2012-09-20 – NRC – Jocassee Dam – History of Oconee Flood Concerns

J OFt:ICIAL USE ONLY= SEGURln' RELATEB INl=OBMA"J'.10» History of Oconee Flood Concerns Updated... View Document

Post

2008-10-26 – NRC – Jocassee Dam – Why did the Oconee flood issue take many years to address

Why did the Oconee flood issue take many years to address?
In 1977, the NRC initi”ated the Systematic Evaluation Program (SEP) to review the designs of 51
older, operating nuclear power plants. The staff compared the design of 10 of 51 older plants to
the Standard Review Plan issued in 1975. The staff’s review identified 27 issues, including dam
integrity and site flooding that required some improvements at one or more of the 1 O plants that
were reviewed. These issues were captured under NRC’s Generic Safety Issue – 156, SEP,
which describes how the NRC resolved the 27 SEP issues for the remaining 41 plants including
Oconee. Generic Safety Issue 156.1.2, Dam Integrity and Site Flooding, credited the agency’s
Individual Plant Examination of External Events (IPEEE) program to close the items because
licensees were expected to address upstream dam failures if it could cause significant site
flooding. In the NRC’s 1991 Generic Letter 88-20, Supplement 4, ‘IPEEE for Severe Accident
Vulnerabilities’, NRC requested that licensees assess their facilities for potential severe accident
vulnerabilities (i.e., beyond design basis events) and consider po.tential enhancements.
During a 1994 NRC service water team inspection at Oconee, inspectors identified that the
1992 Duke Hydro Inundation Study predicted flood waters well in excess of the 5 ft walls that
protect the SSF. The staff’s inspection report shows the licensee argued that the Jocassee Dam
failure was a beyond design basis event for the plant. The licensee committed to address the
issue in the Oconee lPEEE, and on this basis, the staff closed the inspection issue in 1994. By
NRC memorandum dated October 61 1994, Region II staff met with NRR staff on September 1,
1994 regarding several design-related safety issues for Oconee Including the Jocassee-dam
flood issue. The meeting’summary memo shows that NRR staff had not informed RES of the
issue, and NRR staff stated that the external event hazards preliminary review of Oconee would
take several .months. The memo stated that NRR staff considered the issue of minimal
importance. The memo does not provide explanation of the basis of NRR staff views. Region II
staff informed NRR of recent high water levels at the Jocassee and Keowee dams. In 2008
discussions with the memo’s author, it appears that NRR staff did not fully recognize the
potential consequences and was focused on the other Oconee issues regarding the
performance of safety-related equipment (e.g., ECCS) under design-basis conditions.
Duke submitted its IPEEE in 1995 which included an assessment of the Jocassee Dam flood
·hazard. The staffs evaluation of the IPEEE did not take issue with the derivation of the dam
break frequency or take issue with other reduction factors that Duke used to reduce their risk
estimates .of external flood events to justify no plant protection for floods in excess of Sft at the
SSF grade level. Duke did not note in the submittal or subsequent updates that there existed a
recent inundation study that was the subject of an NRC inspection issue. In 2000, the staffs
IPEEE closeout letter to the licensee stated that based on the review of the information
contained in the submittal, the staff considered Duke’s process capable of identifying potential
vulnerabilities associated with these issues at Oconee. The NRC further noted that “on the basis
that no vulnerabilities associated with the external events aspects of these issues were
identified, the staff considers external event Issues resolved. n The closeout letter cites a
dominant contributor to residual risk involved Jocassee dam failures and flood heights
exceeding the 5-foot high SSF flood barrier, thus rendering the SSF inoperable.
In 2008 dis9ussions with RES staff involved in the IPEEE reviews, the staff was unaware of the
Duke Hydro/FER.C 1992 inundation study and the related service water inspection finding in
1994. From the· staff’s review of I PE EE-related correspondence and available contractor
assessments, there is no documented evidence that the J\3.taff questioned the dam-break
frequency estimate or Duke’s use of a reduction factor to lower the risk estimate of a potential
Jocassee dam break. The reduction factor was an assumption that only 20 percent of Jocassee
dam breaks result in flooding at the Oconee site greater than the 5 foot walls protecting the SSF
entrances.
The issue reappeared in April of 2006 when the NRC concluded that the licensee failed to
effectively control maintenance activities associated with removing a fire suppression refill
access cover (a passive NRC committed flood protection barrier) in the SSF south wall to
facilitate installation of temporary electrical power cables. The staff indentified the issue during a
periodic risk-informed flood inspection under the ,NRC’s Reactor Oversight Process (ROP).
Using the ROP Significance Determination…Br-ocess, the staff discovered that the licensee may
not have adequately addressed the potential consequences of flood heights predicted at the
Oconee site based on the 1992 Duke Hydro/FERC Inundation Study. In 2007, the staff
conducted an independent review of the Jocassee Dam failure frequency that Duke had used in
the Oconee Probabilistic Risk Assessment (PRA). From that review, the staff concluded that a
higher frequency estimate of Jocassee Dam failure was more appropriate and that the
licensee’s estimate was not adequately supported by operating experience and actual
performance data of similar rock-filled dam structures. The staff also concluded that Duke had
an inadequate basis for appJying a reduction factor to further lower the risk estimate (i.e., the
assumption that only 20 percent of floods would exceed the existing 5 foot walls).
In December of 2007, the staff initiated a design adequacy review and developed an action plan
to assess the Oconee facility’s ability to withstand severe flood events from a postulated
Jocassee Dam break. Staff assessed the design basis, researched prior licensing actions
related to flood protection, and reviewed other information to determine if the current plant
design meets NRC regulatory expectations. The staff used a collaborative, consensus-building
approach among 4 NRR Divisions and OGC to ensure appropriate regulatory practices were
followed (e.g., backfit analysis). Based upon the draft backfit analysis, NRC concluded that an
adequate protection backfit may be appropriate and further determined that additional
information from the licensee was required before additional regulatory action is taken. The
staff is reviewing the licensee’s September 26, 2008 response letter to NRC’s 50.54(f) letter.
Compliments·of
GREENPEACE

Post

2013-03-25 – NRC – Jocassee Dam – Oconee slides on flood hazard report – ML16237A004

Boska, John
From:
Sent:
To:
Subject:
Attachments:
Attached are the slides.
John Boska
Boska. John
Monday, March 25, 2013 8:09AM
Connor, Eric
RE: march 25 oconee meeting
2013-03-25 Oconee slides on flood hazard report.pdf
Oconee Project Manager. NRR/DORL
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
301-415-2901
email: [email protected]
From: Boska, John
Sent: Thursday, March 21, 2013 12:11 PM
To: ‘Connor, Eric’
Subject: RE: march 25 oconee meeting
It is part of the Fukushima response. Our letter requesting the information is available publicly from our web
site, www.nrc.gov, under ADAMS accession# ML 12053A340. You can enter accession numbers in the search
box in the upper right of the home page. In section 2.1 on flooding, we requested a flooding hazard
reevaluation report from all power reactor licensees.
John Boska
Oconee Project Manager, NRR/DORL
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
301-415-2901
email: [email protected]
From: Connor, Eric [mailto:[email protected]]
Sent: Thursday, March 21, 2013 11:43 AM
To: Boska, John
Subject: RE: march 25 oconee meeting
Thanks, John. Is this re-evaluation report specifically related to requests pre-Fukushima about the Jocassee Dam issue.
Or is this part of a larger Fukushima response?
Eric Connor
The Greenville News
GreenvilleOnline.com
~~L.ULL.L…:%l..I.>..L:r..,'( 0 ~
c)
From: Boska, John [mailto:[email protected]]
Sent: Thursday, March 21, 2013 11:38 AM
To: Connor, Eric
Cc: Hannah, Roger; Ledford, Joey
Subject: RE: march 25 oconee meeting
..
Duke Energy did submit a flooding hazard reevaluation report to the NRC dated 3/12/13, but it is a non-public
document. At the meeting we will discuss sections of the report that can be discussed publicly. Duke may
provide public slides. For example, Duke did an analysis of the consequences of a failure of the Jocassee
Dam. I expect the NRC staff will discuss the analysis method they used. and ask questions about how the
parameters were selected (for example, how large was the assumed failure and what were the flow rates out of
Lake Jocassee). The NRC will not be making any decisions at this meeting, but rather just gather information
to help us reach a decision on the validity of the methods used in the analysis.
John Boska
Oconee Project Manager, NRR/DORL
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
301-415-2901
email: [email protected]
From: Connor, Eric [mailto:[email protected]]
Sent: Thursday, March 21, 2013 11:03 AM
To: Boska, John
Subject: march 25 oconee meeting
Hi, John. I’d like to get the info on the meeting re: Jocassee Dam flooding issues on Monday.
Is there any material to review beforehand?
I’m curious what exactly the meeting will address and what is expected to come out of it.
Thanks
-Eric
Eric Connor
The Greenville News
Greenville Online. com
4.298.4304 (o)
·. (b}(6} kc’
itter @econnorgvnews
2
Boska, John
From:
Sent:
To:
Subject:
Attachments:
Attached are the slides.
John Boska
Boska. John
Monday, March 25, 2013 8:11 AM
Smith, James D
RE: Oconee meeting – flooding hazard
2013-03-25 Oconee slides on flood hazard report.pdf
Oconee Project Manager, NRR/DORL
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
301-415-2901
email: [email protected]
From: Boska, John
Sent: Thursday, March 21, 2013 7:36AM
To: ‘Smith, James D’
Subject: RE: Oconee meeting- flooding hazard
At 2 pm on 3/25/13. call888-469-5869. enter cod nd press the# button. During the meeting we ask
that you don’t allow your background noise on tot e p one line, which is shared by everyone who is calling in.
If your phone has a mute button you can use that. Otherwise, use the built in mute feature of our phone
system. Press •a to mute your phone, and *6 again to unmute if you decide to ask a question during the public
question period. If your phone system plays music when you put a call on hold, please do not put this call on
hold.
John Boska
Oconee Project Manager, NRR/DORL
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
301-415-2901
email: [email protected]
From: Smith, James D [mailto:[email protected]]
Sent: Wednesday, March 20, 2013 3:54PM
To: Boska, John
Subject: Oconee meeting- flooding hazard
Please provide telephone number and pass code for the subject meeting.
Jim Smith
licensing Project Manager
Plant licensing
Westinghouse Electric Company
Phone: +1 423·290-5223
Email: [email protected]
Home Page: www.westinghousenuclear.com
C-3
Boska, John
From:
Sent:
To:
Cc:
Subject:
Attachments:
I \ ~ ‘J f -!
Boska, John 1 1 ~ · \J’·
Monday, March 25, 2013 7:35 AM
Dick Mangrum
Hannah, Roger; Ledford, Joey
RE: Today’s Duke-MRC meet
2013-03-25 Oconee slides on flood hazard report.pdf
At 2 pm on 3/25/13, call 888-469-5869, enter cod nd press the # button. During the meeting we ask
that you don’t allow your background noise on to p line, which is shared by everyone who is calling in.
If your phone has a mute button you can use that. Otherwise, use the built in mute feature of our phone
system. Press *6 to mute your phone, and *6 again to unmute if you decide to ask a question. If your phone
system plays music when you put a call on hold, please do not put this call on hold. Attached are the slides for
the meeting.
John Boska
Oconee Project Manager, NRR/DORL
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
301-415-2901
email: [email protected]
From: Dick Mangrum [mailto:[email protected] .com]
sent: Monday, March 25, 2013 6:55AM
To: Boska, John
Subject: Today’s Duke-MRC meet
John,
Please let me have phone number and pass code for today’s 2 p-m flood hazard re-evaluation meeting.
Sincerely,
Dick Mangrum
News Director, WGOG
Walhalla, SC
1
c __ -Lf
Boska, John
From:
Sent:
To:
Subject:
Attachments:
See attached.
John Boska
Boska, John
Monday, March 25, 2013 8:06 AM
Riccio, Jim
Slides for Oconee public meeting on 3/25/13 at 2pm
2013-03-25 Oconee slides on flood hazard report.pdf
Oconee Project Manager, NRR/DORL
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
301-415-2901
email: [email protected]
—–Original Message—–
From: Boska, John
To: Colleen Payne ; Pascarelli, Robert
Sent: Mon, Mar 25, 2013 8:04 am
Subject: RE: Duke Energy meeting
Colleen, we receive such a high volume of requests that we do not have the time to communicate with
individuals on these items. We have established an email listserver for each of the power reactors, and if you
sign up for the listserver, you will be emailed a copy of all the public documents we issue for Oconee Nuclear
Station. The listserver is automated, I cannot add people or remove them or even see who is on the list. If you
want to sign up, please go to
http://www.nrc.gov/public-involve/listserver/plants-by-region.html
and sign up for Oconee. The meeting notice for 3/25/13 was issued on the listserver on 3/18/13 and was
placed on the NRC web site on 3/19/13.
I will add your name to the security list for today’s meeting (although it is not a requirement, any member of the
public can attend, they just have to register with security when they get here). Attached are the slides for
today’s meeting. Copies will be available at the meeting. Please call my cell phone, 301-661-6969, after you
pass through security and I will ensure an escort brings you to the meeting room.
John Boska
Oconee Project Manager, NRR/DORL
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
301-415-2901
email: [email protected]
From: Colleen Payne [mailto:[email protected]]
Sent: Saturday, March 23, 2013 10:05 AM
To: Pascarelli, Robert; Boska, John
Subject: Re: Duke Energy meeting
John and Robert,
Could you please keep me informed, I thought from last meetings, correspondence and my request that I was clear on
receiving all current, future meetings re: Lake Jocasse/Oconee/Duke Energy & NRC. I receive daily updates and
continually monitor NRC site, however, somehow I missed the upcoming 3/25 meeting re flooding issues/Duke/NRC.
Thank you, Colleen Payne
—–Original Message—–
From: Colleen Payne To: robert.pascarelli ; john.boska
Sent: Sat, Mar 23, 2013 9:56 am
Subject: Re: Duke Energy meeting
Good morning John and Robert,
Is Monday’s, 3/25 meeting re: “to discuss the licensee’s flooding hazard reevaluation report for the three Oconee units…” a
rescheduled or new meeting? I was not made aware nor was this posted until just recently – within past few days.
I will be attending this meeting, please add my name to security list.
Thank you, Colleen Payne
703/786-2247
—–Original Message—–
From: Colleen Payne To: Robert.Pascarelli
Sent: Mon, Mar 11, 2013 2:36 pm
Subject: Re: Duke Energy meeting
Bob,
Yes, that is correct. Thank you.
I just received notice from John Boska, 3/19 meeting has been rescheduled to 4/9.
Colleen
—–Original Message—–
From: Pascarelli, Robert
To: Colleen Payne Sent: Mon, Mar 11, 2013 1:40 pm
Subject: RE: Duke Energy meeting
Colleen,
I believe that you are referring to the April 16-18 industry meeting in Columbia, SC. It is an industry-sponsored meeting
that the Office of New Reactors (NRO) has been invited to speak at for the last few years. Due to budget restrictions,
NRO is not planning to attend this year.
Bob Pascarelli
From: Colleen Payne [mailto:[email protected]]
Sent: Thursday, March 07, 2013 4:43 PM
To: Pascarelli, Robert
Subject: Re: Duke Energy meeting
Bob,
Do you know who will be speaking at the SMR Conference April 16-17? I was registered for that event, but will not be
able to attend.
Thank you, Colleen
—–Original Message—–
From: Pascarelli, Robert
To: Colleen Payne Sent: Thu, Mar 7, 2013 2:29 pm
Subject: RE: Duke Energy meeting
Colleen,
It’s possible that the meeting could occur as late as May. We coordinate resources with our Region II office to ensure that
we can conduct all of the site meetings within a few months following the issuance of the annual assessment letters. I’ll
let you know as soon as we have a tentative date. Have a nice day.
Bob
From: Colleen Payne [mailto:[email protected]]
Sent: Thursday, March 07, 2013 2:14 PM
To: Pascarelli, Robert
Subject: Re: Duke Energy meeting
Bob
Thank you for this information. Any chance of scheduling assessment meeting in May? I would like to attend and mid-
May would work for me. (smile, I am joking – but doesn’t hurt to ask)
Colleen
—–Original Message—–
From: Pascarelli, Robert
To: Colleen Payne Sent: Thu, Mar 7, 2013 10:35 am
Subject: RE: Duke Energy meeting
Ms. Payne,
It was a pleasure to speak with you on Tuesday afternoon and I look forward to seeing you on March 19th. Another
meeting that you may be interested in is the annual end-of-cycle assessment meeting that is held in the Oconee visitor’s
center. Although we have not finalized a date, our annual meeting will most likely occur in the early April timeframe. I
encourage you to consider attending if you are in the area. Additionally, please feel free to contact myself or John Boska if
you have any questions or concerns. Have a great day!
Bob Pascarelli, Chief
Plant Licensing Branch II-1
Division of Operating Reactor Licensing
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
From: Colleen Payne [mailto:[email protected]]
Sent: Thursday, March 07, 2013 9:52 AM
To: Pascarelli, Robert
Subject: Duke Energy meeting
Bob,
Just a quick note to thank your for your time on Tuesday, March 5 during and after Duke meeting.
I appreciate you taking the time to discuss some of the concerns regarding NRC’s position regarding Oconee site.
I look forward to seeing you on the 19th – or rescheduled date.
Have a good rest of week,
Colleen
Duke
nergy
———~-~·_:.’J~~··:’\-
For Information On~
Fukushima·
Flooding Hazard Reevaluation
Upstream Dam Failure Analysis
NCR
Technical
Presentation
NRC Headquarters
One White Flint North
Rockville, MD
March 25, 2013
Dave Baxter, VP, Regulatory Project Completion
Dean Hubbard, Oconee External Flood Licensing Manager
Ray McCoy, Principal Engineer, ONS Civil Design
Chris Ey, Civil Engineering Manager, HDR
Daria Jones, Oconee Fukushima Engineering Supervisor
Joe Ehasz, VP, URS Program Manager- Water Resources
2
For Information Only
Agenda
·:· Current Dam Failure Analysis • January 28, 2011
~ Breach Analysis Summary
~ Model Development
·:· Updated Dam Failure Evaluation -submitted March 12, 2013
~ Models Considered
} Selection of Xu & Zhang
~ Update Breach Parameters
~ Sensitivity Analysis
~ Independent Review
~ Comparative Analysis • Large Modern Dam Failures
•!• Modifications Scope
For Information Only
3
2011 Breach Analysis Summary
·:· Breach parameters developed using regression methodology and
technical papers:
~ Froehlich 2008
~ Walder & O’Connor
~ MacDonald & Langridge-Monopolis
·:· Breach analysis focused on maximizing flooding levels to provide a
very conservative and bounding analysis:
~ Breach dimensions maximized to assume loss of most of the dam
embankment.
~ Froehlich breach time of 5 hours was reduced to 2.8
~ Maximum peak outflow was selected from all methods
~ Breach times of Keowee dams/dikes adjusted to maximize water
directed at the site
~ T ailwater effect below Jocassee dam was not considered
For Information On~
4
Duke
nergy 2011 Breach Analysis Summary
Jocassee Dam (postulated dam failure)
·:· Initial breach derived primarily from Froehlich regression
equations.
·:· Breach dimensions were adjusted based on physical
constraints of natural valley
•!• Jocassee breach parameters:
~ Top Width -1156 (64% of overall crest)
~ Bottom Width – 431 feet
~ Bottom Elevation – 800 msl
~ Breach Formation Time .. 2.8 hrs,
~ Peak outllow 5,400,000 cfs
For Information Only
5
1.2
O.l
‘I
\
\
\
2011 SE JocasseeDamBreach
Progression and Stage-Discharge Hydrographs
Jocassee Dam Breach Progression and Hydrographs
Case Z(lOOW)
S,OOO,(DJ
4,000,000
i 3.000,000 … J •
um,ooo
I,(DJ,(DJ
0 0
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ –
~-···–·—–·——————___..j
For Information Only
6
2011 Breach Analysis Summary
Keowee Dam/Dikes {postulated cascading dam failures)
·:· Overtopping failure trigger of two feet over the crest
·:· Cascading dam/dike failure on Keowee
» Keowee main dam- 2.8 hrs
» West Saddle Dam· 0.5 hrs
» Intake Canal Dike- 0.9 hrs
» Little River Dam -1.9 hrs
•!• Conservative assumptions were made to maximize the water
directed toward the power block
For Information Only
7
Model Development
HEC-RAS JD Model
Duke
nergy
————~,. ~l{;,) .
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8&0
2011 Breach Analysis Summary
2DModel
WATER SURF ACE ELEVATIONS AT KEOWEE DAM
Jocassee-Keowee Dam Breach Study
Pool Elevations at Keowee Dam
. ” r·~ .. ~· ·- . …~ . –~ ···-~ .

