2013-03-25 – NRC – Jocassee Dam – Duke Energy – Upstream Dam Failure Analysis – ML16237A007

> Date: Mon, 25 Mar 2013 09:57:52 ‐0400 > From: jriccio@greenpeace.org > To: lscriscione@hotmail.com;... View Document

Post

2013-03-25 – NRC – Jocassee Dam – Oconee slides on flood hazard report – ML16237A004

Boska, John
From:
Sent:
To:
Subject:
Attachments:
Attached are the slides.
John Boska
Boska. John
Monday, March 25, 2013 8:09AM
Connor, Eric
RE: march 25 oconee meeting
2013-03-25 Oconee slides on flood hazard report.pdf
Oconee Project Manager. NRR/DORL
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
301-415-2901
email: john.boska@nrc.gov
From: Boska, John
Sent: Thursday, March 21, 2013 12:11 PM
To: ‘Connor, Eric’
Subject: RE: march 25 oconee meeting
It is part of the Fukushima response. Our letter requesting the information is available publicly from our web
site, www.nrc.gov, under ADAMS accession# ML 12053A340. You can enter accession numbers in the search
box in the upper right of the home page. In section 2.1 on flooding, we requested a flooding hazard
reevaluation report from all power reactor licensees.
John Boska
Oconee Project Manager, NRR/DORL
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
301-415-2901
email: john.boska@nrc.gov
From: Connor, Eric [mailto:ECONNOR@greenvillenews.com]
Sent: Thursday, March 21, 2013 11:43 AM
To: Boska, John
Subject: RE: march 25 oconee meeting
Thanks, John. Is this re-evaluation report specifically related to requests pre-Fukushima about the Jocassee Dam issue.
Or is this part of a larger Fukushima response?
Eric Connor
The Greenville News
GreenvilleOnline.com
~~L.ULL.L…:%l..I.>..L:r..,'( 0 ~
c)
From: Boska, John [mailto:John.Boska@nrc.gov]
Sent: Thursday, March 21, 2013 11:38 AM
To: Connor, Eric
Cc: Hannah, Roger; Ledford, Joey
Subject: RE: march 25 oconee meeting
..
Duke Energy did submit a flooding hazard reevaluation report to the NRC dated 3/12/13, but it is a non-public
document. At the meeting we will discuss sections of the report that can be discussed publicly. Duke may
provide public slides. For example, Duke did an analysis of the consequences of a failure of the Jocassee
Dam. I expect the NRC staff will discuss the analysis method they used. and ask questions about how the
parameters were selected (for example, how large was the assumed failure and what were the flow rates out of
Lake Jocassee). The NRC will not be making any decisions at this meeting, but rather just gather information
to help us reach a decision on the validity of the methods used in the analysis.
John Boska
Oconee Project Manager, NRR/DORL
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
301-415-2901
email: john.boska@nrc.gov
From: Connor, Eric [mailto:ECONNOR@qreenyillenews.com]
Sent: Thursday, March 21, 2013 11:03 AM
To: Boska, John
Subject: march 25 oconee meeting
Hi, John. I’d like to get the info on the meeting re: Jocassee Dam flooding issues on Monday.
Is there any material to review beforehand?
I’m curious what exactly the meeting will address and what is expected to come out of it.
Thanks
-Eric
Eric Connor
The Greenville News
Greenville Online. com
4.298.4304 (o)
·. (b}(6} kc’
itter @econnorgvnews
2
Boska, John
From:
Sent:
To:
Subject:
Attachments:
Attached are the slides.
John Boska
Boska. John
Monday, March 25, 2013 8:11 AM
Smith, James D
RE: Oconee meeting – flooding hazard
2013-03-25 Oconee slides on flood hazard report.pdf
Oconee Project Manager, NRR/DORL
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
301-415-2901
email: john.boska@nrc.gov
From: Boska, John
Sent: Thursday, March 21, 2013 7:36AM
To: ‘Smith, James D’
Subject: RE: Oconee meeting- flooding hazard
At 2 pm on 3/25/13. call888-469-5869. enter cod nd press the# button. During the meeting we ask
that you don’t allow your background noise on tot e p one line, which is shared by everyone who is calling in.
If your phone has a mute button you can use that. Otherwise, use the built in mute feature of our phone
system. Press •a to mute your phone, and *6 again to unmute if you decide to ask a question during the public
question period. If your phone system plays music when you put a call on hold, please do not put this call on
hold.
John Boska
Oconee Project Manager, NRR/DORL
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
301-415-2901
email: john.boska@nrc.gov
From: Smith, James D [mailto:smithljd@westinghouse.com]
Sent: Wednesday, March 20, 2013 3:54PM
To: Boska, John
Subject: Oconee meeting- flooding hazard
Please provide telephone number and pass code for the subject meeting.
Jim Smith
licensing Project Manager
Plant licensing
Westinghouse Electric Company
Phone: +1 423·290-5223
Email: smithljd@westinghouse.com
Home Page: www.westinghousenuclear.com
C-3
Boska, John
From:
Sent:
To:
Cc:
Subject:
Attachments:
I \ ~ ‘J f -!
Boska, John 1 1 ~ · \J’·
Monday, March 25, 2013 7:35 AM
Dick Mangrum
Hannah, Roger; Ledford, Joey
RE: Today’s Duke-MRC meet
2013-03-25 Oconee slides on flood hazard report.pdf
At 2 pm on 3/25/13, call 888-469-5869, enter cod nd press the # button. During the meeting we ask
that you don’t allow your background noise on to p line, which is shared by everyone who is calling in.
If your phone has a mute button you can use that. Otherwise, use the built in mute feature of our phone
system. Press *6 to mute your phone, and *6 again to unmute if you decide to ask a question. If your phone
system plays music when you put a call on hold, please do not put this call on hold. Attached are the slides for
the meeting.
John Boska
Oconee Project Manager, NRR/DORL
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
301-415-2901
email: john.boska@nrc.gov
From: Dick Mangrum [mailto:dickmangrum@wgog .com]
sent: Monday, March 25, 2013 6:55AM
To: Boska, John
Subject: Today’s Duke-MRC meet
John,
Please let me have phone number and pass code for today’s 2 p-m flood hazard re-evaluation meeting.
Sincerely,
Dick Mangrum
News Director, WGOG
Walhalla, SC
1
c __ -Lf
Boska, John
From:
Sent:
To:
Subject:
Attachments:
See attached.
John Boska
Boska, John
Monday, March 25, 2013 8:06 AM
Riccio, Jim
Slides for Oconee public meeting on 3/25/13 at 2pm
2013-03-25 Oconee slides on flood hazard report.pdf
Oconee Project Manager, NRR/DORL
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
301-415-2901
email: john.boska@nrc.gov
—–Original Message—–
From: Boska, John
To: Colleen Payne ; Pascarelli, Robert
Sent: Mon, Mar 25, 2013 8:04 am
Subject: RE: Duke Energy meeting
Colleen, we receive such a high volume of requests that we do not have the time to communicate with
individuals on these items. We have established an email listserver for each of the power reactors, and if you
sign up for the listserver, you will be emailed a copy of all the public documents we issue for Oconee Nuclear
Station. The listserver is automated, I cannot add people or remove them or even see who is on the list. If you
want to sign up, please go to
http://www.nrc.gov/public-involve/listserver/plants-by-region.html
and sign up for Oconee. The meeting notice for 3/25/13 was issued on the listserver on 3/18/13 and was
placed on the NRC web site on 3/19/13.
I will add your name to the security list for today’s meeting (although it is not a requirement, any member of the
public can attend, they just have to register with security when they get here). Attached are the slides for
today’s meeting. Copies will be available at the meeting. Please call my cell phone, 301-661-6969, after you
