.
• July 2007 – Oconee report 2007003 (ML072120140) issued which closes Sanitary System URI with no
enforcement action.
• September 2007 – Final SERP concluded a WHITE finding for the breached SSF Flood barrier.
• October 2007 -Associated IP95002 Supplemental Inspection (conducted in late August 2007) report
issued.
• November 2007 – November 20 letter to licensee regarding the Final Significance Determination of the
SSF barrier white finding and communication of the NRC’s analysis of the Jocassee Dam failure frequency
error (ML073241045)
• December 2007 – NRC Region II communicated the NRC Jocassee Dam failure frequency computation to
the licensee.
• August 15, 2008 – Oconee 50.54(t) letter issued to address external flooding due to failure of Jocassee
Dam (ML081640244)
• June 10, 2010 – Region II completed inspection of interim compensatory measures (ICMs)
• June 22, 2010 – Region II issued CAL. (ML 101730329) CAL directed licensee to:
• Implement ICMs as documented in the June 3, 2010 letter
• Submit to the NRC by August 2, 2010, all documentation necessary to demonstrate to the NRC that the
inundation of the Oconee site resulting from the failure of the Jocassee Dam has been bounded
Submit by November 30, 2010, a list of all modifications necessary to adequately mitigate the
inundation
• Make all necessary modifications by November 30, 2011
• July 7, 2010- NRC Inspection Report for CAL ICMs, (ML 101880768 non-public, ML 101880769-public)
• January 28, 2011 – Staff issues safety evaluation of inundation study. Safety evaluation determined that
Case 2 provided adequate bounding parameters to model the dam failure and subsequent flooding
(Reservoir 111 O full pond, bottom breach el 800 ft, width 425 ft, time-to-failure 2.8 hours) (ML 110280153)
• September 20, 2012- Staff issues letter answering Duke’s June 14, 2012, letter, accepts FERC standards
for flood walls, and -establishr start date and end date for modification ~eline (ML 12219A 163).
Interactions Timeline Compliments of
GREENPEACE
4-•·· ,_, …… — – ……… A.A . J
2
OPFl61Ab. USE ONI::¥ SECURITY RELMS9 INFO~MA”ffe11t
• May 1980 – Licensee memo to file documents the initiation of the NSAC-60 study (Oconee Level 3 PRA
with internal and external events)
• February 1982 – Oconee calculation OSC-631 contains a simplified licensee flood study which predicts
that a Jocassee failure would overtop the Keowee Dam by 4 feet for 2.4 hours, resulting in 32.5 feet of
flood water on site.
• May 1982 – draft Oconee PRA assigned Jocassee Dam failure frequency of 2.5E-5/yr with conditional
probability of site flooding and core melt to be 1.0.
• January 1983 – Licensee ·memo to file, documents that a Jocassee Dam failure would overtop the Keowee
Dam by 2.45 feet resul!ing in 4. 71 feet of water on ~ite._ The flood study was completed as part of the
Oconee PRA study, NSAC-60, by Duke Power and the EPRI Nuclear Safety Analysis Center.
• April 1983 – Based on RAI responses, NRC issues SSF SER, which recognized turbine building flood as
only credible SSF flooding concern …. not Jocassee Dam (ailure.
• June 1984- NSAC-60 study was completed. (This addressed both random failures of Jocassee Dam …. no
split fractions and no credit for SSF.)
• June 1984 to June 1986 – Licensee design and construction of the North and South SSF 5-ft exterior
flood walls.
.• Decemb~r 1992 – Jocassee Dam Failure Inundation Study (FERC Project No. 2503) was completed and
predicted a flood depth of 12.5 ft to 16.8 ft above site grade level.
• December 1992 – Licensee implemented an UFSAR update which added the Jocassee Dam failure, SSF
flood. wall, a’nd watertight door references to the UFSAR
• December 1993- In an internal memo, licensee attempted to reconcile differences between the FERG
study and their internal one due to upd~d software and analysis conservatism. Licensee admits that they
can not recreate the 4. 71-ft flood height. Proposed corrective action to re-analyze as part of the Individual
Plant Examination bf External Events (f PEEE) for December 1995.
• February 19~4- NRC issued a Notice of Violation and Notice of Deviation (Report number 50_-269,270,287
I 93-25) which included the identification of the inability of the SSF to mitigate the worst case Jocassee
Dam failure per the recently completed FERG study; and the inaccurate IPE submittal, which stated that
the SSF flood walls were 8 .feet in height (they were 5 feet in height).
I
• March 1994 – Service Water inspection and violations. Licensee discussed a commitment to the NRG
” … to complete a reanalysis of a postulated Jocassee flood.with the available information on flood
frequency, ~SF availability, and SSF serviceability, as part of the IPEEE effort.”
• March 1994 – Licensee letter discussed a commitment to the NRC ” .. .to complete a reanalysis of a
postul~ted Jocassee flood with the available information on flood frequency, SSF availability, and SSF
serviceability, as part of the IPEEE effort.”
• June-1994 – Licensee· removed all references to Jocassee Dam failure and the SSF flood walls in the
UFSAR. The 1 O CFR 50.59 evaluation stated that these references were originally added based on results
of a PRA study which was not part of design basis.
• September 1994- (Internal NRG meeting between Rll and NRR as documented in memo dated October
6, 1994) … The status of NRG review of a hypothetical Jocassee Dam failure was discussed. NRR
. indicated that the external events review would not be done for months, and research had not been
contacted about the error in the licensee’s IPE submittal. The ramifications of a high E-5 event was
discussed, NRR considered it of minimal importance, and a revision submittal of 1995 was acceptable.
• December 1995- Licensee issued the IPEEE. Random dam failure frequency was computed to be 1.3 x
10·5 per year. In addition, split fractions for flood heights that exceeded the 5-ft level were included. ·
Subsequent supplements issued in December 1996 and December 1997 a!so carried over these split
fractions. In response to January 1999 RAI, the licensee reconfirms that a flooding event (resulting from
the seismically-induced failure of the Jocassee Dam) which exceeds the 5 foot SSF flood wall is the
dominant cutest. The core damage frequency was calculated to be low enough that no further action was
required. Subsequently in March 2000 (ML003694349), the NRG closes the IPEEE generic letter.
















~ • • 3
OFFIGIA,b USE ONLY SE~YRITY RELATE9 INFf)~MAllON”‘”
July 1998 – Licensee applied for renewal of operating. ficerise for all thr~e·units. In the vah,ie impact results
for potenUally cost-beneficial Severe Accident Mitigation Alternatives (SAMA), the licensee considered
increasing the height of the 5-ft flood walls. However, it was not deemed co~t-effective based on the now
known underesti.rnated-JPEEE results:· It came up during the NRC’s efforts as part of the SSF hole-in-the
wall appeal process~
August”2003. – L’censee rem~ved an access cover on the so~th side of the SSF outer wall exposing it to
floods below the 5-foot level. ~icensee f~i)ed to perform. any 1 O CFR 50.65 (a)(4) or 10 CFR 50.59
evalllation (ref. RIS-2001-009) for a breached barner.
September 2004 _-During SSF sump modifications, the licensee’s SSF Risk Reduction Team identified the
need to consider increasing the height of the flood walls. This recommendation was identified in PIP 0-04-
6365, corrective action #8. However, actual corrective action #8 stated that, “Based on discussions with
the Severe Accident Analysis Group, modifications to increase the height of the flood wall around the SSF
will not be pursued at this time. Therefore, the proposed replacement SSF Sump pump should be based
on operating with flood levels up to the height of the existing flood wall surrounding the SSF.”
June 2005 – NRC inspectors notified licensee of the wall breach in the SSF. The licensee entered the
deficiency into their corrective action program.
August 2005 – After a second corrective action, the licensee corrected the condition by sealing the breach
·in the SSF wall.
April 2006 – NRC inspectors, in documenting a breach of the SSF wall as a performance deficiency, also
note the 1992 Jocassee Dam Inundation Study. Inspectors also identified a new flood flow path via the
building’s sanitary system. Both issues are documented as URls in Oconee report 2006002
(ML061180451 ). .
August 2006 – SERP meeting for the breached SSF flood barrier was assessed as preliminary WHITE with
the choice letter sent to the licensee. This issue would have been YELLOW if the appropriate initiating
event frequency had been utilized (this was discovered in June 2007). SSF Sanitary System issue predecisional
YELLOW.
October 2006 – Licensee provided written response to the NRC choice letter to waive a regulatory
conference.
November 2006 – During caucus, it was recommended by NRR that Sanitary System issue be processed
as a Finding. Oconee’s position in the action matrix was then noted.
November 2006 – Final significance determination of WHITE was issued for breached SSF Flood Barrier
(Oconee report 2006017, ML063260282).
December 2006 – Licensee appeals the determination. Requested NRC to accept an incomplete, undocketed,
Jocassee seismic fragility study. (ML063620092)
January 2007 – Appeal panel was convened with Region II, Region IV and Headquarters personnel.
February 2007 – Licensee sent completed seismic fragility analysis of Jocassee to NRC one month late .
March 2007 – Appeal panel upheld the WHITE finding based on random dam failure alone .
(ML070610458)
May 2007 – Licensee requested reassessment of the final determination of the appeal panel.
(ML072970510)
June 2007 – Team assembled to evaluate seismic analysis. Flooding expert reviewed the random failure
frequency for Jocassee Dam. NRC staff determined that the failure probability of Jocassee Dam was on
the order of 2 x 10-4 events/yr for a sunny day failure. This was a factor of 1 O greater than the licensee’s
probability of dam failure (1.5 x 1 o-5
). The NRC calculation included the failure of two earthen dams. The
licensee’s calculation did hot include the earthen dam failures calculation because they determined they
were not applicable because_ ~ocassee v11as a rock filled dam. With the NRC’s frequency of 2 x 10-4 and a
CDP of 1, the CDF of 2 x 10-4 was above the threshold for an adequate protection issue. Follow up
telecom with licensee after seismic fragility analysis was evaluated. Discrepancy in dam failure frequency
was communicated to the licensee.
4
OFFICIAL US! ONLY -sEC.URITY RF• .UE6 INFORMATIOtf”
• July 2007 – Licensee response to analysis questions by email.
• July 2007 – Oconee report 2007003 issued which closes Sanitary System URI with no ehforcement action.
(ML072120140)
• September 2007 – Final SERP concluded a WHITE finding for the breached SSF Flood barrier.
• October 2007 -Associated IP95002 Supplemental Inspection (conducted in late August 2007) report
issued. (ML072850850)
• November 2007 – November 20 letter to licensee regarding the Final Significance Determination of the
SSF barrier white finding and communication of the Jocassee Dam failure frequency error. (ML073241045)
• December 2007 – NRC Region II communicated the NRC Jocassee Dam failure frequency computation to
the licensee.
• December 2007 – August 2008 – The NRC staff developed/implemented an internal backfit
assessment/flood action plan. This included pursuance of concern as an “inadequate protection” issue.
• August 2008- NRC Deputy Executive Director (DEDR) telecon to licensee Chief Nuclear Officer on
concerns over Jocassee Dam failure and Oconee site flood height. 50.54(f) letter issued August 15, 2008
(ML081640244).
• August 2008 – NRC Declines PRA Walkdown Invitation
• September 26, 2008 – Duke response to 50.54(f) letter (ML082750106)
• November 5, 2008 – Meeting with Duke (see June 18, 2009)
• December 4, 2008 – NRC Meeting Summary of 11-5-08, (ML091420319)
• February 2009 – Oconee increased SSF flood wall height to 7.5 feet
• March 13, 2009 – NRC Closed Meeting with Duke to discuss 50.54f
• April 30, 2009 – NRC RAls (ML090570779)
• May 11, 2009 – NRC closed meeting with Duke
• May 20, 2009 – Duke request to extend 60 day response
• June 1, 2009- Meeting summary of 12-4-08 (ML091420319)
• June 6, 2009 – Duke request to withhold sensitive materials
• June 10, 2009 – Duke reply to NRC’s 4-30-09 (ML091680195)
• June 18, 2009 – NRC meeting summary of 11-5-08 meeting (ML091060761)
• July 9, 2009 – Duke 60 day reply (ML092020480)
• July 9, 2009 – Summary of 6-11-09 meeting on flooding (ML091620675)
• August 12, 2009 – NRC memo justifies continued operation to Nov201 O (ML090570117)
• October 28, 2009 – NRC closed meeting with Duke to discuss flood analyses
• November 10, 2009- NRC Summary of 5-11-09 Closed Meeting (ML092940769)
• November 30, 2009 – Duke provides external flood analysis and corrective action plan (ML093380701)
• December 2, 2009 – NRC Closed Meeting
• January 15, 201 O – Duke provides external flood interim actions (ML 100210199)
• January 29, 2010 – NRC Evaluation of Duke 50.54f Response w/ RAl’s (ML 100271591)
• February 8, 2010- Duke External Flood RAI Response (ML 100470053)
• February 26, 2010 – Duke External Flood Revised Commitments (ML 100610674)
• March 5, 2010 – Duke RAI Response Letter (ML 103430047)
• March 5, 2010 – NRC memo justifies to 11-30-11 for flood protection modifications (ML 103410042)
• March 15, 2010- NRR memo calculates failure frequency for Jocassee Dam as 2.8E-4 per year
(ML 100780084)
5
-OF-FICJA.L l:JSE ONLY seeURITY R~RMATION
• May 27, 2010 – Duke modifies external flood interim actions provided in January 15, 2010, letter
(ML 101600468)
• June 3, 2010 – Duke correspondence providing list of commitments for external flood (ML 101610083)
• June 10, 2010 – Region II completed inspection of interim compensatory measures (ICMs)
• June 22, 2010 – Region ti issued CAL on Ocone~ external flood. (ML 101730329) CAL directed licensee
to:
Implement ICMs as documented in the June 3, 2010 letter
Submit to the NRC by August 2, 2010, all documentation necessary to demonstrate to the NRC that the
inundation of the Oconee site resulting from the failure of the Jocassee Dam has been bounded
Submit by November 30, 2010, a list of all modifications necessary to adequately mitigate the
inundation
Make all necessary modifications by November 30, 201 ·1
• June 24, 2010 – Duke RAI response date change, (ML 101830007), 3 pages
• July 7, 2010 – NRC Inspection Report for CAL ICMs, (ML 101880768 non-public, ML 101880769-public)
• August 2, 2010 – Duke provides inundation study (CAL item) (ML 102170006)
• October 26, 201 O – DE memo to DORL on bounding of flood (ML 102990064)
• November 29, 201 O – Oconee provides high level, conceptual list of possible modifications (CAL
requirement). This was not the detail staff desired. Letter stated they needed to know what Case to use so
they knew what flood height to protect against and stated they would provide a final list by April 30, 2011.
(ML 103490330)
• January 28, 2011 – Staff issues safety evaluation of inundation study. Letter informed Duke that the staff
considered Case 2 to be adequate to bound (Reservoir 111 O full pond, bottom breach el 800 ft, width 425
ft, time-to-failure 2.8 hours) (ML 110280153)
• April 29, 2011 – Oconee provides list of modifications\ (intake dike diversion wall, dedicated flood protected
offsite power, power block diversion wall, turbine building and yard drain isolation, SFP makeup via rerouted
SSF ASW miniflow line). Completion times determined by FERG and NRC (LAR) approvals plus 30
months. (ML 111460063)
Licensee made clear in this letter that they still considered this external flood to be a beyond “DBE” as
described in their licensing basis which clearly states that DBE’s are only those events in Ch 15 of the
FSAR.
Licensee will not build and treat flood protection features as QA 1/safety related
• August 18, 2011 – NRC sends Oconee RAI concerning April 29 2011 , letter focused on more details on
the flood is a beyond DBE, that natural phenomena are not DBEs, justification for assumptions used to
develop mitigation strategies, actions for mitigation strategies, justification for not installing the
modifications IAW 50 Appendix 8. (ML 11174A138)
• October 17, 2011 – Duke responds to August 18 RAls (ML 11294A341)
• April 29, 2011 to present – NRC transmitted and Duke responded to multiple rounds of communications
to resolve/establish: 1) construction/quality standards to be applied to flood protection features, 2) the
timeline for completing modifications, and 3) a better understanding of the planned modifications, including
implications of the results of the flooding hazard re-evaluations required by the Fukushima 50.54(f) letter
recommendation 2.3 on flooding.
• March 12, 2012 – NRC Fukushima 50.54(f) letter (ML 12053A340) ·
• May 15, 2012- NRG CAL RAls (2 RAls on flood wall design) (ML 12129A186)
• June 14, 2012 – Duke’s response to NRC RAls. Duke requests clarification on acceptable standards for
flood walls and posed 2 questions (does the flood SE cover Fukishima 50.54(f) evaluation and, if not, will
the CAL be closed to the Fukishima 50.54(f) letter). (ML 12167A372)
ol a I •
6
OFFICIAL l:JSE 0Nb¥ SECURl!Y.RaAfEO INFORMATION”
• September 4, 2012-Staff briefed JLD steering committee on Oconee flooding. JLD steering committee
agrees with staffs recommendation on endorsing use of FERC standards for building flood protection
features.
• September 20, 2012- Staff issues letter answering Duke’s June 14, 2012, letter, accepts FERG standards
for flood walls, and establishes start date and end date for modification timeline (ML 12219A163).

Post

2008-10-26 – NRC – Jocassee Dam – Why did the Oconee flood issue take many years to address

Why did the Oconee flood issue take many years to address?
In 1977, the NRC initi”ated the Systematic Evaluation Program (SEP) to review the designs of 51
older, operating nuclear power plants. The staff compared the design of 10 of 51 older plants to
the Standard Review Plan issued in 1975. The staff’s review identified 27 issues, including dam
integrity and site flooding that required some improvements at one or more of the 1 O plants that
were reviewed. These issues were captured under NRC’s Generic Safety Issue – 156, SEP,
which describes how the NRC resolved the 27 SEP issues for the remaining 41 plants including
Oconee. Generic Safety Issue 156.1.2, Dam Integrity and Site Flooding, credited the agency’s
Individual Plant Examination of External Events (IPEEE) program to close the items because
licensees were expected to address upstream dam failures if it could cause significant site
flooding. In the NRC’s 1991 Generic Letter 88-20, Supplement 4, ‘IPEEE for Severe Accident
Vulnerabilities’, NRC requested that licensees assess their facilities for potential severe accident
vulnerabilities (i.e., beyond design basis events) and consider po.tential enhancements.
During a 1994 NRC service water team inspection at Oconee, inspectors identified that the
1992 Duke Hydro Inundation Study predicted flood waters well in excess of the 5 ft walls that
protect the SSF. The staff’s inspection report shows the licensee argued that the Jocassee Dam
failure was a beyond design basis event for the plant. The licensee committed to address the
issue in the Oconee lPEEE, and on this basis, the staff closed the inspection issue in 1994. By
NRC memorandum dated October 61 1994, Region II staff met with NRR staff on September 1,
1994 regarding several design-related safety issues for Oconee Including the Jocassee-dam
flood issue. The meeting’summary memo shows that NRR staff had not informed RES of the
issue, and NRR staff stated that the external event hazards preliminary review of Oconee would
take several .months. The memo stated that NRR staff considered the issue of minimal
importance. The memo does not provide explanation of the basis of NRR staff views. Region II
staff informed NRR of recent high water levels at the Jocassee and Keowee dams. In 2008
discussions with the memo’s author, it appears that NRR staff did not fully recognize the
potential consequences and was focused on the other Oconee issues regarding the
performance of safety-related equipment (e.g., ECCS) under design-basis conditions.
Duke submitted its IPEEE in 1995 which included an assessment of the Jocassee Dam flood
·hazard. The staffs evaluation of the IPEEE did not take issue with the derivation of the dam
break frequency or take issue with other reduction factors that Duke used to reduce their risk
estimates .of external flood events to justify no plant protection for floods in excess of Sft at the
SSF grade level. Duke did not note in the submittal or subsequent updates that there existed a
recent inundation study that was the subject of an NRC inspection issue. In 2000, the staffs
IPEEE closeout letter to the licensee stated that based on the review of the information
contained in the submittal, the staff considered Duke’s process capable of identifying potential
vulnerabilities associated with these issues at Oconee. The NRC further noted that “on the basis
that no vulnerabilities associated with the external events aspects of these issues were
identified, the staff considers external event Issues resolved. n The closeout letter cites a
dominant contributor to residual risk involved Jocassee dam failures and flood heights
exceeding the 5-foot high SSF flood barrier, thus rendering the SSF inoperable.
In 2008 dis9ussions with RES staff involved in the IPEEE reviews, the staff was unaware of the
Duke Hydro/FER.C 1992 inundation study and the related service water inspection finding in
1994. From the· staff’s review of I PE EE-related correspondence and available contractor
assessments, there is no documented evidence that the J\3.taff questioned the dam-break
frequency estimate or Duke’s use of a reduction factor to lower the risk estimate of a potential
Jocassee dam break. The reduction factor was an assumption that only 20 percent of Jocassee
dam breaks result in flooding at the Oconee site greater than the 5 foot walls protecting the SSF
entrances.
The issue reappeared in April of 2006 when the NRC concluded that the licensee failed to
effectively control maintenance activities associated with removing a fire suppression refill
access cover (a passive NRC committed flood protection barrier) in the SSF south wall to
facilitate installation of temporary electrical power cables. The staff indentified the issue during a
periodic risk-informed flood inspection under the ,NRC’s Reactor Oversight Process (ROP).
Using the ROP Significance Determination…Br-ocess, the staff discovered that the licensee may
not have adequately addressed the potential consequences of flood heights predicted at the
Oconee site based on the 1992 Duke Hydro/FERC Inundation Study. In 2007, the staff
conducted an independent review of the Jocassee Dam failure frequency that Duke had used in
the Oconee Probabilistic Risk Assessment (PRA). From that review, the staff concluded that a
higher frequency estimate of Jocassee Dam failure was more appropriate and that the
licensee’s estimate was not adequately supported by operating experience and actual
performance data of similar rock-filled dam structures. The staff also concluded that Duke had
an inadequate basis for appJying a reduction factor to further lower the risk estimate (i.e., the
assumption that only 20 percent of floods would exceed the existing 5 foot walls).
In December of 2007, the staff initiated a design adequacy review and developed an action plan
to assess the Oconee facility’s ability to withstand severe flood events from a postulated
Jocassee Dam break. Staff assessed the design basis, researched prior licensing actions
related to flood protection, and reviewed other information to determine if the current plant
design meets NRC regulatory expectations. The staff used a collaborative, consensus-building
approach among 4 NRR Divisions and OGC to ensure appropriate regulatory practices were
followed (e.g., backfit analysis). Based upon the draft backfit analysis, NRC concluded that an
adequate protection backfit may be appropriate and further determined that additional
information from the licensee was required before additional regulatory action is taken. The
staff is reviewing the licensee’s September 26, 2008 response letter to NRC’s 50.54(f) letter.
Compliments·of
GREENPEACE