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840 .. … . . ……. . _.j._ … ·-· • . .. – ‘ .
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0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 I 9 10 11 1210
Model nme (hrs)

Updated Dam Failure Evaluation
Fukushima 2.1
Attributes of updated and refined dam failure analysis
·:· Updated methodology and present day regulatory guidance
·:· Pertormed to meet NUREG CR/7046, 2011 & ANS 2.8, 1992
·:· Realistic but still conservative assumptions
·:· Physical characteristics of the dams/dikes recognized
including materials and method/quality of construction
•!• Overtopping and Seismic are confirmed from the 2011 SEas
not being credible failure modes
12
For Information On~
–··-··-·-··–
Updated Dam Failure Evaluation
Fukushima 2.1
Overtopping of the Jocassee dam was confirmed not to be a credible failure mode
·:· The Jocassee dam and dikes include 15 feet of freeboard
•!• The Jocassee watershed is small relative to storage capacity -148 square miles
·:· The top of the spillways are located at 111 0 (full normal level)
1 Four diverse methods of assuring spillway gate operation
1 Rigorous spillway gate maintenance and surveillance testing as required and
monitored by FERC
•!• Lake management procedures require consideration of lower level to anticipate
additional storage needs for significant storms
1 Weekly rain forecast are prepared by Duke Energy to project rainfall for the basin
1 Precipitation monitoring has assured that no overtopping of the spillway gates has
occurred in 40 + years of operation
·:· PMF using current HRR-51 ,52 results in 3 feet of freeboard margin
·:· 2011 SE also concluded that overtopping was not credible
For Information On~
13
Duke
nergy
Updated Dam Failure Evaluation
Fukushima 2.1
Seismic Failure of the Dam was confirmed not to be a credible failure mode
·:· Seismic evaluation based on current FERC criteria using the 1989 EPRI Hazard Curves
» The Jocassee dam is designed to a 0.12 g horizontal ground acceleration (Oconee site is designed to a
0.1g horizontal ground acceleration).
·:· 2007 Updated Fragili~ Analysis
» High Confidence of a Low Probabili~ of Failure (HCLPF) of the dam by sliding 0.305 g
» Evaluation was performed by Applied Research & Engineering Sciences (ARES) Corp., formerly EQE, a
respected consulting firm in the area of seismic ·fragili~
» The ARES report concluded the median centered fragility value for failure of the dam is 1.64 g.
» Maximum Probabilistic Peak Ground Acceleration for a 2% probability of being exceeded within a 50 year
period is 0.197 g (using the United States Geologic Service hazard maps applicable to Jocassee).
•!• Jocassee dam is included in the seismic model of the Oconee Probable Risk Assessment.
» The combination of the updated seismic fragility with the seismic hazard curve results in a negligible risk
contribution from seismic events.
» In a letter dated 11/20/07 and in the 1/28/11 SE report, the NRC concluded that there is a negligible risk
For Information On~
14
~ Froehlich. 2008
· ~ Walder & O’Connor
Models Considered
Regression Analysis
~ MacDonald & Langridge-Monopolis 1984
~ Xu & Zhang 2009
For Information Only
. 15
Duke Selecdon of Xu & Zhang 2009
nergy Basis
•!• Most current regression method developed and validated with
the largest data base of dam failures:
» 182 earth and rockflll dam failures compiled
» 75 failures w/ sufficient info to develop breach regression models
•!• Empirical formulas that account for physical characteristics of
dam/reservoir: dam type, failure mode, height, dam erodibility,
reservoir shape/storage)
·:· 33 of the 75 failures were on large dams ( ~ 15 meters )
•!• Applies to multi-zoned dams
•!• Method yields realistic but conservative breach parameters
•!• Recognized by industry experts
For Information Only
16
•!• Jocassee Dam – Xu & Zhang
Breach Parameters
Fukushima Update
) Starting reservoir elevation 1110 (normal full pond)
) Rockfill dam with low erodibility classification
) Piping failure initiating at 1020 feet msl (Sunny Day Failure)
) Breach parameters:
IT op Width • 701′ (39% of overall crest)
I Bottom Width – 431′
I Bottom Elevation – 870’
I Breach Formation Time:
1 Xu & Zhang- 29.2 hrs.(14.2 hours piping +16.0 open weir)
1 Froehlich -16.0 hours (open weir)
I Peak outllow: 1,7 60,000 cfs
For Information Only
17
Jocassee Dam
Low Erodibility Classification
(b)(7}(F)
18
For Information Only
Fukushima Model
JOCASSEE DAM BREACH PARAMETERS
Remvo~ . Breach
Crest S I Bottom Breach Bottom Avenge Righ Side L 1 Sid Tune to Top of B 1 .. I
Structare Elevation • El t~(ft Failure Mode Elevation (ft Bre~b Width Breach t e e Failure Breaeh reach Bitiation
(haij e:• I mij (I) M(l) Slope(b)ISiope(1l) (Hr) M(~ Progmsiln ilev:n(ft
Jocassee
112)
Darn
4Jl )66 O.)J O.)J 29.2 1m Sile Wave !,!120
I
1,110 810
Breach Formation Time
Xu & Zhang definition: 29.2 ( 13.2 hours piping + 16.0 hours open weir)
Froehlich definition: 16.0 hours open weir
19
For Information Only
Duke
nergy
Fukushima Model Jocassee Dam Breach
Progression and Stage-Discharge Hydrographs
1.20
& 1.00
1
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r·IK)
1
&
Jocassee Dam Breach Progression and Hydrographs
BEPLE
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I – I l ”’ l0.40 ~, ‘ l,OOO.tnl
t Ill 0.20 soo,cm
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~-~~~flml
-Headwater -TaUwaltr -Breach Procrusion -Breach DiKhargr
—- Breachlnit~lion • – – – Breach FOI’lllalion COmplele
..
Breach Fonnation Time; Xu & Zhang definition:· 29.2 (13.2 hours piping+ 16.0 hours open weir) Froehlich definition: -16.0 hours open weir
For Information On~
20
·:· Keowee Dam
Breach Parameters
Fukushima Update
~ Starting reservoir elevation 800 (normal full pond)
~ Homogeneous earth fill dam
~ Overtopping failure trigger of two feet over the crest at 817 msl by
rapid rise of Keowee reservoir over the crest
~ Multiple simultaneous breach initiation formation points across the
Keowee dam and West Saddle dam
·:· Cascading dam/dike failure on Keowee
~ Keowee main dam- 0.75 hrs
~ West Saddle Dam • 0.5 hrs (shorter than main dam, ratio of height)
For Information Only
21
0.9
0.8
0.7
OJ
0.2
0.1
0
— ~·–·~-, ..
I
!
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~~——
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0 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9
Relative Time Progression
—- ————— ————~——————–
For Information On~
22
Duke
nergy Fukushima JD Modeling
830
820
810
800
790
780
770
– 760 e
ij 750
.!!
~ 740
.i
~ 730
j
Ill 720
710
700
690
680
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Keowee Dam -Headwater and Tailwater Stage Hydrographs
Final BEP LE 1-D Model Performance
i I
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0 2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 20 22 24 26 28 30 32 34 36 ‘
Model Time • hours
-BEP LE HW -BEP LE TW
“”—~~–~——“”-“”
For Information Only
23
Duke
nergy
Fukushima 2.1 2D Modeling
Keowee Dam Breach Progression
0.8 ..J—–+-~——~+——+
c
~ 0.7 r—
~ 0.6 T—+–1 –+—+
.,. I –
D. l i 10.5 -r—: -, ~ 0.4 f——.-; —+-_ –1–1 –~——- ——f–·———–‘–
> . . I
·- 1- -~ ; i : i 0.3 ~–·-r——–r–H-+—-~4—l—-+—–la:
I . ; +West Saddle Dam Sine Wave Breach (HEC-RAS)
-~~~~
-West Saddle Dam 2·0 Breach
+Keowee Dam Sine Wave Breach {HEC-RAS)
-Keowee Dam 2-D Breach
0 ..,…..; ……,. !…—…1—-!——4- —+—-+—-r—+—l
16.2 16.3 16.4 16.5 16.6 16.7 16.8 16.9 17
Time (hr)
For Information Only
24
Duke
nergy
Fukushima 2D ·
Modeling Velocity
and Flow Pattern
at 17 hrs.
0 2 4 6 810121416182022242628303234363840
25
For Information Only
Duke
nergy
Fukushima 2D
Modeling Velocity
and Flow Pattern
at 20 hrs.
2 4 6 8 1012141618 20 2224 2628 3032 34 36 3840
For Information Only
Breachi
Keowee Dam
Fukushima JD-2D
Modeling Results
Intake Dike
HEC·RAS 2-D HEC·RAS 2·D
Maximum Water Surfaces
Keowee Dam Intake Dike
HEC-RAS 2-D HEC·RAS 2·D
Elevation Decimal 11me Elevation Decimalllme Elevation Decimal Time Elevation Decimal Time
~Ql ~~
Maximum Water Surfaces
Swale Tallwater
HEC·RAS 2·D HEC·RAS 2-D
Elevation Decimalllme Elevation Decimalllme Elevation Dedmal11me Elevation Decimal llme
817.5 815.5 16.53 787.4
For Information Only
27
Sensitivity Analysis
Model Peak Outflow (cfs)
McDonald & Langridge-Monopolis 1984 1,566,381
Costa, 1985 1,634,480
Xu & Zhang, 2009 1}60,000
Evans, 1986 1,803,331
SCS, 1981 2,647,711
Bureau of Reclamation, 1982 3,046,462
McDonald & Langridge-Monopolis 1984 5,093,603 (upper envelope)
Froehlich (with additional conservatism), 2008 5,440,000
Data in this table based on Wah12004, JanuaiY 28, 2011 SE and updated Xu & Zhang data
1 00+ HEC-RAS studies pertormed with varied breach parameters and control variables
Erodiblity was the most significant factor influencing the breach parameters for Xu & Zhang 2009
Bias of conservatism w~h realism
For Information Only
28
·Independent Peer Review
Joe Ehasz, P.E.
David Bowles, Ph. D P.E. P.H.
Independent Review
Breach Parameters
• FERC Board of Consultant Review
Gonzalo Castro, Ph.D., P.E.
James Michael Duncan, Ph.D., P.E.
James F Ruff, Ph.D., P. E.
Gabriel Fernandez, Ph.D., P.E.
For Information On~
29
·:· Taum Sauk
Comparative Ana~sis
Large Modern Dam Failures
) Overtopping failure initiated by human error {previous overtopping events had occurred)
) Random rockfill embankment supporting the inner concrete liner loosely placed by end dumping the material
without compaction except for the top 16′ of 84′ height
) The embankment was constructed on a very steep downstream slope of 1.3H to 1V with a 10 high concrete
parapet wall along the crest of the dam
) Embankment was high~ erodible and contained over 45% sand sized material (also evident in unusual
level of surtace erosion from rain events)
·:· .Teton
) earthen dam with majority of dam constructed of highly erodible windblown silt (infant mortality event)
) No transition zones (sand and/or fine fl~ers) were included between the silt core and the sand & gravel
) Thin layer of small rock fill on both up and downstream faces with a majori~ of protection relied upon mix of
sand, gravel and cobble
) Piping failure at 130′ below the crest due to inadequate protection of impervious core trench material
) Breach top width 781’ (“”25% of overall crest)
·:· Hell Hole
) True rockfill dam, with upstream sloping impervious core with massive rock fill sections up and down stream
to support and protect the core.
) Failure caused by overtopping during construction due to an intense rain event that could not be passed
through the construction diversion tunnel
) After overtopping of the core started, the dam took 26 hours to complete the breach and emp~ the upstream
reservoir 30
For Information Only
Modification Scope
Updated
•!• Modifications for protection from dam failure (under review):
1. Relocation of external backup power transmission line
2. Intake Dike embankment protection
3. East embankment protection
4. Discharge Diversion wall
·:· Modifications for Local Intense Precipitation (under review):
~ Transformer relocation
~ Diversion walls and drainage canals
~ Aux building and Turbine building protection
For Information Only
31
\ \
\ \ ‘\
\ \
\ 1
:\
i
\
‘ I I

\
\
~ c
0
c
0
~ e
~
‘-
0
LL

Post

2013-08-04 – NRC – Jocassee Dam – OIG Confidentiality Agreement – ML16216A702

Print Close
Fw: Criscione v. NRC
From: Scott Hodes ([email protected])
Sent: Sun 8/04/13 9:48 AM
To: [email protected] ([email protected])
I’m out of town which is the reason for the delay. I’m not sure you will be receptive of this, especially since
it isn’t nearly all of your request, but I have to present it to you anyway.
Scott
Scott’s Website: www.infoprivacylaw.com
Scott’s blog: http://thefoiablog.typepad.com
—– Forwarded Message —–
From: “Crimm, Nina (USADC)”
To: “[email protected]
Sent: Wednesday, July 31, 2013 11:10 AM
Subject: Criscione v. NRC
FOR SETTLEMENT PURPOSES ONLY
Mr. Hodes,
The NRC proposes the following as a resoluBon to this maDer:
1. To provide your client with a wriDen copy of the “confidenBality agreement” (this would entail providing
him the porBon of the transcript of his January 17, 2013 interview with OIG in which the “confidenBality
agreement” was discussed); and
2. To provide your client the opportunity to listen to the enBre digital/tape recording of his January 17, 2013
interview with OIG, in OIG’s offices. OIG Special Agent(s) may be present.
In addiBon, I recently learned that the US ADorney’s Office declined to iniBate criminal prosecuBon of your client
with respect to OIG invesBgaBon 2013-001.
I look forward to your response.
Regards,
Nina Bafundo Crimm
Special Assistant United States ADorney
U.S. ADorney’s Office for the District of Columbia
Civil Division
202.616.3285 (p)
202.514.8780 (f)
[email protected]

Post

2016-05-17 – NRC – Jocassee Dam – Concerns from NRC staff about Jocasse Flooding Analysis and Response to Public Laws – ML16202A537

Criscione, Lawrence
From: Criscione, Lawrence
Sent: Tuesday, May 17, 2016 8:49 AM
To: Kirkwood, Sara; Holahan, Gary; Clark, Theresa
Cc: ‘[email protected]’; Mitman, Jeffrey; Bensi, Michelle; Philip, Jacob; Perkins,
Richard
Subject: RE: RE: Meeting next week
Sara,
I look forward to meeting with you this morning.
Several colleagues of mine have expressed concerns regarding how the agency is handling flooding issues
and have indicated they would like to meet with your team to discuss their concerns. Their concerns relate to
the two bulleted items in your email below. Jeff Mitman, Michelle Bensi, Jake Philip and Richard Perkins are
all willing to meet with your team.
Jeff Mitman has specific concerns regarding Jocassee/Oconee in that the flooding analysis being used does
not take into account the Lake Jocassee Dam failing from overtopping. These concerns fall under the first
bulleted item in your email below.
Jeff Mitman, Michelle Bensi and Jake Philip have expressed concerns regarding the agency’s response to
Section 402 of Public Law 112-074. Their concerns were expressed in an October 2014 non-concurrence that
was primarily authored by Dr. Bensi. Jake has also expressed concerns regarding water-tight seals for power
plant penetrations. These concerns fall under the second bulleted item in your email below, although they are
not necessarily limited to the plants mentioned.
Richard Perkins has concerns regarding the manner in which the screening analysis report for Generic Issue
204 (flooding at nuclear power plant sites due to upstream dam failures) was redacted. Mr. Perkins’ concerns
were the primary motivation behind my 2012-Sep-18 letter to the NRC Chairman.
In a 2012-Oct-15 letter to the Chairman of the Senate Committee on Homeland Security & Governmental
Affairs I noted that there is no interagency process for ensuring that dams upstream of nuclear reactor plants
are guarded to the same design basis threat (DBT) that the NRC requires nuclear power plants (NPP) to be
guarded to. I realize that it is not within the NRC’s authority to dictate the guard force required at dams
regulated by Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) or maintained by the US Army Corps of
Engineers (USACE). However, since the catastrophic failure of the Oconee Nuclear Station would lead to a
reactor accident at Oconee, it is illogical to require that Oconee be guarded against a specific DBT yet to not—
after 8 years of claiming the flood height at Oconee due to a Jocassee Dam failure is non-public securityrelated
information—have done any study to determine whether or not the same DBT that we believe could
cause an accident at Oconee could also breach the Lake Jocassee Dam.
That is, to my knowledge no one has studied what the design basis threat to the Lake Jocassee Dam is and
whether or not that dam is adequately guarded against that threat. If the same DBT that could threaten
Oconee could also be capable of destroying the Lake Jocassee Dam, then reason dictates that the Lake
Jocassee Dam must be guarded against that DBT. I recognize this is an interagency problem the NRC would
like to avoid. But we have a duty to address it for Oconee and for all other susceptible reactors. What is the
design basis threat capable of destroying the dam? Is that threat less than or equal to the DBT for Oconee? If
so, then the Lake Jocassee Dam needs to be guarded against that DBT. Just because this is an interagency
problem does not mean the NRC can ignore it.
A similar concern exists regarding insider threats. When I worked in the nuclear industry, I needed to be
screened into PADS (Personnel Access Data System?) to ensure there was nothing adverse in my
background. Can an insider threat at the Jocassee Dam pump storage station cause the dam to fail? If so,
are the requirements for background checks and fitness-for-duty at the Jocassee Dam pump storage station
the same or greater than the requirements at Oconee?
I don’t know if you consider my concerns regarding external and internal security threats at the Lake Jocassee
Dam to fall within the two bulleted items in your email below, but they certainly need to be addressed.
Also, I did not mention the silo-ing issue in my disclosure to the OSC because I only became aware of it
recently. You should address what is driving the NRC to silo flooding information and the potential impact of
that silo-ing upon the agency’s Open and Collaborative Work Environment.
V/r,
Larry
573-230-3959
From:?Kirkwood,?Sara??
Sent:?Wednesday,?May?11,?2016?4:27?PM?
To:[email protected];?Criscione,?Lawrence?;?’[email protected]’?
?
Subject:?RE:?RE:?Meeting?next?week?
Dear Mr. Devine,
This note is to confirm that members of the Flooding Working Group will interview your client, Mr. Criscione,
on Tuesday, May 17th, 10:00 a.m., at NRC Headquarters, Room O1F22. The interview will be transcribed.
NRC Headquarters
One White Flint North Building (OWFN)
11555 Rockville Pike
Rockville, MD 20852.
The purpose is to interview Mr. Criscione about the allegations he presented to the Office of the Special
Counsel (OSC) regarding the risk of flooding at 19 specific plants located downstream from dams. In response
to the referral from OSC, Chairman Burns convened a working group to conduct an investigation into the
matters referred to him. Please note that the working group’s investigation is limited in scope to issues referred
by OSC. Our investigation, and thus our interview is limited to the following:
? Whether the NRC has failed to require the Oconee Nuclear Station in South Carolina to take corrective
measures to safeguard the plant from potential flooding should the Lake Jocassee Dam fail.
? Whether the NRC has also failed to require the following nuclear power stations (Arkansas Nuclear,
Beaver Valley, Browns Ferry, Columbia, Cooper, Fort Calhoun, H.B. Robinson, Hope Creek/Salem,
Indian Point, McGuire, Peach Bottom, Prairie Island, Sequoyah, South Texas, Surry, Three Mile Island,
Waterford, and Watts Bar) to take appropriate measures to protect against the risk of flooding in the
event of upstream dam failures.
You will be registered in the visitor access system. Upon arrival to the building, your vehicle will be subject to
a routine screening, the security officer will direct you to a parking space, once parked, please walk around to
the front of the OWFN building to check in at the security desk with a valid ID.
The following link provides directions to NRC Headquarters
http://www.nrc.gov/about-nrc/locations/hq.html
Map for Visitor vehicle entrance

Post

2016-05-09 – NRC – Jocassee Dam – Affidavits regarding flooding concerns at Oconee nuclear power plant – ML16202A536