pass through security and I will ensure an escort brings you to the meeting room.
John Boska
Oconee Project Manager, NRR/DORL
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
301-415-2901
email: john.boska@nrc.gov
From: Colleen Payne [mailto:colleenpayne13@aol.com]
Sent: Saturday, March 23, 2013 10:05 AM
To: Pascarelli, Robert; Boska, John
Subject: Re: Duke Energy meeting
John and Robert,
Could you please keep me informed, I thought from last meetings, correspondence and my request that I was clear on
receiving all current, future meetings re: Lake Jocasse/Oconee/Duke Energy & NRC. I receive daily updates and
continually monitor NRC site, however, somehow I missed the upcoming 3/25 meeting re flooding issues/Duke/NRC.
Thank you, Colleen Payne
—–Original Message—–
From: Colleen Payne To: robert.pascarelli ; john.boska
Sent: Sat, Mar 23, 2013 9:56 am
Subject: Re: Duke Energy meeting
Good morning John and Robert,
Is Monday’s, 3/25 meeting re: “to discuss the licensee’s flooding hazard reevaluation report for the three Oconee units…” a
rescheduled or new meeting? I was not made aware nor was this posted until just recently – within past few days.
I will be attending this meeting, please add my name to security list.
Thank you, Colleen Payne
703/786-2247
—–Original Message—–
From: Colleen Payne To: Robert.Pascarelli
Sent: Mon, Mar 11, 2013 2:36 pm
Subject: Re: Duke Energy meeting
Bob,
Yes, that is correct. Thank you.
I just received notice from John Boska, 3/19 meeting has been rescheduled to 4/9.
Colleen
—–Original Message—–
From: Pascarelli, Robert
To: Colleen Payne Sent: Mon, Mar 11, 2013 1:40 pm
Subject: RE: Duke Energy meeting
Colleen,
I believe that you are referring to the April 16-18 industry meeting in Columbia, SC. It is an industry-sponsored meeting
that the Office of New Reactors (NRO) has been invited to speak at for the last few years. Due to budget restrictions,
NRO is not planning to attend this year.
Bob Pascarelli
From: Colleen Payne [mailto:colleenpayne13@aol.com]
Sent: Thursday, March 07, 2013 4:43 PM
To: Pascarelli, Robert
Subject: Re: Duke Energy meeting
Bob,
Do you know who will be speaking at the SMR Conference April 16-17? I was registered for that event, but will not be
able to attend.
Thank you, Colleen
—–Original Message—–
From: Pascarelli, Robert
To: Colleen Payne Sent: Thu, Mar 7, 2013 2:29 pm
Subject: RE: Duke Energy meeting
Colleen,
It’s possible that the meeting could occur as late as May. We coordinate resources with our Region II office to ensure that
we can conduct all of the site meetings within a few months following the issuance of the annual assessment letters. I’ll
let you know as soon as we have a tentative date. Have a nice day.
Bob
From: Colleen Payne [mailto:colleenpayne13@aol.com]
Sent: Thursday, March 07, 2013 2:14 PM
To: Pascarelli, Robert
Subject: Re: Duke Energy meeting
Bob
Thank you for this information. Any chance of scheduling assessment meeting in May? I would like to attend and mid-
May would work for me. (smile, I am joking – but doesn’t hurt to ask)
Colleen
—–Original Message—–
From: Pascarelli, Robert
To: Colleen Payne Sent: Thu, Mar 7, 2013 10:35 am
Subject: RE: Duke Energy meeting
Ms. Payne,
It was a pleasure to speak with you on Tuesday afternoon and I look forward to seeing you on March 19th. Another
meeting that you may be interested in is the annual end-of-cycle assessment meeting that is held in the Oconee visitor’s
center. Although we have not finalized a date, our annual meeting will most likely occur in the early April timeframe. I
encourage you to consider attending if you are in the area. Additionally, please feel free to contact myself or John Boska if
you have any questions or concerns. Have a great day!
Bob Pascarelli, Chief
Plant Licensing Branch II-1
Division of Operating Reactor Licensing
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
From: Colleen Payne [mailto:colleenpayne13@aol.com]
Sent: Thursday, March 07, 2013 9:52 AM
To: Pascarelli, Robert
Subject: Duke Energy meeting
Bob,
Just a quick note to thank your for your time on Tuesday, March 5 during and after Duke meeting.
I appreciate you taking the time to discuss some of the concerns regarding NRC’s position regarding Oconee site.
I look forward to seeing you on the 19th – or rescheduled date.
Have a good rest of week,
Colleen
Duke
nergy
———~-~·_:.’J~~··:’\-
For Information On~
Fukushima·
Flooding Hazard Reevaluation
Upstream Dam Failure Analysis
NCR
Technical
Presentation
NRC Headquarters
One White Flint North
Rockville, MD
March 25, 2013
Dave Baxter, VP, Regulatory Project Completion
Dean Hubbard, Oconee External Flood Licensing Manager
Ray McCoy, Principal Engineer, ONS Civil Design
Chris Ey, Civil Engineering Manager, HDR
Daria Jones, Oconee Fukushima Engineering Supervisor
Joe Ehasz, VP, URS Program Manager- Water Resources
2
For Information Only
Agenda
·:· Current Dam Failure Analysis • January 28, 2011
~ Breach Analysis Summary
~ Model Development
·:· Updated Dam Failure Evaluation -submitted March 12, 2013
~ Models Considered
} Selection of Xu & Zhang
~ Update Breach Parameters
~ Sensitivity Analysis
~ Independent Review
~ Comparative Analysis • Large Modern Dam Failures
•!• Modifications Scope
For Information Only
3
2011 Breach Analysis Summary
·:· Breach parameters developed using regression methodology and
technical papers:
~ Froehlich 2008
~ Walder & O’Connor
~ MacDonald & Langridge-Monopolis
·:· Breach analysis focused on maximizing flooding levels to provide a
very conservative and bounding analysis:
~ Breach dimensions maximized to assume loss of most of the dam
embankment.
~ Froehlich breach time of 5 hours was reduced to 2.8
~ Maximum peak outflow was selected from all methods
~ Breach times of Keowee dams/dikes adjusted to maximize water
directed at the site
~ T ailwater effect below Jocassee dam was not considered
For Information On~
4
Duke
nergy 2011 Breach Analysis Summary
Jocassee Dam (postulated dam failure)
·:· Initial breach derived primarily from Froehlich regression
equations.
·:· Breach dimensions were adjusted based on physical
constraints of natural valley
•!• Jocassee breach parameters:
~ Top Width -1156 (64% of overall crest)
~ Bottom Width – 431 feet
~ Bottom Elevation – 800 msl
~ Breach Formation Time .. 2.8 hrs,
~ Peak outllow 5,400,000 cfs
For Information Only
5
1.2
O.l
‘I
\
\
\
2011 SE JocasseeDamBreach
Progression and Stage-Discharge Hydrographs
Jocassee Dam Breach Progression and Hydrographs
Case Z(lOOW)
S,OOO,(DJ
4,000,000
i 3.000,000 … J •
um,ooo
I,(DJ,(DJ
0 0
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ –
~-···–·—–·——————___..j
For Information Only
6
2011 Breach Analysis Summary
Keowee Dam/Dikes {postulated cascading dam failures)
·:· Overtopping failure trigger of two feet over the crest
·:· Cascading dam/dike failure on Keowee
» Keowee main dam- 2.8 hrs
» West Saddle Dam· 0.5 hrs
» Intake Canal Dike- 0.9 hrs
» Little River Dam -1.9 hrs
•!• Conservative assumptions were made to maximize the water
directed toward the power block
For Information Only
7
Model Development
HEC-RAS JD Model
Duke
nergy
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2011 Breach Analysis Summary
2DModel
WATER SURF ACE ELEVATIONS AT KEOWEE DAM
Jocassee-Keowee Dam Breach Study
Pool Elevations at Keowee Dam
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0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 I 9 10 11 1210
Model nme (hrs)