Post

1988-10-25 – MDNR – West Lake Landfill – Letter to EPA requesting determination of Hazard Ranking Score

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FREDERICK A. BRL’NNKR “”X” “”VM-m ,» M.in^-tm-m x-rvuvi)
irix.t,,r STATI: (>i MI>S(>riu nm>i,,n ,,f |.arkv R^…^,,,,.
DEPARTMENT OF NATURAL RESOURCES “” “1N”W”””Jllim
Di\’isioN OF I:NVIRONMI;NTAL gi’Ai.nv
I’.O. Box 176
Jefferson City. MOdSI()2
October 25, 1988
Mr. David Wagoner, Director
Waste Management Division
U.S. EPA Region VII
726 Minnesota Avenue
Kansas City, KS 66101
Dear Mr. Wagoner:
The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Conmission (NRC) staff recently released
a report (NUREG-1308, June, 1988) on the radioactive wastes at the
Westlake Landfill in St. Louis County, Missouri.
In the report the NRC staff concludes that “(1) measures must be
taken to establish adequate permanent control of the radioactive
waste and to mitigate the potential long term impacts from its
existing storage conditions and (2) the information developed is
inadequate for a determination of several important issues, i.e.,
whether mixed wastes are involved, and whether on-site disposal is
practical technologically, and, if so, under what alternative
methods.” However, the report does not indicate whether the NRC will
take any further action at the site and informal communication with
the NRC staff indicates that NRC does not intend to take further
action.
The suggestion has been made by a number of state and local officials
and citizen’s groups that the U.S. Department of Energy should
undertake action at the site under the Formerly Utilized Sites
Remedial Action Program (FUSRAP). However, a letter from DOE was
received by the Missouri Department of Natural Resources on
October 30, 1987 which states that [‘the DOE has reviewed the
possibility of the Westlake Landfill being designated as a FUSRAP
site and has concluded, based on the criteria used to designate
FUSRAP sites, that the Westlake Landfill is not eligible for
consideration as a FUSRAP site. The radioactive waste was under
Nuclear Regulatory Commission license when it was brought to the
landfill and, consistent with current DOE policy, would not be
disposed of at a DOE site.”
Mr. David Wagoner
October 25, 1988
Page 2
Since no further activity is planned at the site by either the NRC or
the DOE, I request that the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency
(EPA) determine the Hazard Ranking Score (HRS) for this site and, if
appropriate, place the site on the National Priorities List (NPL).
This ranking should be conducted using all currently available
information on the site. Further, I request that EPA initiate the
Superfund process to determine potentially responsible parties and,
if necessary, initiate enforcement action to begin an appropriate
remedial action.
The Missouri Department of Natural Resources believes that the
current uncontrolled condition of the radioactive waste at the
Westlake Landfill is unacceptable and we are interested in expediting
action at this site. Please contact me if you have any questions
regarding MDNR’s position on this matter.
Sincerely,
DIVISION OF ENVIRONMENTAL QUALITY
William C. Ford/Director
WCF/dbc
cc: Mr. Jim Fiore, DOE
Mr. Germain LaRoche, NRC

Post

2013-01-17 – NRC – AUDIO – Inspector General Interrogation – Concern NRC staffer did not work through internal channels

2013-01-17 – NRC – Audio – Inspector General’s agents concern that NRC staffer did […]

Post

1995-03-09 – NRC – EPA – West Lake Landfill – Policy Issue – Deferral of Regulatory oversight to EPA