Criscione, Lawrence
From: Criscione, Lawrence
Sent: Monday, May 09, 2016 6:16 PM
To: Kirkwood, Sara; Holahan, Gary; Clark, Theresa
Cc: ‘[email protected]’; [email protected]
Subject: Affidavit with Exhibits of interest
Attachments: Criscione OSC affidavit-signed.pdf; Exhibit_35_Letter_from_Criscione_to_Lieberman_
2012-10-15.pdf; Exhibit_47_Letter_from_Criscione_to_Boxer_2012-11-14.pdf; Exhibit_54
_Various_emails_concerning_redactions_to_GI-204_Screening_Anal….pdf
Sara,
Attached is the affidavit that the Government Accountability Project used to draft my 2015 complaints to the US Office
of Special Counsel. The sections regarding the flooding concerns are on pp. 24‐27.
Also attached are my 2012 letters to the Senate E&PW and HS&GA committees and some emails concerning the
redactions made to the GI‐204 Screening Analysis report. The other exhibits of interest are my 2012‐Sep‐18 letter and
email to the chairman which you already have.
I got involved with the Jocassee/Oconee issue in 2011/2012 when some of my coworkers in RES were drafting the
Screening Analysis Report for GI‐204 (flooding at NPP sites due to upstream dam failures) and were concerned that they
were being unduly pressured to keep inconvenient information from the report—inconvenient in the sense that the NRC
did not yet know the extent of the flooding concerns and how to address them and thus desired that they be kept from
the public. It was disconcerting to my colleagues that their internal report on flooding might be watered down due to
containing information on significant nuclear safety issues that did not have a ready resolution.
The flooding portion of the attached affidavit was written in 2013 and based on information I obtained in 2012. This
issue has evolved since then and I have not stayed on top of it.
The concerns I still have regarding flooding are:
1. Instead of building the flooding defenses which they committed to, Duke Energy redid their flooding analysis at
Oconee and now claim that the site will not flood beyond the height of the five foot flood wall surrounding the
Standby Shutdown Facility. However, the unclassified and non‐safeguards records regarding this nuclear safety
issue are being strictly controlled within an internal group of employees designated as having a “need‐to‐know”
the information. I thus cannot find it in ADAMS and so do not know the new assumptions used by Duke
Energy. I have been told that Duke Energy did not consider an overtopping situation at Jocassee—something of
concerned to myself and some colleagues in RES and NRR.
2. Flooding documents regarding Fort Calhoun are being tightly controlled within the agency to a select group of
individuals designated as having a “need‐to‐know”. The Advisory Committee on Reactor Safeguards was even
excluded from seeing this unclassified and non‐safeguards information; the ACRS had to agree to a
Memorandum of Understanding with the US Army Corps of Engineers (USACE) whereby three of their members
were allowed to travel to a USACE facility in Nebraska to review the information and had to agree not to take
any documents back with them.
3. Personnel in NRO assigned to work on flooding reviews are being told they cannot discuss their work with
colleagues who do not have a specific “need‐to‐know” the information. That is, they cannot discuss concerns
they have with colleagues they trust unless those colleagues have been specifically assigned to the project they
are working on. This is anathema to an Open and Collaborative Work Environment and good scientific
protocol. This type of silo‐ing of information is necessary when working with classified or safeguards security
information, but has no place when the issues at hand are about protecting reactor plants from extreme acts of
natures. It is difficult to predict the frequency and severity of earthquakes, probabilistic maximum precipitation
events, latent construction and engineering failures, etc. and such topics warrant extensive peer review and
debate.
4. In 2012 I wrote the Chairman of the Senate Committee on Homeland Security & Governmental Affairs (at the
time, Senator Lieberman) concerning the fact that—based on their extensive use of Exemption 7(F) in redacting
dam‐related FOIA responses—the NRC believes there are credible terrorist threats to dams yet, to my
knowledge, there is no interagency process for ensuring that those dams whose failure from sabotage could
result in a serious nuclear accident are guarded against the same design basis threat that nuclear reactor plants
are guarded against. Senator Lieberman referred my concerns to Hubert Bell in December 2012 yet, after 3 ½
years, the NRC IG’s office has not obtained and reviewed any study from any source to determine whether or
not dams upstream of nuclear reactor plants are adequately guarded against terrorist activity (see FOIA appeal
2016‐0088A).
5. Supposedly the internal silo‐ing of dam/flooding related information and the broad use of Exemption 7(F) with
regard to dam/flooding FOIA responses is due to security concerns regarding the theoretical utility of
dam/flooding information to terrorists, yet to my knowledge—despite having concerns grave enough to justify
silo‐ing of information from even the full ACRS—the NRC has not made any attempt (e.g. commissioning a
security review or requesting an inquiry by the Department of Homeland Security) to determine whether or not
dams upstream of nuclear reactor plants are adequately guarded from the same design basis threats that
nuclear reactor plants must be guarded against.
6. Several of my colleagues in RES, NRO and NRR are concerned that the post‐Fukushima orders on flooding—
which were in response to a public law—have been backtracked on even though the law that was the source of
those orders has not been amended or rescinded.
7. Several of my colleagues are concerned that NRC licensees do not know whether all their penetrations of flood
barriers are water tight.
I have copied Tom Devine on this email. I do not expect that Tom will be able to participate in our meeting at Region III
next week, but I also do not expect him to have any concerns regarding us meeting without him present.
I will be taking leave on Wednesday through Friday this week, but please do not hesitate to call me at 573‐230‐3959 if
you have any questions. My gmail account forwards to my Hotmail account which forwards to my phone. Most of my
project work can be done outside of Citrix so I’m usually not connected to my NRC account during most of the day. If
you copy my Hotmail or gmail account I’ll likely see your questions sooner than if it just goes to my NRC account.
Thank you,
Larry
Lawrence S. Criscione
573‐230‐3959
From: Lawrence Criscione [mailto:[email protected]]
Sent: Monday, May 09, 2016 4:33 PM
To: Criscione, Lawrence
Subject: [External_Sender]
1
AFFIDAVIT
My
name
is
Lawrence
Stephen
Criscione.
I
have
worked
for
the
US
Nuclear
Regulatory
Commission
(NRC)
as
a
Reliability
&
Risk
Engineer
since
October
26,
2009
in
the
Division
of
Risk
Assessment
of
the
Office
of
Nuclear
Regulatory
Research
(RES/DRA).
My
series
and
grade
are
series
801,
grade
GS-­‐14.
I
am
submitting
this
affidavit
to
the
U.S.
Office
of
Special
Counsel
(OSC)
under
the
Whistleblower
Protection
Act,
because
I
believe
I
have
been
denied
honest
consideration
for
a
position
for
which
I
was
qualified
(NRC
job
vacancy
R-­‐III/DRP-­‐
2013-­‐0009).1
I
also
believe
I
was
the
subject
of
an
unwarranted,
retaliatory
criminal
investigation
(OIG
Case
13-­‐001)
by
the
NRC’s
Office
of
the
Inspector
General.
(OIG)
The
denial
of
honest
consideration
for
position
R-­‐III/DRP-­‐2013-­‐0009
and
the
investigation
under
OIG
Case
13-­‐001
were
the
result
of
disclosures
I
made
to
the
NRC
regarding
the
agencies
handling
of
(1)
the
2003-­‐10-­‐21
unintentional
passive
reactor
shutdown
at
Callaway
Plant;
(2)
the
flooding
concerns
at
the
Oconee
Nuclear
Station
from
a
catastrophic
failure
of
the
Lake
Jocassee
Dam,
with
analogous
threats
at
nearly
one
third
of
America’s
operating
nuclear
reactors;
and
(3)
the
NRC’s
violation
of
federal
law
with
regard
to
implementing
the
Freedom
of
Information
Act.
Pursuant
to
5
USC
1213,
I
also
am
seeking
an
independent
investigation
of
the
breakdowns
I
witnessed
in
the
NRC’s
nuclear
safety
mission.
§
1.
Background

October
21,
2003
Unintentional
Passive
Reactor
Shutdown
at
Callaway
Plant
and
Violation
of
10
CFR
2.206
In
2003
I
was
working
at
the
Callaway
nuclear
power
plant
in
Callaway
County,
Missouri.
On
October
20,
2003
at
07:21
a
safety-­‐related
inverter
failed
at
Callaway.2
The
plant’s
Technical
Specifications
required
that
this
equipment
either
be
repaired
within
24
hours
or
that
the
operators
commence
shutting
down
the
reactor
and
have
it
shutdown
within
6
hours
(i.e.
by
13:21
on
October
21,
2003).3
At
01:00
on
October
21,
2003
the
operators
began
shutting
down
the
reactor
at
10%
per
hour.
Their
goal
was
to
have
the
reactor
shut
down
by
noon
if
repairs
could
not
be
made
to
the
failed
inverter
by
then.4
At
09:36
reactor
power
was
at
nominally
10%
and
the
operators
were
essentially
2
hours
ahead
of
schedule
for
shutting
down
the
plant
within
the
required
time
frame.5
In
accordance
with
accepted
industry6
and
regulatory7
practices,
the
operators
decided
to
stabilize
1
(Exhibit
1)
2
Exhibit
22
of
NRC
Office
of
Investigations,
Case
4-­‐2007-­‐049
(see
footnote
11
of
this
affidavit)
3
Callaway,
Unit
1,
Current
Facility
Operating
License
NPF-­‐30,
Tech
Specs,
Revised
6/27/2007
(ML053110040)
4
NRC
Event
Notification
40263
5
International
Nuclear
Safety
Journal
(INSJ),
14-­‐109-­‐1-­‐PB1,
“Analysis
of
the
October
21,
2003
Unintentional
Passive
Reactor
Shutdown
at
Callaway
Plant
with
regard
to
aspects
of
Reactivity
24
§
2.
Background

Flooding
Concerns
at
Oconee
Nuclear
Station
As
will
be
discussed
below,
the
Nuclear
Regulatory
Commission
has
known
since
April
2006
that,
were
the
Lake
Jocassee
Dam
to
fail,
the
resultant
flood
waters
would
inundate
the
Oconee
Nuclear
Station
(ONS)
and
disable
the
equipment
necessary
to
remove
decay
heat
from
the
cores
of
the
three
reactor
plants
sited
there.
The
NRC
has
been
informed
by
Duke
Energy
that
within
10
hours,
all
three
reactor
cores
would
melt
down,
releasing
their
fission
product
inventories
into
the
Reactor
Coolant
System
(RCS).
Without
mitigative
action
to
restore
equipment
(something
that
will
be
extremely
difficult
to
do
following
the
dam
failure
and
resultant
flood),
within
three
days
(1)
the
reactor
vessels
will
fail
and
release
their
fission
product
inventories
into
the
containment
buildings,
(2)
the
containment
buildings
will
fail
and
allow
release
of
fission
products
into
the
atmosphere,
(3)
a
radioactive
plume
of
fission
products
will
leave
the
site
and
travel
in
accordance
with
the
current
wind
patterns,
depositing
radioactive
fallout
along
its
path,
(4)
if
the
radioactive
plume
encounters
a
rain
storm
prior
to
reaching
the
sea,
it
will
likely
cause
large
parts
(i.e.
counties)
of
South
Carolina,
North
Carolina
and/or
Georgia
to
be
permanently
evacuated
in
a
fashion
similar
to
what
occurred
in
the
Ukraine
following
the
Chernobyl
accident
and
what
has
occurred
in
Japan
following
the
accidents
at
Fukushima.
The
plans
for
resolving
the
flooding
issues
at
the
Oconee
Nuclear
Station
have
been
delayed
repeatedly
over
the
past
eight
years,
and
currently
have
a
due
date
of
December
2016
based
on
my
informal
discussions
with
those
working
on
the
issue.
The
only
corrective
actions
done
thus
far
have
involved
minor
changes
to
monitoring
equipment
and
procedures;
none
of
the
actions
taken
thus
far
will
prevent
the
meltdown
of
the
reactors
were
the
Lake
Jocassee
Dam
to
fail.
The
resolution
of
this
substantial
and
specific
danger
to
public
safety
has
been
impeded
by
gross
mismanagement
and
abuse
of
authority
enabled
through
secrecy
in
violation
of
the
Freedom
of
Information
Act.
The
misconduct
is
ongoing.
The
flooding
concerns
at
Oconee
led
to
a
Generic
Issue
on
Flooding
at
Nuclear
Power
Plant
Sites
Due
to
Upstream
Dam
Failures
(Exhibit
32)
that
was
never
fully
released
to
the
public
(although
several
variously
redacted
versions
have
been
released
in
response
to
FOIA
request).
§
2.1.
Substantial
and
Specific
Danger
to
Public
Safety
The
probability
of
the
Lake
Jocasee
Dam
failing
has
been
calculated
by
the
NRC
to
be
2.8E-­‐4/year.72
Since
the
probability
of
a
reactor
accident
occurring
given
72
The
nomenclature
2.8E-­‐4/year
refers
to
an
annual
probability
of
failing
of
0.00028
for
every
given
year.
Although
this
is
a
small
number
equating
to
a
chance
of
failure
of
once
in
every
3571
years,
integrated
across
the
entire
US
fleet
of
100
reactors
this
number
equates
to
a
Fukushima
style
accident
of
once
every
37
years
in
the
U.S
and
once
a
decade
world
wide.
It
is
about
ten
times
higher
than
the
risk
goal
for
a
typical
US
reactor
plant.
25
the
failure
of
the
Lake
Jocassee
Dam
is
a
certainty,
there
is
thus
a
2.8E-­‐4
annual
probability
that
a
reactor
meltdown
will
occur
in
Oconee
County,
South
Carolina.
This
is
roughly
ten
times
the
risk
acceptable
for
a
licensed
US
nuclear
power
plant.
On
September
18,
2012
I
sent
a
letter73
to
the
NRC
Chairman
detailing:
(1)
the
NRC’s
inability
to
resolve—after
knowing
about
the
issue
for
six
years—the
actions
needed
to
be
taken
by
Duke
Energy
to
protect
the
three
reactors
at
the
Oconee
Nuclear
Station
(ONS)
from
a
catastrophic
failure
of
the
Lake
Jocassee
Dam,
and
(2)
the
fact
that
speculative
and
abstract
fears
regarding
terrorist
targeting74
were
sustaining
unwarranted
secrecy
that
prevented
the
open
and
transparent
discussion
of
the
significant
safety
concerns75
threatened
by
a
failure
of
the
Lake
Jocassee
Dam
due
to
acts
of
nature
or
latent
construction/design
failures.76
The
NRC
Chairman
never
contacted
me
regarding
my
2012-­‐09-­‐18
letter.
The
only
follow
up
I
ever
received
was:
(1)
my
branch
chief
(Ben
Beasley)
informed
me
on
September
20,
2012
that
he
had
been
directed
to
file
a
security
infraction
form
against
me
for
not
designating
my
letter
to
the
Chairman
as
“Security-­‐Related
Information”
(Exhibit
34),
(2)
the
Chairman’s
legal
counsel—following
an
October
15,
2012
letter
to
the
Senate
Homeland
Security
&
Government
Affairs
Committee
(Exhibit
35)
in
which
I
mentioned
I
had
not
received
any
follow
up
to
my
concerns—sent
me
an
email
on
October
16,
2012
informing
me
that
the
Chairman
had
referred
my
letter
to
her
to
the
NRC’s
Inspector
General
(Exhibit
36),
and
(3)
the
Inspector
General’s
special
agents
asked
me
about
my
concerns
on
January
17,
2013
during
their
interrogation
of
me
to
build
a
case
to
indict
me
on
felony
charges
of
Fraud
with
Computers
(18
U.S.C.
1030).
The
sense
I
got
was
that
no
one
was
interested
in
discussing
my
safety
and
mismanagement
concerns
and
that
they
were
resentful
that
I
had
“leaked”
the
issue
outside
to
Congress.
73
(Exhibit
33)
74
To
date
no
nuclear
plants
or
dams
have
been
destroyed
by
terrorist
activities.
The
solutions
to
security
concerns
(e.g.
vandalism,
sabotage,
terrorist
attack
or
acts
of
war)
are
vastly
different
than
the
solutions
to
nuclear
safety
concerns.
If
there
are
legitimate
security
concerns,
then
the
solution
is
to
increase
the
guard
force
at
the
dam.
Concerns
regarding
security—whether
speculative
or
grounded—should
not
impede
the
open
discussion
of
legitimate
safety
concerns.
75
Safety
concerns
(vice
security
concerns)
are
failures
from
acts
of
nature
(e.g.
a
PMP—
Probabilistic
Maximum
Precipitation
event),
from
design
or
construction
errors,
or
from
human
errors
in
the
operation
of
the
facility.
76
The
safety
concerns
are
real—according
to
Bureau
of
Reclamation
data
all
dams
(concrete,
earthen,
mixed)
fail
at
a
rate
of
approximately
1E-­‐4/yr
(this
corresponds
well
with
the
NRC’s
determination
of
2.8E-­‐4/yr
for
the
failure
rate
of
the
Lake
Jocassee
Dam).
The
failure
of
the
Lake
Jocassee
Dam
would
place
ONS
under
17
feet
of
water,
leading
to
the
meltdown
of
the
reactors
and
the
failure
of
their
containment
buildings,
and—depending
on
the
current
wind
direction—would
cause
significant
radiological
contamination
in
various
parts
of
the
Southeast.
Since
the
odds
of
a
“Fukushima-­‐style”
accident
happening
in
South
Carolina
are
equivalent
to
the
failure
rate
of
the
Lake
Jocassee
Dam,
there
needs
to
be
an
open
public
discussion
on
the
safety
of
the
Lake
Jocassee
Dam.
26
§
2.2.
Abuse
of
Authority
and
Gross
Mismanagement
The
NRC’s
Office
of
Nuclear
Reactor
Regulation
has
a
duty
to
be
open
and
transparent
with
the
public
about
their
concerns
regarding
the
hazards
posed
by
the
Lake
Jocassee
Dam
to
the
reactors
at
the
Oconee
Nuclear
Station.
But
NRR
successfully
kept
a
serious
safety
liability
at
a
commercial
nuclear
power
plant
site
secret
from
the
public
for
over
five
years
(from
2007
until
2012).
The
issue
regarding
the
“Fukushima-­‐style”
hazards
posed
by
the
Lake
Jocassee
Dam
to
the
three
reactors
at
the
Oconee
Nuclear
Station
only
came
to
the
light
of
the
public
due
to
a
FOIA
“fishing
expedition”
by
a
reporter
in
Oregon
(Exhibit
37).
Managers
within
NRR
abused
their
authority
in
keeping
this
issue
from
the
public.
In
a
2006
publicly
available
inspection
report
(which
was
pulled
from
the
NRC’s
public
website
in
November
2012)
the
NRC
Resident
Inspectors
at
Oconee
noted:
…a
December
10,
1992
Jocassee
Dam
Failure
Inundation
Study
(Federal
Energy
Regulatory
Commission
Project
No.
2503)
predicted
that
a
Jocassee
Dam
failure
could
result
in
flood
waters
of
approximately
12.5
to
16.8
feet
deep
at
the
Oconee
Nuclear
Site.
At
some
point
in
2007
NRR
began
marking
all
external
and
internal
correspondence
regarding
the
flooding
hazards
posed
by
the
Lake
Jocassee
Dam
as
“Official
Use
Only