Updated Dam Failure Evaluation
Fukushima 2.1
Attributes of updated and refined dam failure analysis
·:· Updated methodology and present day regulatory guidance
·:· Pertormed to meet NUREG CR/7046, 2011 & ANS 2.8, 1992
·:· Realistic but still conservative assumptions
·:· Physical characteristics of the dams/dikes recognized
including materials and method/quality of construction
•!• Overtopping and Seismic are confirmed from the 2011 SEas
not being credible failure modes
12
For Information On~
–··-··-·-··–
Updated Dam Failure Evaluation
Fukushima 2.1
Overtopping of the Jocassee dam was confirmed not to be a credible failure mode
·:· The Jocassee dam and dikes include 15 feet of freeboard
•!• The Jocassee watershed is small relative to storage capacity -148 square miles
·:· The top of the spillways are located at 111 0 (full normal level)
1 Four diverse methods of assuring spillway gate operation
1 Rigorous spillway gate maintenance and surveillance testing as required and
monitored by FERC
•!• Lake management procedures require consideration of lower level to anticipate
additional storage needs for significant storms
1 Weekly rain forecast are prepared by Duke Energy to project rainfall for the basin
1 Precipitation monitoring has assured that no overtopping of the spillway gates has
occurred in 40 + years of operation
·:· PMF using current HRR-51 ,52 results in 3 feet of freeboard margin
·:· 2011 SE also concluded that overtopping was not credible
For Information On~
13
Duke
nergy
Updated Dam Failure Evaluation
Fukushima 2.1
Seismic Failure of the Dam was confirmed not to be a credible failure mode
·:· Seismic evaluation based on current FERC criteria using the 1989 EPRI Hazard Curves
» The Jocassee dam is designed to a 0.12 g horizontal ground acceleration (Oconee site is designed to a
0.1g horizontal ground acceleration).
·:· 2007 Updated Fragili~ Analysis
» High Confidence of a Low Probabili~ of Failure (HCLPF) of the dam by sliding 0.305 g
» Evaluation was performed by Applied Research & Engineering Sciences (ARES) Corp., formerly EQE, a
respected consulting firm in the area of seismic ·fragili~
» The ARES report concluded the median centered fragility value for failure of the dam is 1.64 g.
» Maximum Probabilistic Peak Ground Acceleration for a 2% probability of being exceeded within a 50 year
period is 0.197 g (using the United States Geologic Service hazard maps applicable to Jocassee).
•!• Jocassee dam is included in the seismic model of the Oconee Probable Risk Assessment.
» The combination of the updated seismic fragility with the seismic hazard curve results in a negligible risk
contribution from seismic events.
» In a letter dated 11/20/07 and in the 1/28/11 SE report, the NRC concluded that there is a negligible risk
For Information On~
14
~ Froehlich. 2008
· ~ Walder & O’Connor
Models Considered
Regression Analysis
~ MacDonald & Langridge-Monopolis 1984
~ Xu & Zhang 2009
For Information Only
. 15
Duke Selecdon of Xu & Zhang 2009
nergy Basis
•!• Most current regression method developed and validated with
the largest data base of dam failures:
» 182 earth and rockflll dam failures compiled
» 75 failures w/ sufficient info to develop breach regression models
•!• Empirical formulas that account for physical characteristics of
dam/reservoir: dam type, failure mode, height, dam erodibility,
reservoir shape/storage)
·:· 33 of the 75 failures were on large dams ( ~ 15 meters )
•!• Applies to multi-zoned dams
•!• Method yields realistic but conservative breach parameters
•!• Recognized by industry experts
For Information Only
16
•!• Jocassee Dam – Xu & Zhang
Breach Parameters
Fukushima Update
) Starting reservoir elevation 1110 (normal full pond)
) Rockfill dam with low erodibility classification
) Piping failure initiating at 1020 feet msl (Sunny Day Failure)
) Breach parameters:
IT op Width • 701′ (39% of overall crest)
I Bottom Width – 431′
I Bottom Elevation – 870’
I Breach Formation Time:
1 Xu & Zhang- 29.2 hrs.(14.2 hours piping +16.0 open weir)
1 Froehlich -16.0 hours (open weir)
I Peak outllow: 1,7 60,000 cfs
For Information Only
17
Jocassee Dam
Low Erodibility Classification
(b)(7}(F)
18
For Information Only
Fukushima Model
JOCASSEE DAM BREACH PARAMETERS
Remvo~ . Breach
Crest S I Bottom Breach Bottom Avenge Righ Side L 1 Sid Tune to Top of B 1 .. I
Structare Elevation • El t~(ft Failure Mode Elevation (ft Bre~b Width Breach t e e Failure Breaeh reach Bitiation
(haij e:• I mij (I) M(l) Slope(b)ISiope(1l) (Hr) M(~ Progmsiln ilev:n(ft
Jocassee
112)
Darn
4Jl )66 O.)J O.)J 29.2 1m Sile Wave !,!120
I
1,110 810
Breach Formation Time
Xu & Zhang definition: 29.2 ( 13.2 hours piping + 16.0 hours open weir)
Froehlich definition: 16.0 hours open weir
19
For Information Only
Duke
nergy
Fukushima Model Jocassee Dam Breach
Progression and Stage-Discharge Hydrographs
1.20
& 1.00
1
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1
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Jocassee Dam Breach Progression and Hydrographs
BEPLE
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-Headwater -TaUwaltr -Breach Procrusion -Breach DiKhargr
—- Breachlnit~lion • – – – Breach FOI’lllalion COmplele
..
Breach Fonnation Time; Xu & Zhang definition:· 29.2 (13.2 hours piping+ 16.0 hours open weir) Froehlich definition: -16.0 hours open weir
For Information On~
20
·:· Keowee Dam
Breach Parameters
Fukushima Update
~ Starting reservoir elevation 800 (normal full pond)
~ Homogeneous earth fill dam
~ Overtopping failure trigger of two feet over the crest at 817 msl by
rapid rise of Keowee reservoir over the crest
~ Multiple simultaneous breach initiation formation points across the
Keowee dam and West Saddle dam
·:· Cascading dam/dike failure on Keowee
~ Keowee main dam- 0.75 hrs
~ West Saddle Dam • 0.5 hrs (shorter than main dam, ratio of height)
For Information Only
21
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—- ————— ————~——————–
For Information On~
22
Duke
nergy Fukushima JD Modeling
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-BEP LE HW -BEP LE TW
“”—~~–~——“”-“”
For Information Only
23
Duke
nergy
Fukushima 2.1 2D Modeling
Keowee Dam Breach Progression
0.8 ..J—–+-~——~+——+
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~ 0.6 T—+–1 –+—+
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+Keowee Dam Sine Wave Breach {HEC-RAS)
-Keowee Dam 2-D Breach
0 ..,…..; ……,. !…—…1—-!——4- —+—-+—-r—+—l
16.2 16.3 16.4 16.5 16.6 16.7 16.8 16.9 17
Time (hr)
For Information Only
24
Duke
nergy
Fukushima 2D ·
Modeling Velocity
and Flow Pattern
at 17 hrs.
0 2 4 6 810121416182022242628303234363840
25
For Information Only
Duke
nergy
Fukushima 2D
Modeling Velocity
and Flow Pattern
at 20 hrs.
2 4 6 8 1012141618 20 2224 2628 3032 34 36 3840
For Information Only
Breachi
Keowee Dam
Fukushima JD-2D
Modeling Results
Intake Dike
HEC·RAS 2-D HEC·RAS 2·D
Maximum Water Surfaces
Keowee Dam Intake Dike
HEC-RAS 2-D HEC·RAS 2·D
Elevation Decimal 11me Elevation Decimalllme Elevation Decimal Time Elevation Decimal Time
~Ql ~~
Maximum Water Surfaces
Swale Tallwater
HEC·RAS 2·D HEC·RAS 2-D
Elevation Decimalllme Elevation Decimalllme Elevation Dedmal11me Elevation Decimal llme
817.5 815.5 16.53 787.4
For Information Only
27
Sensitivity Analysis
Model Peak Outflow (cfs)
McDonald & Langridge-Monopolis 1984 1,566,381
Costa, 1985 1,634,480
Xu & Zhang, 2009 1}60,000
Evans, 1986 1,803,331
SCS, 1981 2,647,711
Bureau of Reclamation, 1982 3,046,462
McDonald & Langridge-Monopolis 1984 5,093,603 (upper envelope)
Froehlich (with additional conservatism), 2008 5,440,000
Data in this table based on Wah12004, JanuaiY 28, 2011 SE and updated Xu & Zhang data
1 00+ HEC-RAS studies pertormed with varied breach parameters and control variables
Erodiblity was the most significant factor influencing the breach parameters for Xu & Zhang 2009
Bias of conservatism w~h realism
For Information Only
28
·Independent Peer Review
Joe Ehasz, P.E.
David Bowles, Ph. D P.E. P.H.
Independent Review
Breach Parameters
• FERC Board of Consultant Review
Gonzalo Castro, Ph.D., P.E.
James Michael Duncan, Ph.D., P.E.
James F Ruff, Ph.D., P. E.
Gabriel Fernandez, Ph.D., P.E.
For Information On~
29
·:· Taum Sauk
Comparative Ana~sis
Large Modern Dam Failures
) Overtopping failure initiated by human error {previous overtopping events had occurred)
) Random rockfill embankment supporting the inner concrete liner loosely placed by end dumping the material
without compaction except for the top 16′ of 84′ height
) The embankment was constructed on a very steep downstream slope of 1.3H to 1V with a 10 high concrete
parapet wall along the crest of the dam
) Embankment was high~ erodible and contained over 45% sand sized material (also evident in unusual
level of surtace erosion from rain events)
·:· .Teton
) earthen dam with majority of dam constructed of highly erodible windblown silt (infant mortality event)
) No transition zones (sand and/or fine fl~ers) were included between the silt core and the sand & gravel
) Thin layer of small rock fill on both up and downstream faces with a majori~ of protection relied upon mix of
sand, gravel and cobble
) Piping failure at 130′ below the crest due to inadequate protection of impervious core trench material
) Breach top width 781’ (“”25% of overall crest)
·:· Hell Hole
) True rockfill dam, with upstream sloping impervious core with massive rock fill sections up and down stream
to support and protect the core.
) Failure caused by overtopping during construction due to an intense rain event that could not be passed
through the construction diversion tunnel
) After overtopping of the core started, the dam took 26 hours to complete the breach and emp~ the upstream
reservoir 30
For Information Only
Modification Scope
Updated
•!• Modifications for protection from dam failure (under review):
1. Relocation of external backup power transmission line
2. Intake Dike embankment protection
3. East embankment protection
4. Discharge Diversion wall
·:· Modifications for Local Intense Precipitation (under review):
~ Transformer relocation
~ Diversion walls and drainage canals
~ Aux building and Turbine building protection
For Information Only
31
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Post