RECEIVED
2 2 1995
‘***
March 9, 1995
FOR:
FROM:
SUBJECT:
POLICY ISSUE
(Notation Vote) SECY-95-056
The Commissioners
James M. Taylor
Executive Director for Operations **
DEFERRAL OF REGULATORY OVERSIGHT TO THE U.S.
ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY FOR TWO
SITES WITH RADIOACTIVE CONTAMINATION AND
LANDFILL DISPOSAL OF LICENSED MATERIAL FROM
REMEDIATION OF A THIRD SITE
PURPOSE:
To obtain the Commission’s approval for the staff to defer to the U.S.
Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) for the oversight of remediation
activities involving radioactive contamination at two sites and for staff’s
intent to allow disposal of licensed radioactive material in a hazardous waste
landfill.
SUMMARY:
The Nuclear Regulatory Commission and EPA conduct regulatory programs for site
remediation under the Atomic Energy Act (AEA) and the Resource Conservation
and Recovery Act (RCRA), and the Comprehensive Environmental Response,
Compensation, and Liability Act (CERCLA), respectively. Under certain
conditions, NRC staff believes it would be appropriate for NRC to defer to
EPA, or an authorized State environmental protection program, for the
oversight of remediation of radioactively contaminated sites under NRC
Contact: Heather M. Astwood, NMSS
415-5819
NOTE: TO BE MADE PUBLICLY AVAILABLE WHEN THE FINAL SRM IS MADE AVAILABLE.
Enclosure
The Commissioners – 2 –
jurisdiction. The staff is proposing to defer, to ERA and an authorized State
environmental program, regulation of remediation of two unlicensed sites:
E.I. DuPont, Newport, DE; and West Lake Landfill, Bridgeton, MO. In addition,
the staff intends to authorize disposal of licensed material generated from
remediating Dow Chemical sites in Midland and Bay City, MI, in a hazardous
waste landfill regulated by the Michigan Department of Natural Resources under
the EPA-authorized RCRA program. Remediation activities at these sites are at
various stages of completion. Based on reviews to date, the staff believes
that the remedial actions and disposal required by ERA, or the authorized
State program, will be sufficient to protect the public and the environment
from the risks associated with the radioactive contamination at these sites.
Deferral would conserve Federal and licensee resources, streamline the
remediation process by eliminating duplicative agency reviews, and simplify
the review process by consolidating regulatory oversight within a single
agency. If the Commission approves deferral and disposal, the staff would:
continue to provide limited technical assistance to ERA or State agencies, on
request, for all sites (licensed and non-licensed); monitor remediation
activities; and review all relevant documents developed by the licensee and
ERA or State for each site with an NRC license.
BACKGROUND:
As part of NRC’s decommissioning program for nuclear facilities under the AEA,
some contaminated facilities pose special problems because of the presence of
both non-radiological and radiological hazards, limited technical and
financial viability of licensees, and concurrent regulatory jurisdiction over
various aspects of decommissioning. Some of the sites are being, or w i l l be,
remediated under EPA’s Superfund Program, in accordance with CERCLA and the
National Contingency Plan in 40 CFR Part 300. Other sites involve assessment
and disposal of hazardous waste under EPA’s RCRA Program. Similar interfaces
exist between NRC and State regulatory programs, in which EPA’s authority
under CERCLA and RCRA has been delegated to States. ERA actively promotes
delegation of the RCRA program to authorized States and tends to defer to
States that are w i l l i n g to oversee preparation of the Remedial
Investigation/Feasibility Studies (RI/FS) for individual sites.
Although the RCRA and CERCLA Programs both address hazards to the environment,
CERCLA is the more comprehensive statute because it addresses both operating
and inactive facilities and includes hazardous materials, as well as source,
special nuclear, and byproduct material as defined in the AEA. The staff
previously discussed EPA’s RCRA and CERCLA Programs in SECYs 93-235 and
93-322. RCRA uses a general regulatory program to manage hazardous waste from
generation to ultimate disposal. CERCLA provides authority to respond
whenever there is a release or potential release of hazardous material. The
facility owner or operator implements RCRA corrective action, whereas CERCLA
responses may be implemented by a number of different parties, including
private or public responsible parties, States, or Federal authorities. CERCLA
“hazardous substances” include RCRA “hazardous wastes,” as well as toxic
pollutants under the Clean Water Act (CWA), Clean Air Act (CAA), and Toxic
Substances Control Act (TSCA). Although source, special nuclear, and
byproduct materials are excluded from regulation under CWA, TSCA, and RCRA,
they are included under the CAA, so they are included within the scope of
CERCLA. Consequently, ERA can require remediation of both non-radiological
The Commissioners – 3 –
and radiological contamination, including source, special nuclear, and
byproduct material, in accordance with CERCLA.1
As a general policy, ERA has declined listing NRC-licensed sites for
remediation on the National Priorities List (NPL), in deference to NRC
regulation under the AEA, provided that remediation is progressing under an
NRC license. However, ERA has required remediation under RCRA or CERCLA at
sites that exhibited non-radiological contamination (e.g., chromium
contamination at the Shieldalloy facility in Newfield, NJ) or that were
licensed by Agreement States (e.g., Homestake uranium mill in Milan, NM).
Based on the most recent version of the NPL (February 1994), the total number
of sites listed on the NPL is 1191. The Superfund Program is wellestablished,
and has defined remediation procedures and criteria, including
those that address radioactive materials. Although the remediation process
and criteria are not identical to NRC’s, they are parallel in scope and
purpose, and in the staff’s judgment, are generally adequate for the
protection of the public and the environment. A detailed explanation of the
Superfund site remediation and closure process is given in Enclosure 1 of
SECY-93-235.
The Commission has previously considered staff recommendations to establish
procedures for transferring sites from NRC to EPA, for remediation under the
Superfund Program. In a staff requirements memorandum (SRM) concerning
SECY-89-224, dated August 22, 1989, the Commission stated that it w i l l decide
whether to pursue the transfer of sites, to EPA, for remediation, on a
case-by-case basis, or through a memorandum of understanding (MOD). The
March 16, 1992, general MOD between EPA and NRC explicitly excludes matters
arising under CERCLA and RCRA. Since the general MOU was signed, NRC staff
has negotiated site-specific cooperative agreements for remediation of the
Homestake uranium m i l l , under CERCLA, and the Sequoyah Fuels and Engelhard
Corporation facilities, under RCRA. The staff is also currently discussing
cooperative agreements with State agencies in Ohio and Pennsylvania.
In another SRM dated December 21, 1989, the Commission rejected the staff’s
recommendation to develop a protocol with EPA to govern the application of
Superfund to contaminated sites. Instead of developing a protocol, the
Commission directed the staff to provide, for each site the staff proposes to
defer to EPA or a State agency, under Superfund, analyses of: (1) the cleanup
standard that would apply under Superfund, and the differences between that
standard and the AEA standard; (2) the rights and authorities the State would
have if Superfund were extended to the site; and (3) the rights and
authorities that private citizens would have to sue the Federal Government or
the licensee(s), using the citizen-suit provisions of Superfund.
More recently, the staff proposed to the Commission, in SECY 93-235, to
communicate with EPA about transferring the Safety Light Corporation (SLC)
site at Bloomsburg, PA, to EPA, to supervise site remediation under Superfund.
The rationale for the transfer was to accelerate the remediation of the site
1 CERCLA does not cover releases that are subject to NRC required
financial protection pursuant to Section 170 of the AE Act (i.e., Price
Anderson), nor releases from a processing site under Title I of the Uranium
Mill Tailing Radiation Control Act of 1978.
The Commissioners – 4 –
and limit the Federal resources devoted to the litigation to compel SLC to
remediate the site. The paper explained that during the first half of 1993,
the staff and the licensee tried unsuccessfully to settle the litigation and
the staff believed, as of the date of the paper, that further negotiations
would be futile and litigation would resume shortly. While the Commission was
considering SECY-93-235, the parties resumed negotiations; and in an SRM dated
November 2, 1993, the Commission returned SECY-93-235 to the staff,
“…pending the outcome of the negotiations,” and instructed the staff to
“…keep the Commission informed of further developments and, based on the
outcome of the negotiations, submit recommendations for further action to the
Commission, should that be necessary.” The staff recently completed
negotiations with SLC and successfully concluded a settlement agreement that
governs characterization and remediation planning for the Bloomsburg site.
In a related matter, SECY-93-136 presented the Commission with an analysis of
the State of Utah decision to allow Envirocare of Utah to use only
institutional controls as a means of reducing the risk to the public health
and safety after closure, without government land ownership. ERA regulations
do not always require government land ownership of sites such as these. The
Commission determined that this approach was adequate for protection of the
public health and safety in this particular case, and in a Director’s Decision
under 10 CFR 2.206 issued by the Office of State Programs on January 26, 1995,
the Commission did not revoke Utah’s Agreement State status.
DISCUSSION:
At sites where radioactive and non-radioactive materials are located in
distinct and separate areas, NRC and ERA oversight and regulation of remedial
actions can proceed effectively and efficiently. Although the effectiveness
of the government’s response and oversight can be strengthened through
interagency cooperation, each area can be remediated independently in
accordance with each agency’s requirements and administrative process.
However, independent regulation of remedial activities is not always possible.
There are some sites that contain commingled radioactive and non-radioactive
contamination. At other sites, the contamination is not commingled, but
remediation of one type of contamination would affect the responsible party’s
ability or approach to characterization and remediation of the other type of
contamination. In other cases, although the predominant hazard may be
associated with one type of contamination, the licensee or property owner is
not capable, technically or financially, to remediate either type of
contamination, thus preventing timely and effective completion of necessary
decommissioning or remedial actions. In yet other cases, the responsible
party desires a coordinated government response to reduce overall costs,
improve efficiency, and promote a compatible solution for both types of
contamination.
Under certain circumstances, the staff believes it would be appropriate for
NRC to defer to ERA or authorized State oversight of remediation efforts,
under CERCLA, RCRA, or State statutes. Deferral at these sites would reduce
the amount of duplicative effort by both agencies and by the site owners. For
example, the types of analyses performed by ERA as part of the development of
the RI/FS, under CERCLA (40 CFR 300.430), are very similar to the analyses
The Commissioners – 5 –
conducted by NRC in developing an Environmental Impact Statement (EIS) under
the National Environmental Policy Act of 1969 (NEPA) and 10 CFR Part 51. Both
agencies require submission of fairly extensive information on the
environmental characteristics of the contaminated sites and the nature and
extent of contamination. In addition, the agencies require preparation and
submission of a plan for implementing remedial measures found necessary to
remove or contain contamination in accordance with applicable remediation
criteria. EPA’s plan is called a Remedial Design; NRC calls this a
decommissioning plan.
Without cooperation between the agencies, therefore, it is conceivable that
site owners could be required by the government to develop separate reports
for each agency on site characterization, assessment of remediation
alternatives, projected environmental impacts, plans for remedial measures,
and documentation that the remedial measures were appropriately implemented.
Such an approach could result in an unnecessarily duplicative and burdensome
effort by the site owners and by the agencies.
At worst, the requirements of one agency could explicitly conflict with those
of the other agency, thus frustrating the government’s overall intent to
ensure protection of the public and the environment from residual
contamination. If, for example, EPA decided to allow hazardous waste to
remain onsite, to avoid excessive worker exposure and cost, and NRC decided
that commingled radioactive waste would have to be exhumed and disposed of
offsite, it would be difficult and burdensome, if not impossible, for the site
owner to simultaneously comply with-the requirements of both agencies. The
conflict would be especially significant if one action preceded the other
(e.g., EPA requires a cover to be placed over the waste; NRC later determines
that the radioactive waste needs to be removed for off-site disposal).
The staff believes that it is appropriate to rely on EPA’s environmental
remediation programs to ensure protection of the public and environment at the
DuPont and Westlake Landfill sites. Both cases may rely, at least in part, on
institutional controls to ensure long-term protection. As discussed
previously and in the attachments, such reliance on institutional controls is
somewhat inconsistent with NRC’s established policies for low-level
radioactive waste disposal (cf. State or Federal land ownership requirement
for low level waste disposal in 10 CFR 61.59(a)). However, the staff believes
that EPA remediation will be sufficient to provide adequate protection under
the Atomic Energy Act.
In addition, deferral to EPA provides numerous savings in terms of reducing
the administrative and regulatory burden on responsible parties conducting the
remediation and in conserving NRC staff resources. The staff estimates that
deferral of each site should save between 0.25 and 0.5 FTE per year in direct
staff resources required to oversee remediation at the sites. These resources
would partially duplicate the oversight functions that EPA staff will provide
in overseeing the safe and protective execution of the planned remedial
actions. In addition, deferral should save NRC an additional 0.5 FTE per year
and S600K in program support that could be necessary at each site to prepare
an Environmental Impact Statement (EIS) to support consideration of exemptions
from NRC’s existing requirements for decommissioning for unrestricted use.
The Commissioners – 6 –
Since November 1993, the staff has initiated several EISs to consider
exemption requests as appropriate considering the requirements in 10 CFR Part
51. Deferral should also improve the timeliness of remediation by avoiding
the potential delay that could be associated with administration of
independent and complementary regulatory approval processes for remediation.
Remediation could be further delayed by opportunities for legal challenges to
NRC approval of remedial actions.
Allowing disposal of the Dow wastes in the hazardous waste landfill cells in
Midland may also allow a small increase in the long-term risk to the public
and environment due to some reliance on institutional controls. As previously
described for the Westlake and DuPont site remediation projects, however, NRC
staff believes that such disposal would provide adequate protection of the
public, and any small increase in the associated risk is counterbalanced by
the improvements in efficiency, reduction in regulatory and administrative
burden, and savings of NRC and responsible party resources.
The staff does not consider, however, that these cases would necessarily
establish a precedent for resolution of other waste disposal and
decommissioning cases or establishment of general requirements in these areas.
The decisions on deferral and on approving waste disposal are specific to
these cases. In the cases of DuPont and Westlake Landfill, the radioactive
components appear to be intimately mixed with non-radiological contaminants
and wastes that are not subject to the Commission’s jurisdiction. In fact, at
least for some of the wastes, the dominant risks to the public and environment
may be attributable to the non-radiological contaminants. In addition, both
sites are already listed on the National Priorities List for remediation under
CERCLA, and the basis for listing and selection of the remedies included
consideration of the radiological contaminants.
In the Dow case, the staff has considered the merits of disposing of the
specific wastes present at the Dow sites and under the specified conditions
for disposal as proposed by the licensee and the State. Staff has already
approved other disposals of radioactive waste in or adjacent to hazardous
waste landfill cells in accordance with the provisions of 10 CFR 20.302 and
20.2002. Each of these disposals has been based on a site-specific review by
the NRC staff to ensure adequate protection of the public and that potential
radiological doses do not exceed NRC’s limits in 10 CFR Part 20. In most
cases, the staff has assured that the potential doses do not exceed a small
fraction of the public dose l i m i t . The Dow case is especially significant,
however, because it involves the disposal of a relatively large volume of
radioactive waste that will be generated in decommissioning an SDMP site and
that intrusion into the waste, if it were to occur, could result in doses that
may exceed the public dose limit (e.g., if the intruder were to live on top of
exposed waste for an extended period). The staff believes that the likelihood
of such intrusion is remote in the Dow case because of the design of the
disposal cells and the use of the general area for disposal of hazardous
waste. It is likely that an intruder into the waste would recognize that a
waste disposal cell had been breached and could suffer risk from the nonradiological
contaminants in adjacent cells even if the NRC did not authorize
disposal of the radioactive waste.
The staff would be prepared to entertain similar requests to the Dow request
from licensees to dispose of licensed material in hazardous waste landfills or
The Commissioners – 7 –
other suitable disposal facilities (e.g., monofills, sanitary landfills) in
accordance with the requirements of 10 CFR 20.2002. In such cases, as with
the Dow case, the burden would rest with the licensee to demonstrate that the
requirements of 10 CFR Part 20 will be satisfied, specifically that the
potential doses will be consistent with the Part 20 limits and are as low as
is reasonably achievable. Credit for institutional controls, such as those
that accompany Dow’s proposal, would also be considered on a site-specific
basi s.
For these reasons, the staff believes that NRC should defer to EPA or State
oversight regulatory programs for specific aspects of the remediation of two
contaminated sites: E.I. DuPont, Newport, DE; Cotter Corporation (West Lake
Landfill), Bridgeton, MO; and allow disposal of radioactive waste from
remediation in a RCRA permitted landfill for Dow Chemical, Midland and Bay
City (Salzburg Landfill), MI. By deferral, the staff means a variety of
approaches depending on the specific status of the contaminated sites.
For the DuPont site, the staff proposes to recognize EPA’s approved remedial
measures under CERCLA as being sufficiently protective of the public and
environment. The site is not currently licensed by NRC; NRC licensing and
oversight of the remediation of a small quantity of thorium waste in a
landfill would not be necessary, nor required, under the AEA. No further
action would be taken by the NRC staff, unless specifically requested by EPA.
For the West Lake Landfill site, EPA has already agreed to assume lead
responsibility for the site. The West Lake Landfill is listed in NRC’s Site
Decommissioning Management Plan (SDMP). The NRC staff is proposing to defer
to EPA oversight of remedial measures under CERCLA. EPA’s remediation of the
site already considers both radioactive and non-radioactive materials. The
site is not currently licensed by NRC; the staff would take no further action
at the site after deferral, unless specifically requested by EPA. NRC would
remove the site from the SDMP after EPA completes remedial measures at the
site.
Regarding the Dow Chemical sites in Midland and Bay City, Michigan, the staff
proposes to allow the licensee to dispose of thorium-contaminated waste in a
licensee-owned and permitted hazardous waste landfill designed and operated in
accordance with the RCRA requirements administered by EPA and the State of
Michigan. The staff would authorize disposal in accordance with NRC
requirements in 10 CFR 20.2002 and support the decision with an Environmental
Assessment that would presume the effectiveness of RCRA controls in ensuring
protection of the public and environment. Regulatory responsibility for the
management and long-term control of the thorium in the disposal site would, in
theory rest with NRC. However, in terminating the license, NRC would
recognize that controls for the hazardous waste, developed under RCRA, while
relying on land use restrictions which are not dependant on State or EPA
regulatory power, w i l l be adequate for the thorium as well. In allowing
disposal in the Salzburg Landfill, NRC would be recognizing that disposal of
thorium-contaminated wastes in a hazardous waste landfill may be acceptable
under the AEA, instead of requiring offsite disposal at a licensed radioactive
waste disposal facility. The Dow storage sites are listed in the SDMP and are
being remediated under an NRC license. NRC staff would continue to license
and regulate the remedial measures directed at removing the thorium waste from
its present locations. At such time as all waste has been satisfactorily
The Commissioners – 8 –
disposed of in the hazardous waste landfill and residual radioactivity has
been reduced in accordance with existing criteria, the staff would terminate
Dow’s license for the Midland and Bay City sites and no further action would
be taken by the NRC staff.
Background information for the DuPont, Westlake Landfill, and Dow sites is
provided in Attachments 1 to 3, respectively. The potential advantages and
disadvantages of deferral for each site are summarized in Attachment 4.
Requested Analysis:
In accordance with the Commission’s previous direction on information to
support deferral decisions, the staff provides the following analyses of:
(1) the cleanup standard that would apply under Superfund and the differences
between that standard and the AEA standard; (2) the rights and authorities the
State would have if Superfund were extended to the site; and (3) the rights
and authorities that private citizens would have to sue the Federal Government
or the licensee(s), using the citizen-suit provisions of Superfund. The
following analyses are presented in generic terms that would apply to all
three sites. The discussion about remediation criteria is only pertinent at
this time to the West Lake Landfill site; ERA has already decided to stabilize
the thorium waste in place at the Dupont site, and the thorium waste from Dow
would be disposed of in an RCRA-regulated landfill cell. To compare specific
EPA and NRC remediation standards for the West Lake Landfill, more information
would be needed on the remediation criteria EPA intends to implement at that
site. EPA will determine these criteria through the RI/FS and Record of
Decision (ROD) process, as described below.
(1) Remediation Standard
As previously stated, both NRC and EPA have been granted the authority
to regulate radioactive materials, in certain situations. To determine
what remediation standards would govern the remedial actions at a
specific site, EPA would perform a Feasibility Study (FS). This study
is the basis for the development of a ROD that establishes remediation
standards and remedial actions for each site. EPA would prepare the FS
after the site had been scored and entered on the NPL, as explained in
Enclosure 1 of SECY-93-235.
EPA’s requirements for FSs in 40 CFR 300.430(e)(2)(i) require that the
lead agency establish remedial action alternatives, including
remediation objectives and goals. The remediation goals establish
acceptable exposure levels to protect human health and the environment
and are developed considering: applicable or relevant and appropriate
requirements (ARARs) under Federal or State environmental laws,
drinking-water standards and goals, water-quality criteria, and other
factors. For known or suspected carcinogens (including ionizing
radiation), acceptable exposure levels are generally concentration
levels that represent an excess upper-bound lifetime cancer probability,
for an individual, of about 10″A and a cancer probability of 10″6 for as
many in the population as practical. The 10″6 probability is used as
the point of departure for determining remediation goals when ARARs are
not available or are not sufficiently protective, because of the
presence of multiple contaminants or multiple pathways.
The Commissioners – 9 –
These risk goals do not necessarily take into account human intrusion in
the future. If human intrusion were to be considered in the dose
pathway analysis, the calculated dose for thorium contaminated sites
could be in excess of 100 mrem/yr assuming standard exposure scenarios
(e.g., resident farmer scenario). Therefore, sites with significantly
elevated thorium concentrations would not necessarily meet the
provisions of the proposed NRC rule on radiological criteria for
decommissioning (proposed amendments to 10 CFR Part 20; 59 FR 43200).
The statement of considerations for the proposed rule acknowledges that
some sites could not meet the limits proposed in the rule. Deferral to
the Federal Superfund/RCRA approach is a possible way to address these
cases.
NRC risk analyses differ from ERA risk analyses in several ways. ERA
calculates risk based on the chance of developing cancer. NRC relates
risk to both the chance of developing cancer and the chance of a
fatality as a result of cancer. NRC staff calculated the risk to a
maximally exposed member of the public who at some time in the future,
could reside on top of the site. By using a general risk estimate of
5xlO”2 fatal cancers per sievert (5xlO~4 per rem) of received dose
developed for exposure of a large population, NRC can estimate a
potential risk, to an individual, produced by a specific exposure.
Nevertheless, were an actual measured exposure to occur, the staff
recognizes that it would be more appropriate to estimate the risk to
that individual using the cancer risk tables developed by the National
Cancer Institute.
In general, NRC has not relied on institutional controls as a means for
protecting the public or the environment for decommissioning purposes.
However, ERA and DOE have relied on institutional controls to prevent or
reduce the likelihood for human intrusion and otherwise protect the
public (e.g., restrictions on groundwater use). Staff compared
regulatory considerations of institutional controls in SECY-93-322,
dated November 26, 1993. Reliance on institutional controls directly
affects projected risks to exposed humans.
Based on information provided by the ERA staff, NRC has reviewed 19 RODs
for sites that include some radiological contamination. Most cases
involved contamination by radium-226 and its decay products and other
naturally-occurring radionuclides. In most of the RODs, ERA selected
ARARs based on EPA’s standard, for remedial action, at uranium mill
tailings sites in 40 CFR Part 192. In many cases, ERA also identified
NRC guidance in Regulatory Guide 1.86 “Termination of Operating Licenses
for Nuclear Reactors,” as an ARAR for surface contamination on buildings
and equipment. Other sources of ARARs for radiological contamination
include: NRC’s air concentration limits in 10 CFR Part 20, Appendix B;
State guidance on acceptable surface contamination; DOE orders for
acceptable public and worker doses; Federal and State water quality
standards; and Federal and State air-emission limits.
The Commissioners – 10 –
(2) State Authority under Superfund
For facilities covered by CERCLA, 42 USC 9605, et sec?., the States are
encouraged to enter into cooperative agreements to enable them to
undertake certain actions, under the National Contingency Plan (NCR), as
the lead agencies. State and local response organizations are expected
to initiate measures necessary to protect the public health and safety,
consistent with the containment and cleanup requirements in the NCR.
The RI/FS required under 40 CFR 300.430(d) and (e) are to be performed
by a lead agency, in coordination with any support agencies. Under
40 CFR 300.5, the State may be designated as the lead agency to plan and
implement a response, if it is operating pursuant to a contract or
cooperative agreement, under Section 104(d)(l) of CERCLA, or designated
as the lead agency in a Superfund Memorandum of Agreement (SMOA) or
other agreement. In addition, even if the State does not serve as lead
agency, the lead agency is required to consult with the local officials
and community representatives before commencing field work for the
remedial investigation. Under 40 CFR 300.430(c), support agencies are
afforded an opportunity to identify their own ARARs, under 40 CFR
300.430(d)(3). Support agencies are to be notified, by the lead agency,
of the alternatives that will be evaluated in detail, to facilitate the
identification of ARARs and any appropriate guidance to be considered,
under 40 CFR 300.430(e)(8).
In addition to the above, 40 CFR 300.430(e)(9)(iii)(H) requires that the
State’s concerns be assessed, including its views on the preferred and
other alternatives for remedial action and the ARARs or proposed use of
waivers.
Further, 40 CFR 300.430(f)(1)(i)(C) provides that the lead agency must
consult with the State, and that State and community acceptance are
modifying criteria that are to be considered in the remedy selection.
Section 300.430(f)(4)(i) provides that the State’s views are to be