Security-­‐Related
Information”
or
similar
designations
prohibiting
public
release.
The
reason
for
the
shift
away
from
transparency
and
Open
Government
is
not
fully
understood
by
me,
but
it
undermines
public
oversight
and
shields
the
NRC
from
accountability
or
even
exposure
of
dangerous,
embarrassing
breakdowns
in
nuclear
safety
law
enforcement.
It
is
difficult
for
the
NRC
to
publicly
admit,
or
even
let
the
public
know,
that
three
reactors
in
South
Carolina
are
vulnerable
to
a
nuclear
accident
due
to
flooding
caused
by
the
failure
of
an
upstream
dam.
By
withholding
this
information
from
the
public,
the
NRC
eliminated
all
public/legislative
scrutiny
of
their
efforts
and
public/legislative
pressure
to
address
the
issue
in
a
timely
manner.
The
consequence
has
been
a
five
to
fifteen77
year
delay
in
acting
against
a
hazard
whose
likelihood
is
ten
to
one
hundred
times
greater
than
accepted
standards,78
and
77
The
Jocassee/Oconee
flooding
issue
arose
in
February
1994
and
was
dismissed
in
November
1994.
It
then
reappeared—in
its
present
incarnation—in
August
2005.
It
does
take
time
to
address
a
complex
issue
such
as
this,
but
if
the
NRC
had
been
efficient
in
Aug.
2005
we
would
be
about
five
years
ahead
of
where
we
are
now.
If
one
would
make
the
argument
that
the
NRC
dropped
the
ball
in
1994
(and
I
support
that
argument
but
it
is
not
the
one
I
made
to
the
Chairman)
then
one
could
argue
we
are
15
years
behind
where
we
should
be.
78
Although
there
are
no
regulatory
limits
for
risk
of
a
core
meltdown
and
containment
failure,
the
generally
accepted
expectation
at
the
NRC
is
a
risk
of
Core
Damage
Frequency
(CDF)
on
the
27
whose
consequences
would
likely79
be
worse
than
Fukishima.
The
elimination
of
public/legislative
scrutiny
and
pressure
invariably
enabled
this
issue
to
languish.
The
vulnerability
persists,
and
the
delay
in
honoring
our
public
safety
mission
is
gross
mismanagement.
§
2.3.
Media
Coverage
The
issues
regarding
flooding
at
nuclear
power
plants
due
to
upstream
dam
failures
were
covered
in
2012-­‐02-­‐25
and
2012-­‐03-­‐01
articles
in
the
Cascadia
Times.
The
issue
also
appeared
in
the
Huffington
Post
in
September
(Exhibit
38),
October
(Exhibit
39),
and
December
2012
(Exhibit
40).
The
issue
appeared
in
other
news
outlets
as
well
including
an
Iranian
newspaper.
All
of
the
occurrences
listed
here
were
brought
to
my
attention
by
fellow
NRC
employees
who
saw
the
articles
via
the
“NRC
in
the
News”
link
on
the
home
page
of
the
NRC’s
internal
webpage.
I
was
well
known
at
the
NRC
to
be
associated
with
this
issue.
§3
Retaliatory
Investigation
On
September
19,
2012
the
NRC’s
Office
of
the
Inspector
General
opened
Allegation
A-­‐12-­‐07095,
Release
of
Security
Related
Documents
by
RES
Employee
in
response
to
my
September
18,
2012
email
and
letter
to
the
NRC
Chairman.
Note
that
the
“release
of
security
related
documents”
referred
to
in
the
allegation
was
not
a
release
of
information
to
the
public
but
rather
a
release
of
information
to
the
US
Congress
and
the
US
Office
of
Special
Counsel.
On
October
10,
2012,
the
Office
of
the
Inspector
General
completed
their
review
of
Allegation
A-­‐12-­‐07095
and
opened
OIG
Case
13-­‐001
for
a
full
investigation.
Although
these
documents
eventually
made
it
into
the
public
domain,
at
the
time
Allegation
A-­‐12-­‐07095
and
OIG
Case
13-­‐001
were
initiated
(i.e.
September
19
and
October
10,
2012)
there
was
not
yet
any
indication
that
the
documents
had
order
of
1E-­‐5/yr
and
a
risk
of
Large
Early
Release
Frequency
(LERF)
on
the
order
of
1E-­‐6/yr
to
1E-­‐
7/yr.
There
are
some
at
the
NRC
(e.g.
me,
Galloway,
Mitman,
Ferrante,
Perkins)
who
believe
that
a
catastrophic
failure
of
the
Lake
Jocassee
Dam
will
almost
certainly
lead
to
core
damage
at
Oconee
and—in
the
absence
of
any
data
showing
that
Duke
Energy
could
recover
containment
cooling
within
68
hours—possibly
containment
failure.
Since
the
NRC’s
current
failure
frequency
for
the
Lake
Jocassee
Dam
has
been
calculated
at
2.8E-­‐4/yr
(which
is
an
order
of
magnitude
higher
than
the
typical
plant
CDF
and
two
orders
of
magnitude
higher
than
the
typical
LERF),
the
risk
at
ONS
is
about
10
to
100
times
greater
than
at
a
typical
US
reactor
plant.
79
Once
the
cores
meltdown
and
the
containment
buildings
fail
(which
Duke
Energy
predicts
would
happen
within
9
and
68
hours
respectively)
the
consequences
become
dependent
on
the
weather.
If
no
rain
is
encountered
by
the
radioactive
fallout
cloud
on
its
way
to
the
Atlantic
Ocean
or
Gulf
of
Mexico,
and
if
its
path
is
relatively
direct,
then
the
consequences
could
be
less
than
Fukushima.
If
precipitation
systems
are
encountered
then
substantial
amounts
of
land
might
need
to
be
evacuated
for
decades.
28
been
released
beyond
the
US
Congress
and
the
Office
of
Special
Counsel.80
This
is
an
important
distinction:
OIG
Allegation
A-­‐12-­‐07095
and
Case
13-­‐001
were
not
initiated
to
investigate
the
appearance
of
Official
Use
Only
documents
in
the
public
domain,
but
rather,
were
initiated
to
investigate
the
disclosure
of
Official
Use
Only
documents
to
the
US
Congress
and
to
the
US
Office
of
Special
Counsel
even
though
disclosures
to
both
these
bodies
are
protected
by
law.
On
January
17,
2013
I
was
interrogated
by
two
special
agents
from
the
NRC’s
Office
of
the
Inspector
General
regarding
my
release
of
documents
stamped
“Official
Use
Only”
to
several
dozen
Congressional
staffers
and
to
US
Special
Counsel
Carolyn
Lerner.
That
interrogation
was
recorded
and
I
was
informed
during
the
interrogation
that
I
would
be
afforded
an
opportunity
to
review
the
transcript.
During
the
interrogation
I
agreed
to
several
requests,
which
I
did
not
write
down
due
to
the
stress
of
being
involved
in
an
accusatory
and
confrontational
interrogation
and
due
to
the
understanding
that
I
would
be
allowed
to
review
the
transcript.
At
the
end
of
the
interrogation,
I
was
directed
to
agree
to
a
Confidentiality
Agreement
while
still
under
oath.
I
asked
for
a
copy
of
the
agreement
to
keep,
but
was
told
I
could
not
have
one.
Again,
I
did
not
take
notes
on
what
I
was
required
to
read
because
I
had
been
told
I
would
be
afforded
an
opportunity
to
review
the
transcripts.
After
seven
weeks
and
despite
repeated
requests
I
was
neither
afforded
an
opportunity
to
review
the
transcripts
of
my
interrogation
nor
was
I
provided
a
copy
of
the
confidentiality
statement
I
was
directed
to
read.
On
March
3,
2013
under
the
Privacy
Act
I
requested
the
recording
of
my
interrogation.
On
March
14,
2013
my
Privacy
Act
request
was
denied
citing
Exemption
7(A)
of
the
Freedom
of
Information
Act.
I
appealed
that
decision
and
on
March
15,
2013
the
NRC
assigned
tracking
number
2013-­‐008A
to
my
appeal.
On
April
2,
2013
my
appeal
was
denied
by
Hubert
Bell,
the
NRC
Inspector
General.
Mr.
Bell
cited
Privacy
Act
exemption
(j)(2)
and
FOIA
exemption
(7)(A)
as
the
basis
for
his
denial.
In
order
to
obtain
the
record
of
my
interrogation,
I
employed
Scott
Hodes
in
order
to
ensure
the
NRC
did
not—prior
to
the
closure
of
OIG
case
13-­‐001—
maliciously
destroy
the
recording
of
my
January
17,
2013
session.
On
July
3,
2013
Mr.
Hodes
filed
a
civil
action
on
my
behalf
that
was
assigned
“Civil
Action
No.
13-­‐CV-­‐
00942-­‐RMC”.
After
prolonged
negotiations,
on
October
28,
2013
a
settlement
agreement
was
reached
whereby
the
transcript
and
recording
of
my
interrogation
would
be
released
within
the
shorter
time
period
of
either
the
passage
of
one
year
(i.e.
by
October
28,
2014)
or
within
5
working
days
of
the
closure
of
both
OIG
Case
13-­‐001
and
13-­‐005.
The
transcript
and
recording
were
provided
to
me
on
March
17,
2014.
80
The
first
appearance
of
one
of
these
“Official
Use
Only

Security-­‐Related
Information”
documents
in
the
public
domain
was
in
an
October
19,
2012
Huffington
Post
article.
29
I
chose
to
settle
my
lawsuit
because
it
had
already
cost
me
$2,000
and—
although
my
attorney
believed
we
would
certainly
prevail
in
court—it
was
the
estimation
of
my
attorney
that
it
would
likely
take
at
least
12
months
before
I
would
get
the
recording
and
would
cost
an
extra
$4,000.
Below
is
a
summary
of
the
retaliatory
investigation
and
criminal
referral
for
prosecution,
which
openly
and
specifically
occurred
because
I
made
non-­‐classified
disclosures
to
Congress
of
the
upstream
dam
vulnerability.
§3.1
Background
On
September
18,
2012
I
wrote
a
19-­‐page
letter
to
the
NRC
Chairman
(Exhibit
33).
I
transmitted
that
letter
from
my
NRC
email
account.
Along
with
the
letter,
I
attached
to
the
email
several
NRC
documents
designated
“Official
Use
Only

Security-­‐Related
Information”
to
back
up
statements
I
had
made
in
the
letter.
I
copied
the
email
to
about
two
dozen
Congressional
staffers,
several
dozen
NRC
employees
and
to
the
US
Special
Counsel
(Exhibit
43).
Everyone
to
whom
I
copied
on
the
original
email
or
to
whom
I
later
forwarded
the
email
were
all
employees
of
the
US
federal
government.
I
was
informed
on
or
prior
to
September
20,
2012
by
my
branch
chief
(Ben
Beasley)
that
he
had
been
directed
to
fill
out
a
NRC
Form
183,81
because
my
2012-­‐
09-­‐18
letter
to
the
NRC
Chairman
and
the
accompanying
email
were
not
stamped
“Official
Use
Only

Security-­‐Related
Information”.
Over
the
past
year
my
2012-­‐09-­‐
18
letter
and
most
of
the
documents
submitted
with
it
had
been
released
under
the
Freedom
of
Information
with
no
security-­‐related
redactions.82
Although
some
of
the
documents
attached
to
my
2012-­‐09-­‐18
are
still
designated
“Official
Use
Only”,
there
are
currently
outstanding
FOIA
appeals
regarding
these
documents
and
the
NRC
may
yet
release
them.
So,
although
these
documents
were
designated
“Security-­‐
Related
Information”—and
although
I
did
control
them
as
if
they
were
(i.e.
I
did
not
distribute
them
to
anyone
outside
the
federal
government)—it
is
apparent
that
most
of
them
did
not,
in
fact,
contain
any
security
sensitive
information.
On
a
number
of
separate
occasions
in
September,
October
and
November
2012,
I
was
interviewed
by
a
Huffington
Post
reporter
(Tom
Zeller)
regarding
the
NRC’s
handling
of
the
flooding
risk
posed
to
the
reactors
at
the
Oconee
Nuclear
Station
by
the
Lake
Jocassee
Dam.
I
was
quoted
in
at
least
three
Huffington
Post
articles.
At
some
point
in
the
autumn
of
2012
I
was
quoted
by
an
Iranian
news
service
concerning
the
NRC’s
handling
of
the
flooding
concerns
at
Oconee.
I
have
never
spoken
with
any
foreign
reporters,
foreign
government
agents,
or
anyone
else
81
(Exhibit
34)
82
The
only
redactions
were
my
home
address
and
cell
phone
number
which
were
redacted
by
the
NRC
under
Exemption
6
due
to
their
belief
that
releasing
information
I
voluntarily
allow
to
be
published
in
the
telephone
directory
is
a
“clearly
unwarranted
invasion
of
personal
privacy”.
30
connected
with
a
foreign
government
or
group
regarding
the
Jocassee/Oconee
flooding
issues.
Although
the
quote
attributed
to
me
was
accurate,
I
did
not
provide
it
to
the
Iranians.
All
quotes
attributed
to
me
in
the
Iranian
news
story
were
verbatim
repetitions
of
quotes
I
had
made
to
Tom
Zeller
of
the
Huffington
Post
and
which
appeared
in
Mr.
Zeller’s
articles.
Since
the
quotes
in
the
Iranian
newspaper
appeared
after
Mr.
Zeller’s
articles
were
published,
I
have
always
assumed
that
the
Iranians
merely
copied
the
quotations
out
of
the
Huffington
Post.
The
Huffington
Post
articles
on
the
Jocassee/Oconee
flooding
issue
contained
links
to
some
of
the
documents
that
I
provided
to
the
US
Congress.
It
is
my
understanding
that
a
Congressional
staffer
to
whom
I
submitted
the
documents
provided
copies
of
them
to
Greenpeace
who,
in
turn,
passed
them
along
to
the
Huffington
Post.
Although
I
did
not
distribute
any
“Official
Use
Only”
documents
outside
of
the
US
government,
the
NRC’s
Office
of
the
Inspector
General
claims
that
I
essentially
“laundered”
documents
through
Congress.83
That
is,
they
claim
I
sent
the
documents
to
Congressional
staffers
who
I
knew
would
leak
them.
Although
everyone
at
the
NRC
should
know
there
is
a
potential
that
information
submitted
to
Congress
could
be
publicly
released
through
a
number
of
venues,84
I
did
not
make
any
arrangements
with
anyone
in
Congress
to
leak
any
documents.
However,
when
asked
by
the
Huffington
Post
I
did
tell
them
to
whom
in
Congress
I
had
sent
the
documents.
I
do
not
view
this
as
conspiring
to
launder
documents.
I
view
this
as
informing
the
Huffington
Post
as
to
what
congressional
offices
should
be
aware
of
the
flooding
issues
and
whose
own
oversight
should
be
monitored.
None
of
the
documents
in
question
were
classified
or
in
any
way
restricted
from
release
by
law.
On
October
26,
2012
I
met
with
my
branch
chief
and
division
director
and
was
told
to
submit
a
list
of
all
the
documents
that
I
had
shared
outside
of
the
NRC.
At
this
meeting
I
was
also
told
to
route
any
future
documents
that
I
wished
to
send
to
Congressional
offices
through
my
chain
of
command
and
the
Office
of
Congressional
Affairs.
I
provided
the
requested
list
on
October
30,
2012.
It
is
enclosed
as
(Exhibit
43).
In
mid-­‐January
2013
I
was
contacted
by
special
agent
William
Walls
of
the
NRC’s
Office
of
the
Inspector
General
regarding
my
availability
to
participate
in
an
interview
concerning
OIG
Case
13-­‐001
of
which
I
was
told
I
was
the
subject
of
the
investigation
(Exhibit
44).
Prior
to
the
interrogation,
the
OIG
refused
to
inform
me
as
to
what
the
specific
charges
were.
I
was,
however,
informed
that
the
interrogation
would
be
conducted
under
a
Garrity
warning
and
not
a
Kalkines
statement,
which
meant
that
I
was
under
criminal
investigation.
83
(Exhibit
42)
84e.g.
during
meetings
of
Congressional
oversight
committees,
by
press
releases
of
Congressional
offices,
or
simply
by
a
leak
from
a
staffer
31
§3.2
January
17,
2013
Interrogation
On
January
17,
2013
I
was
interrogated
by
two
armed
special
agents,
William
Walls
and
Daniel
Esmond
of
the
US
NRC’s
Office
of
the
Inspector
General.
Kevin
Nietmann,
an
OIG
Technical
Advisor,
was
also
present.
Also
present
was
Randy
Sullivan
(my
NTEU
steward)
and
a
transcriber
from
Neal
R.
Gross
Court
Reporters
and
Transcribers
who
was
transcribing
the
interrogation
and
operating
a
recording
device.
In
the
sections
below,
which
summarize
the
transcript85
in
(Exhibit
45),
I
hope
to
make
the
case
that
my
2013-­‐01-­‐17
interrogation
was
conducted
with
the
intent
of
trumping
up
felony
charges
against
me
in
order
to
use
as
leverage
to
get
me
to
resign
from
my
job.
In
the
aftermath,
it
places
me
at
a
severe
disadvantage
when
seeking
any
other
federal
position,
such
as
the
Resident
Inspector
posts
for
which
I
have
been
denied.
The
first
37
minutes
of
the
interrogation
(up
to
page
34,
line
7
of
the
transcript)
we
discussed
OIG
Case
13-­‐005
which
the
OIG
claims
I
am
the
source
of
(i.e.
they
claim
that
in
my
letter
to
the
Chairman
I
made
allegations
which
they
are
now
investigating).
Although
I
never
intended
for
a
criminal
investigation
to
be
initiated
into
the
NRC’s
mismanagement
of
the
Jocassee/Oconee
flooding
issues,
the
OIG
initiated
one
anyway
(i.e.
OIG
Case
13-­‐005).
During
that
exchange
I
tried
to
accurately
summarize
my
views.
The
Oconee
Nuclear
Station
was
licensed
to
design
criteria
that
we
now
believe
are
no
longer
valid—particularly
we
now
believe
(versus
what
we
believed
in
the
late
1960s/early
1970s
when
the
plant
and
dam
were
originally
sited)
that
the
failure
of
a
dam
of
similar
construction
to
Jocassee
is
a
credible
event
(i.e.
something
we
must
account
for
in
our
analysis)
whereas
when
the
reactors
and
dam
were
originally
constructed
a
dam
failure
at
Jocassee
was
considered
of
such
low
probability
(i.e.
not
credible)
that
it
did
not
need
to
be
analyzed.
So
although
I
would
be
comfortable
living
and
working
in
Oconee
County,
as
a
regulator
I
believe
that
our
current
understanding
of
dam
failures
and
flooding
at
nuclear
plants
dictates
that
to
prevent
a
substantial
and
specific
threat
to
public
health
and
safety
we
need
to
either
improve
the
flooding
defenses
at
Oconee
or
we
need
to
lower
the
level
of
Lake
Jocassee
such
that
the
flooding
due
to
a
dam
failure
would
be
acceptable.
The
impression
I
get
from
my
transcript
is
that
the
OIG
agents
were
trying
to
manipulate
this
view
into
an
opinion
that
I
did
not
think
the
issue
was
safety
significant
since
there
was
not
an
immediate
need
to
shut
down
the
plant.
Nuclear
accidents
rarely
kill
people.
At
Fukushima
we
are
seeing
thousands
of
people
displaced
from
their
homes
but
we
are
not
seeing
any
deaths.
My
nightmare
85
The
recording
of
the
interrogation
is
being
included
as
(Exhibit
46).
There
is
information
on
the
recording
that
is
not
in
the
transcript
(e.g.
the
tone
of
the
questions,
pauses,
inflections)
and
the
transcription
does
have
some
errors.
32
at
Jocassee/Oconee
is
a
failure
of
the
dam
would
cause
flooding
at
the
site
that
eventually
leads
to
all
three
nuclear
reactors
melting
down
and
their
containment
structures
failing
(as
what
occurred
at
Fukushima
following
the
tsunami
flooding).
Then
the
radioactive
debris
being
carried
by
the
winds
meeting
a
precipitation
system
on
its
way
to
the
ocean
and
contaminating
several
counties
in
South
Carolina
to
the
extent
that
they
need
to
be
evacuated.
This
is
an
economic
nightmare
for
all
US
taxpayers
and
a
life-­‐altering
catastrophe
for
the
people
who
need
to
be
evacuated—but
it
involves
no
deaths.
I
have
serious
safety
concerns.
Yet
when
asked
if
I’d
live
and
work
in
Oconee,
I
have
to
say
“yes”.
I’m
not
from
there.
If
the
government
has
to
buy
me
out
of
my
home
due
to
a
nuclear
accident
it
would
not
devastate
me
to
move.
In
the
59-­‐68
hour
scenario
that
it
would
take
for
the
nuclear
accident
to
unfold,
I
could
easily
move
my
family
to
safety.
I
had
to
be
honest.
I
was
under
oath.
But
the
OIG
agents
manipulate
this
to
“Well,
in
your
own
words,
you
just
mentioned
that
you
wouldn’t
sell
a
house
and
you’d
continue
to
live
there.”
You
can
have
serious
safety
concerns
without
fearing
for
your
life.
Millions
of
Americans
having
to
leave
their
hometowns
and
family
farms
due
to
radiological
contamination
is
a
devastating
catastrophe
even
if
no
one
falls
ill
or
dies.
Another
concern
I
had
was
that
the
agency
had
not
done
an
adequate
job
staying
on
top
of
the
issue
and
driving
it
to
conclusion.
However,
I
am
not
aware
of
any
statutes
that
make
it
a
crime
for
federal
bureaucrats
to
be
ineffective.
In
all
my
letters
(e.g.
to
the
NRC
Chairman,86
to
Senator
Lieberman,87
to
Senator
Boxer88)
I
focus
on
the
ineffectiveness
of
the
process,
which
is
gross
mismanagement
and
abuse
of
authority,
and
not
criminal
wrongdoing
on
the
part
of
any
individuals.
During
their
questioning,
I
get
the
overall
impression
from
the
first
34
pages
of
the
transcript
that
the
agents
believe
the
agency’s
actions
have
been
adequate.
Finally,
during
these
first
34
pages
there
is
discussion
about
my
background.
In
totality,
this
came
across
as
them
trying
to
discredit
my
background
because
I
have
not
been
trained
in
hydrology,
civil
engineering,
security,
etc.
My
background
was—at
the
time—nearly
17
years
working
in
nuclear
power.
I
understand
how
organizations
function
and
make
decisions,
how
operators
typically
perform
(or
fail
to
perform)
both
when
they
are
doing
a
well
trained
task
and
a
novel
evolution,
the
history
behind
the
evolution
of
nuclear’s
“defense-­‐in-­‐depth”
strategy,
the
limitations
of
deterministic
analyses
and
probabilistic
risk
assessments,
the
reliability
concerns
with
equipment,
etc.
Like
all
operators,
I
have
had
in-­‐depth
training
for
the
accidents
at
Three
Mile
Island
and
Chernobyl.
I
worked
in
the
NRC’s
Operations
Center
in
the
weeks
following
the
Fukushima
accident.
Although
I
must
defer
to
other
experts
with
regard
to
hydrology
and
dam
design—these
experts
agree
with
me
(I
have
no
citation
here
but
you
are
welcome
to
interview
Greg
Baecher
of
the
University
of
Maryland
and
Tom
Nicholson
of
NRC/RES
and
they
will
tell
you
that
the
failure
rate
of
the
Lake
Jocassee
Dam
is
on
the
order
of
1E-­‐4/yr).
Although
I
am
86
(Exhibit
33)
87
(Exhibit
35)
88
(Exhibit
47)
33
not
a
security
expert,
the
security
experts
in
Office
of
Nuclear
Security
and
Incident
Response
(NRC/NSIR)
agree
with
me
that
the
Jocassee/Oconee
issue
is
not
a
nuclear
security
concern
requiring
designation
as
Safeguards
information
(Exhibit
48).
The
remainder
of
the
interview
(i.e.
beyond
page
34
line
7)
was
conducted
for
the
purposes
of
manufacturing
a
felony
case
against
me.
Beginning
on
page
34
they
asked
me
general
questions
about
my
assigned
work,
my
work
schedule,
my
work
from
home
habits,
and
my
use
of
personal
computers.
I
had
the
general
sense
from
the
interview
that
they
were
questioning
whether
or
not
I
should
be
pursuing
concerns
regarding
Jocassee/Oconee
on
“agency
time”.
To
be
clear,
a
lot
of
my
efforts
were
done
“off
the
clock”.
However,
at
no
time
were
any
of
my
work
products
hindered
by
office
hours
spent
looking
at
Jocassee/Oconee
documents.
As
a
nuclear
professional,
I
am
expected
to
be
able
to
interact
with
colleagues
and
to
discuss
safety
issues
not
assigned
to
me.
Although
I
cannot
neglect
my
assigned
work
to
pursue
personal
interests,
that
is
not
what
occurred.
What
occurred
was,
in
addition
to
my
assigned
duties,
I
spent
some
time
looking
into
concerns
that
colleagues
(primarily
Richard
Perkins
but
others
as
well)
shared
with
me.
This
is
not
uncommon
at
the
agency,
where
discussion
and
research
among
staff
beyond
those
immediately
assigned
to
a
task
is
common.
Due
to
my
assigned
workload,
by
necessity
I
conducted
nearly
all
research—beyond
that
necessary
to
respond
to
colleagues—after
working
hours.
I
would
find
it
chilling
were
someone
to
tell
me
I
cannot
look
into
a
safety
concern
a
colleague
has
brought
to
me
unless
I
am
authorized
to
do
so
by
my
supervisor.
Although
no
one
has
said
this
to
me,
it
is
the
impression
I
got
from
the
totality
of
the
OIG’s
January
17,
2013
interrogation
of
me.
Beginning
on
page
44
my
union
steward
interrupted
the
interrogation
to
ask
what
is
meant
by
“Security-­‐Related
Information”
(Exhibit
49).
My
steward
works
in
NRC/NSIR
and
is
used
to
working
with
Safeguards
information,
which
is
a
designation
defined
by
a
federal
statute
that
controls
release
of
such
information.
He
was
unaware
of
“Security-­‐Related
Information”
which
is
an
informal
marking
that
NRR
places
on
documents
that
they
don’t
wish
to
be
publicly
release.
I
think
it
telling
that
my
steward
had
this
confusion,
because
I
believe
that
“Security-­‐Related
Information”
is
intentionally
made
to
resemble
Safeguards
Information
so
that
staff
will
be
leery
of
leaking
it
(it
is
a
federal
crime
to
release
Safeguards
Information
to
an
individual
without
an
official
government
need
for
it
whereas
“Security-­‐Related
Information”
has
no
formal
definition
whatsoever
and
can
legally
be
given
to
anyone).
There
was
much
discussion
as
to
whether
or
not
I
processed
“Security-­‐
Related
Information”
on
my
personal
PC.
I
am
still
not
sure
whether
or
not
I
am
allowed
to
process
“Security-­‐Related
Information”
and
proprietary
information
on
my
personal
PC
(I
know
I
cannot
process
Safeguards
or
classified
information).
I
got
34
the
impression
from
reading
the
testimonies
of
Kathy
Lyons-­‐Burke
(Exhibit
51)
and
Thorne
Graham
(Exhibit
52)
that
it
is
not
allowed
to
send
“Security-­‐Related
Information”
or
proprietary
information
via
commercial
email
servers
(e.g.
Hotmail,
Gmail,
Yahoo)
yet
it
is
still
common
for
employees
to
do
so.
But
I
am
still
unclear
about
using
my
personal
PC
for
processing
propriety
documents.
I
may
have
broken
some
IT
rules,
but
it
is
clear
to
me
that
the
IT
rules
are
ill
defined
and
often
violated.
In
their
September
11,
2013
Report
of
Investigation,
the
agents
mention
the
following
findings
(Exhibit
50):
OIG
found
that
on
December
10,
2012,
CRISCIONE
forwarded
an
email
containing
NRC
OUO-­‐SRI
from
his
NRC
email
account
to
his
personal
Hotmail
account,
although
NRC
prohibits
transmittal
of
such
information
to
commercial
and
personal
email
accounts.
The
sensitive
information
he
forwarded
pertained
to
subject
matter
of
the
Screening
Analysis
Report.
In
addition,
CRISCIONE
admitted
sending
the
NRC
OUO