2012-12-14 – NRC – Jocassee Dam – NRC Concealing Concerns Regarding Oconee Nuclear Station – ML16204A001

From: Larry Criscione
Sent: Friday, September 14, 2012 5:51 PM
To: matt_buckham@demint.senate.gov, homeland.security@mail.house.gov,
michael.kiko@mail.house.gov, peter.spencer@mail.house.gov,
valerie_manak@epw.senate.gov, nathan_mccray@epw.senate.gov,
devon.hill@mail.house.gov, graciela.tatane@mail.house.gov,
stephen.salsbury@mail.house.gov, jim_mcgee@hsgac.senate.gov, Marty Gelfand,
vic.edgerton@mail.house.gov, Michal Freedhoff
Subject: NRC Concealing Concerns Regarding Oconee Nuclear Station
Attachments: Inspector General Letter.pdf
Flooding of Nuclear Power Plant Sites Following Upstream Dam Failures.pdf
The Oconee Nuclear Station (ONS) in South Carolina is situated 12 miles downstream of Jocassee
Dam. The site has three reactors, each housed inside a containment building. At the site is a Standby
Shutdown Facility (SSF) which contains support equipment necessary to remove decay heat from the
reactors in the event of a loss of the transmission lines to the plant. The SSF has a five foot high flood
wall around it to protect it in the event of severe flooding.
Just like the reactor vessels and containment building at the Fukushima Dai-ichi complex in Japan, the
reactors at ONS and their containment structures are build to withstand earthquakes and severe
flooding. However, just like at Fukushima, the reactors at ONS and their containment structures cannot
survive a sustained loss of offsite power.
And just like Fukushima, the flood wall at ONS is not adequately sized to prevent the loss of the
equipment at the SSF in the event of a failure of Jocassee Dam.
Duke Energy has known since 1992 that the flood wall at ONS is at least seven feet too short. The US
Nuclear regulatory commission has known this since 2006.
There are many people within Duke Energy and the US Nuclear Regulatory Commission who believe that,
were Jocassee Dam to fail, all three reactors at ONS would melt down in less than 10 hours. Duke Energy
predicts that if cooling cannot be restored following the recession of flood waters, the containment
buildings will fail within 60 hours of the dam break exposing the public to a significant dose.
The predicted annual failure rate for a dam of Jocassee’s construction is 2.8E-4/yr. That is, every year
there is a 1 in 3600 chance that Jocassee Dam will fail. Integrated over the 22 years which Duke Energy
has left on the renewed licenses of its Oconee reactors, this becomes a 1 in 163 chance. That’s better
than the odds of being dealt a straight or about 8 times better than the odds of rolling Yahtzee.
But of course, a 1 in 163 chance a dam will fail is a 163 in 1 chance that it will not. The odds are pretty
good (99.4%) that in the next 22 years the Jocassee Lake Dam will not fail. The Oconee Nuclear Station
is a vital part of the economy of Oconee County. Maybe it’s appropriate that, as a society, we can accept
those odds. I am not one to make that decision, however; that decisions is up to our elected
representatives. My role is to follow the NRC’s regulations as they currently exist. And currently, on an
annual basis the odds of a meltdown at ONS are about ten times higher than for a typical US reactor
plant.
There is another aspect to this issue though, and that is the survivability of the containment structures
around the reactors. It is well accepted that these structures can survive a flood resultant from a
Jocassee Dam failure. And it is well accepted that these structures, as at Fukushima, will eventually fail if
the utility cannot re-establish cooling. What is not known is the likelihood that, after the flood waters
recede, Duke Energy will be able to re-establish cooling to the containment buildings. If they cannot, then
a dam break at Jocassee Lake will cause a Fukushima-style accident in Oconee County, South
Carolina. Except instead of blowing out to sea as happened in Japan, depending on the winds the
radioactivity will be blown over Columbia or Charleston or Atlanta or Huntsville or Knoxville or
Charlotte. Whatever the winds, the radioactive fallout will occur over farmlands and not merely over the
ocean.
The failure of the containment structure at a typical US facility is generically taken to be 1 in 100. That’s a
99% chance of survival. But does anyone really think there’s a 99% chance that Duke Energy employees
can make it through the devastation wrought by the flood and find a way to restore the cooling equipment
prior to the failure of the containment structures? It might be possible, but I would not put the odds at
anything better than 50%. That makes the annual probability of a Fukushima-style accident occurring at
ONS about 500 times more likely than at a typical US facility.
As a citizen I might be able to accept these odds, but as a regulator it is clear I cannot accept them under
the processes which are currently in place at the NRC. However, the NRC is accepting them and in a way
which I believe is unethically. The NRC keeps allowing Duke Energy to postpone the improvement of their
flood protections. The original date set was November 2011 but that has been moved to 2014 and now to
2017. Maybe it is best for the nation to tacitly accept the risk at Oconee, but that is not a decision the
NRC staff should be making. That decision is up to the actual commissioners and they should be debating
it and making it in full view of the Congress and the American public.
The attached letter is from Richard Perkins to the NRC Inspector General. Mr. Perkins was the lead author
on an NRC screening analysis concerning flooding hazards at US nuclear sites due to upstream dam
failures (also attached). Mr. Perkins wrote the Inspector General because he believes that his study is
being unlawfully kept from the public.
Many of the references in Mr. Perkins’ study are from documents stamped by the NRC as “Official Use
Only – Security-Related Information”. Unlike documents classified for national defense purposes, from a
legal standpoint “Official Use Only – Security-Related Information” is meaningless. I could release these
documents to the press or public and not face any jail time or fines. What I could face, however, is loss
of my job because releasing “Official Use Only” material is – and should be – a violation of NRC policies for
which one can get fired. I have no problems with that policy. My concern, and Mr. Perkins’, is the misuse
of the “Security-Related Information” stamp.
Nowhere in these “Security-Related Information” documents can be found the actual word “security” other
than in the stamp. Terrorism, sabotage, vandalism, etc. are not anywhere discussed. The documents
pertain entirely to safety issues concerning the failure of Jocassee Dam due to natural phenomena and
latent construction/engineering flaws.
Some might argue that knowing there is an extremely high chance the failure of Jocassee Dam will lead to
the meltdown and containment failures on three reactor plants is something that would benefit
terrorists. That may be true. But if there is a terrorist threat to Jocassee Dam, then it must be addressed
in some way other than merely suppressing the discussion of bonafide safety concerns about a dam
failure.
The Department of Homeland Security reviewed Mr. Perkins’ screening report as part of its routing and
review. The DHS assessment was that there was nothing in the report concerning Jocassee Dam and the
Oconee Nuclear Station that needed to be withheld from the public for security reasons. Yet the NRC is
continuing to withhold the unredacted version of the report from the public, citing FOIA exemption
7(F): Disclosure could reasonably be expected to endanger the life or physical safety of an individual.
Mr. Perkins’ concern is that the NRC is illegally using false security claims to withhold information on
Jocassee Dam from the public because they realize that their options regarding Oconee are to shut down
the site either temporarily or – quite possibly – permanently. My concern is that by withholding this
information from the public, the necessary oversight of the NRC – by both Congressional committees and
non-governmental watchdog organizations – with regard to ONS is being impeded. The decision as to
whether or not Duke Energy should continue to be allowed to operate ONS when its risk profiles are 500
times higher than other plants is a not a decision that should be made by NRC staffers – it is a decision
that should be made by the NRC Commissioners themselves in few view of the American public, the US
Congress, and the state and local governments of South Carolina.
V/r,
Lawrence S. Criscione, PE
573-230-3959

Post

2011-03-24 – NRC – Fukushima Daiichi – Issues with RASCAL During Fukushima Response