considered by the lead agency in its final remedy selection from among
the various alternatives.
(3) The Rights of Private Citizens under Superfund
As discussed above, ERA is to solicit community participation in the
identification of ARARs and other aspects of the RI/FS process. In
addition, private citizens are authorized under CERCLA to undertake a
response action to eliminate a release of a hazardous substance,
pollutant, or contaminant, subject to the citizens’ compliance with the
provisions of 40 CFR 300.700. Various mechanisms are provided in CERCLA
for a private citizen to recover the cost of such response action.
These mechanisms are summarized in 40 CFR 300.700, and include:
(a) recovery of the response cost, plus interest, from the
parties found to be liable; and (b) recovery from Superfund of the
private citizen’s reasonable costs, plus interest.
In addition, “citizens suits” are authorized under Section 310 of
CERCLA. Private citizens are authorized to commence a civil action, on
The Commissioners – 11 –
their own behalf, against: (a) any person who is alleged to be in
violation of any standard, regulation, condition, requirement, or order
under CERCLA; and (b) any Federal official who is alleged to have failed
to perform a required duty, under CERCLA. Judicial relief, in such
actions, may consist of an order to enforce and/or correct the violation
or an order imposing any civil penalty provided for the violation; and
the court may award the prevailing party his costs of litigation,
including reasonable attorney and expert witness fees.
RECOMMENDATIONS:
That the Commission:
1. Approve deferral to EPA’s CERCLA program for the remediation of the
thorium waste located on the E. I. DuPont Superfund site in Newport, DE.
2. Approve deferral to EPA’s Superfund program for remediation of the West
Lake Landfi11/Cotter Corporation site in Bridgeton, MO.
3. Approve staff’s plans to pursue a request submitted by Dow
Chemical Company for an exemption from the unrestricted release
provisions of 10 CFR 40.42(f)(3) and to authorize disposal of
thorium waste from remediation in a landfill in accordance with
10 CFR 20.2002. The landfill would be regulated under Michigan
hazardous waste regulations that implement the RCRA program for
long term control of the waste in the Salzburg Landfill cells,
including reliance on institutional and State control and longterm
monitoring of the Salzburg Landfill site in Midland, MI.
4. Note:
a. That although EPA is authorized to regulate byproduct, source, and
special nuclear material under CERCLA and CAA, the State agencies, if
they are not NRC Agreement States, are not authorized except under CAA.
That even though NRC is allowing disposal under the RCRA program
administered by EPA and Michigan Department of Natural Resources, NRC
staff will continue to regulate remediation of the Dow Chemical storage
sites in Michigan, which are currently licensed by NRC. With respect to
the disposal in the Salzburg landfill, the staff will continue to review
pertinent documents to ensure Michigan is not applying significantly
less stringent waste disposal requirements than NRC.
b. That reliance on institutional controls over the long term may not
provide as high a level of protection for the public health and
environment as that attained if there were no reliance on institutional
controls. This lower level of assurance results from the lack of a
guarantee that there will always be a responsible party to maintain the
controls.
The Commissioners – 12 –
COORDINATION:
The Office of the General Counsel has reviewed this paper and has no legal
objection. NRC staff consulted with ERA and the States of Delaware, Missouri,
and Michigan in preparing this paper. Neither ERA nor the States objected to
the staff’s proposed approach.
~2^1/L~
x , „„ /A- -^*yl^-^
/J^mes M. Ta/lor
(ecutive Director
for Operations
Attachments:
1. Bkgd Info for E.I. DuPont
2. Bkgd Info for Cotter Corporation
West Lake Landfill
3. Bkgd Info for Dow Chemical
4. Adv/Disadv of Prop Options by Site
Commissioners’ comments or consent should be provided directly to the Office
of the Secretary by COB Friday, March 24, 1995.
Commission Staff Office comments, if any, should be submitted to the Commissioners
NLT March 17, 1995, with an information copy to the Office of the Secretary.
If the paper is of such a nature that it requires additional review and comment,
the Commissioners and the Secretariat should be apprised of when comments may
be expected.
Distribution:
Commissioners
OGC
OCAA
DIG
OPA
OCA
ACNW
Region I
Region III
EDO
SECY
BACKGROUND INFORMATION FOR THE
E.I. DUPONT NEWPORT, DELAWARE, SITE
The E.I. DuPont site is located in Newport, Delaware, near 1-95, 1-495, and
the Christina River. The entire site is approximately 485,600 m2 (120 acres)
and contains a paint pigment production facility, a chromium dioxide
production facility, and two industrial landfills (North and South) which are
closed.
DuPont was licensed by the U.S. Atomic Energy Commission (AEC) and began using
radioactive materials at this site in 1961, for the processing of thorium into
metal alloys. The alloys consisted mostly of nickel, some chromium and
molybdenum, and thorium (approximately 2 to 5 percent by weight thorium-232).
Waste materials from this process were buried in the North Landfill,
reportedly, in accordance with 10 CFR 20.304 regulations that were in effect
at the time. According to DuPont, the thorium waste was placed in glass jars
that were subsequently placed in 55-gallon barrels together with disposable
protective clothing and debris from the waste-handling operations. The
barrels were then buried in a specific, although uncertain, section of the
North Landfill and covered with 3 m (10 feet) of soil. The area where the
thorium was buried is estimated to be 40 m by 10 m (130 ft by 35 ft) and
contains approximately 20 tons of thorium metal, which were placed in the
North Landfill over a 7 year period.
DuPont believes most of the thorium in the North Landfill consists of thorium
oxide, a relatively insoluble form of thorium. However, DuPont’s records, as
well as information in the Nuclear Regulatory Commission’s docket files,
indicate that thorium nitrate, a more soluble form of thorium, and other salts
could also have been disposed of in the North Landfill. Long-term releases
from these other forms of the thorium waste could be greater than from the
thorium oxide. They could also pose a greater threat to shallow groundwater
beneath the North Landfill site, because of leaching and subsequent transport.
The thorium burials comprised a small portion of the North Landfill area. The
remaining portion of the North Landfill was used for the disposal of
lithophone wastes (an inorganic paint pigment based on zinc and barium),
organic pigment wastes, chromium wastes, and other miscellaneous wastes,
including the off-specification thoriated nickel and other thorium wastes.
The Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) initiated the Comprehensive
Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act (CERCLA) Program for
remediation of the site in the 1980s and proposed the site for inclusion on
the National Priorities List (NPL) in 1987. EPA proposed the site for
remediation under CERCLA because of extensive non-radiological contamination.
DuPont used historical records and interviews with retired employees to
estimate the quantity of thorium that was buried in the l a n d f i l l . However,
the records are not complete and the exact quantity and form of the thorium
are not known. Although the entire DuPont site is currently undergoing
remediation, remediation of the North Landfill is of the most concern to NRC
because of the thorium buried in the landfill. The North Landfill is only a
small section of the entire 120-acre site.
Attachment 1
-2-
Based on available records of the burials, NRC staff believes that at least
some of the thorium wastes in the North Landfill exceeds the concentration
criteria in Options 1 and 2 of the 1981 Branch Technical Position (BTP)
entitled: “Disposal or Onsite Storage of Thorium or Uranium Wastes from Past
Operations” (46 FR 52061). NRC identified these criteria as the pertinent
release criteria in the Site Decommissioning Management Plan (SDMP) Action
Plan of April 16, 1992 (57 FR 13389) coupled with the principle that residual
radiation be reduced to as low as is reasonably achievable (ALARA). Because
thorium concentrations are expected to exceed these criteria in some areas by
a substantial margin (e.g., 10,000 pCi/g thorium-232), the NRC staff would
generally not consider onsite disposal as a viable disposal action.
In addition, as described above, it is possible that there are soluble forms
of thorium in the landfill, which could become mobile and enter the
groundwater beneath the site or the river adjacent to the site. DuPont has
not attempted to characterize the thorium waste in the landfill for the
following reasons: (1) the exact location of the thorium in the landfill is
not known; (2) intrusive and extrusive sampling may be necessary because the
waste is very heterogeneous, which would make accurate sampling through a
limited number of boreholes difficult; and (3) exposure to the hazardous
material in the landfill would cause risks to workers during the
characterization and sampling process.
Monitoring well sampling found slightly elevated levels of radium-226 and
radium-228 in the groundwater adjacent to the landfill. DuPont believes the
elevated levels are representative of background. Elevated levels of radium
were not found in surrounding wells or in wells located between the landfill
and the well containing the elevated readings.
EPA w i l l require DuPont to place a low-permeability cover system over the
landfill, capable of reducing infiltration by over 99 percent, to minimize
groundwater contamination below the site. In addition, DuPont is required to
construct a physical barrier wall extending from the top on the landfill,
along the river bank and down to the base of the Columbia aquifer. This wall
w i l l cause mounding of the groundwater in the landfill. Groundwater
extraction wells w i l l be installed to control this mounding. The recovered
groundwater shall be treated. This wall will prevent the contaminated
groundwater from entering the river. Monitoring will be needed to ensure
there will not be erosion of the river bank and the potential for erosion from
the river into the landfill itself.
The potential risks produced by the thorium contamination are small compared
with the risks posed by the other hazardous waste in the North Landfill, as
well as the materials on the remaining portions of the site. EPA’s risk
assessment supporting the ROD concluded that non-radiological risks
predominate over radiological risks associated with the thorium waste buried
in the landfill. EPA requires in the ROD that DuPont: monitor groundwater to
detect any potential migration of thorium or its decay products; apply
institutional controls to restrict public access to the waste and to
groundwater beneath and adjacent to the site; and assess the existence of
radiological contamination at other locations onsite. The remedial action
identified in the ROD was developed through a public process that involved
DuPont, State of Delaware, local community officials, members of the public,
and other interested parties.
The NRC staff believes that the remedial action required by EPA, under CERCLA,
-3-
would be sufficient to protect the public and the environment from the risks
associated with the thorium waste. Although NRC and ERA staffs suspect that a
majority of the thorium is in the relatively insoluble oxide form, there is a
possibility that some more soluble thorium compounds exist in the landfill.
However, with the cap, wall along the river bank, groundwater monitoring,
institutional controls, and groundwater use restrictions, the staff believes
that any significant contamination of the groundwater by thorium is unlikely
to occur. However, if it does, the staff believes the contamination would be
accompanied by other contaminants, promptly detected, and mitigated before
causing any significant health or environmental hazards.
Since the site is not currently licensed by NRC, the staff would not undertake
any other activities directly related to remediation of the site, including:
performing reviews of licensing (Superfund-required) documents; undertaking
site visits or inspections; monitoring ERA progress on the remediation; and
examining the completion of cleanup activities.
BACKGROUND INFORMATION FOR THE
WEST LAKE LANDFILL/COTTER CORPORATION
BRIDGETON, MISSOURI SITE
The West Lake Landfill is a 809,000 m2 (200-acre) tract located in St. Louis
County, Missouri, approximately 16 miles northwest of downtown St. Louis.
Beginning in 1962, portions of the property were used as an unregulated dump
for solid and liquid industrial wastes, municipal refuse, and construction
debris. In 1973, Cotter Corporation, a Nuclear Regulatory Commission
licensee, disposed of over 39,000 metric tons of uranium ore processing
residues and contaminated soil in two areas covering about 64,750 m2 (16
acres) of the site. This is a relatively small portion of the larger
809,000 m2 (200-acre) site. In 1976, the unregulated landfill was closed, and
in following years, the Missouri Department of Natural Resources issued
several permits for various portions of the 809,000 m2 site. Efforts to
remediate the site included NRC survey and site characterization work in the
1980s. In 1990, the Environmental Protection Agency (ERA) listed West Lake
Landfill as a Superfund site by adding it to the National Priorities List.
Under Superfund, EPA is now regulating remediation of the site for both
radiological and other hazardous wastes.
The radioactive wastes in the two soil areas are mostly covered by other
landfill materials. The site poses no immediate radiological threat to the
public. Radioactive wastes, in concentrations greater than the current NRC
standards for unrestricted release, are found in two soil piles and include
uranium-238, thorium-230, and radium-226. Elevated levels of radioactivity
(gross alpha particle contamination) have been detected in groundwater
monitoring wells onsite, indicating slight contamination above background.
The NRC staff proposes to defer to EPA’s Superfund Program for the remediation
of uranium contamination. NRC staff has already acknowledged that EPA’s
Superfund Program is responsible for the remediation of the radioactive waste
on this site. A letter dated May 1991 states that “. . . EPA is taking the
lead for site remediation activities . . . .” NRC staff has performed limited
reviews of EPA-required documents, including the Remedial Investigation/
Feasibility Study for the site, that included considerations of both
radiological and non-radiological material onsite. The NRC staff believes the
remedial actions that would be required by EPA, under the Comprehensive
Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act (CERCLA), would be
sufficient to protect the public and the environment from the risks associated
with the uranium contamination.
Under this deferral scenario, NRC staff would continue to provide certain
technical support to EPA, at the specific request of EPA. In addition, NRC
would retain a copy of the Record of Decision in the permanent files for the
site. The staff would take no further action at the site after deferral to
EPA, since the site is not currently licensed by the NRC.
Attachment 2
BACKGROUND INFORMATION FOR THE DOW CHEMICAL COMPANY
BAY CITY AND MIDLAND, MICHIGAN, SITES
Dow Chemical Company possesses thorium-contaminated waste under a Nuclear
Regulatory Commission license at two sites in Michigan: Bay City and Midland.
The Bay City site is located 1 mile south of Saginaw Bay and is 20 miles east
of Midland, Michigan. The thorium-contaminated waste at this site is stored
in a fenced-in area owned by Dow Chemical Company. Approximately 30,500 m3
(40,000 yd3) of thorium-contaminated waste is estimated to be stored at the
Bay City site. This waste has an average concentration of 188 pCi/g thorium-
232, with a range of from 2 to 7000 pCi/g thorium-232. Dow estimates that
there are about 9.2 Ci of thorium-232 and an equivalent amount of thorium-228
at the Bay City location.
The estimated volume of the thorium-contaminated waste at the Midland site is
over 9000 m3 (12,000 yd3). The area where the waste is stored at the Midland
site measures 50 m by 90 m (160 ft by 300 ft) and is roped off. The waste is
covered by a clay cover that is approximately 1-meter thick. The thoriumcontaminated
waste storage area is located within a larger industrial complex
that Dow owns and controls access to. The radioactivity in the waste varies
substantially and ranges up to 2000 pCi/g, with an average of 29 pCi/g
thorium-232 and an equivalent activity concentration of thorium-228. Dow
estimates that there is approximately 0.46 Ci of thorium-232 in the waste at
this site.
In 1956, the U.S. Atomic Energy Commission gave Dow Chemical Company a license
to use thorium metal and compounds to produce thorium-magnesium alloys. The
alloying process produced a thorium-contaminated waste. In 1973, the license
was amended to authorize storage only at Dow’s Bay City and Midland sites in
Michigan, and at the Madison site in Illinois. The Madison site is now under
the regulatory authority of the Illinois Department of Nuclear Safety.
Thorium-contaminated waste and associated contaminated soil are currently
being stored at both sites. Dow proposes to dispose of its thoriumcontaminated
waste in two dedicated disposal cells at the Dow-owned and
operated Salzburg Landfill in Midland. The Salzburg Landfill is permitted by
the Michigan Department of Natural Resources and the Environmental Protection
Agency (ERA), for the disposal of hazardous and non-hazardous solid wastes.
The Salzburg Landfill, is relatively large [615,100 m2 (152 acres)], and is
located 1.5 miles from the Midland site and 20 miles from the Bay City site.
The proposed disposal cell design, for the thorium-contaminated waste, would
be comprised of, from the bottom, a 6 meter clay underliner with a hydraulic
conductivity of less than 10″6 cm/s; 1 meter of recompacted clay with
hydraulic conductivity of less than 10″7 cm/s; a synthetic liner with a leak
detection and removal system consisting of a 0.33-meter sand drainage layer;
1.5 meters of clay; a geosynthetic liner; and a 0.33-meter sand leachate
drainage layer. This liner would underlie the thorium-contaminated waste
which would be covered by 1 meter of clay; a 100-mil HOPE synthetic liner;
0.33 meters of drainage medium; almost a meter (91 cm) of a frost protection
layer; and 0.66 meters of top soil. No liquid wastes are allowed to be
disposed of at the Salzburg Landfill. The approximate design area for one of
the proposed thorium-contaminated waste disposal cells is 61 m (200 ft) long
by 40 m (125 ft) wide, and the other is 221 m (725 ft) long by 23 m (75 ft)
Attachment 3
-2-
wide. Both disposal cells will be covered by a unified cover. There are 16
shallow monitoring wells around the proposed disposal cells. These monitoring
wells are required under Resource Conservation and Recovery Act (RCRA) and
State of Michigan hazardous waste requirements. Groundwater monitoring wells
and domestic wells in the area are sampled as part of the Salzburg Landfill
monitoring program.
The NRC staff proposes to allow Dow Chemical Company to dispose of licensed
material in EPA-approved RCRA designed cells in accordance with 10 CFR 20.2002
and thereby be exempt from NRC’s unrestricted release criteria of 10 CFR
40.42(j)(3) [Although the amended rule does not refer to unrestricted release,
but to release in accordance with NRC requirements, the criteria of the SDMP
Action Plan apply. These are essentially unrestricted release criteria.] Dow
has requested to bury thorium-contaminated waste in the Salzburg landfill, per
10 CFR 20.2002, at concentrations above NRC’s SDMP Action Plan criteria for
unrestricted release.
There is a parallel between what is being proposed by Dow and the burial of
low-level waste under 10 CFR Part 61. The performance objectives for the
disposal of low-level radioactive waste, as stated in 10 CFR Part 61 and the
Final Environmental Impact Statement for Part 61 (NUREG-0945), are to: 1)
protect public health and safety (and the environment) over the long term; 2)
protect the inadvertent intruder; 3) protect workers and the public during the
short-term operational phase; and 4) provide long-term stability, to eliminate
the need for active long-term maintenance after operations cease. The staff
believes that disposal of the thorium waste in the landfill would be generally
consistent with these objectives, although the staff has not completed the
kind of detailed review that would be required for a license application under
10 CFR Part 61.
For thorium contamination of the type presently stored by Dow under its
license, the dominant exposure pathway is direct exposure from human
intrusion. Thorium-232 has an extremely long half-life (in excess of 14
b i l l i o n years). Thus, the potential hazard will continue to exist whether the
material is excavated and shipped to a licensed disposal site (at an estimated
cost of about $28 million if disposed at Envirocare or significantly more if
disposed at a licensed low-level waste disposal facility) or excavated and
shipped to the Salzburg Landfill (at a cost of about $5 million). The primary
safety issue then becomes how to minimize the potential for human intrusion
over the long term under either disposal alternative. Dilution of the
contamination was not considered due to the significant increases in waste
volume that would be required to substantially reduce thorium concentrations
down to levels approaching natural background for soils in the Midland area.
As a regulated hazardous waste disposal facility, institutional controls would
be required to be maintained over the Salzburg Landfill under hazardous and
solid waste regulations. Dow states that, even though the concentration of
thorium in the waste exceeds NRC’s criteria for unrestricted release, the colocation
of the thorium waste disposal cells with the hazardous and solid
waste disposal cells would offer sufficient institutional control to deter
intrusion over the long term. The institutional controls offered by hazardous
and solid waste regulations involve environmental monitoring and reporting,
maintenance and release control, and controls on the post-closure use of the
land (i.e., no disturbance of the waste or any components of the disposal
unit). There are additional requirements for post-closure financial assurance
and a schedule for closure. Dow estimates that the pre-closure operational
-3-
period for the Salzburg Landfill will extend until approximately the year
2045. The post-closure institutional control period generally lasts 30 years
and can be extended by the ERA Regional Administrator or State agency. The
Salzburg Landfill is not a remote site, but because of the existence of the
hazardous waste already buried there, the land can never be used productively
again for farming and other non-industrial applications without extensive
remediation. Dow has already imposed restrictive covenants in the Salzburg
Landfill deed, in accordance with ERA requirements for hazardous waste
landfills. If the thorium wastes are buried in the Salzburg Landfill, Dow
proposes a requirement (to be inserted into the deed) to notify NRC (or its
successor) before disturbing the landfill.
On balance, the staff believes that disposing of the thorium wastes at the
Salzburg Landfill constitutes an as low as reasonably achievable (ALARA)
approach to remediation of the Bay City and Midland sites, and that the
conditions and restrictions placed on the landfill, combined with the RCRA
regulatory and cell design provisions, provide a comparable level of
protection of human health and the environment, as is provided at other
licensed low-level waste disposal sites. In the Office of the General
Counsel’s opinion, Dow’s proposed restrictive covenants appear adequate to
support an exemption. With one exception, the restrictive covenants, and the
co-location of the thorium-contaminated waste disposal cells with hazardous
and solid waste disposal cells, appear to achieve the same effect as if this
thorium-contaminated waste were buried at a location where State or Federal
control alone is considered sufficient to guarantee institutional care.
Inadvertent intrusion into the thorium waste disposal cells would be
controlled by the restrictive covenants on the deed as proposed by Dow in its
exemption request. The one exception is that, as with the Envirocare facility
in Utah, there is no assurance that, for the very long term, there will be a
responsible party with the obligation to take additional remedial action
should this become necessary.
Therefore, NRC staff proposes to allow disposal of licensed radioactive
material in the landfill operated by Dow and regulated by ERA and the State of
Michigan. This decision would be supported by an appropriate Environmental
Assessment, which would presume the adequacy of the cell design and
institutional controls (including ERA and Michigan regulation) in protecting
humans and the environment. NRC staff would notice in the Federal Register
its intent to issue a license amendment to allow the disposal of the waste in
the Salzburg Landfill, including the exemption. Pursuant to Subpart L of 10
CFR Part 2, the notice will offer an opportunity for an informal hearing. The
hearing would include approval of the decommissioning plan and the transfer
and disposal under 20.2002 at the Salzburg l a n d f i l l . Following completion of
the necessary safety and environmental reviews, NRC staff anticipates issuing
the amendment, provided the safety and environmental reviews are favorable.
Because the Dow storage sites are currently licensed by the NRC, the staff
would monitor the remedial activities being performed by Dow to ensure that
NRC requirements are satisfied. The staff would review all pertinent
documents and would terminate the license after disposal of the radioactive
material currently in storage at the Bay City and Midland sites and the
storage sites are cleaned up to unrestricted use standards.
ADVANTAGES AND DISADVANTAGES OF
PROPOSED OPTIONS FOR EACH SITE
Attachment 4
E. I. DUPONT CORPORATION
Administrative Alternatives for the
Remediation of the Newport, Delaware, Site
Deferral to EPA Superfund NRC Maintains Responsibility
Advantages
• Allows DuPont to continue remediation activities
in a timely and effective manner.
• Reduces delays and expense produced from
duplicative regulation.
• Ensures consistency in remediation decision for
both radiological and non-radiological waste.
• Avoids need for an NRC license.
• Promotes interagency cooperation and consistency
in selection of remedial actions.
Advantages
Remediation of the thorium contamination down to
Option 1 or 2 levels2 would reduce risk to
inadvertent intruders.
Provides higher level of assurance that remediation
is conducted in a satisfactory manner, from NRC’s
perspective.
2 Option 1 or 2 of the 1981 Branch Technical Position “Disposal or Onsite Storage
of Thorium or Uranium Wastes from Past Operations.”
-2-
Disadvantages
Relies on institutional controls for protection
of the public.
Could require removal at some point in the
future, if the thorium contaminates the
groundwater.
Reduces assurance of satisfactory remediation
from NRC’s perspective.
Disadvantages
May ultimately find that current proposed
remediation is acceptable and preferable, after
additional expense and time.
If exhumation would be required, could result in
increased risk to workers from exposure to nonradiological
and radiological wastes in the landfill
and extended storage of waste pending access to
disposal facilities.
Increases costs for DuPont, ERA, and NRC.
May require additional effort to establish location
of thorium waste in landfill.
Could require NRC license.
Could delay or impair remedial actions for the other
wastes onsite, pending resolution of the thorium
waste disposal issue._____________________
-3-
WEST LAKE LANDFILL/COTTER CORPORATION
Administrative Alternatives for the
Remediation of the Bridgeton, Missouri, Site
Deferral to ERA Superfund NRC Maintains Responsibility
Advantages
• Continues established lead responsibilities
between NRC and ERA (ERA lead).
• Reduces costs and delays produced from duplicative
regulat ion.
• Avoids need for an NRC license.
• Promotes consistency in NRC and ERA remedial
deci sions.
Advantages
• Maintains NRC control of the remediation under Atomic
Energy Act.
• May result in lower risk to public and environment if
site is remediated to Option 1 or 2 levels.
• Avoids reliance on institutional controls.
Disadvantages
• Reduces assurance that NRC w i l l find the remedial
action satisfactory because ERA has not yet
selected remedial action for the uranium
contamination.
• Introduces possibility that additional remediation
may be necessary in the future.
• Places remediation outside of NRC control; no
assurance when remedial actions w i l l occur.
Disadvantages
• Increases costs and duplicative effort for regulating
agencies and Cotter Corporation.
• May delay the remediation of the non-radioactive
materials onsite.
• May produce conflicts for Cotter if NRC and ERA
approve inconsistent remedial actions.
• May require imposition of a license through order, if
Cotter objects to license and one is required.
DON CHEMICAL COMPANY
Administrative Alternatives for the
Remediation of the Midland and Bay City, Michigan, Sites
Approve Site Disposal Request Removal & Offsite Disposal
Advantages Advantages
Reduces costs and delays from duplicative
regulation.
Allows timely completion of remediation and
termination of NRC licenses for the Midland and
Bay City sites.
Could reduce public and worker risks
from near site disposal as compared to
transporting waste across country.
Promotes consistency between NRC and ERA in terms
of remediation decisions.
Maintains NRC control of the disposal of the
radioactive waste.
May reduce long-term risks if wastes were disposed
of at a licensed disposal facility for radioactive
waste that does not rely on institutional controls.
Reduces by one the number of radioactive waste
disposal sites in the country.
Disadvantages
Additional remediation under NRC control may be
necessary at the Salzburg Landfill at some point
in the future, if warranted.
Establishes precedent for disposal of radioactive
wastes in hazardous waste landfill and for
reliance on institutional controls.
Disadvantages
• Relies on limited disposal capacity for radioactive
waste.
• Increases costs for regulating agencies and Dow
Chemical.
• May delay remediation of the Midland and Bay City
sites, pending resolution of waste disposal
location.
-5-