SRI
Screening
Analysis
Report
to
members
of
Congress
from
his
personal
Hotmail
account,
and
storing
a
copy
of
the
report
in
his
Hotmail
account,
although
NRC
prohibits
staff
from
using
their
personal
email
accounts
to
transmit
or
store
OUO

SRI
information.
Note
that
the
above
findings
were
never
presented
to
me.
I
had
to,
on
my
own
initiative,
request
the
Report
of
Investigation
under
the
Freedom
of
Information
Act
and
wait
six
weeks
for
the
NRC
to
release
it
to
me.
Despite
all
the
discussion
of
IT
issues
during
my
interrogation,
no
one
has
ever
informed
me
that
any
of
the
IT
actions
taken
by
me
and
discussed
during
the
interrogation
violated
any
NRC
policies.
The
only
reason
I
am
aware
I
have
violated
policies
is
because
I
have
gained—through
my
own
initiative—documents
through
the
Freedom
of
Information
Act
and
inadvertently
(i.e.
while
looking
for
other
information)
came
across
passages
indicating
I
had
broken
some
NRC
IT
rules.
I
still
have
supposedly
“Security
Sensitive”
documents
in
my
personal
email
account.
During
my
interrogation
I
was
told
not
to
delete
anything
from
my
personal
email
account.
As
I
was
being
walked
to
the
elevator
after
my
interrogation,
I
asked
special
agent
Daniel
Esmond
when
I
can
again
delete
records
from
my
Hotmail
account.
He
told
me
that
they
would
let
me
know.
I
have
yet
to
hear
from
anyone.
So,
what
exactly
is
so
sensitive
about
these
documents
that
they
cannot
be
stored
on
my
Hotmail
account
yet—even
though
the
NRC
knows
they
are
in
my
account—cannot
be
deleted?
I
left
my
January
17,
2013
interrogation
pretty
shaken
up
about
having
to
admit
apparent
violation
to
NRC
IT
rules
(rules
which
I
was
not
aware
of
but
likely
had
signed
statements
agreeing
to),
yet
in
the
end
these
rules
do
not
seem
to
be
of
much
concern
to
anyone.
35
Beginning
on
page
54,
line
24
there
was
much
discussion
on
using
the
Non
Concurrence
Process,
the
Differing
Professional
Opinions
(DPO)
process,
Open
Door
meetings,
etc.
to
address
my
concerns.
The
topic
of
going
through
channels
was
again
brought
up
around
page
70,
line
14
(Exhibit
23).
The
totality
of
the
discussion
left
me
with
the
impression
that
my
professional
integrity
was
being
challenged
because
I
did
not
use
these
processes.
I
used
Open
Door
meetings
in
the
past
on
the
Callaway
2003-­‐10-­‐21
issue,
with
little
success.
I
could
not
use
the
Non-­‐Concurrence
process
on
the
Jocassee/Oconee
issues
because
I
was
not
assigned
to
concur
on
any
of
the
correspondence.
I
could
not
use
the
DPO
process
because
none
of
the
Jocassee/Oconee
issues
were
formally
assigned
to
me
and
thus
I
was
not
involved
in
any
of
the
decision-­‐making.
I
believe
the
Non
Concurrence,
DPO
and
Open
Door
policies
are
good
policies,
but
the
problem
with
“going
through
channels”
is
that
those
who
control
the
channels
have
myriad
ways
to
bureaucratically
stymie
you.
That
being
said,
as
a
Professional
Engineer
I
typically
go
through
channels:
at
Callaway
Plant
I
dutifully
took
the
October
21,
2003
incident
through
all
levels
of
my
chain
of
command
seeking
a
solution
before
bringing
the
matter
to
the
NRC
as
a
career
ending
allegation.
The
above
being
said,
the
Jocassee/Oconee
issue
had
spent
six
years
“going
through
channels”.
And
Melanie
Galloway—a
deputy
division
director
in
NRR—
submitted
a
Non
Concurrence
and
so
did
Jeff
Mitman—a
well-­‐regarded
senior
risk
analyst
in
NRR.89
If
these
individuals
could
not
get
proper
consideration
for
their
concerns,
how
could
I?
Additionally,
regarding
the
inappropriate
withholding
of
the
issue
from
the
public,
Richard
Perkins—the
project
lead
for
the
Upstream
Dam
Failure
generic
issue—fought
that
battle
at
every
meeting
he
attended
for
over
a
year.
The
NRC
had
had
ample
exposure
of
this
issue
through
its
“channels”
when
Richard
Perkins
and
others
asked
me
if
I
could
get
the
issue
in
front
of
a
congressional
oversight
committee.
Beginning
on
page
58
we
discuss
the
role
other
federal
agencies
had
in
reviewing
the
release
of
the
report
(Exhibit
53).
The
general
implication
of
this
discussion
was
that
other
agencies
did
not
want
their
information
released,
yet
I
somehow
released
it.
These
other
agencies
are—like
the
NRC—not
monolithic
organizations.
There
were
plenty
of
individuals
in
these
organizations—just
like
in
the
NRC—who
felt
the
report
could
go
out
with
no
redactions
(Exhibit
54).
Beginning
on
page
79
there
is
a
discussion
on
“need-­‐to-­‐know”
(Exhibit
55).
On
October
25,
2012
I
was
directed
by
Dan
Cardenas
in
the
Division
of
Facilities
Security
(NRC/ADM/DFS)
to
go
to
an
internal
web
page
and
read
all
the
documents
89
Ms.
Galloway’s
Non-­‐Concurrence
is
in
NRC
ADAMS
as
ML091170104
(Exhibit
83)
and
Mr.
Mitman’s
is
ML110260443
(Exhibit
84).
36
there
concerning
handling
of
SUNSI
(Sensitive
Unclassified
Non-­‐Safeguards
Information—so
basically
SUNSI
is
anything
that
is
controlled
from
public
release
by
administrative
policies
vice
by
legal
statutes)
(Exhibit
56).
This
direction
was
being
given
as
a
follow
through
item
from
the
September
20,
2012
security
infraction
that
had
been
submitted
against
me
for
not
marking
my
2012-­‐09-­‐18
letter
to
the
NRC
Chairman
as
“Security-­‐Related
Information”
(which,
by
the
way,
in
response
to
the
PEER
v.
NRC
lawsuit
was
publicly
released
by
the
NRC
in
September
2013
with
no
redactions
other
than
my
home
address
and
phone
number).
This
direction
was
coming
two
days
after
Doug
Coe’s
October
23,
2012
interview
with
OIG
special
agents
in
which
Doug
was
pointedly
asked
about
what
actions
had
been
taken
as
a
result
of
the
supposed
2012-­‐09-­‐18
security
infraction
and
why
I
continued
to
have
unrestricted
access
to
NRC
internal
ADAMS
(Exhibit
57).
I
did
not
fully
understand
the
contradictory
and
confusing
agency
guidance
for
marking
and
handling
SUNSI
and
replied
to
Dan
Cardenas
with
a
series
of
questions.
After
19
months,
Mr.
Cardenas
still
had
not
seen
fit
to
answer
my
questions—despite
being
the
subject
matter
expert
on
SUNSI—and
instead
referred
me
to
my
supervisor
(Exhibit
56).
I
am
far
from
the
only
NRC
employee
confused
by
our
guidance
on
SUNSI.
From
discussions
in
Ben
Beasley’s
October
19,
2012
interrogation,
it
is
clear
that
he
is
confused
too
(Exhibit
58).
Unfortunately
for
the
sake
of
public
transparency
and
openness,
Ben—like
most
NRC
employees—deals
with
his
confusion
by
defaulting
“conservatively”
and
ensures
he
errs
on
the
side
of
withholding.
The
central
questions
I
had
for
Mr.
Cardenas
revolved
around
the
idea
of
need-­‐to-­‐know
for
official
government
business
(e.g.
is
me
leaving
the
screening
analysis
report
on
upstream
dam
failures—which
is
marked
“Not
for
Public
Disclosure—with
the
intern
in
Representative
Duncan’s
office—the
US
Congressman
from
the
South
Carolina
congressional
district
that
includes
Oconee—
for
distribution
to
his
appropriate
staffer
a
violation
of
“need-­‐to-­‐know”).
The
totality
of
this
part
of
the
IG’s
questioning
of
me
left
me
with
the
impression
that
I
did
not
have
the
authority
to
determine
who
had
a
“need-­‐to-­‐know”
and
therefore
needed
to
go
through
official
channels
to
deliver
documents
to
Congress.
Beginning
on
page
88
there
is
a
discussion
regarding
how
I
came
to
be
quoted
in
the
Iranian
press
(Exhibit
59).
I
am
not
certain
how
I
came
to
be
quoted.
I
did
not
speak
to
any
foreign
journalists
and
the
quotes
attributed
to
me
(which
I
recall
to
be
actual
quotes
which
I
had
spoken
to
Tom
Zeller
of
the
Huffington
Post)
in
the
Iranian
newspaper
match
the
ones
quoted
in
an
earlier
Huffington
Post
article
so
I
assume
that
the
Iranians
used
the
Huffington
Post
as
a
source
for
their
article.
37
The
Iranian
news
article
was
linked
to
in
the
“NRC
in
the
News”
link
on
the
NRC’s
internal
home
page
so
it
is
widely
known
throughout
the
NRC
that
I
was
quoted
by
an
Iranian
newspaper.
Beginning
on
page
89
there
is
a
discussion
regarding
how
Greenpeace
and
the
Huffington
Post
came
to
possess
the
unredacted
GI-­‐204
screening
analysis
(Exhibit
60).
At
the
time,
I
believed
that
it
had
been
provided
to
Jim
Riccio
of
Greenpeace
by
Vic
Edgerton
of
Congressman
Kucinich’s
office.
However,
I
did
not
know
this
for
certain
and
strongly
felt
that,
even
had
I
known,
it
was
not
appropriate
for
me
to
discuss
the
completely
legal
actions90
of
a
legislative
branch
staffer
(i.e.
Edgerton)
with
investigative
agents
of
the
executive
branch
(i.e.
Walls)
who
were
trying
to
determine
how
an
embarrassing—yet
unclassified,
non-­‐Safeguards
and
wholly
otherwise
legally
unrestricted
from
release—document
made
it
into
the
public
domain.
When
I
hesitated
to
speculate
on
the
precise
name
of
an
individual,
I
was
directed
to
do
so.
This
made
me
very
uncomfortable.
I
did
not
think
it
right
that
I
name
Vic
Edgerton,
who
might
not
have
been
the
one
who
leaked
the
document
and
thus
whose
name
I
would
be
besmirching.
I
also
did
not
think
it
right
that,
were
Vic
to
be
the
actual
source,
I
name
him
since
he
had
every
right
to
consult
with
Greenpeace
on
the
document
and
his
mention
in
an
NRC
IG
investigation
report
might
limit
his
ability
to
get
documents
from
the
NRC
in
the
future.
I
should
note
here
that
my
feelings
about
this
questioning
would
have
been
wholly
different
had
we
been
discussing
classified
or
Safeguards
documents.
I
believe
that
the
NRC’s
IG
has
every
right
to
investigate
the
release
of
classified
material
and
Safeguards
documents
since
their
release
is
a
violation
of
law.
Congressional
staffers
are
not
above
the
law,
but
they
are
above
NRC
administrative
rules
designed
to
keep
embarrassing
issues
out
of
the
hands
of
the
public.
Beginning
on
page
98
there
is
a
discussion
regarding
my
relationship
with
Richard
Perkins
with
regard
to
the
Jocassee/Oconee
issue
(Exhibit
61).
Richard
and
I
worked
in
the
same
branch
and
he
would
share
his
concerns
with
me
all
the
time
regarding
how
he
believed
NRR
was
trying
to
withhold
the
Oconee/Jocassee
issue
from
the
public.
It
was
in
support
of
his
efforts
that
I
reached
out
to
congressional
committees.
I
believe
our
relationship
is
the
typical
type
of
professional
collaboration
that
is
expected
in
an
“Open
and
Collaborative
Work
Environment”
(OCWE).
The
totality
of
this
part
of
the
IG’s
questioning
of
me
left
me
with
the
impression
that
they
believed
I
had
colluded
with
Richard
Perkins
to
publicly
release
the
GI-­‐204
Screening
Analysis.
90
There
was
nothing
legally
prohibiting
Vic
Edgerton,
me,
or
anyone
else
from
releasing
the
GI-­‐
204
screening
report
to
the
public.
For
NRC
employees
(such
as
myself)
there
were
administrative
policies
preventing
it
but
no
legal
statutes.
38
Beginning
on
page
116
there
is
a
discussion
regarding
what
qualifies
me
to
determine
whether
or
not
an
issue
is
release-­‐able
to
the
public
(Exhibit
62).
As
an
NRC
employee,
one
of
my
tasks
is
to
process
Freedom
of
Information
Act
(FOIA)
requests
for
which
I
am
the
document
owner.
In
that
role,
I
believe
I
have
the
authority
to
determine
what
can
and
cannot
be
released
(although
that
authority
can
be
questioned
and
overridden
as
the
FOIA
submittal
is
routed
through
the
process).
Another
role
I
am
sometimes
assigned
is
to
do
the
SUNSI
review
of
records
I
am
placing
in
ADAMS.
In
that
role,
I
am
specifically
being
assigned
the
task
of
determining
if
a
document
is
publicly
release-­‐able.
The
totality
of
the
OIG’s
questioning
in
this
part
of
the
interview
left
me
with
the
impression
that
only
the
FOIA
office
and
the
Office
of
General
Counsel
can
authorize
the
public
release
of
a
document.
Beginning
on
page
123
the
tone
of
the
investigation
gets
accusatory
(Exhibit
63).
The
accusation
is
made
that
it
was
my
intent
to
publicly
release
the
report
through
Congress.
On
page
126
there
is
a
hostile
exchange
between
Agent
Esmond
and
my
union
steward
regarding
Agent
Esmond’s
inability
to
understand
why
I
would
think
it
acceptable
to
provide
a
document
marked
“Not
for
Public
Disclosure”
(i.e.
the
GI-­‐204
screening
analysis)
to
Congress
when
I
knew
there
was
a
possibility
it
could
get
publicly
release.
On
page
129
agent
Walls
states
in
a
very
intimidating
manner
(Exhibit
63):
Many
people
believe
that
you
are
directly
responsible
for
Greenpeace
and
Huffington
Post’s
receipt
of
the
unredacted
GI-­‐204
report,
and
posting
that
report
for
the
public’s
consumption.
I
didn’t
know
how
to
answer
such
an
accusation.
As
I
was
trying
to
formulate
and
answer
he
interrupted
me
and
stated:
Well,
you’ve
told
me,
you
didn’t
say,
“No,
I’m
not
responsible,”
so
that—you
not
coming
out
and
telling
me
that,
that
tells
me
something.
I’ve
got
another
follow
up
question.”
At
this
point
I
asked
him
to
hold
on
and
give
me
a
chance
to
answer
that
accusation
at
which
point
he
aggressively
interrupted
me
and
stated:
You’re
right,
I’m
going
to
make
some
accusations,
because
I
think
you
have
taken
some
steps
that
you
haven’t
fully
thought
through,
or
maybe
you
have.
At
this
point
he
went
on
to
the
next
question
without
giving
me
an
opportunity
to
finish
my
answer
to
his
earlier
accusation
about
many
people
believing
I
am
directly
responsible
for
the
release
of
the
GI-­‐204
screening
analysis
report.
39
This
portion
of
the
interrogation
left
me
feeling
intimidated.
I
felt
that
I
was
being
accused
of
directly
releasing
the
report
to
the
public—something
I
am
legally
allowed
to
do
but
something
that
I
did
not
do
since
it
violates
NRC
administrative
policies.
The
interrogation
then
focused
on
whether
or
not
I
led
anyone
to
believe
that
it
would
be
acceptable
to
release
the
documents
and
what
I
did
once
I
realized
that
the
Huffington
Post
was
in
possession
of
the
documents.
Again
Agent
Walls
asked
me
if
I
felt
responsible:
SR.
SPEC.
AGENT
WALLS:
Did
you
feel
responsible?
MR.
CRISCIONE:
That
there
was
an
article
written
about
this?
SR.
SPEC.
AGENT
WALLS:
That
those
documents
were
made
public.
Did
you
feel
responsible?
MR.
CRISCIONE:
Yeah.
That’s
going
back
to
that
first
question
too
about
“many
people
believe”
whatever…
SR.
SPEC.
AGENT
WALLS:
Do
you
feel
responsible
for
this
public—this
report
being
made
public?
MR.
CRISCIONE:
It
was
not
my
intent…
SR.
SPEC.
AGENT
WALLS:
[interrupting
in
a
harsh
tone]
You’re
the
only
subject
of
this
investigation.
I’m
asking
you,
do
you
feel
responsible?
Yes
or
no?
MR.
CRISCIONE:
It
was
not
my
intent
to
release
this
document
through
some
unofficial
channels
to
the
public.
All
right?
SR.
SPEC.
AGENT
WALLS:
That
may
have
not
been
your
sole
intent,
but
you
knew
it
was
a
possibility.
MR.
CRISCIONE:
Right.
SR.
SPEC.
AGENT
WALLS:
And
you
were
okay
with
it.91
91
Here
I
am
“guilty
as
charged”.
It
was
not
my
sole
intent,
but
I
was
certainly
“okay
with
it”.
The
document
we
are
talking
about
here
was
not
Safeguards,
was
not
classified
a