From:
Sent:
To:
Subject:
Attachments:
George Athey
Thursday, March 24, 2011 5:22 PM
Brandon, Lou; PMT02 Hoc; PMT11 Hoc
Summary of RASCAL errors and suggested workarounds
Fukushima RASCAL errors.pdf
PMT Dose Assessors
Please see the attached PDF for a brief write-up of some of the errors you have been encountering with RASCAL during
the Fukushima response and some possible workarounds or fixes. I will be in the office on Friday, March 2 5th so if the
document needs expansion or correction please let me know.
George Athey
Athey Consulting
(304) 725-8834
george.athev@atheyconsulting.com
1
DB 400 of 696
Issues with RASCAL During Fukushima Response
To: PMT Dose Assessors and Meteorologists
Thanks to all who are giving RASCAL such a thorough workout. All the feedback, errorreporting,
and suggestions for improvements are welcome and appreciated.
Following is a summary of some of the problems that have been occurring with RASCAL and
what you can do about them.
Problem: Total crash of the STDose model
Symptoms: The program shuts down completely; sometimes with an error message and
sometimes without. This happens when trying to do a very long calculation (e.g. 48 hours) with a
large release rate (e.g. total failure or 100%/hr).
Cause: The transport and diffusion puff model that calculates to the longer distances (10/25/50
mi) is having problems with the long durations. We are not sure why the module is crashing but
the developer is looking into things.
Workarounds:
” If all you need is the source term to export to NARAC, then run with “Close-in only”
selected. This will avoid the puff model but still generate the full source term file.
* If you need to see results to distance, reduce the calculation time to say 24-32 hours. With
large release rates most of the material has been released by 10-12 hours anyway and all
that gets added to dose with the longer calculation time is groundshine.
* If you absolutely need to do 48 hours, try using a lower leak rate. Try 50%/hour. You will
still get all the material out it will just be at a slower rate. Overall doses should be about
the same.
Problem: Error 13, Type mismatch
Symptoms: This was first reported on Monday morning on PMT02. Restarting RASCAL did not
help. The error was occurring because RASCAL could not delete the files in its temporary folder
(\STDTemp). We tried manually deleting them and then restarting RASCAL. The files
reappeared somehow; not sure why but it may be a Windows XP issue. A similar issue appeared
on Thursday on PMT 11.
Fix: Rebooted the computer. Then, after restarting RASCAL, selected New Case from the file
menu. This forced a fresh cleanout of the RASCAL temporary folder. I don’t think that
RASCAL needs to be reinstalled – although that may also work because it rebuilds the folders.
Thursday March 24, 2011
DB 401 of 696
Problem: Timing of Sprays off was changing doses
Symptom: Moving the time when sprays were Off in the release pathway definitions changed
the results. A user set the Sprays Off event in the release pathway to the reactor shutdown time
(instead of the default of core damage time). Since the sprays are off by default this should not
have made a difference. However, it radically changed the doses. We are not sure why this is
happening. It appears related to the timing in the source term model that controls the removal
and reduction processes. A developer is looking into the issue.
Workaround: Leave the first spray event paired with the first leak rate event (whether on or
off). This is how the initial release pathway is defined with a new case. It is OK to add spray
events later. Just don’t stick in events earlier than the first leak rate event.
If you need more information on any of the above do not hesitate to call or e-mail. I will be out
of the office on vacation starting Monday, March 28th. I will be back in the office on Tuesday,
April 5tl. I will be checking e-mail and voice mail (office and cell) so I can provide some support
if needed. Please continue to report any problems with RASCAL and include as much detail as
possible to help us duplicate the conditions.
George Athey
(304) 725-8834 office
(b)(6 cell
george.athey@atheyconsulting.com
Thursday March 24, 2011
DB 402 of 696

Post

2011-03-22 – NRC – Total Core-Melt of Fukushima Daiichi Unit 1 on March 11 or 12, 2011

Miroslav Gregoric
(b)(6)
+43-650-5660-528
From: GREGORIC, Miroslav
Sent: Tuesday,22 March 2011 14:42
To: IEC3 – INCIDENT & EMERGENCY CENTRE
Cc: FLORY, Denis; ANDREW, Graham; NILSSON, Anita Birgitta; LYONS,
James E.; SUZUKI, Satoshi; MRABIT, Khammar; YLLERA, Javier; LIPAR,
Miroslav; CARUSO, Gustavo; HAHN, Pil-Soo; CZARWINSKI, Renate; VINCZE,
Pal; BUGLOVA, Elena; MARTINCIC, Rafael; Kryuchenkov,Vladimir
(V.Kryucbenkov(aiaea.org); COLGAN, Peter; COLGAN, Tony; DUSIC, Milorad;
WINTER, Denis Jacques
Subject: Core melt at Fukushima Unit 1 from 11 to 12 March 2011 JST
***NOT for distribution***
Importance: High
Dear colleagues
Please find attached calculations for Fukusbima Daiichi Unit 1 core
melt from basic principles. Of course with your input the
calculations could be improved.
Best regards
Miro
DK 1888 of 1892
Total Core-melt of Fukushima Daiichi Unit 1 on 11 or 12 March 2011
Basic hand held calculations by Miroslav Gregoric, checked by Vladimir Kryuchenkov on 22 March
2011. (Note: The excel sheet is attached. Of course the modelling by MELCOR or other severe
accident codes will give better results, but one cannot go against basic heat equations.)
Basic assumptions based on known reported data from TEPCO and NISA
1) At the earthquake, reactor scrammed from 1380 MWth on I I March at 14:46 SJT, and after station
blackout, main steam isolation valves closed. Reactor was cooled by injecting condensate water to
Reactor Pressure Vessel via diesel operated pump (via steam turbine – not confirmed), and by
releasing steam to containment suppression pool -wetwell. This went on almost an hour, when at
15:42 tsunami flooded both diesels and many electrical distributing equipment and washed away or
damaged condensate storage tanks. Yet NISA reported that water injection continued for almost
additional hour until 16:36 when water injection failed. By that time 198000 MJ of the residual heat
was generated. In order to cool the core also the accumulated heat in the core needed to be taken
away, but that was small compared to decay heat. Assumption is that all this heat was successfully
discharged to the wetwell, acting as the only hit sink, where the temperature and pressure increased.
At least 79 tons of condensate water was needed to be injected and boil off to take the heat away.
No measured pressures are available for this period.
2) After loss of water injection on 11 March at 16:36 there was no water flow to reactor for almost
28 hours, up to 12 March at 20:20 when sea water injection was established via fire pumps to
reactor. During this time 1000000 MJ (one million Mega Joule) of the residual heat was generated. In
order to cool the core at least 412 tons of water should be boiled off in the core, but this was not
available. The core dried and overheated. If average heat capacity of the core is 0.3 ki/kg/degC, and
if fuel in the core and core internals mass is 140 tons then it takes only about 42 MJ to heat the core
for one degree Celsius. To melt the core it should be heated first to the melting point(s) and then the
melting (phase transition) will consume additional 260 kJ/kg or 62000 MJ in total. The residual heat
generated in this period is much higher (ten times or more) than needed for heating up to melting
points and for melting. The available heat could heat up the core far above the melting points. The
only cooling during this time was heat irradiation to the reactor pressure vessel from the outer layers
of fuel elements.
On the 12 March at 0:49 (or 8 hr 13 minutes after loss of water injection) un unusual increase of PCV
pressure was detected (drywell). At that point the residual heat generated after loss of water
injection was 390000 MJ, which would need additional 156 tons of water to boil off, which was not
available and the core heated up above melting point. Before core melting Zirconium in the fuel
cladding starts oxidising and adding chemical reaction heat. This added additional heat and also a lot
of hydrogen, causing sudden increase of pressure in reactor pressure vessel, discharging hydrogen
through the relieve valves to the wetwell. We can assume that once the Zirconium started to oxidise,
very soon all fuel rods have broken to release all noble gasses and volatiles like Iodine and Cesium
into the reactor. Some of the iodine and Cesium could be trapped in the wetwell water, but not the
noble gases.
All of the above points to a conclusion that a substantial core melt in reactor unit 1 has
happened starting in the night from 11 to 12 March and going on up to the start of injection of
sea water on 12 Mach at 20:20. It is possible that the vessel has melted through already before
increase in PCV pressure on 12 March at 0:49 hours, 8 hr 13 minutes of no cooling, and molten
core has penetrated the drywell as no water was there.
00005.doc
DK 1889 of 1892
Page 2
3. Venting of the containment started on 12 March at 14:30, releasing mixture of water vapour,
hydrogen, most of noble gases in the core, Iodine, Cesium and all other volatile radionuclides. Release
point was not given, stack release was probably not successful as in less an hour later, at 15:36 a huge
hydrogen explosion blasted the top of reactor building I sideways and upwards. The explosion must
have damaged the operating floor where spent fuel pool is located, with the crane for spent fuel is
located (and maybe the crane for the reactor vessel).
The wind was on 11 and 12 March blowing to the Pacific during the containment venting and
explosion, so that all noble gases and volatile radionuclides of the first release were going towards
ocean. However sharp peaks should be observed on the monitoring stations inland, 3 km to the west,
mainly reading the cloud shine (to be checked with actual data).
DK 1890 of 1892

Post

2011-03-21 – NRC – Fukushima Daiichi – A Delta pilot’s perspective on his approach to Tokyo in the wake of the March 11th earthquake