Post

1995-06-16 – NRC – West Lake Landfill – Deferral of Regulatory Oversight to USEPA for the West Lake Landfill , Bridgeton, Missouri

UNITED STATES ftFCPll/t**
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION **l-vC|V£[)
WASHINGTON, D.C 2O555-OO01
22 m,, June 16, 1995
/• ‘ ~~ ~
Michael Sanderson, Director
Superfund Division
U.S. Environmental Protection Agency
Region VII
726 Minnesota Avenue
Kansas City, KS 66101
SUBJECT: DEFERRAL OF REGULATORY OVERSIGHT TO THE U.S. ENVIRONMENTAL
PROTECTION AGENCY FOR THE WEST LAKE LANDFILL, BRIDGETON, MISSOURI
Dear Mr. Sanderson:
The Nuclear Regulatory Commission is deferring regulatory oversight to
Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) for the remedial actions at the West
Lake Landfill site in Bridgeton, Missouri. I have enclosed a paper written by
the NRC staff entitled “Deferral of Regulatory Oversight to the U.S.
Environmental Protection Agency for Two Sites with Radioactive Contamination
and Landfill Disposal of Licensed Material from Remediation of a Third Site.”
In this paper, the NRC staff proposed to defer, to EPA, the regulation of the
remediation of two sites: E.I. DuPont, Newport, DE; and West Lake Landfill,
Bridgeton, MO. These sites contain both hazardous and radioactive waste, both
are in various stages of remediation by EPA, and neither hold a current NRC
license. The NRC staff consulted with EPA, the State, and other interested
parties in developing this paper.
The NRC and EPA conduct regulatory programs for site remediation under the
Atomic Energy Act and the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act (RCRA), and
the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act,
respectively. Based on the reviews to date, the NRC has concluded that the
remedial programs being administered by EPA at these two sites are adequate to
protect the public and the environment from the risks associated with the
radioactive contamination at these sites.
Therefore, on April 28, 1995, the Commission approved the staff’s request to
defer to EPA for the oversight of remediation activities at these two sites.
The deferral of these sites is considered in effect as of the receipt of this
letter. In addition, the West Lake Landfill will be removed from NRC’s Site
Decommissioning Management Plan (SDMP) list.
The NRC staff does not plan to take any further action on the West Lake
Landfill site unless specifically requested by EPA.
40057850
SUPERFUND RECORDS
M. Sanderson -2-
If you have any questions concerning these actions, please contact Heather
Astwood of my staff on 415-5819.
Sincerely,
Enclosure: As stated
cc: Steve Kinser, ERA RVII
Steve Sturgess, MO-DNR
Ed Sadler, MO-DNR
James W. Wagoner, DOE
Doug Borrow, Laidlaw
Conrad Bowers, Mayor
of Bridgeton, MO
Jerome T. Wolf
Charlotte Nitzel
James F. Gunn
Michael F. Weber, Chief
Low-Level Waste and Decommissioning
Projects Branch
Division of Waste Management
Office of Nuclear Material Safety
and Safeguards
RECEIVED
2 2 1995
‘***
March 9, 1995
FOR:
FROM:
SUBJECT:
POLICY ISSUE
(Notation Vote) SECY-95-056
The Commissioners
James M. Taylor
Executive Director for Operations **
DEFERRAL OF REGULATORY OVERSIGHT TO THE U.S.
ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY FOR TWO
SITES WITH RADIOACTIVE CONTAMINATION AND
LANDFILL DISPOSAL OF LICENSED MATERIAL FROM
REMEDIATION OF A THIRD SITE
PURPOSE:
To obtain the Commission’s approval for the staff to defer to the U.S.
Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) for the oversight of remediation
activities involving radioactive contamination at two sites and for staff’s
intent to allow disposal of licensed radioactive material in a hazardous waste
landfill.
SUMMARY:
The Nuclear Regulatory Commission and EPA conduct regulatory programs for site
remediation under the Atomic Energy Act (AEA) and the Resource Conservation
and Recovery Act (RCRA), and the Comprehensive Environmental Response,
Compensation, and Liability Act (CERCLA), respectively. Under certain
conditions, NRC staff believes it would be appropriate for NRC to defer to
EPA, or an authorized State environmental protection program, for the
oversight of remediation of radioactively contaminated sites under NRC
Contact: Heather M. Astwood, NMSS
415-5819
NOTE: TO BE MADE PUBLICLY AVAILABLE WHEN THE FINAL SRM IS MADE AVAILABLE.
Enclosure
The Commissioners – 2 –
jurisdiction. The staff is proposing to defer, to ERA and an authorized State
environmental program, regulation of remediation of two unlicensed sites:
E.I. DuPont, Newport, DE; and West Lake Landfill, Bridgeton, MO. In addition,
the staff intends to authorize disposal of licensed material generated from
remediating Dow Chemical sites in Midland and Bay City, MI, in a hazardous
waste landfill regulated by the Michigan Department of Natural Resources under
the EPA-authorized RCRA program. Remediation activities at these sites are at
various stages of completion. Based on reviews to date, the staff believes
that the remedial actions and disposal required by ERA, or the authorized
State program, will be sufficient to protect the public and the environment
from the risks associated with the radioactive contamination at these sites.
Deferral would conserve Federal and licensee resources, streamline the
remediation process by eliminating duplicative agency reviews, and simplify
the review process by consolidating regulatory oversight within a single
agency. If the Commission approves deferral and disposal, the staff would:
continue to provide limited technical assistance to ERA or State agencies, on
request, for all sites (licensed and non-licensed); monitor remediation
activities; and review all relevant documents developed by the licensee and
ERA or State for each site with an NRC license.
BACKGROUND:
As part of NRC’s decommissioning program for nuclear facilities under the AEA,
some contaminated facilities pose special problems because of the presence of
both non-radiological and radiological hazards, limited technical and
financial viability of licensees, and concurrent regulatory jurisdiction over
various aspects of decommissioning. Some of the sites are being, or w i l l be,
remediated under EPA’s Superfund Program, in accordance with CERCLA and the
National Contingency Plan in 40 CFR Part 300. Other sites involve assessment
and disposal of hazardous waste under EPA’s RCRA Program. Similar interfaces
exist between NRC and State regulatory programs, in which EPA’s authority
under CERCLA and RCRA has been delegated to States. ERA actively promotes
delegation of the RCRA program to authorized States and tends to defer to
States that are w i l l i n g to oversee preparation of the Remedial
Investigation/Feasibility Studies (RI/FS) for individual sites.
Although the RCRA and CERCLA Programs both address hazards to the environment,
CERCLA is the more comprehensive statute because it addresses both operating
and inactive facilities and includes hazardous materials, as well as source,
special nuclear, and byproduct material as defined in the AEA. The staff
previously discussed EPA’s RCRA and CERCLA Programs in SECYs 93-235 and
93-322. RCRA uses a general regulatory program to manage hazardous waste from
generation to ultimate disposal. CERCLA provides authority to respond
whenever there is a release or potential release of hazardous material. The
facility owner or operator implements RCRA corrective action, whereas CERCLA
responses may be implemented by a number of different parties, including
private or public responsible parties, States, or Federal authorities. CERCLA
“hazardous substances” include RCRA “hazardous wastes,” as well as toxic
pollutants under the Clean Water Act (CWA), Clean Air Act (CAA), and Toxic
Substances Control Act (TSCA). Although source, special nuclear, and
byproduct materials are excluded from regulation under CWA, TSCA, and RCRA,
they are included under the CAA, so they are included within the scope of
CERCLA. Consequently, ERA can require remediation of both non-radiological
The Commissioners – 3 –
and radiological contamination, including source, special nuclear, and
byproduct material, in accordance with CERCLA.1
As a general policy, ERA has declined listing NRC-licensed sites for
remediation on the National Priorities List (NPL), in deference to NRC
regulation under the AEA, provided that remediation is progressing under an
NRC license. However, ERA has required remediation under RCRA or CERCLA at
sites that exhibited non-radiological contamination (e.g., chromium
contamination at the Shieldalloy facility in Newfield, NJ) or that were
licensed by Agreement States (e.g., Homestake uranium mill in Milan, NM).
Based on the most recent version of the NPL (February 1994), the total number
of sites listed on the NPL is 1191. The Superfund Program is wellestablished,
and has defined remediation procedures and criteria, including
those that address radioactive materials. Although the remediation process
and criteria are not identical to NRC’s, they are parallel in scope and
purpose, and in the staff’s judgment, are generally adequate for the
protection of the public and the environment. A detailed explanation of the
Superfund site remediation and closure process is given in Enclosure 1 of
SECY-93-235.
The Commission has previously considered staff recommendations to establish
procedures for transferring sites from NRC to EPA, for remediation under the
Superfund Program. In a staff requirements memorandum (SRM) concerning
SECY-89-224, dated August 22, 1989, the Commission stated that it w i l l decide
whether to pursue the transfer of sites, to EPA, for remediation, on a
case-by-case basis, or through a memorandum of understanding (MOD). The
March 16, 1992, general MOD between EPA and NRC explicitly excludes matters
arising under CERCLA and RCRA. Since the general MOU was signed, NRC staff
has negotiated site-specific cooperative agreements for remediation of the
Homestake uranium m i l l , under CERCLA, and the Sequoyah Fuels and Engelhard
Corporation facilities, under RCRA. The staff is also currently discussing
cooperative agreements with State agencies in Ohio and Pennsylvania.
In another SRM dated December 21, 1989, the Commission rejected the staff’s
recommendation to develop a protocol with EPA to govern the application of
Superfund to contaminated sites. Instead of developing a protocol, the
Commission directed the staff to provide, for each site the staff proposes to
defer to EPA or a State agency, under Superfund, analyses of: (1) the cleanup
standard that would apply under Superfund, and the differences between that
standard and the AEA standard; (2) the rights and authorities the State would
have if Superfund were extended to the site; and (3) the rights and
authorities that private citizens would have to sue the Federal Government or
the licensee(s), using the citizen-suit provisions of Superfund.
More recently, the staff proposed to the Commission, in SECY 93-235, to
communicate with EPA about transferring the Safety Light Corporation (SLC)
site at Bloomsburg, PA, to EPA, to supervise site remediation under Superfund.
The rationale for the transfer was to accelerate the remediation of the site
1 CERCLA does not cover releases that are subject to NRC required
financial protection pursuant to Section 170 of the AE Act (i.e., Price
Anderson), nor releases from a processing site under Title I of the Uranium
Mill Tailing Radiation Control Act of 1978.
The Commissioners – 4 –
and limit the Federal resources devoted to the litigation to compel SLC to
remediate the site. The paper explained that during the first half of 1993,
the staff and the licensee tried unsuccessfully to settle the litigation and
the staff believed, as of the date of the paper, that further negotiations
would be futile and litigation would resume shortly. While the Commission was
considering SECY-93-235, the parties resumed negotiations; and in an SRM dated
November 2, 1993, the Commission returned SECY-93-235 to the staff,
“…pending the outcome of the negotiations,” and instructed the staff to
“…keep the Commission informed of further developments and, based on the
outcome of the negotiations, submit recommendations for further action to the
Commission, should that be necessary.” The staff recently completed
negotiations with SLC and successfully concluded a settlement agreement that
governs characterization and remediation planning for the Bloomsburg site.
In a related matter, SECY-93-136 presented the Commission with an analysis of
the State of Utah decision to allow Envirocare of Utah to use only
institutional controls as a means of reducing the risk to the public health
and safety after closure, without government land ownership. ERA regulations
do not always require government land ownership of sites such as these. The
Commission determined that this approach was adequate for protection of the
public health and safety in this particular case, and in a Director’s Decision
under 10 CFR 2.206 issued by the Office of State Programs on January 26, 1995,
the Commission did not revoke Utah’s Agreement State status.
DISCUSSION:
At sites where radioactive and non-radioactive materials are located in
distinct and separate areas, NRC and ERA oversight and regulation of remedial
actions can proceed effectively and efficiently. Although the effectiveness
of the government’s response and oversight can be strengthened through
interagency cooperation, each area can be remediated independently in
accordance with each agency’s requirements and administrative process.
However, independent regulation of remedial activities is not always possible.
There are some sites that contain commingled radioactive and non-radioactive
contamination. At other sites, the contamination is not commingled, but
remediation of one type of contamination would affect the responsible party’s
ability or approach to characterization and remediation of the other type of
contamination. In other cases, although the predominant hazard may be
associated with one type of contamination, the licensee or property owner is
not capable, technically or financially, to remediate either type of
contamination, thus preventing timely and effective completion of necessary
decommissioning or remedial actions. In yet other cases, the responsible
party desires a coordinated government response to reduce overall costs,
improve efficiency, and promote a compatible solution for both types of
contamination.
Under certain circumstances, the staff believes it would be appropriate for
NRC to defer to ERA or authorized State oversight of remediation efforts,
under CERCLA, RCRA, or State statutes. Deferral at these sites would reduce
the amount of duplicative effort by both agencies and by the site owners. For
example, the types of analyses performed by ERA as part of the development of
the RI/FS, under CERCLA (40 CFR 300.430), are very similar to the analyses
The Commissioners – 5 –
conducted by NRC in developing an Environmental Impact Statement (EIS) under
the National Environmental Policy Act of 1969 (NEPA) and 10 CFR Part 51. Both
agencies require submission of fairly extensive information on the
environmental characteristics of the contaminated sites and the nature and
extent of contamination. In addition, the agencies require preparation and
submission of a plan for implementing remedial measures found necessary to
remove or contain contamination in accordance with applicable remediation
criteria. EPA’s plan is called a Remedial Design; NRC calls this a
decommissioning plan.
Without cooperation between the agencies, therefore, it is conceivable that
site owners could be required by the government to develop separate reports
for each agency on site characterization, assessment of remediation
alternatives, projected environmental impacts, plans for remedial measures,
and documentation that the remedial measures were appropriately implemented.
Such an approach could result in an unnecessarily duplicative and burdensome
effort by the site owners and by the agencies.
At worst, the requirements of one agency could explicitly conflict with those
of the other agency, thus frustrating the government’s overall intent to
ensure protection of the public and the environment from residual
contamination. If, for example, EPA decided to allow hazardous waste to
remain onsite, to avoid excessive worker exposure and cost, and NRC decided
that commingled radioactive waste would have to be exhumed and disposed of
offsite, it would be difficult and burdensome, if not impossible, for the site
owner to simultaneously comply with-the requirements of both agencies. The
conflict would be especially significant if one action preceded the other
(e.g., EPA requires a cover to be placed over the waste; NRC later determines
that the radioactive waste needs to be removed for off-site disposal).
The staff believes that it is appropriate to rely on EPA’s environmental
remediation programs to ensure protection of the public and environment at the
DuPont and Westlake Landfill sites. Both cases may rely, at least in part, on
institutional controls to ensure long-term protection. As discussed
previously and in the attachments, such reliance on institutional controls is
somewhat inconsistent with NRC’s established policies for low-level
radioactive waste disposal (cf. State or Federal land ownership requirement
for low level waste disposal in 10 CFR 61.59(a)). However, the staff believes
that EPA remediation will be sufficient to provide adequate protection under
the Atomic Energy Act.
In addition, deferral to EPA provides numerous savings in terms of reducing
the administrative and regulatory burden on responsible parties conducting the
remediation and in conserving NRC staff resources. The staff estimates that
deferral of each site should save between 0.25 and 0.5 FTE per year in direct
staff resources required to oversee remediation at the sites. These resources
would partially duplicate the oversight functions that EPA staff will provide
in overseeing the safe and protective execution of the planned remedial
actions. In addition, deferral should save NRC an additional 0.5 FTE per year
and S600K in program support that could be necessary at each site to prepare
an Environmental Impact Statement (EIS) to support consideration of exemptions
from NRC’s existing requirements for decommissioning for unrestricted use.
The Commissioners – 6 –
Since November 1993, the staff has initiated several EISs to consider
exemption requests as appropriate considering the requirements in 10 CFR Part
51. Deferral should also improve the timeliness of remediation by avoiding
the potential delay that could be associated with administration of
independent and complementary regulatory approval processes for remediation.
Remediation could be further delayed by opportunities for legal challenges to
NRC approval of remedial actions.
Allowing disposal of the Dow wastes in the hazardous waste landfill cells in
Midland may also allow a small increase in the long-term risk to the public
and environment due to some reliance on institutional controls. As previously
described for the Westlake and DuPont site remediation projects, however, NRC
staff believes that such disposal would provide adequate protection of the
public, and any small increase in the associated risk is counterbalanced by
the improvements in efficiency, reduction in regulatory and administrative
burden, and savings of NRC and responsible party resources.
The staff does not consider, however, that these cases would necessarily
establish a precedent for resolution of other waste disposal and
decommissioning cases or establishment of general requirements in these areas.
The decisions on deferral and on approving waste disposal are specific to
these cases. In the cases of DuPont and Westlake Landfill, the radioactive
components appear to be intimately mixed with non-radiological contaminants
and wastes that are not subject to the Commission’s jurisdiction. In fact, at
least for some of the wastes, the dominant risks to the public and environment
may be attributable to the non-radiological contaminants. In addition, both
sites are already listed on the National Priorities List for remediation under
CERCLA, and the basis for listing and selection of the remedies included
consideration of the radiological contaminants.
In the Dow case, the staff has considered the merits of disposing of the
specific wastes present at the Dow sites and under the specified conditions
for disposal as proposed by the licensee and the State. Staff has already
approved other disposals of radioactive waste in or adjacent to hazardous
waste landfill cells in accordance with the provisions of 10 CFR 20.302 and
20.2002. Each of these disposals has been based on a site-specific review by
the NRC staff to ensure adequate protection of the public and that potential
radiological doses do not exceed NRC’s limits in 10 CFR Part 20. In most
cases, the staff has assured that the potential doses do not exceed a small
fraction of the public dose l i m i t . The Dow case is especially significant,
however, because it involves the disposal of a relatively large volume of
radioactive waste that will be generated in decommissioning an SDMP site and
that intrusion into the waste, if it were to occur, could result in doses that
may exceed the public dose limit (e.g., if the intruder were to live on top of
exposed waste for an extended period). The staff believes that the likelihood
of such intrusion is remote in the Dow case because of the design of the
disposal cells and the use of the general area for disposal of hazardous
waste. It is likely that an intruder into the waste would recognize that a
waste disposal cell had been breached and could suffer risk from the nonradiological
contaminants in adjacent cells even if the NRC did not authorize
disposal of the radioactive waste.
The staff would be prepared to entertain similar requests to the Dow request
from licensees to dispose of licensed material in hazardous waste landfills or
The Commissioners – 7 –
other suitable disposal facilities (e.g., monofills, sanitary landfills) in
accordance with the requirements of 10 CFR 20.2002. In such cases, as with
the Dow case, the burden would rest with the licensee to demonstrate that the
requirements of 10 CFR Part 20 will be satisfied, specifically that the
potential doses will be consistent with the Part 20 limits and are as low as
is reasonably achievable. Credit for institutional controls, such as those
that accompany Dow’s proposal, would also be considered on a site-specific
basi s.
For these reasons, the staff believes that NRC should defer to EPA or State
oversight regulatory programs for specific aspects of the remediation of two
contaminated sites: E.I. DuPont, Newport, DE; Cotter Corporation (West Lake
Landfill), Bridgeton, MO; and allow disposal of radioactive waste from
remediation in a RCRA permitted landfill for Dow Chemical, Midland and Bay
City (Salzburg Landfill), MI. By deferral, the staff means a variety of
approaches depending on the specific status of the contaminated sites.
For the DuPont site, the staff proposes to recognize EPA’s approved remedial
measures under CERCLA as being sufficiently protective of the public and
environment. The site is not currently licensed by NRC; NRC licensing and
oversight of the remediation of a small quantity of thorium waste in a
landfill would not be necessary, nor required, under the AEA. No further
action would be taken by the NRC staff, unless specifically requested by EPA.
For the West Lake Landfill site, EPA has already agreed to assume lead
responsibility for the site. The West Lake Landfill is listed in NRC’s Site
Decommissioning Management Plan (SDMP). The NRC staff is proposing to defer
to EPA oversight of remedial measures under CERCLA. EPA’s remediation of the
site already considers both radioactive and non-radioactive materials. The
site is not currently licensed by NRC; the staff would take no further action
at the site after deferral, unless specifically requested by EPA. NRC would
remove the site from the SDMP after EPA completes remedial measures at the
site.
Regarding the Dow Chemical sites in Midland and Bay City, Michigan, the staff
proposes to allow the licensee to dispose of thorium-contaminated waste in a
licensee-owned and permitted hazardous waste landfill designed and operated in
accordance with the RCRA requirements administered by EPA and the State of
Michigan. The staff would authorize disposal in accordance with NRC
requirements in 10 CFR 20.2002 and support the decision with an Environmental
Assessment that would presume the effectiveness of RCRA controls in ensuring
protection of the public and environment. Regulatory responsibility for the
management and long-term control of the thorium in the disposal site would, in
theory rest with NRC. However, in terminating the license, NRC would
recognize that controls for the hazardous waste, developed under RCRA, while
relying on land use restrictions which are not dependant on State or EPA
regulatory power, w i l l be adequate for the thorium as well. In allowing
disposal in the Salzburg Landfill, NRC would be recognizing that disposal of
thorium-contaminated wastes in a hazardous waste landfill may be acceptable
under the AEA, instead of requiring offsite disposal at a licensed radioactive
waste disposal facility. The Dow storage sites are listed in the SDMP and are
being remediated under an NRC license. NRC staff would continue to license
and regulate the remedial measures directed at removing the thorium waste from
its present locations. At such time as all waste has been satisfactorily
The Commissioners – 8 –
disposed of in the hazardous waste landfill and residual radioactivity has
been reduced in accordance with existing criteria, the staff would terminate
Dow’s license for the Midland and Bay City sites and no further action would
be taken by the NRC staff.
Background information for the DuPont, Westlake Landfill, and Dow sites is
provided in Attachments 1 to 3, respectively. The potential advantages and
disadvantages of deferral for each site are summarized in Attachment 4.
Requested Analysis:
In accordance with the Commission’s previous direction on information to
support deferral decisions, the staff provides the following analyses of:
(1) the cleanup standard that would apply under Superfund and the differences
between that standard and the AEA standard; (2) the rights and authorities the
State would have if Superfund were extended to the site; and (3) the rights
and authorities that private citizens would have to sue the Federal Government
or the licensee(s), using the citizen-suit provisions of Superfund. The
following analyses are presented in generic terms that would apply to all
three sites. The discussion about remediation criteria is only pertinent at
this time to the West Lake Landfill site; ERA has already decided to stabilize
the thorium waste in place at the Dupont site, and the thorium waste from Dow
would be disposed of in an RCRA-regulated landfill cell. To compare specific
EPA and NRC remediation standards for the West Lake Landfill, more information
would be needed on the remediation criteria EPA intends to implement at that
site. EPA will determine these criteria through the RI/FS and Record of
Decision (ROD) process, as described below.
(1) Remediation Standard
As previously stated, both NRC and EPA have been granted the authority
to regulate radioactive materials, in certain situations. To determine
what remediation standards would govern the remedial actions at a
specific site, EPA would perform a Feasibility Study (FS). This study
is the basis for the development of a ROD that establishes remediation
standards and remedial actions for each site. EPA would prepare the FS
after the site had been scored and entered on the NPL, as explained in
Enclosure 1 of SECY-93-235.
EPA’s requirements for FSs in 40 CFR 300.430(e)(2)(i) require that the
lead agency establish remedial action alternatives, including
remediation objectives and goals. The remediation goals establish
acceptable exposure levels to protect human health and the environment
and are developed considering: applicable or relevant and appropriate
requirements (ARARs) under Federal or State environmental laws,
drinking-water standards and goals, water-quality criteria, and other
factors. For known or suspected carcinogens (including ionizing
radiation), acceptable exposure levels are generally concentration
levels that represent an excess upper-bound lifetime cancer probability,
for an individual, of about 10″A and a cancer probability of 10″6 for as
many in the population as practical. The 10″6 probability is used as
the point of departure for determining remediation goals when ARARs are
not available or are not sufficiently protective, because of the
presence of multiple contaminants or multiple pathways.
The Commissioners – 9 –
These risk goals do not necessarily take into account human intrusion in
the future. If human intrusion were to be considered in the dose
pathway analysis, the calculated dose for thorium contaminated sites
could be in excess of 100 mrem/yr assuming standard exposure scenarios
(e.g., resident farmer scenario). Therefore, sites with significantly
elevated thorium concentrations would not necessarily meet the
provisions of the proposed NRC rule on radiological criteria for
decommissioning (proposed amendments to 10 CFR Part 20; 59 FR 43200).
The statement of considerations for the proposed rule acknowledges that
some sites could not meet the limits proposed in the rule. Deferral to
the Federal Superfund/RCRA approach is a possible way to address these
cases.
NRC risk analyses differ from ERA risk analyses in several ways. ERA
calculates risk based on the chance of developing cancer. NRC relates
risk to both the chance of developing cancer and the chance of a
fatality as a result of cancer. NRC staff calculated the risk to a
maximally exposed member of the public who at some time in the future,
could reside on top of the site. By using a general risk estimate of
5xlO”2 fatal cancers per sievert (5xlO~4 per rem) of received dose
developed for exposure of a large population, NRC can estimate a
potential risk, to an individual, produced by a specific exposure.
Nevertheless, were an actual measured exposure to occur, the staff
recognizes that it would be more appropriate to estimate the risk to
that individual using the cancer risk tables developed by the National
Cancer Institute.
In general, NRC has not relied on institutional controls as a means for
protecting the public or the environment for decommissioning purposes.
However, ERA and DOE have relied on institutional controls to prevent or
reduce the likelihood for human intrusion and otherwise protect the
public (e.g., restrictions on groundwater use). Staff compared
regulatory considerations of institutional controls in SECY-93-322,
dated November 26, 1993. Reliance on institutional controls directly
affects projected risks to exposed humans.
Based on information provided by the ERA staff, NRC has reviewed 19 RODs
for sites that include some radiological contamination. Most cases
involved contamination by radium-226 and its decay products and other
naturally-occurring radionuclides. In most of the RODs, ERA selected
ARARs based on EPA’s standard, for remedial action, at uranium mill
tailings sites in 40 CFR Part 192. In many cases, ERA also identified
NRC guidance in Regulatory Guide 1.86 “Termination of Operating Licenses
for Nuclear Reactors,” as an ARAR for surface contamination on buildings
and equipment. Other sources of ARARs for radiological contamination
include: NRC’s air concentration limits in 10 CFR Part 20, Appendix B;
State guidance on acceptable surface contamination; DOE orders for
acceptable public and worker doses; Federal and State water quality
standards; and Federal and State air-emission limits.
The Commissioners – 10 –
(2) State Authority under Superfund
For facilities covered by CERCLA, 42 USC 9605, et sec?., the States are
encouraged to enter into cooperative agreements to enable them to