Post

2016-05-19 – NRC – Jocassee Dam – Keeping inundation levels from the public – ML16201A100

Criscione, Lawrence
From: Criscione, Lawrence
Sent: Thursday, May 19, 2016 8:13 AM
To: Kirkwood, Sara; Holahan, Gary; Clark, Theresa
Cc: [email protected]; ‘[email protected]
Subject: Keeping inundation levels from the public
Attachments: Toops’ Interview.pdf
Sara, et. al.,
The Toops family was washed out of their home when the upper reservoir at Taum Sauk failed on 2005-Dec-
14.
Although this has nothing to do with nuclear power, I encourage you to read the short 2½ page transcript of the
their interview with the Missouri State Highway Patrol. On the third page Jerry Toops mentions how Ameren’s
emergency action plan for a failure of the upper reservoir “showed the water stooping short of his house”.
In actuality, most of the water did stop short of his house. The flooding models accurately predicted the
course of the bulk of the water. However, a rouge splash demolished his house and flushed him and his family
out into the night.
Had Ameren’s emergency action plan been in the public domain, it is possible that some group (e.g. an
environmental group, a university) might have studied the plan and found its inadequacies. I admit that it is
likely that, had this plan been public, no one would have reviewed it and found its flaws. But you will never
convince me that making it public would have caused Jerry Toops and his family to be the victims of an Al-
Qaeda plot to destroy the reservoir. There are very valid reasons for inundation studies to be in the public
domain; the only reason for keeping these studies from the public are—as termed by the President—
“speculative or abstract fears”.
Larry
Lawrence S. Criscione
573-230-3959
From: Criscione, Lawrence
Sent: Thursday, May 05, 2016 4:24 PM
To: Desaulniers, David
Subject: FW: Taum Sauk Upper Reservoir Failure ‐ December 14, 2005
Attached is the Missouri State Highway Patrol interview of the Toops family. It’s 2½ pages long and a real
easy read; reads like a newspaper article.
Somewhere in the lengthy email trail below is a link to a very damning (pun intended) report by the staff of the
Missouri Public Service Commission. I could have written a much worse assessment of Ameren’s failed safety
culture, but given the political influence that can be exerted on the MoPSC, the report is pretty good.
This made the national news the night it happened but even in Missouri was forgotten about within a
month. Had it occurred in July instead of December, it would be one of the seminal disaster we all know
about—maybe not up there with the Titanic and TMI but well discussed in engineering circles. With hundreds
of dead campers, the production-over-safety of the Ameren officials and the wholesale destruction of
incriminating emails on the part of some managers would have seen scrutiny in criminal courts instead of a
stern rebuke by some Public Service Commission staffers.
From: Criscione, Lawrence
Sent: Tuesday, March 26, 2013 9:08 AM
To: Hiland, Patrick
Cc: [email protected]
Subject: RE: Taum Sauk Upper Reservoir Failure ‐ December 14, 2005
FERC leveled their largest fine to date against Ameren ($15 million) due to the organizational failing that led to the
Upper Reservoir failure. I am not aware of what changed in FERC’s regulations, but Joseph Ehasz was one of the
contractors who either reviewed or performed the FERC assessment of the event and could likely inform you of all the
regulatory enhancements which occurred.
To my knowledge though, dams do not have “Tech Specs” like nuclear plants do. When the Taum Sauk disaster
occurred, there was a common mode failure affecting both channels of level indications that were used to shut off the
pumps during a reservoir fill. At a nuclear plant, we would never allow continued operation with a known common
mode failure of two channels of safety equipment.
What had happened was the stand pipes for the level indications were known to be moving in their brackets in a manner
which caused indicated level to read lower than actual level. While waiting for an outage to fix the stand pipe brackets,
the temporary “solution” was to recalibrate the level channels so that indicated level matched actual level. The
problem with this “solution” is that it did not address the root cause – the movement of the standpipes. That is, the
newly calibrated level could (and did) still drift if the standpipes again moved. I am confident that few nuclear plants
would ever continue to operate in such a reckless situation, but we aren’t dealing with nuclear plant operators and
managers – we are dealing with hydro.
I’m not willing to take on faith that Duke Energy’s non‐nuclear management is any better than Ameren’s, but even if I
were there are still concerns regarding the workers. I’ve worked the back shift at power plants and know what goes
on. The items Duke Energy committed to are excellent things to do, but as barriers to a nuclear accident they do not
even begin to compare to building a flood berm.
Note in Jerry Toops’ testimony to the Missouri State Highway Patrol (last page of the attached 4 page document) that
Ameren’s calculations prior to the Taum Sauk Disaster showed the flood waters stopping just shy of his house and
Ameren’s emergency plan committed to giving him a 12 minute warning. The only warning he got was the tremendous
rumble of boulders, trees and water rushing down Proffit Mountain. And the “steady state” flood volume might have
stopped just shy of his house, but a dynamic wave demolished his home and nearly killed him, his wife and three
children. I think a noble effort has been done by Duke Energy to estimate the flooding effects due to a dam break, but
like Ameren their estimation could be a little off.
If this was 1971 we would be requiring Duke Energy to deterministically show that they could protect against a
catastrophic failure of the Lake Jocassee Dam. I recognize that “that ship has sailed” – that based on the poor
understanding of dam failure frequencies that was present in the 1970s we gave them a license without requiring a
deterministic evaluation. To be quite honest, I do not have an issue with them abandoning their plans for a flood
wall. We cannot live with a 2.8E‐4/year risk at 104 US reactors, but we can certainly live with that risk at 3 reactors in
South Carolina. My concerns are:
 We haven’t been transparent and open with the public about this issue
 As an agency we haven’t dealt effectively with this issue over the past six years and there are important lessons
to be learned from that but for some reason, unlike the utilities we regulate, we have no method for capturing
poor organizational performance and analyzing it for ways to improve
 I see no security concerns surrounding Oconee/Jocassee, but others do (particularly in NRR) and yet I am not
aware of any formal study or evaluation that has been done to determine whether or not the Lake Jocassee
Dam is adequately protected from sabotage
The decision on what to allow at Oconee is ultimately up to the Commissioners. I can be satisfied with whatever
decision they come up with as long as they and the public are fully aware of the risks and are aware of the
limitations/uncertainties of the various studies and assessments. Jeff Mitman is the first to admit that his 2.8E‐4/yr
number might not be the actual number for Jocassee – it’s merely the most accurate estimate he can provide from the
available data. Likewise, any assessment we do on Duke Energy’s evaluations and contingencies must acknowledge the
limitations of what we can estimate and the limited confidence we can place on human barriers (e.g. procedures,
policies).
I’ve copied Joseph Ehasz. Hopefully he can inform us of what changes occurred at FERC regulated facilities as a result of
Taum Sauk or point us to the FERC documents which discuss those changes. I am certain there were many
improvements.
I appreciate NRR holding public meetings on the Jocassee/Oconee concerns.
From: Hiland, Patrick
Sent: Tuesday, March 26, 2013 8:12 AM
To: Criscione, Lawrence
Subject: RE: Taum Sauk Upper Reservoir Failure – December 14, 2005
If my memory cells are still working, I believe FERC imposed requirements/expectations on a number of hydro units they
regulate including DUKE’s Jocasee? Believe I recall their normal operating pool level was lowered in response to Taum
Sauk? Not sure if I recall all the facts.
From: Criscione, Lawrence
Sent: Monday, March 25, 2013 5:11 PM
To: Boska, John; Wilson, George; Miller, Ed; Bensi, Michelle; Monninger, John; Hiland, Patrick; Mitman, Jeffrey; Ferrante,
Fernando; Kanney, Joseph; Chung, Donald; [email protected]; [email protected]
Subject: FW: Taum Sauk Upper Reservoir Failure – December 14, 2005
Attached is some of the information on Taum Sauk. The “Toops’ Interview” is only three pages but is an excellent
example of the important role engineers and technicians (and the federal bureaucrats who regulate them) have in
ensuring the safety of the public. Most of the other documents are all either one or two pages. One of them is an
Ameren press release from the day of the accident.
A more detailed discussion of the event is found in the attached 85 page 2007‐10‐24 report from the staff of the
Missouri Public Service Commission to the commissioners, which can be found at:
http://psc.mo.gov/CMSInternetData/Electric/Taum%20Sauk%20Report%2010‐24‐07.pdf
The staff report has some good details on the Safety Culture failures at Ameren which led to the event. Duke Energy
might be right to discount the engineering aspects of Taum Sauk, but it is my experience from working at four utilities
and seven reactor sites that the organizational aspects of the Taum Sauk event cannot be discounted. I think it is
excellent that they once a shift check turbidity of leaks through the dam and that they have a video camera on it. And I
think it is excellent that they have procedures to shut down the reactors based on incoming storms, rising turbidity, or
high water levels. And I think they have every right to brag about these measures and to credit them in their
analyses. But keep in mind that not all the workers operating these plants behave as they are supposed to and when
they need to. Probabilistic Risk Assessment does not model human errors well and ignores errors of commission
altogether.
Larry Criscione
From: Criscione, Lawrence
Sent: Saturday, July 24, 2010 12:17 AM
To: ‘[email protected]
Cc: Philip, Jacob; Beasley, Benjamin; Kauffman, John; Perkins, Richard; Kanney, Joseph
Subject: FW: Taum Sauk Upper Reservoir Failure – December 14, 2005
Dr. Baecher,
I enjoyed the seminar today.
You mentioned the Taum Sauk Upper Reservoir failure. In 2005 I was working for the utility which owned
Taum Sauk and as a teenager in Missouri I spent four summers working in a town near where the disaster
occurred. Except during the six summers I spent in the navy, I have visited Johnson Shut-ins State Park at
least once a summer since I was 11 and have camped there on four occasions. I even visited it in 2006 &
2007 when it was closed to swimming because of the disaster.
The pumps/turbines at the Taum Sauk Plant are controlled by the operators at Bagnell Dam 100 miles away
(as the crow flies – it’s about 200 miles on Missouri winding highways). Although there is security and
maintenance at Taum Sauk (and maybe an equipment operator) the control room operators are at Bagnell
Dam.
Taum Sauk was built in the early 1960s by shaving the top off of Proffit Mountain (a fitting name) and building
an earthen/rock reservoir with the rubble. There was no spill way. As far as I know, water only entered and
left through a tunnel at the bottom of the reservoir which led to the pumps/turbines at the bottom of the
mountain.
Taum Sauk was meant for occasional summer peaking and was never expected to be in service 12 months a
year. However, it was a very profitable plant for Ameren and they did some upgrades to it since the 1960s. By
2005 it was being used most days of the year. Like all hydro, it had become an extremely important generation
asset now that MISO has financial penalties for members who both overbid and underbid their daily power
(since hydro plants can be placed on and off the grid in minutes, Taum Sauk became a treasured “jewel” when
the new MISO rules were implemented early last decade).
Taum Sauk had a major outage early last decade and a liner was installed in it along with a new level sensing
system. The stand pipes for the level system moved upward for some reason. This affected multiple channels
on both the primary and backup sensors (redundant electrical trains, but a common mode failure in the stand
pipes which all used the same mounting brackets). Ameren was aware of this problem but continued to
operate the plant.
In October 2005, the faulty levels sensors caused the water level in the upper reservoir to be filled too high
causing there to be not enough “free board” at the top of the reservoir. Although this had probably been
occurring for a while, it was not really noted because the loss of “free board” had no yet caused any problems
(more water might be bad for the dam, but it’s good for the dam operator). However, on the day in question in
October 2005, high winds from Hurricane Rita caused waves in the upper reservoir which were high enough to
overtop the walls at the point of lowest free board. Enough water overtopped to cause significant “wash out” of
the road to the reservoir. Some engineers from Ameren were at the top of the reservoir and witnessed the
overtopping. This led to some emails being generated between engineering, operations, I&C and dispatching
(in their investigation the MSHP uncovered some of these emails, but most were only known because they
were alluded to in other emails having themselves been deleted from a server in the week following the
accident). Some I&C technicians had been complaining for a while about the faulty level indications and
wanted it fixed. Some engineers agreed with them. Upper management gave them lip service, but whenever
an outage window was decided it was postponed due to generation commitments.
I can’t remember all the details (it’s in the Missouri State Highway Patrol’s 1000+ page mind numbing report),
but some “band aid” to the level problem was implemented without an outage. I believe it involved merely
changing the electrical calibration to account for the believed movement of the standpipes which, of course, did
nothing to address the fact that the stand pipes were still liable to move further.
In the early morning of December 14, 2005, I was the Shift Technical Advisor in the Control Room of the
Callaway Nuclear Plant when the Generation Supervisor from St. Louis (who had been promoted from the
Callaway Plant Senior Reactor Operator ranks just a year earlier) told us that the level at Taum Sauk had
rapidly dropped to zero and they think the Upper Reservoir may have failed.
The operators at Bagnell Dam had been filling Taum Sauk for several hours (I believe it took 9 to fill) when
electric prices were low in the middle of the night. The level controls had all drifted to the point that the pumps
did not automatically shut off. Had he been paying attention, the operator may have noticed that indicated
level had quit rising (even though indicated level was reading low, if it’s not rising but the turbines are still
pumping this should clue you in that there is a problem).
With the dam overtopping, it was merely a matter of time before the earthen/rock wall decayed to the point that
it catastrophically failed sending a wall of water down the side of Proffit Mountain.
The wall of water stripped all the trees, boulders and soil from the mountainside leaving a bedrock scar. At the
base of the mountain, it overshot the banks of the Black River and flowed up the gradual slope of the flood
plain on the opposite bank cutting down the forest in its path. Many of the boulders were deposited in this
area. Once sufficient water had pooled in the flood plain, it flowed down the Black River in a huge
torrent. The Johnson Shut-ins camp ground is along the river banks and for the most part about ten vertical
feet above the river (maybe less). The restrooms and showers were built away from the river where the flood
plain meets the base of the hills. These brick structures were demolished by the water and tree trunks. The
camp grounds were the tents and RVs set up was completely demolished.
In one sense the Taum Sauk Upper Reservoir Failure is not a “near miss” because it is an event that actually
happened. However, to me it is a “near miss”. Johnson Shut-ins is possibly the most popular state park in
Missouri. It’s located where the Black River falls through a granite field. The river diverges into dozens of side
channels all with little pools and waterfalls. It is a very popular day and overnight destination. The main
reason I have only camped there four times is because of the difficulty in getting a camp site – you need to
know your plans a year in advance. It is not an exaggeration to state that had the Taum Sauk failure occurred
in the early morning hours of July or August instead of December, there would have been hundreds of corpses
littered amongst the debris in the shut-ins and floating in the lower reservoir (many of whom would be young
children).
The only humans whose lives were threatened by the catastrophe were the Toops family. You can read their
harrowing ordeal for yourself in the three page MSHP interview I’ve attached.
Jerry Toops was the superintendent of Johnson Shut-ins State Park. His house was in the forest at the far
edge of the flood plain from Proffit Mountain. In all my years going to Johnson Shut-ins (and I literally went
every weekend some summers as a teenager) I never knew a house was there because of all the trees. None
of those trees are still standing. As the main torrent of water was pooling in the flood plain, a couple stories
high “splash” travelled up the gentle contours of one of the feeder creeks, losing many of its boulders and tree
trunks along the way. This splash hit the Toops house, knocking it off its foundation and causing it to float
“upstream” and break apart. Jerry Toops, his wife and seven month old son, his three year old daughter and
his five year old son were all flushed out into the night. They could do nothing but “go with the flow”. Jerry
ended up in a tree that was high enough that he could not climb out of it when the water receded. His wife was
sent swimming in the frigid water while trying to hold her seven month old son’s head above water. She could
hear her five year old son in the darkness but could do nothing to help him. She had no idea where her three
year old daughter was.
Miraculously, all of the Toops survived. Tanner Toops (the 5 year old) “died” but in the cold water the
emergency responders were able to revive him. No one knows how, but the three year old girl was alive when
found by the rescuers.
Ameren paid the Toops $20 million dollars and had them sign a draconian confidentiality statement; you’ll only
hear their story from the MSHP report – they are very leery to discuss the incident with their friends in the state
park service for fear of violating the terms of their settlement.
The “Rizzo” engineering firm did the failure report of the incident. They blame it on a number of causes, but
chiefly place the blame on poor construction. Although it is true (at least I have always assumed so, but your
lecture today seemed to point to the opposite) that an earthen reservoir like that could never be built today on a
mountain top without a spillway, that was not the cause of the accident. The accident was entirely preventable
and was a result of what we in the nuclear industry call a poor “Safety Culture”:
1. Production over safety (postponement of non-commercially lucrative projects which require a plant
outage)
2. Not listening to technicians and engineers
3. Cutting back on personnel (a $15/hour security guard with a walkie talkie assigned to watch the
reservoir fill could have prevented the entire incident)
4. Technicians and engineers afraid to make a stand against upper management
Had one of the engineers demanded his way and got the outage scheduled to fix the level sensors, the
reservoir failure would have never happened. Unfortunately though, no one would have known what
catastrophe was averted – including the engineer who would have torpedoed his career if he took that
stand. At the utilities, Safety Culture begins and ends at the top. 100 engineers complaining about something
will not result in any safety if the management refuses to listen to the ones brave enough to stand up to
them. And what of the engineer who does risk his career? If the accident is avoided he’s viewed as nothing
more than a “Chicken Little” who claimed the sky was falling when actually nothing happened.
Originally the State of Missouri demanded that Ameren re-plant the mountainside which was ruined, but later
reversed the decision. Geology professor have been taking students to Taum Sauk since the 1960s to see the
rock formations exposed where the tunnels were cut for the power house. These same professors convinced
the state to leave the bedrock scar in place; Missouri has millions of acres of forest but only one bedrock
scar. It’s a pretty impressive sight if you ever get a chance to see it. The trees trunks were harvested and the
debris was cleared from the shut-ins, but the debris in the flood plan is still there.
The new Taum Sauk from your power point slide show looks pretty impressive. My friends back at Ameren tell
me that insurance companies picked up the entire tab.
Larry Criscione
From: Criscione, Lawrence
Sent: Friday, March 19, 2010 3:32 PM
To: Kanney, Joseph
Cc: Perkins, Richard
Subject: Taum Sauk Upper Reservoir Failure – December 14, 2005
Joe,
Here’s some information on the Taum Sauk Upper Reservoir Failure we discussed earlier today. I don’t know
if it’s pertinent to any of the studies you guys are doing (it was essentially a “man-made” event and not an act
of nature) but it makes for some interesting reading if nothing else.
I certainly believe that there is a calculable probability of “man-made” dam failure for any pump storage unit. A
nuclear plant susceptible to flooding from a reservoir with pump make-up capability should be required to
calculate the probability of the catastrophic failure of the reservoir from a human/equipment performance
event.
Larry
From: Criscione, Larry S.
Sent: Monday, December 19, 2005 2:57 PM
To: ‘[email protected]’; ‘[email protected]
Subject: FW: Johnson Shut-Ins Tsunami
, Importance of Stewardship and Responsibility
From: Lawrence Criscione ([email protected])
Sent: Fri 1/30/09 12:28 AM
To: Will Kraus ([email protected]); Jeanette Oxford ([email protected])
Cc: Jeff Davis ([email protected]); Jeanette Oxford (jmo[email protected]); Casey Exendine
([email protected]); Sheryl Gregory ([email protected]); Michael Taylor
([email protected]); William Jones (william [email protected]); Marty Gelfand
([email protected]); Houlihan Bill ([email protected]); Llana Weiss
([email protected]); Wess Henderson (wess. [email protected])
Attachments: MSHP interview of Toops. PDF (287.0 KB)
Representative Kraus and Oxford,
Attached to this email are the notes which Missouri State Highway Patrol Sergeant Wiedemann took when he
interviewed Jerry and Lisa Toops following the Taum Sauk disaster.
I am sure you are aware that Jerry Toops was the superintendent of Johnson Shut-Ins State Park when the
upper reservoir at Taum Sauk was over-topped and subsequently failed.
The three page interview summary is pretty intense. Imagine you were Lisa Toops when, on a cold
December morning, you heard the deafening noise of the wall of trees and water as your house began to fill
with water and break apart. Imagine hearing your five year-old son calling for you as he attempts to swim in
the frigid water and you can do nothing to help him because you are fighting to swim yourself while keeping
your 7 month-old son’s head above water. You have no idea where your three-year-old daughter is.
Imagine spending the weeks before Christmas praying that your three children, in the intensive care unit of
the hospital, survive.
As tragic as the Toops’ ordeal was, anyone who has visited Johnson Shut-ins State Park in July knows how
lucky we were that the accident happened in December, when just the Toops were in the path of the
water. It is not an exageration to state that there would have been hundreds of dead campers floating in
the lower reservoir had the disaster occurred in the early hours of July vice December.
The wall of water which destroyed the Toops home was just a fraction of the roughly 3000 MW-hr of energy
released down the mountainside in the torrent of water. The reactor core at Ca llaway Plant has more than
12,000 times as much energy stored in it as the Taum Sauk upper reservoir had.
Although not required, having an operator (or even just a night watchman) present at the top of the
reservoir to monitor the filling evolution would have prevented the disaster. Ameren’s Emergency Action
Plan for the reservoir stated that the Toops would have 12 minutes warning if the upper reservoir were to
break, however Ameren made no attempt to meet this commitment by assigning someone to visually monitor
the reservoir for failure. The only warning the Toops had was the deafening sound of the torrent, stripping
trees and boulders from the mountainside as it swept towards their house.
Many of the causes of the Taum Sauk disaster are also present at the Callaway Nuclear Plant: minimal
staffing of operators, management ignoring the concerns of craft personnel, postponement of maintenance
on equipment not necessary for the production of electricity, reluctance of engineers to agressively challenge
management.
I believe that a new nuclear plant in mid-Missouri is the best option we have to meet our future electricity
demands. However, we need to ensure that any new nuclear reactors, as well as the current one, will be
operated by a utility which is willing to forego some of its profits in the interest of safety. Ameren might
operate Callaway Plant in strict compliance to bureaucratic processes, but that does not in and of itself make
it safe. Callaway Plant must be staffed with workers who recognize what is right and are willing to challenge
their superiors when allowed practices are inadequate. I once fit that description, and the management of
the Operations Department drove me away because of it.
Please read the attached summary of the Toops’ interview and consider the importance of stewardship and
responsibility when entrusted with operating a power plant.
()
MISSOURI STATE HIGHWAY PATROL
REPORT OF INVESTIGA’!’ION
STATE CONTROL NO.: 05 362 0:24 001 REPd~T DA’J!E: 01/ :31/06
REPORTING. OFFICER: SERGE~.NT ltJ. W. VJIE:DEHANN 0696 TROOP OF OCCURRENCE: G
OCC TYPE: ‘rAUM SA\JK RESERVOIR BREA.CH
COUNTY: REYNOLDS SCE!IJ:E PROCESSED: N
DATE/TIME:. DECEMBER 14, 2·0.05
OFFENSE STATUS: lNVESTIGATI;ON CONTINUING DDCC AT SC.ENE: N
LOCATION: LE;STERVI’LLE.
PETATLS OF INVESTIGATION
INTERVIEW Of Ta.E TOOPS
MO · 6365-9
Td1111e r
TJ..orA
~ y~c -r-J old
‘1 ye ~ r~ c tJ
-, ~M.OWt~J> 0 I J
l, On January :n, 2006, 1 continued tbe investiga-t~o.n .into the fai.lvre
of the Ta\lrn sauk upper reservoir. During this investigation, I ·
interviewed jert;y w. Toops ana Lisa A. Toops at the Reynold,s county
sner iff ‘ s Depart:men t .
2. On January 31, 20’06, at 1333 hours, I met with Jerr.t a:.J.d Lisa
Toops at the Reynolds County She-riff·• s .Department.. They al,so· had
their attorney with them .. steve D. Burmeister, telephone n\.l.mbt:.r
816~37,3-5590. The Toops agreed t.o talk to tne abo.ut what had occurred
on the mo:rning of December 14 . 2005, wh¢n the Tautn sauk upper
Reservoir broke. The Toops are ident.ified as. foilOttJS:
a. ~$: dat . e .of birth
– Miss·oul”:t 63656, t
b . ~s. date of bin:h
…_.. l~issouri 63656,
3 . Lisa Toops. told me that present in their house that night was
l_ler ~t;16~and .•. Jerry, and th~ir three chil-~en… . ~· , ·h -. ewer e
1qent1f1ed as Tanner ~of b:trth Tara R.
· · ,. oate of bi.r·th – and Tucker · . · oops a-~ o£ birth
·4. Lisa bad got:ten up arou1.1;d 0.400 hours and fed TUcker on the couch in
their living ro0m. She bad then laid db’Wn on the couo.b and gone t.o
sleep vii th T1:1;cker. Lisa ‘i.’Jas awakened by a loud. rumb-ling like a train.
She at first thought it was a tornado an.!S quickly got up with- Tucke:r;.
She yelled to Jerry t.o help her get the kids. Lisa Started down t…l-J.e
ha.ll to TCl.Imer’ s room. ‘,rh~ house began to fill v.ri th wate~ as. she got
into the bedroom. Lisa helped Tanner to the top b®k and t .o.ld l:li\U to
say a pr.ayer an.d hold ni.s br~ath. ‘l’he room rapidly filled wi tA w.;:.ter
compleiely covering the three o.f them. Lis-a was trying · tiD ‘j:igur:e ou”t,
how -to get out of the water when the roof ‘IGracked ppen~. The three of
tbern were .washed out of the house at this t-ime.
S. Li$a was. able to bold Tl.)Cker’ s head above. water w~le they were
was’hed away from the hOtil.S<:: . She wa'S able to touch hmt tom after several minutes of floating in the waters. Lisa was able to get up and walk out of ·the water. She tO.en .Qeard Tanner calling to her. She c;.nswered him encour.aging him to swim. Lisa t.hen can::ied Tucker ~i th her as. she waded back into the water. She was able t-o S\1.1im to Tanner, who ,..,as still s~imming in the ""-ra:t::e;:r:. Sh¢ w.a:s able· to get t.Q him and pull him back to the shallow water. Lisa was too cold, ti+eci, and numb ar.: this time to. walk. She pulled the children ·next. to her and sat down in the shallow water. Lisa heard voices but ·lost consciousness. She woke up in the Q.j,Wulance and vJas told they were working on be:r: son. Lisa did not recall anything else until sbe was in the .hospital. She was told that ber entire family had been. found. Lisa described her inju:t-ies as se,ver-e hypothermia and a serious· case ·of poison ivy. 6. Jerry Toops began to tell me what had happened to him on the morning of December 14, 2005.. J .erry had been ·sleeping in his bed when l+e heard Liset s ·cream. He hea.rd a loud noise like a jet engine. He immed).ately re.coc;.Ini ~ed it:. to he rushing water. Jeirry knew t:P,ey were in danger f ·rorn the reservoir. J~r;r:y got ov;t of bed and :made it about two reet towards the baby's cri~ when the room exploded. Jerry said he rolled with it and fourid himself. covered with water outside the house . He was able to swim to the surface and could only see tvater, trees, and boulders. He was able to swim ·to the house and climb on top of tbe· roof . He ran around the roof of the house looking for his family, but was u.."'lable to find arrjbody. He then f.elt the roof began to move as the house floated off the foundation. Jerry continued to look for his family, but was unable to s :ee anybody in. the dark. The house began breaking up, and ,Jerry dropped into th~ water. He continued, to ·swim wi. trl the depris :Erom the house. The bouse . eventtlally completely .broke up. Jerry- grabbed the tops of .s .everal trees· trying to climb out of the water, but ea~b time tlJ.e tree came uprooted and washed away with hd.rn. He late~ saw a li:;~e of cedar :trees and was a-ble· to grab one of them. Jerry c;t.iffiPed into· the tree and waited until help arrived. Jerry thotlght :he wai.ted in the t:ree- for approximately one an.d one-half hours . 7. While in the tree, Jerry heard someone calling. He anst.Jered and was told to wait; they couldn't get to him. Approximately fifteen minutes later, ell second person got to him and helped him walk to the ambulance. Jerry told them the na.rnes of hi.s f ·amily and about the i -nte:cp who was living in temporary quarters near the Shut. Ins. While be was in the arobulartce, rescuers brought his son, ':Pucker, into t -he a:tll);>ulance. \Jerry heard TUcker crying and knew he was alive. They
pent brought Tara in. and she w.as unconscious. Rescue-rs la.ter told
J:;U~n they b-ad found tbf: res.t of his famlly; cmd they were alive. Tlley
were then t-ranspqrt.ed t;:.o the hospi.tal. · Jerry described l’lis injux:ies
as hypo·thermi~. a bulging disc , a p’t.J.P.c~ure in his riQtht foot, and his
f~at have peen numb sinc·e the incident. He stated the chil .r stopping short of
his house. He had a lso been told in the e”.re.r1t of a. breach, he would
be immediately called ~iving him approximately twelve minutes to
evacuate his f.a.”l1ily before the water would reach his residence. Jerr y
was. ups.et that he had not received any warninq that the darn had
bToken. He was also una1t1are the re.se:!:v.o-ir was .rentotely puniped cmd no
one was wa tcbing the reservoir to see it breaking and notify him.
0
This he felt caused him not to be notifi.ed befbre t he water struck n~s
residence. The interview \.’ITas concluded at approximately 1500 hours.
9. This investigation is continuing .
iiJ. ~IJ , Wiedeman<"1, Sergeant WWVJ:klb Di'Jision of Drug. and Crime Control Page 3