From: Stuchell. Sheldon
To: Cru.Holl GoiIa. Joe; Hon. Andrew; Honcharik. Michelle; Lenning. Ekaterina: Miller.Bar; Philpott. Stephen;
Rowley. Jonathan
Subject: FW: Written by a Delta pilot on approach to Tokyo during…
Date: Monday, March 21, 2011 11:22:42 AM
From (b)(6) Thought you may enjoy the read…
Oriainal M–e-s-saae —-
From: (b)(6)
Sent: Monday, March 21, 2011 7:5/ AM
To:
Subject: Written by a Delta pilot on approach to Tokyo during…
Great observation on the Japan disaster from an aerial viewpoint. Kind of leads to one of those ‘what
would I do?’ introspectives.
Scott Stuchell, Contractor, 914OSS/DON
System Support Representative, BAE Systems Niagara Falls ARS, NY, 14304-5010
DSN: 238-3534, Comm: 716-510-1846
I ~(b)(6)
I’m currently still in one piece, writing from my room in the Narita crew hotel.
It’s 8am. This is my inaugural trans-pacific trip as a brand new, recently checked out, international 767
Captain and it has been interesting, to say the least, so far. I’ve crossed the Atlantic three times so far
so the ocean crossing procedures were familiar.
By the way, stunning scenery flying over the Aleutian Islands. Everything was going fine until 100 miles
out from Tokyo and in the descent for arrival.
The first indication of any trouble was that Japan air traffic control started putting everyone into holding
patterns. At first we thought it was usual congestion on arrival. Then we got a company data link
message advising about the earthquake, followed by another stating Narita airport was temporarily
closed for inspection and expected to open shortly (the company is always so positive).
From our perspective things were obviously looking a little different. The Japanese controller’s anxiety
level seemed quite high and he said expect “indefinite” holding time. No one would commit to a time
frame on that so I got my copilot and relief pilot busy looking at divert stations and our fuel situation,
which, after an ocean crossing is typically low.
It wasn’t long, maybe ten minutes, before the first pilots started requesting diversions to other airports.
Air Canada, American, United, etc. all reporting minimal fuel situations. I still had enough fuel for 1.5 to
2.0 hours of holding. Needless to say, the diverts started complicating the situation.
Japan air traffic control then announced Narita was closed indefinitely due to damage. Planes
immediately started requesting arrivals into Haneada, near Tokyo, a half dozen JAL and western planes
got clearance in that direction but then ATC announced Haenada had just dosed. Uh oh! Now instead of
just holding, we all had to start looking at more distant alternatives like Osaka, or Nagoya.
One bad thing about a large airliner is that you can’t just be-pop into any little airport. We generally
need lots of runway. With more planes piling in from both east and west, all needing a place to land
and several now fuel critical ATC was getting over-whelmed. In the scramble, and without waiting for
my fuel to get critical, I got my flight a clearance to head for Nagoya, fuel situation still okay. So far so
good. A few minutes into heading that way, I was “ordered” by ATC to reverse course. Nagoya was
saturated with traffic and unable to handle more planes (read- airport full). Ditto for Osaka.
DO 595 of 1673
With that statement, my situation went instantly from fuel okay, to fuel minimal considering we might
have to divert a much farther distance. Multiply my situation by a dozen other aircraft all in the same
boat, all making demands requests and threats to ATC for clearances somewhere. Air Canada and then
someone else went to “emergency” fuel situation. Planes started to heading for air force bases. The
nearest to Tokyo was Yokoda AFB. I threw my hat in the ring for that initially. The answer – Yokoda
closed! no more space.
By now it was a three ring circus in the cockpit, my copilot on the radios, me flying and making
decisions and the relief copilot buried in the air charts trying to figure out where to go that was within
range while data link messages were flying back and. forth between us and company dispatch in Atlanta.
I picked Misawa AFB at the north end of Honshu island. We could get there with minimal fuel
remaining. ATC was happy to get rid of us so we cleared out of the maelstrom of the Tokyo region. We
heard ATC try to send planes toward Sendai, a small regional airport on the coast which was later the
one I think that got flooded by a tsunami.
Atlanta dispatch then sent us a message asking if we could continue to Chitose airport on the Island of
Hokkaido, north of Honshu. Other Delta planes were heading that way. More scrambling in the cockpit –
check weather, check charts, check fuel, okay. We could still make it and not be going into a fuel critical
situation … if we had no other fuel delays. As we approached Misawa we got clearance to continue to
Chitose. Critical decision thought process. Let’s see – trying to help company – plane overflies perfectly
good divert airport for one farther away.. .wonder how that will look in the safety report, if anything
goes wrong.
Suddenly ATC comes up and gives us a vector to a fix well short of Chitose and tells us to standby for
holding instructions. Nightmare realized. Situation rapidly deteriorating. After initially holding near Tokyo,
starting a divert to Nagoya, reversing course back to Tokyo then to re-diverting north toward Misawa, all
that happy fuel reserve that I had was vaporizing fast. My subsequent conversation, paraphrased of
course…., went something like this:
“Sapparo Control – Delta XX requesting immediate clearance direct to Chitose, minimum fuel, unable
hold.”
“Negative Ghost-Rider, the Pattern is full” <<< top gun quote <<< "Sapparo Control - make that - Delta XX declaring emergency, low fuel, proceeding direct Chitose" "Roger Delta XX, understood, you are cleared direct to Chitose, contact Chitose approach....etc...." Enough was enough, I had decided to preempt actually running critically low on fuel while in another indefinite holding pattern, especially after bypassing Misawa, and played my last ace.. .declaring an emergency. The problem with that is now I have a bit of company paperwork to do but what the heck. As it was - landed Chitose, safe, with at least 30 minutes of fuel remaining before reaching a "true" fuel emergency situation. That's always a good feeling, being safe. They taxied us off to some remote parking area where we shut down and watched a half dozen or more other airplanes come streaming in. In the end, Delta had two 747s, my 767 and another 767 and a 777 all on the ramp at Chitose. We saw two American airlines planes, a United and two Air Canada as well. Not to mention several extra Al Nippon and Japan Air Lines planes. Post-script - 9 hours later, Japan air lines finally got around to getting a boarding ladder to the plane where we were able to get off and clear customs. - that however, is another interesting story. By the way - while writing this - I have felt four additional tremors that shook the hotel slightly - all in 45 minutes. Cheers, J.D. DO 596 of 1673

Post

2011-03-16 – NRC – Fukushima Daiichi – Heroic Efforts Mean Fatal Doses

Riley (OCA), Timothy
From: Droggitis, Spiros
Sent: Wednesday, March 16, 2011 7:27 AM
To: Powell, Amy; Dacus, Eugene; Decker, David; Weil, Jenny; Riley (OCA), Timothy; Shane,
Raeann
Cc: Schmidt, Rebecca
Subject: Re: Q&As re: Japan
Heroic efforts mean fatal doses.
From: Powell, Amy
To: Droggitis, Spiros; Dacus, Eugene; Decker, David; Weil, Jenny; Riley (OCA), Timothy; Shane, Raeann
Cc: Schmidt, Rebecca
Sent: Wed Mar 16 07:11:36 2011
Subject: Re: Q&As re: Japan
Yes, I noticed that we time traveled a bit…
Amy Powell
Associate Director
Office of Congressional Affairs
U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Phone: 301-415-1673
Sent from my Blackberry
From: Droggitis, Spiros
To: Powell, Amy; Dacus, Eugene; Decker, David; Weil, Jenny; Riley (OCA), Timothy; Shane, Raeann
Cc: Schmidt, Rebecca
Sent: Wed Mar 16 07:07:25 2011
Subject: Re: Q&As re: Japan
This is great, except for the error in the first line – the date.
From: Powell, Amy
To: Droggitis, Spiros; Dacus, Eugene; Decker, David; Weil, Jenny; Riley (OCA), Timothy; Shane, Raeann
Cc: Schmidt, Rebecca
Sent: Wed Mar 16 06:06:40 2011
Subject: Q&As re: Japan
Attached is a document of Q&A responses prepared by OPA and technical experts in the Ops Ctr. We CANNOT send this
document in its entirety down to the Hill as is, but we can use it to respond to individual questions. I know that we “owe”
answers to questions to a number of staffers. Please read through here and see if answers are provided to questions that
came into you anf get back to the requesting staff. This may also help those of you in the Ops Ctr with calls.
Questions that speculate about what could happen, compare Japan regs with US, and other speculative Qs are NOT
included here. Just not the focus now.
Thanks
Amy
Amy Powell
Associate Director
339
Office of Congressional Affairs
U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Phone: 301-415-1673
Sent from my Blackberry
From: Harrington, Holly
To: Coggins, Angela; Taylor, Robert
Cc: McIntyre, David; Schmidt, Rebecca; Powell, Amy
Sent: Tue Mar 15 21:51:03 2011
Subject: RE: Japanese-Rx-Incident addtl questions – March-14-2011 doc.docx
Angela, Amy, Becki – These are fully approved by relevant folks in the Op Center. For your use. I have not
added to WebEOC yet as it’s not clear these should also be used by others…
From: Coggins, Angela
Sent: Tuesday, March 15, 2011 8:36 PM
To: Taylor, Robert
Cc: Harrington, Holly; McIntyre, David; Schmidt, Rebecca; Powell, Amy
Subject: Re: Japanese-Rx-Incident addtl questions – March-14-2011 doc.docx
Thanks so much!! I appreciate all the effort!
Angela Coggins
Policy Director
Office of Chairman Gregory B Jaczko
US Nuclear Regulatory Commission
anqela.co a)nirncs. oov/301-415-1828
From: Taylor, Robert
To: Coggins, Angela
Cc: Harrington, Holly; McIntyre, David; Schmidt, Rebecca; Powell, Amy
Sent: Tue Mar 15 20:29:17 2011
Subject: Japanese-Rx-Incident addtl questions – March-14-2011 doc.docx
Angela,
We have done our best to incorporate your questions into the Chairman’s Q&As that were developed earlier
today and provided to OCA. The updated set of Q&As is undergoing ET review and we will hopefully have it to
you in the near future. The attached provides a roadmap of where we believe the responses can be found. A
few questions fell into the broader “After this event is over, we will determine what changes need to be made in
the US” message. I did not directly incorporate them, but you can see a draft response in the attached.
Regarding the third question about past events, I did not try to evaluate all of the events you listed. I would
propose sticking to the party line, in that, “The NRC routinely reassess its regulatory requirements in light of
new operating experience and plant events.”
Regards,
Rob
340