undertake certain actions, under the National Contingency Plan (NCR), as
the lead agencies. State and local response organizations are expected
to initiate measures necessary to protect the public health and safety,
consistent with the containment and cleanup requirements in the NCR.
The RI/FS required under 40 CFR 300.430(d) and (e) are to be performed
by a lead agency, in coordination with any support agencies. Under
40 CFR 300.5, the State may be designated as the lead agency to plan and
implement a response, if it is operating pursuant to a contract or
cooperative agreement, under Section 104(d)(l) of CERCLA, or designated
as the lead agency in a Superfund Memorandum of Agreement (SMOA) or
other agreement. In addition, even if the State does not serve as lead
agency, the lead agency is required to consult with the local officials
and community representatives before commencing field work for the
remedial investigation. Under 40 CFR 300.430(c), support agencies are
afforded an opportunity to identify their own ARARs, under 40 CFR
300.430(d)(3). Support agencies are to be notified, by the lead agency,
of the alternatives that will be evaluated in detail, to facilitate the
identification of ARARs and any appropriate guidance to be considered,
under 40 CFR 300.430(e)(8).
In addition to the above, 40 CFR 300.430(e)(9)(iii)(H) requires that the
State’s concerns be assessed, including its views on the preferred and
other alternatives for remedial action and the ARARs or proposed use of
waivers.
Further, 40 CFR 300.430(f)(1)(i)(C) provides that the lead agency must
consult with the State, and that State and community acceptance are
modifying criteria that are to be considered in the remedy selection.
Section 300.430(f)(4)(i) provides that the State’s views are to be
considered by the lead agency in its final remedy selection from among
the various alternatives.
(3) The Rights of Private Citizens under Superfund
As discussed above, ERA is to solicit community participation in the
identification of ARARs and other aspects of the RI/FS process. In
addition, private citizens are authorized under CERCLA to undertake a
response action to eliminate a release of a hazardous substance,
pollutant, or contaminant, subject to the citizens’ compliance with the
provisions of 40 CFR 300.700. Various mechanisms are provided in CERCLA
for a private citizen to recover the cost of such response action.
These mechanisms are summarized in 40 CFR 300.700, and include:
(a) recovery of the response cost, plus interest, from the
parties found to be liable; and (b) recovery from Superfund of the
private citizen’s reasonable costs, plus interest.
In addition, “citizens suits” are authorized under Section 310 of
CERCLA. Private citizens are authorized to commence a civil action, on
The Commissioners – 11 –
their own behalf, against: (a) any person who is alleged to be in
violation of any standard, regulation, condition, requirement, or order
under CERCLA; and (b) any Federal official who is alleged to have failed
to perform a required duty, under CERCLA. Judicial relief, in such
actions, may consist of an order to enforce and/or correct the violation
or an order imposing any civil penalty provided for the violation; and
the court may award the prevailing party his costs of litigation,
including reasonable attorney and expert witness fees.
RECOMMENDATIONS:
That the Commission:
1. Approve deferral to EPA’s CERCLA program for the remediation of the
thorium waste located on the E. I. DuPont Superfund site in Newport, DE.
2. Approve deferral to EPA’s Superfund program for remediation of the West
Lake Landfi11/Cotter Corporation site in Bridgeton, MO.
3. Approve staff’s plans to pursue a request submitted by Dow
Chemical Company for an exemption from the unrestricted release
provisions of 10 CFR 40.42(f)(3) and to authorize disposal of
thorium waste from remediation in a landfill in accordance with
10 CFR 20.2002. The landfill would be regulated under Michigan
hazardous waste regulations that implement the RCRA program for
long term control of the waste in the Salzburg Landfill cells,
including reliance on institutional and State control and longterm
monitoring of the Salzburg Landfill site in Midland, MI.
4. Note:
a. That although EPA is authorized to regulate byproduct, source, and
special nuclear material under CERCLA and CAA, the State agencies, if
they are not NRC Agreement States, are not authorized except under CAA.
That even though NRC is allowing disposal under the RCRA program
administered by EPA and Michigan Department of Natural Resources, NRC
staff will continue to regulate remediation of the Dow Chemical storage
sites in Michigan, which are currently licensed by NRC. With respect to
the disposal in the Salzburg landfill, the staff will continue to review
pertinent documents to ensure Michigan is not applying significantly
less stringent waste disposal requirements than NRC.
b. That reliance on institutional controls over the long term may not
provide as high a level of protection for the public health and
environment as that attained if there were no reliance on institutional
controls. This lower level of assurance results from the lack of a
guarantee that there will always be a responsible party to maintain the
controls.
The Commissioners – 12 –
COORDINATION:
The Office of the General Counsel has reviewed this paper and has no legal
objection. NRC staff consulted with ERA and the States of Delaware, Missouri,
and Michigan in preparing this paper. Neither ERA nor the States objected to
the staff’s proposed approach.
~2^1/L~
x , „„ /A- -^*yl^-^
/J^mes M. Ta/lor
(ecutive Director
for Operations
Attachments:
1. Bkgd Info for E.I. DuPont
2. Bkgd Info for Cotter Corporation
West Lake Landfill
3. Bkgd Info for Dow Chemical
4. Adv/Disadv of Prop Options by Site
Commissioners’ comments or consent should be provided directly to the Office
of the Secretary by COB Friday, March 24, 1995.
Commission Staff Office comments, if any, should be submitted to the Commissioners
NLT March 17, 1995, with an information copy to the Office of the Secretary.
If the paper is of such a nature that it requires additional review and comment,
the Commissioners and the Secretariat should be apprised of when comments may
be expected.
Distribution:
Commissioners
OGC
OCAA
DIG
OPA
OCA
ACNW
Region I
Region III
EDO
SECY
BACKGROUND INFORMATION FOR THE
E.I. DUPONT NEWPORT, DELAWARE, SITE
The E.I. DuPont site is located in Newport, Delaware, near 1-95, 1-495, and
the Christina River. The entire site is approximately 485,600 m2 (120 acres)
and contains a paint pigment production facility, a chromium dioxide
production facility, and two industrial landfills (North and South) which are
closed.
DuPont was licensed by the U.S. Atomic Energy Commission (AEC) and began using
radioactive materials at this site in 1961, for the processing of thorium into
metal alloys. The alloys consisted mostly of nickel, some chromium and
molybdenum, and thorium (approximately 2 to 5 percent by weight thorium-232).
Waste materials from this process were buried in the North Landfill,
reportedly, in accordance with 10 CFR 20.304 regulations that were in effect
at the time. According to DuPont, the thorium waste was placed in glass jars
that were subsequently placed in 55-gallon barrels together with disposable
protective clothing and debris from the waste-handling operations. The
barrels were then buried in a specific, although uncertain, section of the
North Landfill and covered with 3 m (10 feet) of soil. The area where the
thorium was buried is estimated to be 40 m by 10 m (130 ft by 35 ft) and
contains approximately 20 tons of thorium metal, which were placed in the
North Landfill over a 7 year period.
DuPont believes most of the thorium in the North Landfill consists of thorium
oxide, a relatively insoluble form of thorium. However, DuPont’s records, as
well as information in the Nuclear Regulatory Commission’s docket files,
indicate that thorium nitrate, a more soluble form of thorium, and other salts
could also have been disposed of in the North Landfill. Long-term releases
from these other forms of the thorium waste could be greater than from the
thorium oxide. They could also pose a greater threat to shallow groundwater
beneath the North Landfill site, because of leaching and subsequent transport.
The thorium burials comprised a small portion of the North Landfill area. The
remaining portion of the North Landfill was used for the disposal of
lithophone wastes (an inorganic paint pigment based on zinc and barium),
organic pigment wastes, chromium wastes, and other miscellaneous wastes,
including the off-specification thoriated nickel and other thorium wastes.
The Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) initiated the Comprehensive
Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act (CERCLA) Program for
remediation of the site in the 1980s and proposed the site for inclusion on
the National Priorities List (NPL) in 1987. EPA proposed the site for
remediation under CERCLA because of extensive non-radiological contamination.
DuPont used historical records and interviews with retired employees to
estimate the quantity of thorium that was buried in the l a n d f i l l . However,
the records are not complete and the exact quantity and form of the thorium
are not known. Although the entire DuPont site is currently undergoing
remediation, remediation of the North Landfill is of the most concern to NRC
because of the thorium buried in the landfill. The North Landfill is only a
small section of the entire 120-acre site.
Attachment 1
-2-
Based on available records of the burials, NRC staff believes that at least
some of the thorium wastes in the North Landfill exceeds the concentration
criteria in Options 1 and 2 of the 1981 Branch Technical Position (BTP)
entitled: “Disposal or Onsite Storage of Thorium or Uranium Wastes from Past
Operations” (46 FR 52061). NRC identified these criteria as the pertinent
release criteria in the Site Decommissioning Management Plan (SDMP) Action
Plan of April 16, 1992 (57 FR 13389) coupled with the principle that residual
radiation be reduced to as low as is reasonably achievable (ALARA). Because
thorium concentrations are expected to exceed these criteria in some areas by
a substantial margin (e.g., 10,000 pCi/g thorium-232), the NRC staff would
generally not consider onsite disposal as a viable disposal action.
In addition, as described above, it is possible that there are soluble forms
of thorium in the landfill, which could become mobile and enter the
groundwater beneath the site or the river adjacent to the site. DuPont has
not attempted to characterize the thorium waste in the landfill for the
following reasons: (1) the exact location of the thorium in the landfill is
not known; (2) intrusive and extrusive sampling may be necessary because the
waste is very heterogeneous, which would make accurate sampling through a
limited number of boreholes difficult; and (3) exposure to the hazardous
material in the landfill would cause risks to workers during the
characterization and sampling process.
Monitoring well sampling found slightly elevated levels of radium-226 and
radium-228 in the groundwater adjacent to the landfill. DuPont believes the
elevated levels are representative of background. Elevated levels of radium
were not found in surrounding wells or in wells located between the landfill
and the well containing the elevated readings.
EPA w i l l require DuPont to place a low-permeability cover system over the
landfill, capable of reducing infiltration by over 99 percent, to minimize
groundwater contamination below the site. In addition, DuPont is required to
construct a physical barrier wall extending from the top on the landfill,
along the river bank and down to the base of the Columbia aquifer. This wall
w i l l cause mounding of the groundwater in the landfill. Groundwater
extraction wells w i l l be installed to control this mounding. The recovered
groundwater shall be treated. This wall will prevent the contaminated
groundwater from entering the river. Monitoring will be needed to ensure
there will not be erosion of the river bank and the potential for erosion from
the river into the landfill itself.
The potential risks produced by the thorium contamination are small compared
with the risks posed by the other hazardous waste in the North Landfill, as
well as the materials on the remaining portions of the site. EPA’s risk
assessment supporting the ROD concluded that non-radiological risks
predominate over radiological risks associated with the thorium waste buried
in the landfill. EPA requires in the ROD that DuPont: monitor groundwater to
detect any potential migration of thorium or its decay products; apply
institutional controls to restrict public access to the waste and to
groundwater beneath and adjacent to the site; and assess the existence of
radiological contamination at other locations onsite. The remedial action
identified in the ROD was developed through a public process that involved
DuPont, State of Delaware, local community officials, members of the public,
and other interested parties.
The NRC staff believes that the remedial action required by EPA, under CERCLA,
-3-
would be sufficient to protect the public and the environment from the risks
associated with the thorium waste. Although NRC and ERA staffs suspect that a
majority of the thorium is in the relatively insoluble oxide form, there is a
possibility that some more soluble thorium compounds exist in the landfill.
However, with the cap, wall along the river bank, groundwater monitoring,
institutional controls, and groundwater use restrictions, the staff believes
that any significant contamination of the groundwater by thorium is unlikely
to occur. However, if it does, the staff believes the contamination would be
accompanied by other contaminants, promptly detected, and mitigated before
causing any significant health or environmental hazards.
Since the site is not currently licensed by NRC, the staff would not undertake
any other activities directly related to remediation of the site, including:
performing reviews of licensing (Superfund-required) documents; undertaking
site visits or inspections; monitoring ERA progress on the remediation; and
examining the completion of cleanup activities.
BACKGROUND INFORMATION FOR THE
WEST LAKE LANDFILL/COTTER CORPORATION
BRIDGETON, MISSOURI SITE
The West Lake Landfill is a 809,000 m2 (200-acre) tract located in St. Louis
County, Missouri, approximately 16 miles northwest of downtown St. Louis.
Beginning in 1962, portions of the property were used as an unregulated dump
for solid and liquid industrial wastes, municipal refuse, and construction
debris. In 1973, Cotter Corporation, a Nuclear Regulatory Commission
licensee, disposed of over 39,000 metric tons of uranium ore processing
residues and contaminated soil in two areas covering about 64,750 m2 (16
acres) of the site. This is a relatively small portion of the larger
809,000 m2 (200-acre) site. In 1976, the unregulated landfill was closed, and
in following years, the Missouri Department of Natural Resources issued
several permits for various portions of the 809,000 m2 site. Efforts to
remediate the site included NRC survey and site characterization work in the
1980s. In 1990, the Environmental Protection Agency (ERA) listed West Lake
Landfill as a Superfund site by adding it to the National Priorities List.
Under Superfund, EPA is now regulating remediation of the site for both
radiological and other hazardous wastes.
The radioactive wastes in the two soil areas are mostly covered by other
landfill materials. The site poses no immediate radiological threat to the
public. Radioactive wastes, in concentrations greater than the current NRC
standards for unrestricted release, are found in two soil piles and include
uranium-238, thorium-230, and radium-226. Elevated levels of radioactivity
(gross alpha particle contamination) have been detected in groundwater
monitoring wells onsite, indicating slight contamination above background.
The NRC staff proposes to defer to EPA’s Superfund Program for the remediation
of uranium contamination. NRC staff has already acknowledged that EPA’s
Superfund Program is responsible for the remediation of the radioactive waste
on this site. A letter dated May 1991 states that “. . . EPA is taking the
lead for site remediation activities . . . .” NRC staff has performed limited
reviews of EPA-required documents, including the Remedial Investigation/
Feasibility Study for the site, that included considerations of both
radiological and non-radiological material onsite. The NRC staff believes the
remedial actions that would be required by EPA, under the Comprehensive
Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act (CERCLA), would be
sufficient to protect the public and the environment from the risks associated
with the uranium contamination.
Under this deferral scenario, NRC staff would continue to provide certain
technical support to EPA, at the specific request of EPA. In addition, NRC
would retain a copy of the Record of Decision in the permanent files for the
site. The staff would take no further action at the site after deferral to
EPA, since the site is not currently licensed by the NRC.
Attachment 2
BACKGROUND INFORMATION FOR THE DOW CHEMICAL COMPANY
BAY CITY AND MIDLAND, MICHIGAN, SITES
Dow Chemical Company possesses thorium-contaminated waste under a Nuclear
Regulatory Commission license at two sites in Michigan: Bay City and Midland.
The Bay City site is located 1 mile south of Saginaw Bay and is 20 miles east
of Midland, Michigan. The thorium-contaminated waste at this site is stored
in a fenced-in area owned by Dow Chemical Company. Approximately 30,500 m3
(40,000 yd3) of thorium-contaminated waste is estimated to be stored at the
Bay City site. This waste has an average concentration of 188 pCi/g thorium-
232, with a range of from 2 to 7000 pCi/g thorium-232. Dow estimates that
there are about 9.2 Ci of thorium-232 and an equivalent amount of thorium-228
at the Bay City location.
The estimated volume of the thorium-contaminated waste at the Midland site is
over 9000 m3 (12,000 yd3). The area where the waste is stored at the Midland
site measures 50 m by 90 m (160 ft by 300 ft) and is roped off. The waste is
covered by a clay cover that is approximately 1-meter thick. The thoriumcontaminated
waste storage area is located within a larger industrial complex
that Dow owns and controls access to. The radioactivity in the waste varies
substantially and ranges up to 2000 pCi/g, with an average of 29 pCi/g
thorium-232 and an equivalent activity concentration of thorium-228. Dow
estimates that there is approximately 0.46 Ci of thorium-232 in the waste at
this site.
In 1956, the U.S. Atomic Energy Commission gave Dow Chemical Company a license
to use thorium metal and compounds to produce thorium-magnesium alloys. The
alloying process produced a thorium-contaminated waste. In 1973, the license
was amended to authorize storage only at Dow’s Bay City and Midland sites in
Michigan, and at the Madison site in Illinois. The Madison site is now under
the regulatory authority of the Illinois Department of Nuclear Safety.
Thorium-contaminated waste and associated contaminated soil are currently
being stored at both sites. Dow proposes to dispose of its thoriumcontaminated
waste in two dedicated disposal cells at the Dow-owned and
operated Salzburg Landfill in Midland. The Salzburg Landfill is permitted by
the Michigan Department of Natural Resources and the Environmental Protection
Agency (ERA), for the disposal of hazardous and non-hazardous solid wastes.
The Salzburg Landfill, is relatively large [615,100 m2 (152 acres)], and is
located 1.5 miles from the Midland site and 20 miles from the Bay City site.
The proposed disposal cell design, for the thorium-contaminated waste, would
be comprised of, from the bottom, a 6 meter clay underliner with a hydraulic
conductivity of less than 10″6 cm/s; 1 meter of recompacted clay with
hydraulic conductivity of less than 10″7 cm/s; a synthetic liner with a leak
detection and removal system consisting of a 0.33-meter sand drainage layer;
1.5 meters of clay; a geosynthetic liner; and a 0.33-meter sand leachate
drainage layer. This liner would underlie the thorium-contaminated waste
which would be covered by 1 meter of clay; a 100-mil HOPE synthetic liner;
0.33 meters of drainage medium; almost a meter (91 cm) of a frost protection
layer; and 0.66 meters of top soil. No liquid wastes are allowed to be
disposed of at the Salzburg Landfill. The approximate design area for one of
the proposed thorium-contaminated waste disposal cells is 61 m (200 ft) long
by 40 m (125 ft) wide, and the other is 221 m (725 ft) long by 23 m (75 ft)
Attachment 3
-2-
wide. Both disposal cells will be covered by a unified cover. There are 16
shallow monitoring wells around the proposed disposal cells. These monitoring
wells are required under Resource Conservation and Recovery Act (RCRA) and
State of Michigan hazardous waste requirements. Groundwater monitoring wells
and domestic wells in the area are sampled as part of the Salzburg Landfill
monitoring program.
The NRC staff proposes to allow Dow Chemical Company to dispose of licensed
material in EPA-approved RCRA designed cells in accordance with 10 CFR 20.2002
and thereby be exempt from NRC’s unrestricted release criteria of 10 CFR
40.42(j)(3) [Although the amended rule does not refer to unrestricted release,
but to release in accordance with NRC requirements, the criteria of the SDMP
Action Plan apply. These are essentially unrestricted release criteria.] Dow
has requested to bury thorium-contaminated waste in the Salzburg landfill, per
10 CFR 20.2002, at concentrations above NRC’s SDMP Action Plan criteria for
unrestricted release.
There is a parallel between what is being proposed by Dow and the burial of
low-level waste under 10 CFR Part 61. The performance objectives for the
disposal of low-level radioactive waste, as stated in 10 CFR Part 61 and the
Final Environmental Impact Statement for Part 61 (NUREG-0945), are to: 1)
protect public health and safety (and the environment) over the long term; 2)
protect the inadvertent intruder; 3) protect workers and the public during the
short-term operational phase; and 4) provide long-term stability, to eliminate
the need for active long-term maintenance after operations cease. The staff
believes that disposal of the thorium waste in the landfill would be generally
consistent with these objectives, although the staff has not completed the
kind of detailed review that would be required for a license application under
10 CFR Part 61.
For thorium contamination of the type presently stored by Dow under its
license, the dominant exposure pathway is direct exposure from human
intrusion. Thorium-232 has an extremely long half-life (in excess of 14
b i l l i o n years). Thus, the potential hazard will continue to exist whether the
material is excavated and shipped to a licensed disposal site (at an estimated
cost of about $28 million if disposed at Envirocare or significantly more if
disposed at a licensed low-level waste disposal facility) or excavated and
shipped to the Salzburg Landfill (at a cost of about $5 million). The primary
safety issue then becomes how to minimize the potential for human intrusion
over the long term under either disposal alternative. Dilution of the
contamination was not considered due to the significant increases in waste
volume that would be required to substantially reduce thorium concentrations
down to levels approaching natural background for soils in the Midland area.
As a regulated hazardous waste disposal facility, institutional controls would
be required to be maintained over the Salzburg Landfill under hazardous and
solid waste regulations. Dow states that, even though the concentration of
thorium in the waste exceeds NRC’s criteria for unrestricted release, the colocation
of the thorium waste disposal cells with the hazardous and solid
waste disposal cells would offer sufficient institutional control to deter
intrusion over the long term. The institutional controls offered by hazardous
and solid waste regulations involve environmental monitoring and reporting,
maintenance and release control, and controls on the post-closure use of the
land (i.e., no disturbance of the waste or any components of the disposal
unit). There are additional requirements for post-closure financial assurance
and a schedule for closure. Dow estimates that the pre-closure operational
-3-
period for the Salzburg Landfill will extend until approximately the year
2045. The post-closure institutional control period generally lasts 30 years
and can be extended by the ERA Regional Administrator or State agency. The
Salzburg Landfill is not a remote site, but because of the existence of the
hazardous waste already buried there, the land can never be used productively
again for farming and other non-industrial applications without extensive
remediation. Dow has already imposed restrictive covenants in the Salzburg
Landfill deed, in accordance with ERA requirements for hazardous waste
landfills. If the thorium wastes are buried in the Salzburg Landfill, Dow
proposes a requirement (to be inserted into the deed) to notify NRC (or its
successor) before disturbing the landfill.
On balance, the staff believes that disposing of the thorium wastes at the
Salzburg Landfill constitutes an as low as reasonably achievable (ALARA)
approach to remediation of the Bay City and Midland sites, and that the
conditions and restrictions placed on the landfill, combined with the RCRA
regulatory and cell design provisions, provide a comparable level of
protection of human health and the environment, as is provided at other
licensed low-level waste disposal sites. In the Office of the General
Counsel’s opinion, Dow’s proposed restrictive covenants appear adequate to
support an exemption. With one exception, the restrictive covenants, and the
co-location of the thorium-contaminated waste disposal cells with hazardous
and solid waste disposal cells, appear to achieve the same effect as if this
thorium-contaminated waste were buried at a location where State or Federal
control alone is considered sufficient to guarantee institutional care.
Inadvertent intrusion into the thorium waste disposal cells would be
controlled by the restrictive covenants on the deed as proposed by Dow in its
exemption request. The one exception is that, as with the Envirocare facility
in Utah, there is no assurance that, for the very long term, there will be a
responsible party with the obligation to take additional remedial action
should this become necessary.
Therefore, NRC staff proposes to allow disposal of licensed radioactive
material in the landfill operated by Dow and regulated by ERA and the State of
Michigan. This decision would be supported by an appropriate Environmental
Assessment, which would presume the adequacy of the cell design and
institutional controls (including ERA and Michigan regulation) in protecting
humans and the environment. NRC staff would notice in the Federal Register
its intent to issue a license amendment to allow the disposal of the waste in
the Salzburg Landfill, including the exemption. Pursuant to Subpart L of 10
CFR Part 2, the notice will offer an opportunity for an informal hearing. The
hearing would include approval of the decommissioning plan and the transfer
and disposal under 20.2002 at the Salzburg l a n d f i l l . Following completion of
the necessary safety and environmental reviews, NRC staff anticipates issuing
the amendment, provided the safety and environmental reviews are favorable.
Because the Dow storage sites are currently licensed by the NRC, the staff
would monitor the remedial activities being performed by Dow to ensure that
NRC requirements are satisfied. The staff would review all pertinent
documents and would terminate the license after disposal of the radioactive
material currently in storage at the Bay City and Midland sites and the
storage sites are cleaned up to unrestricted use standards.
ADVANTAGES AND DISADVANTAGES OF
PROPOSED OPTIONS FOR EACH SITE
Attachment 4
E. I. DUPONT CORPORATION
Administrative Alternatives for the
Remediation of the Newport, Delaware, Site
Deferral to EPA Superfund NRC Maintains Responsibility
Advantages
• Allows DuPont to continue remediation activities
in a timely and effective manner.
• Reduces delays and expense produced from
duplicative regulation.
• Ensures consistency in remediation decision for
both radiological and non-radiological waste.
• Avoids need for an NRC license.
• Promotes interagency cooperation and consistency
in selection of remedial actions.
Advantages
Remediation of the thorium contamination down to
Option 1 or 2 levels2 would reduce risk to
inadvertent intruders.
Provides higher level of assurance that remediation
is conducted in a satisfactory manner, from NRC’s
perspective.
2 Option 1 or 2 of the 1981 Branch Technical Position “Disposal or Onsite Storage
of Thorium or Uranium Wastes from Past Operations.”
-2-
Disadvantages
Relies on institutional controls for protection
of the public.
Could require removal at some point in the
future, if the thorium contaminates the
groundwater.
Reduces assurance of satisfactory remediation
from NRC’s perspective.
Disadvantages
May ultimately find that current proposed
remediation is acceptable and preferable, after
additional expense and time.
If exhumation would be required, could result in
increased risk to workers from exposure to nonradiological
and radiological wastes in the landfill
and extended storage of waste pending access to
disposal facilities.
Increases costs for DuPont, ERA, and NRC.
May require additional effort to establish location
of thorium waste in landfill.
Could require NRC license.
Could delay or impair remedial actions for the other
wastes onsite, pending resolution of the thorium
waste disposal issue._____________________
-3-
WEST LAKE LANDFILL/COTTER CORPORATION
Administrative Alternatives for the
Remediation of the Bridgeton, Missouri, Site
Deferral to ERA Superfund NRC Maintains Responsibility
Advantages
• Continues established lead responsibilities
between NRC and ERA (ERA lead).
• Reduces costs and delays produced from duplicative
regulat ion.
• Avoids need for an NRC license.
• Promotes consistency in NRC and ERA remedial
deci sions.
Advantages
• Maintains NRC control of the remediation under Atomic
Energy Act.
• May result in lower risk to public and environment if
site is remediated to Option 1 or 2 levels.
• Avoids reliance on institutional controls.
Disadvantages
• Reduces assurance that NRC w i l l find the remedial
action satisfactory because ERA has not yet
selected remedial action for the uranium
contamination.
• Introduces possibility that additional remediation
may be necessary in the future.
• Places remediation outside of NRC control; no
assurance when remedial actions w i l l occur.
Disadvantages
• Increases costs and duplicative effort for regulating
agencies and Cotter Corporation.
• May delay the remediation of the non-radioactive
materials onsite.
• May produce conflicts for Cotter if NRC and ERA
approve inconsistent remedial actions.
• May require imposition of a license through order, if
Cotter objects to license and one is required.
DON CHEMICAL COMPANY
Administrative Alternatives for the
Remediation of the Midland and Bay City, Michigan, Sites
Approve Site Disposal Request Removal & Offsite Disposal
Advantages Advantages
Reduces costs and delays from duplicative
regulation.
Allows timely completion of remediation and
termination of NRC licenses for the Midland and
Bay City sites.
Could reduce public and worker risks
from near site disposal as compared to
transporting waste across country.
Promotes consistency between NRC and ERA in terms
of remediation decisions.
Maintains NRC control of the disposal of the
radioactive waste.
May reduce long-term risks if wastes were disposed
of at a licensed disposal facility for radioactive
waste that does not rely on institutional contr