Post

2016-05-19 – NRC – Jocassee Dam – Failure to Study Dam Security – ML16201A086

Criscione, Lawrence
From: Criscione, Lawrence
Sent: Thursday, May 19, 2016 7:34 AM
To: Kirkwood, Sara; Holahan, Gary; Clark, Theresa
Cc: [email protected]; ‘[email protected]
Subject: Failure to study Dam Security
Attachments: Final Response.pdf; Senator Lieberman’s letter to Hubert Bell–OIG Case 13-001.pdf
Sara et. al.,
In his response to the FOIA appeal mentioned below, Hubert Bell confirmed that his agents have not reviewed
a single study regarding whether or not the Lake Jocassee Dam is vulnerable to terrorist action or internal
sabotage.
My have concerns have always been about dams failing due to acts of nature and not from acts of
sabotage. However, given the secretive silo-ing of flooding information, there are obviously many individuals
within the NRC and the US Army Corp of Engineers who believe that there are credible security threats to
dams. That being the case, after knowing about this problem for a decade should we not at least have studied
the issue?
Is the Lake Jocassee Dam vulnerable to terrorist action? If so, should it not be guarded against the same
Design Basis Threat (DBT) used for Oconee? If not, why are we being so secretive about flood heights and
basic dam design? Is the Lake Jocassee Dam vulnerable to internal sabotage? If so, does Duke Energy
screen individuals granted access to the dam to the same level as it screens individuals granted access to
Oconee?
These questions might not have been in the OSC referral letter, but they should be answered. I will certainly
be pointing them out—and any lack of consideration of them—in my comments upon your response to the
President via the OSC.
Larry
Lawrence S. Criscione
573-230-3959
From: Lawrence Criscione [mailto:[email protected]]
Sent: Wednesday, April 06, 2016 10:16 PM
To: Bell, Hubert ; Lee, David
Cc: Andoh, Roger ; Dave Lochbaum ; Paul Gunter ; Paul Blanch ; [email protected]; Tom
Devine ; Jim Riccio ; FOIA Resource ;
William R. Corcoran, Ph.D., P.E.
Subject: [External_Sender] Appeal of search adequacy for FOIA/PA‐2016‐0397
Mr. Bell,
Please accept this email as a FOIA appeal.
On October 15, 2012 I wrote a letter to the Chairman of the Senate Committee on Homeland Security and
Governmental Affairs (HS&GA). That letter is attached for your reference (it follows the one page letter
Senator Lieberman sent to you on Dec. 18, 2012).
On page 2 of my letter I requested that the HS&GA verify that the NRC is ensuring access to Jocassee Dam is
adequately guarded and is ensuring personnel with access to the pump storage plant at Jocassee Dam are
adequately screened for insider threats.
On page 4 of the 2012-Oct-15 letter I requested that the HS&GA ensure that after five years of assuming there
is a security threat to Jocassee Dam, the NRC has adequately assessed the minimum required threat capable of
jeopardizing the integrity of the Lake Jocassee Dam.
In early December 2012 I reiterated my concerns to the HS&GA in a joint letter with Paul Blanch which also
included Paul’s concerns regarding the natural gas pipeline near Indian Point.
On December 18, 2012 Senator Lieberman forwarded my 2012-Oct-15 letter onto you for your consideration.
On March 22, 2016 I requested under the Freedom of Information Act:
1. All studies reviewed by the Office of the Inspector General concerning the security at the Lake Jocassee
Dam.
2. All replies from the Office of the Inspector General to the Senate Committee on Homeland Security &
Governmental Affairs concerning the 2012-Dec-18 letter from Senator Lieberman to Hubert Bell.
On March 30, 2016 I received the attached response stating that no records could be found.
I find it hard to believe that your agents have never reviewed any studies concerning whether or not the security
at the Lake Jocassee Dam is adequate to protect the dam–and the downstream reactors at Oconee–from terrorist
attack and/or internal sabotage. I am therefore appealing the 2016-Mar-16 FOIA response on the grounds of
inadequate search.
I also find it hard to believe that neither the NRC nor any other federal agency has ever assessed the adequacy
of the security of the Lake Jocassee Dam; however due to the regulatory gaps described in my 2012-Oct-15
letter (e.g. FERC regulates the Lake Jocassee Dam but has no mandate to ensure it is protected to the same
design basis threat as the downstream nuclear reactor plants which it would flood) I do recognize it is possible
that both FERC and the NRC have avoided addressing security issues surrounding the dam. However, if that is
the case (i.e. if neither FERC nor the NRC has adequately studied whether the Lake Jocassee Dam poses a
security threat to the Oconee reactors) I would expect that you would have reported back to the HS&GA that
you found a gap in the regulatory domains of FERC and the NRC.
Therefore, I find it hard to believe that FOIA 2016-0397 would find no records. I would expect either that your
agents satisfactorily determined the existence of at least one security study showing the Lake Jocassee Dam is
adequately guarded against sabotage or that you reported back to the HS&GA that there is currently an
outstanding concern regarding whether the security at the FERC regulated dam is adequate to ensure the
security of the downstream NRC regulated reactors.
Please ensure your agents conduct an adequate search for the records requested under FOIA/PA 2016-0397.
Thank you,
Larry
Lawrence S. Criscione
573-230-3959
From: [email protected]
To: [email protected]
CC: [email protected]
Date: Wed, 6 Apr 2016 14:42:02 -0400
Subject: FOIA/PA-2016-0397 Final Response
Dear Mr. Criscione: Please find attached NRC’s final response to your FOIA request, FOIA/PA-2016-00397.
Please take a moment to help us improve our FOIA processes, and let us know what your experience has
been. Just click on this embedded link: http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/foia/foia-user-survey.html. Once you
have completed the survey, just click the “SUBMIT” button and your survey response will be returned to us.
Thank you,
Freedom of Information, Privacy & Information Collections Branch
Customer Service Division, Office of the Chief Information Officer
Mail Stop: T-5F09
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Washington, D.C. 20555-0001
[email protected] Ph: 301-415-7169 Fax: 301-415-5130
NRC FORM 464 Part I (OIG) U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION FOIA RESPONSE NUMBER
(12·2015)
/”Rto”‘-<., I 2016-0397 II l I ~~% RESPONSE TO FREEDOM OF ; ' ~ !~ . ) INFORMATION ACT (FOIA) REQUEST RESPONSE D 0 INTERIM FINAL ....... TYPE REQUESTER: DATE: !Lawrence Criscione li~ a o ze• 1 DESCRIPTION OF REQUESTED RECORDS: All studies reviewed by the OIG regarding security at Lake Jocassee Dam and all replies from the OIG to the Senate Committee on Homeland Security & Governmental Affairs concerning the December 18, 2012letter from Senator Lieberman to Hubert Bell. PART I. -INFORMATION RELEASED Agency records subject to the request are already available in public ADAMS or on microfiche in the NRC Public Document Room. Agency records subject to the request are enclosed. D Records subject to the request that contain information originated by or of interest to another Federal agency have been referred to that agency (see comments section) for a disclosure determination and direct response to you. D We are continuing to process your request. 0 See Comments. PART I.A •• FEES AMOUNT' 0 $11 II You will be billed by NRC for the amount listed. None. Minimum fee threshold not met. "See Comments for details D You will receive a refund for the amount listed. Fees waived. PART I.B -INFORMATION NOT LOCATED OR WITHHELD FROM DISCLOSURE 0 We did not locate any agency records responsive to your request. Note: Agencies may treat three discrete categories of law enforcement and national security records as not subject to the FOIA ("exclusions"). 5 U.S.C. 552(c). This is a standard notification given to all requesters; it should not be taken to mean that any excluded records do, or do not, exist. We have withheld certain information pursuant to the FOIA exemptions described, and for the reasons stated, in Part II. D Because this is an interim response to your request, you may not appeal at this time. We will notify you of your right to appeal any of the responses we have issued in response to your request when we issue our final determination. You may appeal this final determination within 30 calendar days of the date of this response by sending a letter or email to the FOIA Officer, at U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, D.C. 20555-0001, or [email protected] Please be sure to include on your letter or email that it is a "FOIA Appeal." PART J.C COMMENTS ( Use attached Comments continuation page if required) r-====~~- '"'- ----~ • ••••••~ •••••CTOR GENERAL FOR INVESnGATIONS, OIG -3l:~- ~:::::::::::... NRC Form 464 Part I (OIG) (12-2015) Page 2 of 2 Mr. Hubert I3ell Inspector General Nuclear Regulatory Commission Ollke or the Inspector General I (b)(7)(C) I I ~ 55 5 Rockvill~ Pike Rockville, MD 20852 Dear lnspcc!Or General Bell: .. ... . ~ . December 18. 2012 Instead of seriously considering the safety issues, the NRC Inspector General's agents went after the person raising the concerns. 1 am enclosing a copy of a letter I received from Mr. Lawrence S. Criscione regarding safety concerns by the U.S. Nuckar Regulatory Commi$sion (NRC.) The concerns are in regards to the Oconee Nuclear Station uno Jocassee Dam. The allegation claims that the NRC is aware of safety issues at these two facilities, and has fa iled to act appropriately. t\s I have no way of ascertaining the basis for these allegations. I have enclosed thi'i letter for your consideration . Thank you for your attention to this matter. Sinc erely . :J:eU:::: Chairmnn 1412 Dial Court Springfield, II. 62704 Sen Nuclear Station, it stands
to renson that the .security, operations and maintenance personnel at the }ocassce Dam
pumped storage station should be held to the same background checks and periodic
rt’aS!>Cssmcnts as similar personnel at the Oconee Nuclear Stat1on and other reactor plants.
I re!>pectfully request that the Senate Committee on Homeland Security & Governmentgu latory Commission (FERC). I know little about FF.RC. but it is my understanding that
FERC doe~ not reqUire the facilities it regulates to be guarded against the same design basis
threats that commerc1al nuclear reactors are guCirded against. Although FF:RC’s security
requirements arc likely adequ~tc for most of the facilities it regulates. in the case of a
pumped storage dam whose sabotttge is assumed to result tn a nuclear drains
to) are pumped storag~ impounds. Within a matter of hours, Duke Energy can lower the
volume of water impounded by the Lake jocassee and Lake Keowee Dams such thdt in the
event of a failure of the Jocassee Dam the remaining volume of water impounded will not
overtop the in<~dequatcly sized tlood fall surrounding the Standby Shutdown Facility at the Oc·onee Nuclear St:ltion. There is also ancther :;olution to the security concern: shut down the three reactors at the Oconee Nucle~1r St:1tion until the flooding defenses surrounding the Standby Shutdown Facility are adequately improved. It IS understandable that the NRC cannot address the perceived security vu lnerabilities at JocassPe Oam since it does not regulate Jocassee Dam. Howe\·cr. the NRC rcgubtes the Oconee Nuclear Station and it is unconscionable that for five years rhe NRC has suspected a grave security concern and has not addressed it by requiring the three reactors at the Oconee Nuclear Stat1on to be shutdown as long as the volume of water impounded in Lakes JocassE'e and KCO\'\'eE' pose a security threat to those reactors. And it is equally unconscionable thdt the NRC is going to allow this condition to continue for an additional ~hree or four years. 3 I am not convinced that there is a credible security concern regarding jocasscc DrlC.Ige
vandals with some stolen dynamite nnd a canoe? Or is it a platoon of trained underwater
demolition experts from a technologically ad\’:-~nced nation-state?
I do not know enough about dam construction, terrorism or demolition to say what the
min: mum requtred threat to jocassN• Dam is. If it is less than (e.g. teenage vandals} or
equ<~l to (e.g. a well-armed squad of terrorists) the design basis threat for the Oconee Nuclear Station, then I agree with the NRC that there ts a security concern with the Lake jocassec Dam. If. however, it is greater than the design basis threat for the Oconee Nuclear Station (e.g. underwater demolition experts from the CIA, KGB. Mossad or M16). then I do not believe there is a credible threat to jocassee Dam. I respectfully request the followi ng from the Senate Committee on Homeland Security & Gov0rnmcntal Affairs: 1. Ensure that after five years of assuming there is a security threat to Jocasscc Dam. the NRC hns adequately assessed the minimum required threat capable of jeopardi7ing the integrity of the Lake Jocassee Dam. 2. If the minimum required threat capable of jeopardizing the integrity or the Lake jocassee Dam is greater rhan the design basis threat for the Oconee Nudear Station. then request the NRC to cease v;ithholding frotn the public the correspondence, memos and studies concerning the safety liabilities which a failure of the Lake Jocassee Dam poses to the Oconee Nuclear Station. 3. If the minimum required threat capable of jeopardizing the integrity of the Lake Jocassee Dam is less than or equal to the design basis threat for the Oconee Nuclear Station, then request the NRC to ensure the three reactors at the Oconee Nuclear Station are in a shutdown condition whenever the combined volume of water impounded by the )ocassee and Keowee Dams is great enough to pose a noodir.g thre;~t to the Oconee Nuclear Station in the event of a failure of Jocassec Dam. Enclosed with this letter is a list of the correspondence. memos and studies concerning the saff't~· li;tbilities posed by a failure of the Lake }ocassee Dam. Most of these documents have been stamped by the NRC as "Official Use Only- Security-Related Information" despite not containing <~ny discussion of security concerns. It is my perception that the "securityrelated" concerns are merely assumed to exist; however it is possible that the I\11C has done an actual assessment that shows there is a credible security threat to the dam. If this is the case, then it is unconscionable that in five years the NRC has not done any~hing to prevent the operation of the three reactors at ONS while an unaddressed vulnerability to their security remains outstanding. 4 Copied on this letter are several industry groups and government watchdog organ1zations. There :1re some within the Nuclear Regulatory Commission who will claim that it is irresponsible for me to share the information in this letter with members oft he public. To them I would note that there is nothing in this letter- other than the I 1st of documents enclosed- that is not aln•ady public knowledge. With regard to the list of documents enclosed, although these documents are stamped "Official Use Only - Security-Related Informatio n", I do not believe that the mere mention of the existence of these documents constitutes the release of"Security-Related Information''. I h <~ve copied politically active organiz<~tions on this letter because I believe their participation is vital to the proper functioning of our democ ratic and republican proces!.cs. Although it might not be appropriate to release specific infomHltion to these org:mizations from documents stamped "Sec urity-Related Information", merely informing them that after five years the NRC has failed to adequately address a perceived security threat from the LakE' )oct~sscc Dam is certainly within my rights as a citizen and my duties as a licensed profl!ssional engint>er.