Post

2016-07 – TEPCO – Fukushima Daiichi – Evaluation of the exposure dose of workers at the Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Station

Attachment
Exposure Dose Distribution
1. Effective Dose from External Exposure
Table 1 shows the distribution of external exposure dose of workers who were involved in radiation
work at the Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Station in the past three months.
Table 1. External Exposure Dose
・The values of the exposure dose and the number of the workers in the table above are subject to change, because there are times when APD
data are replaced with monthly dose data measured by integral dosimeters. Or dose data of workers who wore only an integral dosimeter (ex.,
workers who entered only the Main Anti-earthquake Building) need to be updated in the table after the publication of the data.
2. Sum of External and Internal Exposure Dose (Effective Dose)
Table 2 shows the distribution of cumulative exposure dose of workers who were involved in radiation
work at Fukushima Daiichi in the five years, starting from April 1, 2016. Table 3 shows the distribution of
cumulative exposure dose in the fiscal year of 2016. The tables show the data in two different periods of
time, from April 1, 2016 to June 30, 2016 and from April 1, 2016 to July 31, 2016 for comparison.
Table 2. Cumulative Exposure Dose in the Five Years
TEPCO’s
Employees Contractors Total
TEPCO’s
Employees Contractors Total
TEPCO’s
Employees Contractors Total
Above 100 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
75-100 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
50-75 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
20-50 0 6 6 0 11 11 0 5 5
10-20 0 61 61 0 145 145 0 84 84
5-10 0 328 328 4 467 471 4 139 143
1-5 142 2014 2156 180 2448 2628 38 434 472
1 or less 1164 7901 9065 1238 7766 9004 74 -135 -61
Total 1306 10310 11616 1422 10837 12259 116 527 643
Maximum (mSv) 4.90 32.46 32.46 6.22 33.23 33.23 – – –
Average (mSv) 0.40 0.97 0.91 0.44 1.22 1.13 – – –
Dose Ranges (mSv)
April 2016 – June 2016 April 2016 – July 2016 Difference
・The values of the exposure dose and the number of the workers in the table above are subject to change, because there are times when APD
data are replaced with monthly dose data measured by integral dosimeters. Or dose data of workers who wore only an integral dosimeter (ex.,
workers who entered only the Main Anti-earthquake Building) need to be updated in the table after the publication of the data.
・No significant internal exposure has been reported since October 2011.
TEPCO’s
Employees Contractors Total
TEPCO’s
Employees Contractors Total
TEPCO’s
Employees Contractors Total
Above 100 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
75-100 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
50-75 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
20-50 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
10-20 0 0 0 0 6 6 0 2 2
5-10 0 19 19 0 56 56 0 70 70
1-5 9 651 660 26 833 859 11 735 746
1 or less 1128 7748 8876 1166 7928 9094 1020 7749 8769
Total 1137 8418 9555 1192 8823 10015 1031 8556 9587
Maximum (mSv) 2.50 9.70 9.70 2.00 13.81 13.81 1.92 10.42 10.42
Average (mSv) 0.14 0.32 0.30 0.16 0.41 0.38 0.10 0.37 0.34
Dose Ranges (mSv)
May 2016 June 2016 July 2016
Table 3. Cumulative Exposure Dose in the Fiscal Year of 2016
・The values of the exposure dose and the number of the workers in the table above are subject to change, because there are times when APD
data are replaced with monthly dose data measured by integral dosimeters. Or dose data of workers who wore only an integral dosimeter (ex.,
workers who entered only the Main Anti-earthquake Building) need to be updated in the table after the publication of the data.
3. Sum of External and Internal Exposure Dose of Workers Exposed to Especially High Radiation (Effective Dose)
Table 4 shows the distribution of cumulative exposure dose of workers exposed to especially high
radiation.*1
Table 4. Cumulative Exposure Dose (workers exposed to especially high radiation)
(From October 2015, TEPCO Holdings has opted not to report to the Labour Standards Inspection Office about workers exposed to especially
high radiation.)
*1. Workers exposed to especially high radiation means workers who are involved in operations in which they could be exposed to the
emergency exposure dose limit (100mSv), which is stipulated in “Ordinance on Prevention of Ionizing Radiation Hazards, Chapter 7.” In more
detail, they are workers engaged in the work to maintain the function of the cooling facility to cool down the reactor facility or the spent fuel
tank in the reactor facility, the steam turbine and its related facilities or the surrounding area where the radiation doses exceed 0.1mSv/h. Or
they are workers who would engage in keeping running the function to control or prevent the release of a large number of radioactive materials
should it be likely to occur due to malfunction or damage of the reactor facility.
So far workers who have worked as “workers exposed to especially high radiation” are all TEPCO employees.
*2. The number of “workers exposed to especially high radiation” each month is the number of the workers who reported working as such
workers in a given month and were engaged in that work. The figures in the cumulative data during the period from March 2011 to September
2015 in Table 4 above include the numbers of workers who have been reported to work as “workers exposed to especially high radiation” at
least once.
*3. The values of the exposure dose and the number of the workers in the table above are subject to change, because there are times when APD
TEPCO’s
Employees Contractors Total
TEPCO’s
Employees Contractors Total
TEPCO’s
Employees Contractors Total
Above 100 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
75-100 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
50-75 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
20-50 0 6 6 0 11 11 0 5 5
10-20 0 61 61 0 145 145 0 84 84
5-10 0 328 328 4 467 471 4 139 143
1-5 142 2014 2156 180 2448 2628 38 434 472
1 or less 1164 7901 9065 1238 7766 9004 74 -135 -61
Total 1306 10310 11616 1422 10837 12259 116 527 643
Maximum (mSv) 4.90 32.46 32.46 6.22 33.23 33.23 – – –
Average (mSv) 0.40 0.97 0.91 0.44 1.22 1.13 – – –
April 2016 – July 2016 Difference
Dose Ranges (mSv)
April 2016 – June 2016
Above 100
75-100
50-75
20-50
10-20
5-10
1-5
1 or less
Total
Maximum (mSv)
Average (mSv)
102.69
36.49
Dose Ranges (mSv)
129
51
1203
145
1
191
233
267
186
March 2011 – September 2015
data are replaced with monthly dose data measured by integral dosimeters. Or the dose data of workers who wore only an integral dosimeter
(ex., workers who entered only the Main Anti-earthquake Building) need to be updated in the table after the publication of the data.
*4. The figure shown in the dose range, “Above 100mSv,” in the cumulative data during the period from March 2011 to September 2015 is the
figure when the March 2011 data of the internal exposure dose were reevaluated in July 2013.
4. Equivalent Dose
Table 5 and Table 6 show equivalent dose to the skin and the lens of the eyes of the workers, respectively,
who were involved in radiation work at the Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Station in the past three
months.
Table 5. Equivalent Dose to the Skin
・The values of the exposure dose and the number of the workers in the table above are subject to change, because there are times when APD
data are replaced with monthly dose data measured by integral dosimeters. Or the dose data of workers who wore only an integral dosimeter
(ex., workers who entered only the Main Anti-earthquake Building) need to be updated in the table after the publication of the data.
・Equivalent dose is a measure of the radiation dose to organs and tissues, and the equivalent dose limit to the skin is 500mSv/year (the
emergency exposure dose limit is 1Sv).
・Equivalent dose to the skin is measured at a depth of 70 micrometers from the skin surface. When the equivalent dose is measured with a
dosimeter other than the one put on around the chest and the abdomen, for example, a finger dosimeter, the maximum measurement value is
counted as the equivalent dose.
Table 6. Equivalent Dose to the Lens of the Eyes
TEPCO’s
Employees Contractors Total
TEPCO’s
Employees Contractors Total
TEPCO’s
Employees Contractors Total
Above 500 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
300-500 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
250-300 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
200-250 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
150-200 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
100-150 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
75-100 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
50-75 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
20-50 0 7 7 0 5 5 0 0 0
10-20 0 9 9 0 23 23 0 17 17
5-10 4 79 83 0 166 166 0 115 115
1-5 10 996 1006 37 1158 1195 11 871 882
1 or less 1123 7327 8450 1155 7471 8626 1020 7553 8573
Total 1137 8418 9555 1192 8823 10015 1031 8556 9587
Maximum (mSv) 5.70 33.00 33.00 4.50 40.70 40.70 1.92 16.38 16.38
Average (mSv) 0.16 0.51 0.47 0.18 0.64 0.58 0.10 0.47 0.43
Dose Ranges (mSv)
May 2016 June 2016 July 2016
TEPCO’s
Employees Contractors Total
TEPCO’s
Employees Contractors Total
TEPCO’s
Employees Contractors Total
Above 150 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
100-150 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
75-100 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
50-75 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
20-50 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
10-20 0 1 1 0 15 15 0 17 17
5-10 0 42 42 0 115 115 0 115 115
1-5 9 819 828 28 996 1024 11 871 882
1 or less 1128 7556 8684 1164 7697 8861 1020 7553 8573
Total 1137 8418 9555 1192 8823 10015 1031 8556 9587
Maximum (mSv) 2.50 11.90 11.90 2.00 13.81 13.81 1.92 16.38 16.38
Average (mSv) 0.14 0.40 0.37 0.16 0.51 0.47 0.10 0.47 0.43
Dose Ranges (mSv)
May 2016 June 2016 July 2016
・The values of the exposure dose and the number of the workers in the table above are subject to change, because there are times when APD
data are replaced with monthly dose data measured by integral dosimeters. Or the dose data of workers who wore only an integral dosimeter
(ex., workers who entered only the Main Anti-earthquake Building) need to be updated in the table after the publication of the data.
・Equivalent dose is a measure of the radiation dose to organs and tissues, and the equivalent dose limit to the lens of the eye is 150mSv/year
(the emergency exposure dose limit is 300mSv).
・The equivalent dose to the lens of the eyes is measured at a depth of 70 micrometers from the skin surface using a dosimeter put on around
the chest or the abdomen, and thus the shielding effect of face masks is not taken into consideration.
5. Cumulative Equivalent Dose
Table 7 and Table 8 show the distribution of cumulative equivalent dose to the skins and the lens of the
eyes of the workers, respectively, who were involved in radiation work at the Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear
Power Station during two different periods of time, from April 1, 2016 to June 30, 2016 and from April 1,
2016 to July 31, 2016 for comparison.
Table 7. Equivalent Dose to the Skin
・The values of the exposure dose and the number of the workers in the table above are subject to change, because there are times when APD
data are replaced with monthly dose data measured by integral dosimeters. Or the dose data of workers who wore only an integral dosimeter
(ex., workers who entered only the Main Anti-earthquake Building) need to be updated in the table after the publication of the data.
Table 8. Equivalent Dose to the Lens of the Eyes
TEPCO’s
Employees Contractors Total
TEPCO’s
Employees Contractors Total
TEPCO’s
Employees Contractors Total
Above 500 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
300-500 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
250-300 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
200-250 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
150-200 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
100-150 0 2 2 0 2 2 0 0 0
75-100 0 3 3 0 4 4 0 1 1
50-75 0 2 2 0 2 2 0 0 0
20-50 0 48 48 0 99 99 0 51 51
10-20 0 247 247 1 333 334 1 86 87
5-10 8 585 593 10 688 698 2 103 105
1-5 145 2175 2320 182 2497 2679 37 322 359
1 or less 1153 7248 8401 1229 7212 8441 76 -36 40
Total 1306 10310 11616 1422 10837 12259 116 527 643
Maximum (mSv) 9.70 104.70 104.70 11.62 105.47 105.47 – – –
Average (mSv) 0.45 1.58 1.45 0.48 1.88 1.72 – – –
Dose Ranges (mSv)
April 2016 – June 2016 April 2016 – July 2016 Difference
TEPCO’s
Employees Contractors Total
TEPCO’s
Employees Contractors Total
TEPCO’s
Employees Contractors Total
Above 150 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
100-150 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
75-100 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
50-75 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
20-50 0 23 23 0 60 60 0 37 37
10-20 0 147 147 0 245 245 0 98 98
5-10 1 446 447 4 584 588 3 138 141
1-5 146 2106 2252 182 2462 2644 36 356 392
1 or less 1159 7588 8747 1236 7486 8722 77 -102 -25
Total 1306 10310 11616 1422 10837 12259 116 527 643
Maximum (mSv) 5.30 36.50 36.50 6.22 44.68 44.68 – – –
Average (mSv) 0.41 1.23 1.14 0.45 1.54 1.42 – – –
April 2016 – July 2016 Difference
Dose Ranges (mSv)
April 2016 – June 2016
・The values of the exposure dose and the number of the workers in the table above are subject to change, because there are times when APD
data are replaced with monthly dose data measured by integral dosimeters. Or the dose data of workers who wore only an integral dosimeter
(ex., workers who entered only the Main Anti-earthquake Building) need to be updated in the table after the publication of the data.
End