Post

2011-03-19 – NRC – Jocasse Dam – Misuse of Government Position and Inappropriate Conducte by RES Employee – ML16244A009

Case Title:
Origination Doclink: J
OFFICIAL USE-ONLY
Memos to File
Prepared by: I (bi(7)(C) I 0412011011
Misuse of Government Case Number:
Position and Inappropriate
Conduct by RES Employee
Subject CRISCIONE Conversation with NRC Employees
Report Date: 03/19/2011
Narrative:
c 11 031
On March 29, 2011, While attending the NRC and It’s Environment course, Special Agent (SA)
I (bJ(7J(CJ ptfice of Inspector General (OIG), Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC),
overheard Larry CRISCIONE, Division of Risk Analysis, Office of Research, NRC, having a
conversation with (b)(7J

Post

2013 – NRC – Jocassee Dam – Transcript of interview released under settlement for Case 1-13-cv-00942-RMC – ML16244A000

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1 MR. CRISCIONE: You know, I’ve got the home
2 phone numbers of people on that project, I ‘ve got their
3 cell phone numbers, I’ve got their work numbers . You
4 know, I ‘ ve got their personal email accounts. You know,
5 we would do what we needed to do to contact each other.
6 If they weren’t at their work number, you’d call them
7 at their home number. You know, they’d tell you, “Call
8 me any time if you’ve got a question.”
9 And you’d call people at home, you’d call
10 them on their cell phone, you ‘d use their personal email
11 address, because t.hey – – you know, if they were on a leave
12 period or vacation, they are more likely to check that
13 than their work email . But, I mean, this is all – – this
14 is all non-secured stuff. I mean, it’s — none of it
15 is ouo. –
16 Now, this December 10th email is something
17 different, and I — you know, I don’t know how much I
18 can speak to it without — I mean, if — you know, I’d
19 rather if we could take a break at: some point and
20 SR. SPEC. AGENT WALLS : We I 11 take a recess
21 and I’ll provide those to you .
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23 that .
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MR. CRISCIONE: Thank you. I’d appreciate
SR. SPEC. AGENT WALLS: Have you previously
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1 used any of the non-concurrence avenues afforded to
2 employees at the NRC?
3 MR. CRISCIONE: Yes .
4 SR . SPEC. AGENT WALLS : Okay.
5 MR . CRISCIONE : Not regarding Jocassee
6 Dam, but yes .
7 SR . SPEC. AGENT WALLS: Could you explain
8 the non- concurrence processes.:_ ___ I,” ‘i ~ o I
9 MR. CRISCIONE : Well, there is differing
10 professional opinions — process. And I have never used
11 that, by the way, but i t is my underst andi ng you submi t
12 a DPO. And there ‘ s a board that meets to d iscuss it,
13 and you get to choose one of the board member s.
14 And, really, that’s only if you’ r e i nvolved
15 with the — with decisionrnaking on the issue itself.
16 Like I can’t — at least it’s my understanding that :
17 can’t go ask for a DPO about how we are handling J ocassee
18 Dam if I’m just some guy in Research t ha t has nothing
19 to do with this.
20 SR. SPEC. AGENT WAL~S: Ar e there other
21 avenue s?
22 MR. CRISCIONE: Yeah. The
23 non- concurrence process, I have used that. And that’s
24 where i f you’ re a signatory on a document you can
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1 non-concur.
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And, you know, you non-concur, your
2 supervisor signs it, and you — you know, it gets — you
3 get an answer.
4 And before you use that process, and
5 probably before you use any process, you are s upposed
6 to first, you know, discuss it with your supervi sor, see
7 if you can — and discuss with the person who had the
8 i ssue to see if you can resolve it that way.
9 SR. SPEC. AGENT WALLS: And the Commission
10 has an open door policy .
11 MR. CRISCIONE: Yeah, that’s — and I have
12 used that one as well . / : ().)/ 7J
. —-
13 SR. SPEC. AGENT WALLS: Okay. Could you
14 please explai n what role you had in the Generic Issues
15 GI – 204 screening report?
16 MR . CRISCIONE: Yeah . I didn’ t have
17 anything to do with it.
18 SR. SPEC. AGENT WALLS: No role?
19 MR. CRISCIONE: No. No role.
20 SR. SPEC . AGENT WALLS: Okay.
21 MR. CRISCIONE : I was in the same branch
22 that wrote the report , but no role ·___., I~ or: s-o
23 SR. SPEC . AGENT WALLS: Could you please
24 explain the process and length of t i me it took to
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1 coordina t e the r edacted version of that GI-204 screening
2 report?
3 MR . CRISCIONE : Yeah. You know, that’s
4 rea lly something you s h ould talk to Richard Perkins,
5 Michelle Bensi, Se lim Sankata r, or Jake Phillips about.
6 But —
7 SR. SPEC . AGENT WALLS: What is your
8 knowledge of —
9 MR . CRISCIONE: Yeah .
10 SR . SPEC . AGENT WALLS: – – the process that
11 wa s involved?
12 MR . CRI SCIONE: Well, my knowledge is I
13 know all four of those people. And it took about a
14 year – – it was l ess t han a yea r, but, I mean, like we’ re
15 talking 11 month s , maybe 10 plus, to route that — get
16 that routed through approva:._:_ I: oG ; ::r 7
1 7 Now, you probably can’t tell me, but I’ll
18 ask anyways . Have you spoken to Richard Perkins about
19 that process?
20 SR. SPEC. AGENT WALLS : We’ 11 be talking to
21 a lot of p eople on this i ssue, but
22 MR . CRISCI ONE : Okay.
23 SR. SPEC . AGENT WALLS: – – right now I want
24 to know what your knowledge i s.
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MR. CRISCIONE: Okay.
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2 SR. SPEC. AGENT WALLS: Okay? What other
3 federal agencies influenced the decision on what
4 information needed to be redacted out of the GI-204
S screening report:__..- /: o ? ! Q?
6 MR. CRISCIONE: Well, let’s see,
7 Department of Homeland Security reviewed the report.
8 And initially I believe they said there was no – – nothing
9 they needed r edacted. But I also believe they changed
10 that opinion. I didn’t find out they had changed that
1 1 opinion until much later .
12 The Army Corps of Engineers, I think they
13 review the report. I don’t know if they specifically
14 redacted it, but I do know that they told us, you know,
15 some things they traditionally redact, and we redacted
16 it out. And then they released a report on Missouri
17 River flooding that really had a lot of the redacted
18 information out of the public report . _, 1• 0
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1 9 So, yeah, there’s some incongruencies
20 there.
21 And then, FERC and the Tennessee Valley
22 Authority , and I — to my knowledge , that’s everyone.
23 There might have been others, though.
24 SR . SPEC. AGENT WALLS:
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Okay.
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Did you
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1 verify with anyone a t t h e NRC i f any of these agencies
2 objected to t he public release of their informa t ion~
3 MR. CRISCI ONE : Are you saying before I
4 sent the unredacted report to members of Congress, did
5 I verify wi t h any of those agencies?
6 SR. SPEC. AGENT WALLS : correct.
7 MR . CRISCIONE : No, I did not.
8 SR. SPEC. AGENT WALLS: Okay. And I guess
9 that would go — did you — wel l , this is a separate
10 question. Did you seek approval from DHS, the Army
11 Corps of Engine ers, or FERC, or the TVA, to release their
12 information in unredacted form~ ()I~ of[:-.rr
13 MR. CRISCIONE: Wh en you say “release,” I
14 did. Just documents to member s of Congress. I don’t
15 know if I would cla rify that as release, but that’s what
16 you’ re talking about is when I s ent those to members of
17 Congress?
18 SR . SPEC. AGENT WALLS: Yes.
19 MR. CRISCIONE: I did not , no.
20 SR. SPEC. AGENT WALLS: Did Duke Energy
21 have a role in determining what information should be
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withheld in the GI -204 screening report? t ! o ‘/ : z.o
MR. CRISCIONE : Yes, they did.
SR. SPEC . AGENT WALLS: What role?
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MR. CRISCIONE: You know, I — like I said,
2 I wasn’t on that report, but I do know that there was
3 a phone call with Duke Energy prior to release of the
4 redacted report·__.- I ~ ‘ ‘!:’ ?J’
s SR. SPEC. AGENT WALLS: Okay. You shared
6 with me a detailed response to the union as we
7 coordinated this interview explaining your actions in
8 releasing the unredacted GI- 204 report to Congress in
9 July of 2012. That’s correct_:::_– /:{ 3 – MR . CRISCIONE: That’s correct, yes.
14 SR. SPEC . AGENT WALLS: In your letter to
15 the union, you explain that you provided Richard
1 6 Perkins’ complaint and the unredacted screening report,
17 GI – 204, to about a dozen congressional offices in
18 September.
19 MR. CRISCIONE: That’s correct, yes .
20 SR . SPEC. AGENT WALLS : Are they fully
21 detailed in this memorandum?
22 MR. CRISCIONE: They are, yes.
23 SR. SPEC . AGENT WALLS: Okay. Are we able
24 to have a copy of this memorandum?
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MR . CRISCIONE : You can keep that, or I can
2 email you the e l e c t ronic copy . I don’t care.
3 SR . SPEC. AGENT WALLS : I ‘ 11 keep this one,
4 if you don’t mind.
5 MR . CRISCIONE: Yeah, that’s okay.
6 SR. SPEC. AGENT WALLS: When you provided
7 Richard Perkins’ complaint letter in the unredacted
8 GI-204 report , did you inform the recipients of that
9 information of the sensitivity and urgency to protect
10 that info:rmation?
MR . CRISCIONE : I don’t specifically
12 remember doing that, no. I mean, but the unredacted
13 screening report i s stamped OUO . It’s not stamped SRI,
14 though, it’s stamped — I think it’s — no, I think it’s
15 stamped Not For Public Disclosure. I don ‘ t know exactly
16 what it’s stamped. I believe it’s Not For Public
17 Disclosure, t hough .
18 SR. SPEC. AGENT WALLS: So other than the
19 stampings on the document, you didn’ t take any steps to
20 art iculate that this information was to be non-public?
MR . CRISCIONE: Not that I recall , no .
22 SR . SPEC. AGENT WALLS: Okay.
23 MR . CRISCIONE: But reemphasize, I gave it
24 to people who I believed were – – had a need to know and
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1 were authori zed to r eceive it . And, you know, I’m not
2 aware tha t I h ad an obligation to — if I’m giving it
3 to someone who is authorized to receive it and has a need
4 to know, they also have an obligation to train them on
5 control of Offici al Use Only mat erial.
/ ~ J/ .’ZJl 6 SR . SPEC . AGENT WALLS: You mention in your
7 union email relat i ng to the GI-204 report that — and
8 you confirmed here today – – that the report was nothing
9 you were assigned to.
10 MR . CRISCI ONE : That’s correct, yeah.
11 SR. SPEC . AGENT WALLS: Yet you have taken
1 2 a lot of time, you have compiled numerous int ernally
13 protected documents in it from ADAMS, conducted research
14 into this matter, a nd you have engaged Congress. When
15 did you have time to do all of this?
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MR . CRI SCI ONE : Well, some of it was done
on my own time, and, you know, some – – you know, I think
all of us at the NRC have a little bit of time in the
k…,o …/
work week to talk to colleagues and, yo” , review things.
SR. SPEC. AGENT WALLS: If you had to put
a percentage on it, how much of a percentage of your time
did you put into this effort during your normal duty
hours?
MR . CRISCIONE: To my normal duty hours,
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I’d say the week I wrote that letter to the Chairman maybe
20 hours, maybe not that much. I don’ t know. Other
weeks, really not much at all . When I walked down to
the — in July, that was on my lunch hour. I’ve got a
three-hour lunch hour built i nto my schedule.
And, you know, a lot of the — a lot of
interactions I had after the letter to the Chairman was
done, you know, while I was on — at home on leave, so
a lot of it was done in the evenings. And most of the
interactions with the congressional staff, I could say
all of it, but I’m not certain it was every single – – all
of it, but, you know, that was done on my own time.
That letter to the Chairman, you know, I
think it ‘ s a gray area to me on whether or not I’m allowed
to write a letter to the Chairman on company time, so
to speak, bur. it was probably 20 hours that week.
SR. SPEC. AGENT WALLS: Okay. Have you
used your position as an NRC employee to access internal
agency documents, non-public information, for which you
did not have an official need to know?
MR . CRISCIONE: I think the — I think to
answer that I would have to caveat what an official need
to know is. But I feel as a concerned federal employee
who has listened r.o another employee express their
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concerns about issues , not just one other employe but
several, the same issue, that, you know, it’s — I have
official business to, you know, go into ADAMS and look
at documents that I’m not restricted from seeing.
Now, there is others who might define it
differently, but I — if you want me to address
SR. SPEC . AGENT WALLS: You
MR. CRISCIONE : — give me the question
again.
SR. SPEC . AGENT WALLS: You currently work
for the Office of Research.
MR. CRISCIONE : Yeah .
SR. SPEC. AGENT WALLS: Let’s say an issue
pops up in the Office of Licensing. Do you have a need
to know or official duty responsibility to go out and
review those documents from an Office of Licensing?
MR. CRISCIONE: I certainly bel ieve I
might. I mean, I —
SR. SPEC. AGENT WALLS : Normal course of
duty, what are your normal duties
issues?
MR. CRISCIONE : Well , one of my —
SR. SPEC. AGENT WALLS: screening
MR . CRISCIONE: One of my normal duties is
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1 to review all of the OpE coming into the agency. I’m
2 not the only one that does that, but I’m, you know, one
3 of the people in t he branch that does that. And, you
4 know, I have seen p ieces of OpE where I might have
5 questions of or need some knowledge of or want to dig
6 a little bit, where I have gone and accessed ADAMS
7 documents .
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And one of them was a licensing issue. You
know, there was an issue with Wolf Creek on how they
(;VJ+~.-
handled their feed ear isolation signal.
SR. SPEC. AGENT WALLS: So by virtue of not
being restricted from access, you have access – – you have
official need to access all of — all documents if you
are not restricted, is that what you’re telling me?
MR. CRISCIONE: I don’t know what the NRC
16 policy is on accessing documents in ADAMS. But I have
17 always assumed that if you can’t access it, you don’t
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have the —
SR. SPEC . AGENT WALLS: Need to know.
MR . CRISCIONE: You don’t have the
electronic access to it. Yeah. If you don’t have
22 the — you know, need to know, a lot of people define
23 that different ways. But if you ‘ re not allowed to see
24 t hat document, I have always assumed you don’t have the
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1 electronic access t o it .
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2 Like I don ‘ t know what is going to happen
3 with this transcrip t, but I’m assuming it’s not going
4 to go into ADAMS in a spot La rry Criscione can get to .
5 All right? I mean, I ass ume that ADAMS is set up so that
6 if NRC employees cannot – – a certain NRC employee cannot
7 see something, then he doesn’ t have electronically the
8 ability to see i t. I j ust assume that if I can get to
9 it in ADAMS, I have the — I’m allowed to see it.
SR. SPEC. AGENT WALLS : There is a
11 difference between a cit izen having access and having
12 access to non-publ i c information, and an NRC employee
13 having access to a large majority of non-public
14 information
15 MR. CRISCIONE : Right.
16 SR. SPEC. AGENT WALLS: — for personal
1 7 use. Have you accessed NRC records, non-public
18 records, for your personal use?
19 MR . CRISCIONE : What do you mean by
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“personal use”?
SR . SPEC . AGENT WALLS: Your personal
22 goals, ambitions, t hat you wouldn’t normally have access
23 to as a U.S. citizen.
24 MR. CRISCIONE: No.
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SR. SPEC . AGENT WALLS: And not – – go ahead.
2 I’ll let you answer that .
3 MR . CRISCIONE : I have to say no. I mean,
4 I have access to a l ot of documents that — from our
5 responsibilities in OEGIB I probably didn’t need to look
6 at to get my job done that day. But, you know, when I
7 have a concern, or when a fellow employee brings a
8 concern to me, I bel ieve that as an NRC employee I’ve
9 got an obligation to look into things.
10 SR . SPEC . AGENT WALLS : When you look into
11 these things, do you work with your supervisor? Does
12 he approve you to look into these matters beyond your
assigned duties?
MR . CRISCIONE: No.
15 SR. SPEC . AGENT WALLS: So on occasion you
16 use your NRC access t o all documents to pursue matters
17 that aren’t assigned to you, officially assigned to you.
18 MR . CRISCIONE: On occasion, I l ook at
19 ADAMS documents that are on matters not officially
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assigned to me, yes .
SR. SPEC. AGENT WALLS: When was t he last
22 time you have done that?
23 MR . CRISCIONE: Well, I don’t think I’ve
24 done i t this week, but I’m — I might be wrong there.
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The letter -~ the ChairmanJ’- t he office is writing a
letter to a state legislator in Missouri on the Callaway
plant incident . And I came across it, and I requested
from the – – one of the Chairman’s aides, Jake Zimmerman,
who isn’t with the Chairman, I found out, anymore, an
open door meeting with the Chairman.
And that is probably the last time I
accessed a document in ADAMS that wasn’t part of my
official j ob duties. But I do feel that as an NRC
employee who has nuclear safety concerns, you know, I
am authorized to look at that document. And tha t was
I believe last week. I mean, it’s possible it was
Monday, but I don’t think so.
SR . SPEC. AGENT WALLS: How did you come
across that document?
MR. CRISCIONE: I was writing an email to
a woman named Lisa Marie Jarriel, who works in the Office
of Enforcement. I don’t know if you know who she is.
She is the allegations coordinator. And she has been
assisting me to some extent with the Callaway issue.
And in my email to her, I wanted to detail
the correspondence between the NRC and Jeanette Ox£ord,
who is a legislator in the state of Missouri. And I
believe I did an ADAMS search, you know, with the word
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1 “Jeanette Oxford. ”
2 And, you know, I was looking for
3 correspondence which I knew had occurred, but, you know,
4 even though I had always seen that correspondence and
5 everything, I – – you know, in my emai 1 to Lisa I wanted
6 to be a little thorough, so I wanted the dates and stuff
7 like that. And that’s when I came across the letter that
was being drafted, so
SR. SPEC. AGENT WALLS: Was it caveated?
10 Did it have any caveats on it?
11 MR. CRISCIONE: Actually, I think it
12 was — I think it was denoted as publicly available,
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which, by the way, it ‘s not.. It.’ s entirely
pre- decisional. It’s in the routing process, hasn’t
been signed yet, but I think it’s denoted “publicly
available” because once it is signed and sent to this
state legislator it’s going to be a public document.
SR. SPEC. AGENT WALLS: Public document.
MR. CRISCIONE: But I’m pretty certain it
20 didn1 t have any Official Use Only designation or
21 anything like that on it . I mean, it’s a letter from
22 the Chairman to a state legislator.
23 SR. SPEC. AGENT WALLS:
24 pre-decisional?
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MR. CRISCIONE : I don’t — see, I didn’t
2 look at every ADAMS code, but I d idn’t see any code like
3 that. But , I me a n , I knew from professional
4 intelligence t hat it was — i t ‘s an unsigned letter. I t
5 wasn ‘ t a PDF . It was a Word document . It was still in
6 the routing . There were still unsigned blocks in the
7 concurrence .
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SR. SPEC . AGENT WALLS : Who was the
responsible point of contact f o r drafting that letter?
MR. CRISCIONE : I don’t know.
SR. SPEC. AGENT WALLS: Okay.
MR. CRISCIONE : But the Chairman signing
13 it. I mean, I don ‘ t kn o w who — obviously, she is not
14 writing it, but
15 SR. SPEC. AGENT WALLS: What did you do with
16 it? Did you save it? Forwa rd it?
17 MR. CRI SCI ONE : Oh, no. Well, I might have
18 forwarded it to the Chairman and told her I’d like
19 to — you know, I sent an email to Jake Zimmerman out
20 of the Chairman’s office , you know, saying, “I would like
21 an open door mee t i ng to d i scuss, you know, your reply
22 here. ” And I ‘m pretty c e r t ain I attached that Word
23 document to it. I might not have, though . I don’t
24 know. I did print a copy for myself, though. It’s on