Very respectfu!’.•;,
Lawrence S. Criscione, PE
573-230-3959
I “C.ill.t iou..!:.!tit’ ”’ “DillJ.cnm
Enclosure- 5 pages
C:c: Senator Susan Collins, Ranking Member. Homeland Security & Governmental Affairs
Sen ator Richard Durbin, Illinois
Congressman Pete King, Chairman, Homeland Security
Congressmun Bennie Thompson. Ranking Member. Homeland Security
Co ngres ~ ma n Prcd Upton, Chairman, Energy & Commerce
Congressman I lenry Waxman. Ranking Member, Energy & Com mere~
Chairman Allison Macf<1r lane, US Nuclear Regul:nory Commission Special Counsel Carolyn Lerner. US Office of Special Counsel Michael Corradini, American Nuclear Society Admiral )ames Ell is, Institute of Nuclear Power Operdtions Leshe Barbour, Nuclear Energy Institute David J.ochbaum, Union of Concerned Scientists Scott Arney. Project on Government Oversight Louis Cl:lrk, Government Accountability Project Ken Bunting. National Freedom of Information Coali tion Tyson Siocum, Public Citizen Energy Program Jim Riccio, Greenpeace 5 Date 1994-FEB·ll 1994 ·MAR·l4 19Q4-0CT-6 1994-DE::-19 2000-MAR-15 2006-APR-28 2006·AUG 31 2006-0\ T S 2006-NOV-22 2006-0EC-20 2007-JAN-29 2007-FEB-S 2007-'E3·22 2C':J7 MAR·l 2007-MAY-3 2007-JUN-22 2007-JUN-28 2007-0CT ·l 2007-0CT 1 2007-0 C. I -1 2007-NOV-20 2008-MAY-19 2008-JUN-23 7.008-JUL-28 List of NRC Correspondence, Memos and Studies Regarding Failure of jocassce Oilm ADAMS M lQ(,ll804 ~1 ~LO~Q?J!OJ.12 Ml06~890206 _tyltOG ns:!
MLOG:G20092
ML070440345
ML070590329
ML070610460
ML072970510
ML07:580259
Ml07:’77076S
ML072770775
MLOi:770777
Ml073241045
ML08:3S0689
ML082390669
ML082120390
Title
tetter from Albert F. Gibson, NRC, toJ. W Hampton, Duke, “Notice ofVIolat1on and
Notice of Deviation (NRC lnspectton Report Nos. 50-2 69/93-25, 50·270/93-25, and
50·287/93-25).” dated February 11, 1994
Letter from J. W. Hampton, Duke. dated March 14, 1994
Internal NRC memo documenting a meeting between Region II and NRR concerning
a hypothetical Jocilssee Dam failure.
Letter from Albert F. Gibson, NRC, to J. W. Hampton, Duke, “Notice of Viol at 1M and
Notice of Deviation (NRC Inspection Report Nos. 50·269/94-31, S0-270/94-31, Mld
50-287/ 94-31),” dated December 19, 1994
Letter from Davtd E. LaBarge, NRC, toW. R. McCollum, Jr., “Oconf:’P. Nuclear Station,
Units 1, 2, and 3 Re: Review of Individual Plant Examination of External Events (TAC
No~. M83649, M83650, and M8365l),” dJted March 15, .2000
OCONEE NUCLEAR STAT10N -INTEGRA-fO INSPECTION REPORT
05000269/2006002,05000270/200602,05000287/2006002
IR 05000269-06·016, IR 05000270-06-016, IR 05000287·06·016, on 03/31/2006,
Ocon~:>e Nuclear Station – Prefim1nary White Findmg
Oconee. Units 1, 2 & 3 .. Response to Preliminary White Finding
IR 0500026’l·06·017, IR 05000270·06-017, IR 05000287 ·06·017, Final Signi ficance
Determination for a White Finding and Notice of Violation, Duke Energy Carolinas,
LLC
Ocone~. Units 1, 2. & 3, Appeal of Final Significance D€termination for White
Finding and Reply to Notic;e of VIolation; EA-06-199
Summary of Revised Fragility Evaluation Results for Jocassee Dam
Letter from Bruce H. Hamilton, Duke, to NRC, ”SE- ismic Frag11ity Study”
Manual Chapter 0609.02 Appeal Panel Recommendatio r.s (Oconf’f’ Reply to a
Notice of Vrolation and White Finding (EA-06-199))
Oconee Appeal Panel Review of Manual Chapter 0609.02 Appeal Panel Review of
Oconee Standby Shutdown Facility White Finding (EA-06-199)
Oconee. Units 1, 2 and 3- Request for NRC to Review Appeal of Final Sign ificance
Determination f~>r SSF Flood Barrier White Finding
Consideration of New Information Associated with a Final Signi ficance
Determinatior for a White Finding – OconeE’ NS
Phone calf between the NRC and Duke Energy
10/01/2007, Slides with Notes for Final ReguiP Nuclear Station- Revisions to the Selected Licensee Commitments Manual
(SlC)
Enclosure, page 1
Lic;t of NRC Correspondence, Memos and Studies Regarding Failure of Jo c:~sscc Dam
Date ADAMS Title
2008-AUG-15 Ml081640244 Information Request Pursuant to 10 CFR 50. 54( F) Related to Extprnal Flooding,
Including Failure of the Jocasst>e Dam at Oconee Nuclear Station, Units 1, 2, and 3
(TAC Nos. MD8224, MD822S, and MD8226)
200!!·AUG 26 ML08~390690 Kick Off for Risk Analysis of the Failure of the Jocassee and Keowee Dt~ms to Assess
the Potential Effects on the Safe Shutdown Facility at the Oconee Nuclear Station
2008-AUG-28 ML083300427 08/28/2008 · Summary of Closed Meeting to with Duke Energy Carolinas. UC to
Discuss the August 15. 2008, 50.54(f) LeltN on External Flooding (TAC Nos.
MD8224, MD8225. and MD8226)
:>008-AUG-28 ML082550290 Meeting with Duke Energy Carolinas. Oconee Flood Protection and the JocassPP
Dam Hatard
2008-SEP-6 ML082250166 OconPP. Nuclear Station – Communication Plan for lnforlllation Request Related to
Failure Frequencies for the Jocassee Pumped Storage Dam (Joca~~PP Dam) at thP
OconE’e Nuclei!r Station and Potential Gt-neric tmphcat1ons
2008·SEP-26 ML0827S0106 Oconee, Units 1, 2 and 3 · Response to 10 CFR 50.54(f) Request
2008-NOV·S ML09:0607&1 11/0S/08 Summary of Closed Meeting with Duke on External Flooding Issues,
including failure of the Jocassee Dam, at Ocon£>e Nucle<~r Stanon, Units 1, 2, and 3 2008-NOV·S ML0833906SO 2C08·DEC-4 ML09:420319 2008 ·DEC·4 ML09048()(\44 ?009-FE13·3 Ml 090280474 2009-AI'R-6 Ml092170104 2009-APR-9 ML09:0301 7~ 2009-APR-30 Ml090570779 11/0S/2008 Meet ing Slides, "Oconee Site Flood Protection," NRC Meeting with Duke Energy Carolinas, LLC 12/04/2008 Mel'ting Summary, Meeting to Discuss External Flooding at Oconee Nuclear Station (Reissuance, with Error on Page 3 Corrected) OconeP Nuclear Station. External Flood NRR Meeting, Rockville, MD, D~cem ber 4, 2008 Briefing Package for Commissioner Lyons Visit to Oconee on February 4, 2009 Oconee NuciPar Station, Units 1. 2 And 3 · Non-concurrence on Evaluation of Duke Energy Carolinas, llC Septembl'r 26, 2008. Response to Nuclear Regulatory Commission LettE'r Dated August 15, 2008 Related to External Flooding Oconee External Flooding Briefing for Commissioner Janko OconPe Nuclear Station Units 1, 2, and 3, Evaluatio'l of Duke Energy Carolinas Seotembcr 26, 2008, Response to External Flooding, Including Failure of the Jocassee Dam 2009·MAY ·11 ML092940769 05/11/2009 Summary of Closed Meeting with Duke Energy Carol1nas, LLC, to D1scuss Preliminary Results of the Recent Inundation and SensitiVIty Studies Concern.ng Failure of the Jocassee Dam and Resultant Flood1ng at Oconee Nuclear Station, 1, 2, and 3 2009·MAY 11 ML090820470 5/11/2009 Notice of Forthcoming Closed MePting with Duke Energy Cdrolinas, LLC, to Discuss Sensitivity Studies Concerning Failure of the Jocassee Dam & Resultant Flooding at the Oconee Nuclear Station, Unit 1, 2, & 3 2009-MAY· l l ML091380424 OconeE' Nuclear Station, Slides for Closing Meeting May n . 2009 with Duke on the Ocont>e Flooding Issue
2009·MAY·20 Ml091470265 Oconee, Units 1, 2 & 3, Request for Extension of Duke Response Time to Referenced
Letter
2009·MAY·26 Ml091480116 E-mail re Bnefing Package for ViSit to Jocassee Dam on June 23, 2009
2009·JUN·l Ml091590046 Oconee, Units 1, 2, and 3, Request to Withhold Sensitive Information in
Presentation Materials Left with Staff
2009-JUN· l O ML09168019S Oconee. Units 1, 2, and 3 ·Interim 3Q-Day Response to Reference 2.
Enclosure, page 2
Date
2009-JUN-11
2009-JUN-25
2C09·JL:l·9
2009-JUL-28
2009-AUG-12
2009·AU(;·27
2009-SEP 25
2009-0CT-28
2009 -NOV-30
2009-U~C-4
2C10·JAN-6
2010-JAIHl
2010-JAN-15
2010-JAN-29
2010-FEB-8
2010·FE8·26
2010·MAR·S
2010·MAR·15
2010-MAR-18
2010-APR-14
2010·MAY·27
2ClO·JUN· l
2ClO·JvN·3
2010·JU~ · 22
20 lO·JU’-1 ·29
2010 JUL-7
2010-JUL-19
List of NRC Correspondence, Memos and Studies Regarding Failure of Jocassee Dam
ADAMS
M L091620669
Ml091760072
ML092020480
ML092230608
ML09C570117
ML092380305
ML09~7 10344
ML093080034
ML09::380701
M L09C680737
Mll0C2809S4
Ml100150066
Ml100210199
Mll0(l271591
ML100470053
Mll00610674
Mll05430047
ML100780084
ML100810388
ML100760109
Mll0l600468
Mll0!750619
Mll01610083
MllO~ 730329
Ml10::.890803
ML10!880768
ML10l90030S
Title
6/11/09 Summary of Closed Meeting wtth Duke Carolina to Distuss External
Flooding at Oconee
NRC Site V1sit to the Oconee Nuclear Station on June 15, 2009
Oconee, Units 1, 2, & 3, Finai6Q-Day Response to Reference 2
Oconee, Submittal of Selected Licensee Commitments Manual SLC Revision
Oconee Flood Protection and thE’ Jocas.spe Dam Hazard Basis for NRC Allowing
Continued Operation
Oconee, Slides for Closed Meeting Regarding External Flood Technical Meetang On
August 27, 2009
Site Visit Observation on 09/25/2009 by Joel Munday for Ocon(‘t’
10/:’R/09 Slides for Oconee Nuclear Station, Units 1, 2. and 3 · Meeting Slides ·
E!Cternal Flood NRC Technical Meeting
OconP.P. Nuclear Station, Units l, 2, and 3, Oconee External Flood Analyses and
Msociated CorreC1ive Action Plan
12/04/09 Summary of Oosed MeE-ting to Discuss the Duke Energy Carolinas, LLC.,
09/26/08 Response to NRC’s August I S, 2008 SO.S4(f) letter on External Flooding at
OconeE’
01/06/2010 Briefing to the Executive Team on the Oconee Nuclpar Station External
Flooding Issue
Request Addittonallnformation Regarding the Oconee External Flooding Issue
Ocone!’. Units 1, 2 and 3 · Additionallnformatton Rega~ding Postulated External
Flood Threat Issues
Evaluation of Duke Energy Carolina, llC (Duke), November 30, 2009, Response to
Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) l etter Dated Apnl 30, 2009, Related to
External Flooding At Oconee Nuclear Station, Units 1, 2, And 3 (Oconee)
Oconee, Units 1, 2, & 3, External Flood. Response to Request for Additional
Information
OconeP, Units 1, 2, & 3, External Flood Revised Commitment Letter
Oconee Nuclear Stat1on, Units 1, 2, & 3, Letter From Duke Energy Carolinas, LLC
Regarding Ext ernal Flood. Response to Request For Additional Information
Generic Failure Rate Evaluation for Jocassee Dam Risk Analy!>is
Prepare Briefing Book and Material fo r Eric lPeds for the Dukt> Fleet MPeting on
March 18, 2010
Generic Failure Rate Evaluation for Jocassee Dam
oconee. Units 1, 2 Be 3, Response to Requested Information on the Protection
Against External Flooding Including a Postulated Failure of the JocassP!’ Dam
OUO • Communicatton Plan For Issuance of Conf:rmiltory Action Letter To Duke For
Oconee· External Flooding June 2010
OconeE> Nuclear Station, Untts 1, 2, and 3, • External Flood CommitmPnt•
Oconee, Units 1, 2 & 3, Confirmatory Action Letter (CAL 2· 10·003), Commitments to
Address External Flooding Concerns
06/29/2010 Summary of Closed Meeting With Duke Energy Carohnas, LLC. to
Discuss External Flooding at Oconee
OUO ·IR OS000269·10.002, 05000270-10·006, 05000287-10·006; 01/01/2010 •
03/31/2010; Oconee Nuclear Station Units 1, 2 and 3; lntenm Compensatory
Mt>asures for External Flood
Identification of a Generic External Flooding Issue Due to Potential Dam Faalures
Enclosure. page 3
Date
2010-AUG-2
20l0-0CT·20
2010-0CT 26
2010-N0\1·29
20ll·JA’J-S
20:1-JAN·lO
20~1-JAN -28
List of NRC Correspondence, Memos and Studies Regarding Failure of Jocassee Dam
ADAMS
ML102170006
ML102910480
ML102990064
ML103490330
Mlll0180609
ML110260443
ML110280153
Title
Oconee Units 1, 2, & 3, Response to Confirmatory Action Letter (CAL) 2·10·003
NRC Assessment of Oconee External Flooding Issue (October 18, 2010)
NRC Staff Assessment of Duke Energy Carolinas, LLC, Oconee ExtNni\1 Flood1ng
Issue (TAC NOS. ME4441, ME4442, and ME4443)
0<"onee Nuclear Site, Units 1, 2, and 3, Oconee Response to Co"lf:rmatory Action Lcttc:>r (CAL) 2·10·003
Enclosure 1, Ocont-e> Nuclear Station, Major Projt-ct Plans
Non-concurrence on Oconee Assessment Letter
Staff Assessment of Duke’s Response to Confirmatory Action Letter Regarding
Duke’s Comm1tments To Address EKtcrnal Flooding Concerns At The Oconee
NuciPar Station, Units 1. 2. And 3 (ONS) (TAC NOS. ME3065. MF3066. and ME3067)
2011-MAR-S Mll03410042 Supplement to Technical Basis for Allowing Oconee Nuclear Station to Remain in
Operation Through November 2011, Associated with the External Flooding Issues
2011-MAR 1!> M Ll10/40482 Analysis Report for the Proposed Generic Issue on Flooding of Nuclear Power Plant
Sites Follow1ng Upstream Dam Fa1lures
2011-APR-29 Mllll460063 Oconee Nuclear Site, Units 1, 2, and 3, Response to Confirmatory Action Letter
(CAL) 2-10·003
201l·AUG·16 Mlll229A710 E-mail re Briefing Package for Visit to Oconee Nuclear Power Plant on September 12·
13, 2011
2011-AUt;-18 ML11174A138 OconPe Nuclear Station, Umts 1, 2, and 3, Assessment of Duke Energy Carolinas, LLC
April29, 2011, Response to Confirmatory Action Letter Regardmg Modifications to
Address External Flooding Concerns (TAC Nos. ME6133, ME6134, and ME6135)
20l1-AUG-31 ML112430114 Screening Analysis Report for the Proposed GPneric Issue on Flooding of Nuclear
Power Plant Sites Following Upstream Dam Failures
2Cll·S:f’-1 ML 11?44A024 Brie fine Package for Visit to Oconee Nuclear Power Plant on September 12 ·13, 2011
2011-0CT-3 ML11278A173 Oconee Nuclear Station (ONS), Units 1. 2, and 3. Response to Requests for
Additional Information Regarding Necessary Modifications to Enhance the
Capability of the ONS Site to Withstand the Postulated Failure of the Jocassee Dam
20: 1-0::i-17 ML11294A341 Oconee Nuclear Station (ONS). Units 1. 2. and 3, Response to Requests for
Additionallnformat •on Regarding Necessary Modifications to Enhanc~ the
Capability of the ONS Site to Withstand the PostulatE-d Failure of the Jocassee Dam
2011-DE::-16 ML1B500495 Screenmg Analysis Report for the Proposed Generic Issue on Flooding of Nuclear
Power Plant S1 tes Following Upstream Dam Failures_redacted
2012-IAN-26 Mll2C26A549 Briefing Package for Commissioner Svinlcki Visit to Oconee on February 1. 2012
20 12-JAN-31 ML12026A254 Communication Plan for Oconee Nuclear Station (ONS) Following Issuance of Gl -204
2012 rfB-3 Mll2C39A239 Oconet>, Units 1. 2 and 3 · Request for Withholding from Public Disclosure Duke
EncrRv Letter Dated May 20, 2009 Involving Postulated Failure of the JocasseP Dam
2012HG·9 ML12C39A217 Briefing Pilckage Request for Mel:’ting with Duke Energy on Febru<~rv 16, 2012 Enclosure, page 1 List of NRC Correspondence, Memos and Studies Regarding Fuilure ofjocasst>P. Dam
Date ADAMS Title
201.2 ‘E[: 17 ML120S3A016 Duke Energy Carolinas, LLC- Recommended Revisions to the Oconee Nuclear
Station Section of NRC’s Scret-ning Analysis Report for the Propost>c1 Generic Issue
on Flooding of Nuclear Plant Sites Following Upstream Dam Failure
20l2·FEB-23 Mll20S8A236 02/23/12 Summary of a Teleconft-rPn::e between the US NRC and Duke Energy
Regarding Comments made by Duke Energy Concerning th!’ Issuance of the
Screening Analysis Report for Generic Issue 204
2012 · M~ting Slides on Oconep External Flood
Mitigation
Briefing Paclc;~gP. for Meeting with Ouke Energy on July 11, 2012
Briefing Book for Meeting w ith Duke Energy on August 7, 2012
Communication Plan for Flooding September 2012
OconeP. Nuclear Station, Units 1, 2 and 3 – Response to Questions Rt>p,tlrding
Modifications to Address External Flooding Hazards (TAC Nos. ME7970. ME7971,
AND ME7972)
Enclosure. page 5
Case Title:
Origination Doclink: ·j
OFFICIAL USE ONLY
Memos to File
Prepared by.i (bX7)(Cl j 011081101 J
Release of NRC Security Case Number:
Related Documents ·by RES
Employee
c 13 001
Subject: OIG Receipt of Letter from U.S. Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental
Affairs, dated December 18, 2012, LIEBERMAN
Report Date: 12/18/2012
Narrative:
Status: Closed Edit Authorization:
Request Review:
Approval:
OFFICIAL USE ONLY 1

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