Post

2011-04-03 – NRC – Fukushima Daiichi – 1-131 detected at Wolf Creek

From: Jensen Tammy J
Sent: Sunday, April 03, 2011 9:59 AM
To: Hoc, PMT12
Cc: Hammond Robert A; Muilenburg William T; Hooper Diane M; Sen Gautam
Subject: RE: 1-131 detected at Wolf Creek
Ms. Wastler,
Thanks for verifying that you received the information. I have spoken with Gautam Sen, Manager Licensing, this
morning. He will ensure that Bob Hammond loads the data in the NEI spreadsheet. Bob already had the password for
access. Bob is working nights to support our refueling outage, so it may not be updated immediately.
Will you be receiving the information from the Website in the future, or would you like us to send any future positive
sample results to this e-mail address also? We understand that submittal of the information is voluntary and doesn’t
constitute a notification.
Thanks,
Tammy Jensen
Manager Chemistry
Wolf Creek Nuclear Operating Corporation
620-364-8831 x5396 (during refueling outage)
From: Hoc, PMT12 [mailto:PMT12.Hoc@nrc.gov]
Sent: Saturday, April 02, 2011 6:20 PM
To: Jensen Tammy J
Subject: RE: 1-131 detected at Wolf Creek
Ms. Jensen
Thank you for the information.
For further reference, NEI is now collecting the information on radiation levels at US nuclear plants from
Fukushima. They have developed a password protected database where NPP’s can enter this data at
http://environmental.nei.org. I believe you will need to contact Ralph Anderson at RLA@nei.org to get a
password. Once you have the password, you can enter the information gathered at Wolf Creek into the database. I
would appreciate it if you could pass this information on to the appropriate staff at Wolf Creek.
Again, thank you for contacting us in this regard.
Sandra Wastler
Protective Measures Team
From: Jensen Tammy J [mailto:tajense@WCNOC.com]
Sent: Saturday, April 02, 2011 5:40 PM
To: Hoc, PMT12
Cc: Hammond Robert A; Muilenburg William T; Hooper Diane M; Sen Gautam
Subject: 1-131 detected at Wolf Creek
DB 689 of 696
I spoke to Bobby Eid on the phone this afternoon and voluntarily provided the following information. As we discussed,
this activity was verified to be coming from a source outside of Wolf Creek. The environmental air sampling data was
obtained from Bob Hammond who is copied on this e-mail in the event you have further questions. The water sampling
data was obtained by the Chemistry department. I’m the contact for that data. I am still working on the uncertainties. I
chose to send this data that I have now.
Environmental Data:
Lake surface water was sampled on 3/28 non-detectable for 1-131
Air Samples pulled on 3/14 & 3/21 non-detectable.
But on 3/28 had detectable 1-131 on Air Samples:
Location
WC-2
WC-18
WC-32
WC-37
WC-49
WC-53
1-131 concentration (pCi/m3)
0.10 ± 0.03
0.10 ± 0.02
0.11 ± 0.02
0.11 ± 0.02
0.09 ± 0.03
0.12 ± 0.03
Chemistry Data:
Included in attached Excel spreadsheet
If there’s anything else we can provide please let Bob or I know.
Thanks,
Tammy Jensen
Manager Chemistry
Wolf Creek Nuclear Operating Corporation
620-364-8831 x5396 (during refueling outage)
2
DB 690 of 696

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