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my desk back in OEGIB.
SR. SPEC. AGENT WALLS: Did you save a copy?
MR. CRISCIONE: It• s possible. I don’t
recall.
SR. SPEC. AGENT WALLS: Have you provided
internally protected documents to anyone beyond the
Federal Government?
MR. CRISCIONE: No.
SR. SPEC . AGENT WALLS : Individuals at
POGO?
MR. CRISCIONE: No. I have provided
documents to them, but not internally protected ones.
SR. SPEC. AGENT WALLS : Uni.on of Concerned
Scientists?
MR. CRISCIONE: No.
SR. SPEC. AGENT WALLS: Greenpeace?
MR. CRISCIONE: No.
SR . SPEC. AGENT WALLS: Buffington Post?
MR. CRISCIONE: No.
SR. SPEC. AGENT WALLS: Greenville News?
MR. SULLIVAN: Larry
MR . CRISCIONE: No.
MR. SULLIVAN: – – I want to make sure – – the
agent is asking, have you provided documents, or have
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1 you provided protected d ocuments? Which of —
2 SR. SPEC. AGENT WALLS : Internally
3 protected documents .
4
5
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I ; r.–JC/: zZ- –
9
MR. SULLIVAN: Okay.
SR . SPEC . AGENT WALLS : Official Use Only.
MR. SULLIVAN : Thank you.
SR. SPEC . AGENT WALLS: Documents
designated Non- Public Disclosure.
MR . CRI SCIONE : Right. And the answer to
10 all of those agencies is no, or all of those
11 organizations is no . You know, based on the Callaway
12 issue , you know, I – – you know, I might have shared some
13 of my corresponde nce, but none of it is Official Use
14 Only, and none of i t is — it’s correspondence from me
15 as a citizen . A l ot o f it was done before I even worked
16 at the NRC. But no, I have not ever given internally
17
/ : 1/Jl:. s-1
18
protected documents to any of those organizations.
SR . SPEC. AGENT WALLS: There have been two
19 articles from Iranian press citing you in these
20 articles.
21 press?
22
23
24
Have you provided information to foreign
MR. CRISCIONE: No, I have not.
SR . SPEC . AGENT WALLS: By any means?
MR . CRISCIONE: No.
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SR. SPEC . AGENT WALLS :
89
Have you been
2 interviewed by foreign press?
3 MR. CRI SCI ONE: No , I have not .
4 SR. SPEC. AGENT WALLS: How did they come
5 in con tact with you r information to quote you directly
6 in t hese a r tic les?
7 MR. CRI SCIONE : I ‘m pretty certain they
8 read The Hu£fington Pos t or t he eNews wire or something .
9 SR. SPEC . AGENT WALLS: Have you been
10 contacted by t he Iranian press or anyone representing
1 1 Iran?
MR . CRISCIONE : No , I have not.
SR. SPEC. AGENT WALLS: How did Greenpeace
14 and The Buffingt on Post come into possession of the
1 5 unredacted GI-2 04 report?
1 6 MR . CRISCI ONE : It would be speculation for
17 me to answer that. I – –
18 SPECIAL AGENT ESMOND: Speculate, please.
19 MR . CRISCI ONE: Official answer is I don’t
20 know. But the specu lation is I beli eve it was provided
21 to them by a congressional staffer.
22
23 staffer?
24
SR . S PEC . AGENT WALLS : Who is that
MR . CRISCIONE : I really can 1 t speculate on
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1 that. I mean, i f I knew, and if the IG from the Hill
2 was asking me, I think it ‘ s appropriate. But I don’t
3 know, and I don’t —
4 SR. SPEC. AGENT WALLS: We came across some
5 information where you indicated you suspect who released
6 it. So I’m asking you, who do you suspect released it?
MR. CRISCIONE : I don’t know who released
8 it . And I
9 SR. SPEC. AGENT WALLS: You’re very
10 hesitant. Somebody has given you — you are of the
11 assumption that you ‘ve got a good idea who released it.
Why are you so hesitant?
MR. CRISCI ONE : Why? Because we are the
nuclear regulatory a gency. We are overseeing you
know, we ‘re a federal – – we ‘re an executive branch
agency, but we a r e — you know, we have congressional
oversight. And I really I don’t think it’s
appropriate for me to speculate on what congressional
office might have released what. I mean, I don’t know
for certain.
SR. SPEC. AGENT WALLS : Let’ s – – why do you
suspect somebo dy? What did they tell you?
MR. CRISCIONE : What did who tell me?
SR. SPEC. AGENT WALLS:
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1 suspect somebody released t.his informat.ion. I ‘m asking
2 you who. You have an obligation, as a federal employee,
3 a member who is sworn to the Constitution
4 MR. CRISCIONE: Right.
s SR . SPEC. AGENT WALLS: — to protect this
information. This information goc out in the public.
SPECIAL AGENT ESMOND: And it. is very
8 appropriate that the NRC OIG ask you that question,
9 because it is our responsibility to track down where that
10 information went . So if you have information
11 pertaining to the release of that: information, it is your
12 duty as a government employee to answer that.
13 MR. CRISCIONE: I agree 100 percent with
14 that. But I don’t have information; I’m speculating.
15 SPECIAL AGENT ESMOND: Let me ref er you
16 back to an email thac we have possession of.
17 MR. CRISCIONE : Okay.
18 SPECIAL AGENT ESMOND: From you . It
19 states that you have a very good idea of what
20 congressional staffer released that. Why would you say
21 that to a supervisor if you didn’t have that information?
22 And let me remind you, you are under oath this whole time.
23
24
MR. CRISCIONE: Right.
SPECIAL AGENT ESMOND: Okay?
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MR. CRISCIONE: And I haven’ t said anything
SPECIAL AGENT ESMOND: I understand that.
But what I want to remind you of is most of the time when
we interview people, if you make a mistake in government,
if you do something wrong, okay, it’s never as bad as
the lie to cover it up.
MR. CRISCIONE: Right.
SPECIAL AGENT ESMOND: Okay?
MR. CRISCIONE: I am not going to lie to
cover it up, and I’m not going to give you a name that
I —
SPECIAL AGENT ESMOND: You also said that
you didn’t think it was appropriate to tell us. But if
it was a congressional inquiry on the Hill, you would
be obliged to tell them?
MR. CRISCIONE: That’s completely
different, because that’s — a ~~4;,, ~~ Congressman – – c~J f’err
SPECIAL AGENT ESMOND: Let 1 s go back to
Agent Walls’ question. In that email where you had
stated to your supervisor that you had a good idea of
what congressional staff officer rel eased it —
way?
MR. SULLIVAN : Could I say it a different
Randy Sullivan. I think we are obligated to
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answer the agent’s question. The issue is , if you are
just speculating , you should say that. If you have some
information that led you to that speculation, you should
give them that. And if you are just spouting off with
some wild idea, you should say that. But answer the
agent’s question I think is the best way to go.
MR. CRISCIONE: All righc.
SR. SPEC. AGENT WALLS: Who do you suspect
released it, the screening report and the Chairman’s
letter?
MR. CRISCIONE: I have absolutely no proof
of this, and no idea, but when I — and I haven’t seen
that email to my supervisor, but I — and I would like
to see it . But I was probably referring to Kucinich’s
office.
SPECIAL AGENT ESMOND: I’m sorry . Who?
MR. CRISCIONE: Kucinich.
SPECIAL AGENT ESMOND: Who specifically in
Dennis Kucinich’s office?
MR. CRISCIONE: I can only tel l you who I
sent it to there . I can’t really speculate on who might
have given it. I mean, it could have been —
SPECIAL AGENT ESMOND: And who did you send
it to in that off ice?
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MR. CRISCIONE: I believe I sent it to Marty
2 Gelfand.
3 SPECIAL AGENT ESMOND: Could you spell the
4 last name, please?
s MR. CRISCIONE: Yeah. It ‘s
6 G- E- L- F-A-N- D. And Victor Egerton.
7 SPECIAL AGENT ESMOND: And how do you know
8 t hose individuals?
9 MR . CRISCIONE: Well, I have actually known
10 Marty for years, since 2008. But
11 SPECIAL AGENT ESMOND: In what capacity?
12 MR. CRISCIONE: Well, he helped me with
13 some of the Callaway stuff. I used to live in Dennis’
14 district when I was in – – and – – when I was in Ohio. But
15 I don ‘ t think Marty gave it to anybody.
But, you know, when I was looking for – – you
17 know, I don’t know how to find a Congressman’s email
1 8 address, but, you know, when I was looking for
1 9 Congressmen on the House Energy and Commerce Committee,
20 on the Environment and Public Works Committee, on the
21 Homeland Security Commi ttee, Government Affairs, you
22 know, I could find the phone number on the internet, you
23 know, on the Senate pages or House pages, and I ‘d call
24 and say, “Well, who i s your lead, you know, Majority and
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1 Minority contact for these issues with the NRC?”
2 And, you know, that’s usually who I decided
3 who to send you know, what email to send it to. I
4 mean, you know, I might have sent it to Vic Egerton, but
5 I was really sending it to Dennis Kucinich. I mean, I
6 just — you know, Dennis doesn’t have an email that every
7 federal employee can — that’s why he has a staff is to
8 receive stuff .
9 MR. SULLIVAN: Larry, just to be complete,
10 is there a reason the agent asked, did you have some basis
11 for this speculation?
12 MR. CRISCIONE: Um – –
13 MR . SULLIVAN: If you didn’t, just say you
14 didn’t.
15 MR . CRISCIONE: Yeah. I mean, you know,
16 really, no more speculation than that Tom Zeller of The
kv..ov .s
17 Huffington Post is from the Cleveland area , and E:hat o+a~>
18 Kucinich . And that ‘s really my only —
19 SPECIAL AGENT ESMOND: Have you ever spoken
20 to Tom Zeller?
21 MR . CRISCIONE: Oh, on many occasions, but
22 not specifically about how he got those documents.
23 SPECIAL AGENT ESMOND: Is t hat how maybe
24 you were contacted for input into the article for The
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1 Huffington Post with relation t o GI-204?
2 MR . CRISCIONE : Yeah. He contacted me.
96
3 SPECIAL AGENT ESMOND ; Why would he contact
4 you on GI- 204 if you had no i nput on GI-204? I : f-3’. ,LC__ –
5 MR . CRISCI ONE: Well, you know, I was
6 concer ned about how — how the GI was being withheld,
7 and t he d ocument was released in I think February, it
8 might have been e arly March , of last year.
9 I sent the public copy, you know, the
1 O r edacted copy, to David Lochbaum at the Union of
ti …
11 Conc erned Sci entists. And I gave him the ,MR number for
1 2 the unredact ed copy and, you know, I didn’t give him an
,.J .1>4 ,i 5 .:J ~ ,,
13 unredacted copy, but I gave him the ”-sent to” number,
14 so he coul d easi ly FOIA it.
15 And I think. that, you know, come —
1 6 SPECIAL AGENT ESMOND : Well, what
17 timefr ame did you send it to Mr . Lochbaum?
1 8 MR. CRI SCIONE: Well, that was — I don’t
19 have the exact date, but it was late February/early
20 March.
21
22
23
24
SPECIAL AGENT ESMOND: February of?
MR. CRISCIONE : 2012 .
SPECIAL AGENT ESMOND: 2012 .
MR . CRI SCI ONE : Yeah. It was r i ght around
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1 the — I mean, obviously, it was af t e r the — it was after
2 the redacted copy was released. I t hink that might have
been March 6th, so – –
SPECIAL AGENT ESMOND: Okay . Why did you
5 send it to David Lochbaum?
6 MR. CRISCI ONE: The redacted copy?
7 SPECIAL AGENT ESMOND: Yeah.
8 MR. CRISCIONE: Well, you know
9 SPECIAL AGENT ESMOND: Is David Lochbaum a
10 member of Congr ess?
11 MR. CRISCIONE : He i s not. But I a l so had
12 nev e r given David Lochbaum int e rnally restricted —
13 SPECIAL AGENT ESMOND: That Is not what I’m
14 a sking.
15 MR. CRISCIONE: Okay. But the reason I
16 sent i t to him is I thought this was a significant issue.
17 All right? And one of the things that the ucs kind of
1 8 is a watch d og in the NRC over i s transparency and about,
19 you know , withho lding that from the public.
20 And, you know, I think it was important for
21 him t o s ee t his heavily redacted r eport. And, you know,
22 it’s a report , by the way, that we essentially released
23 to them. I me an, we rel eased i t on our public website.
24 But, you kno w, I just wanted t o draw his attention to
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it.
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SPECIAL AGENT ESMOND:
98
Do you remember
having conversations with Mr. Perkins about releasing
it to David Lochbaum or any members of Congress?
MR . CRISCIONE: Wel l, back in
SPECIAL AGENT ESMOND; Yes or no.
MR. CRISCIONE: Okay. No through the
March timeframe. And , you know, I’ve had many
conversations with Mr . Perk ins about this stuff after
i t went to Congress, so —
SPECIAL AGENT ESMOND: Did Mr. Perkins ask
you to act on his behalf to send it to the people that
you knew, whethe r it be Tom Zeller, Dennis Kucinich, or
David Lochbaum, or any o t h e r person outside of the NRC?
MR. CRISCI ONE: Now, when you used the
pronoun “it,” if you mean by “it”
SPECIAL AGENT ESMOND: GI-204.
MR. CRISCIONE: Okay. No. But if “it” is
his letter to the IG, then yes.
SPECIAL AGENT ESMOND: How did in
regards to the GI-204 issue, you had previously stated
you didn’t have input. And then you said you had a lot
of conversations with Mr. Perkins, who is the author of
GI-204. Did Mr. Perkins ever come to you and ask you
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l f or your advice or input or suggestions on anyth ing
2 related to GI-204?
3 MR. CRISCIONE: Oh. All t he time.
4 SPECIAL AGENT ESMOND: But you said you had
S no inp u t i nto the 204.
I . r?’- llJ 6
MR. CRISCIONE: Okay. And when I say t hat,
7 I work in the Off ice of Research, a l l righ t? A lot of
8
9
10
11
12
~,,J. fe ( ·.L ._I
people there have Ph.D. s , a- number of -operators-at a
nuclear reactor plant. Richard Perki ns and Shelby
Bensi came to me all the time to ask me about opera tional
~lo” J >’~ o the p lants, you know,
co~1 ..r ‘ I rPO>t\ .y -J;,,of.tl
what happens if the p&t•gle~ ~t•rtea — how t he circ
13 water system works, you know , how the UHS works. So,
14 yeah, I mean, I —
15 SPECIAL AGENT ESMOND: Did you classify it
16 a s t hey probably boW1c ed i nformation off of you for an
17 opinion ?
18 MR. CRISCIONE: Yeah. Or p rob ably b e tte r
19 c l ass ifies it as a tutorial .
20 SPECIAL AGENT ESMOND: And I know you would
21 classify your input.
22 MR. CRISCIONE: Yeah . Other than —
23 SPECIAL AGENT ESMOND : You mi ght not h ave
24 had the total document , but you h a d —
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MR. CRISCIONE: I guess the bes t way to say
2 it is I was a techni cal resource , but not on dam — on
3 plant operation . The people who wrote that screening
4 report, most of them were hydrol ogis t s , civil engineers,
5 you know. They wer e experts on the f a i l ing on the civil
Covt.5-f’rfA. cf 1 ‘o.,,,
6 eng ineering .ins trticti~R-, not on p lant construction.
I : r-~ :s> 7 SPECIAL AGENT ESMOND: Okay. Did Mr.
8 Perkins ever ask you or talk to you about his
9 d i sag reement wi th the redacted v e rs ion of GI-204?
10 MR . CRI SCIONE : Yes.
11 SPECIAL AGENT ESMOND: And what did those
12 conve rsations enta il?
13 MR. CRISCIONE : Well , he was kind of
14 frustrated wi t h what we were – – what we were, you know,
15 trying to wi t hhold. He basi cally felt that, you know,
16 t h i s – – it’s one t hing to — you know, t o get these
17 letters piecemeal and s end them on a piecemeal
dec i s ionmaking, you know, to withhold them.
But then his s creening report, you know, he
20 r eally felt that , you know, it r eally deserved a second
21 look as to , you know, the past decisi ons on what can be
22 released and can’t be released.
23 And, you know, the b iggest complaint he had
24 wit h me , too , was on — and I don’t want to put words
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101
in his mouth. You really have to talk to him. Bue I
have the impression he was under a lot of pressure to
remove what he thought was significant information from
the report, because it was Official Use Only
information.
And I guess what his complaint was was that
he is not writing this report to the public. He is
writ ing this report to Bill Ruland of NRR who is the
Chairman of the Screening Committee for the GI, and why
V” ,. I {
d-±d he dumb down his report, you know, to Bill Ruland
\’! ,. t. ~I/,~
~t this information ,
SPECIAL AGENT ESMOND: And what was your
response to his frustration?
MR. CRI SCIONE: I agreed with him. To me,
it fel t — you know, I don ‘ t want you guys to take this
and say I ‘m making some criminal accusation against NRR.
But to me, you know, he is of the opinion, and I agree
with it — and you’ve got to get that opinion from him,
I shouldn’t be putting words in his mouth. But we
were – – you know, we were protecting Duke Energy for some
reason from embarrassment.
SPECIAL AGENT ESMOND: And you are basing
that on what information?
MR . CRI SCIONE : I Im basing that on what he
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1 said to me. He thought we were – – he thought there were
2
3
4
5
people at NRR who were prone to prot ect Duke Energy for
reasons he didn’t understand, just. because it’s a habit
L.ll J.1, 0 //’-J
to circle the wri~~ ng~ around a nuclear problem.
SPECIAL AGENT ESMOND: And you agreed with
6 that, his assessment.
7 MR. CRISCIONE: Yeah. You know, my
opinion, I’ve seen it before.
SPECIAL AGENT ESMOND: Now, is it — kind
lO
r~ J~ ><: 01 • \ ~~ of moving forward here, ~e re~t information,w as it 11 to have the NRC do i ts job and not protect Duke Energy 12 with the information being redacted, or was it to protect 13 the public from a dam failure? Which one was it? I'm 14 kind of - - I'm getting confused listening to what you' re 15 saying, because it seemed on one hand it's to protect 16 the public; in the next sentence it's t.o say, "Well, I 1 7 disagree with the NRC' s stance on that we' re protecting 18 Duke Energy, and I agree with Richard Perkins." 19 MR. CRISCIONE: Okay . 20 SPECIAL AGENT ESMOND: So which one is it? 21 MR. CRISCIONE: Well , I think part of the 22 confusion is you ' re thinking it's one or the other. You 23 can write a letter and have multiple purposes for that 24 letter. And, you know, my purpose of my letter to the Released under the settlement for Case 1:13-cv-00942-RMC NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1 2 3 Released under the settlement for Case 1:13-cv-00942-RMC Chairman and, you know, my l etters to the Boxer and to Senator Lieberman is that multiple purposes in t hem . 103 senator there's Number one , it's really -- my chief concern 5 has been our process. You know, t here is something foul in our process that this issue has dragged on for so long. SPECIAL AGENT ESMOND: If there is something wrong wit

Post

2014-03-12 – NRC – Jocassee Dam – Notice of Closure of Investigation – ML16239A085

—– Forwarded Message —–
From: “Averbach, Andrew”
To: “infoprivacylaw@yahoo.com”
Cc: “Grodin, Maryann”
Sent: Wednesday, March 12, 2014 11:45 AM
Subject: RE: notification in Criscione v. NRC, 12-042 (D.D.C)
My apologies; case number is 13-942 (D.D.C.)
From: Averbach, Andrew
Sent: Wednesday, March 12, 2014 11:44 AM
To: infoprivacylaw@yahoo.com
Cc: Grodin, Maryann
Subject: notification in Criscione v. NRC, 12-042 (D.D.C)
Mr. Hodes:
This email confirms our conversation this morning, during which I informed you that we will be
sending out a notice of closure of investigation pursuant to paragraph 2 of the settlement agreement
dated October 28, 2013. We will send this notification today by certified mail through the USPS (to
the address designated in the settlement agreement) and will also send you a copy of the notice by email
to this address (infoprivacylaw@yahoo.com).
Please let me know if you have any questions.
Andrew P. Averbach
Solicitor
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
(301) 415-1956
andrew.averbach@nrc.gov
UNITED STATES
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20555-0001
OFFICE OF THE
INSPECTOR GENERAL
Mr. Lawrence Criscione
1412 Dial Court
Springfield, IL 62704
March 12, 2014
RE: Civil Action No: 13-0942 (RMC)
Dear Mr. Criscione:
Pursuant to paragraph two of the settlement agreement in the above captioned matter,
this constitutes notice that both OIG lnvestigations13-001 and 13-005 are now closed
· cases.
Please contact Joseph McMillan, the Assistant Inspector General for Investigations,
Office of the Inspector General, at 301 -415-5929 to arrange for your receipt of the digital
recording referenced in the settlement agreement.
cc: Joseph McMillan
Andrew Averbach
Sincerely,
Maryann L. Grodin
General Counsel to the Inspector General
Case 1:13-cv-00942-RMC Document 11 Filed 11/01/13 Page 1 of 4
Case 1:13-cv-00942-RMC Document 11 Filed 11/01/13 Page 2 of 4
Case 1:13-cv-00942-RMC Document 11 Filed 11/01/13 Page 3 of 4
Case 1:13-cv-00942-RMC Document 11 Filed 11/01/13 Page 4 of 4

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To search for specific strings of two or more search terms(ie: Fukushima Daiichi ), while excluding records that include separate references to each search term, place the search query in quotations "Fukushima Daiichi" in the search bar.

Document Collections

Records are grouped together into the following collections:

  1. Collections by Agency
  2. Collections by Organization
  3. Collections by Event
  4. Collections by Site