1979-10-02 – Oak Ridge – What has happened to the survivors of the early Los Alamos Nuclear Accidents

-~ LA-UR-79-2 so 2 ca 0 ' \ ·No. 836 RJ :762\} I TITLE: WHAT HAS HAPPENED TO THE SURVIVORS... View Document


1948-11-01 – AEC – SLAPS – Uranium contamination at Airport Storage Area, St Louis MO

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s Atomic Energy ComOnfifsisc1eon u. • I k: Operations
New or 1 Di vi;:i on
November 1 • 1948
. ,; _-_·-·c(\_.M,·EfJJ.£NfiAt.,.- ~-~~ _ V.tiY
A study of pollution o£ Cold ‘?later Creek and content of
uranium that may be .found in the earth at the Airport .
Storage Area, st. Louis, Uissouri revealed the followinga
1. Creek water samples were well within the limits
of tole ranee.
2. M.ld samples adjacent to the area ranged in value ·
from nil to 190 times that of normal uranium
content in soil.
H~rever, no final conclusion should be drawn from these
Ad~itional samples both under normal and adverse weather
conditions need to be taken so that the evaluation o!
hazards presented by erosion and drainage both into the
Creek and adjacent area can be more soundly determined.
‘~ •
Egrpose of Raoo~
During the period z~~rch 23 to March 28, 1948 mud and l’later samples were
taken by Paul B. Klavin in the a raas adjacent to t.lJ.e air:9ort storage area,
Robertson, !o:;issouri. This sampling survey nas planned in order to study
(1} the pollution of Cold ~1ater Creek by materials stored or dun?ed at the
ai rport a rea, and (2) the content of uranium that might have soaked into the
~thod of _s.t u9z
Seventeen water samples werG collected in 500 cc bottles fr~ the various
drainage ditches and streams alongside and adjacent to the storage area. In
addition, samples were collected from the main stream, cold 7’fater Creek.
Samples of water ware obtained from various hiehway bridges frO!ll its oriein
to its mouth.
Fifty mud samples ”are tal(en in 250 cc bottles at both surface and subsurface
levels 01•-.3″ and .3″ to 7″ raspectively; the latter procu.Nd to indicate
pene·tr ation. Using a two inch di.a.metar pi-pe to obtain a 211 x 3″ cylinder
of mud, the sub~urface and surface mud was sampled throughout tht3 area west
of the property, where the most noticeable drainage from. the storage area
occurs. Thera lVere 20 sampling stations along a north-eouth line follotdng the
wast fence appro:x:i.:nately 25 – 30 feet apart. ‘Ihe remaining staticns were wast
of the fenced area along the drainage ditches and a9pr~ll~tely 100 feet apart.
In addition to these samples four control mud samples were taken at distances
of one and five miles from the area.
Soil and liquid samples were· analyzed by the University of Ro<'~he ster for uranium content. A soil analysis result of o.o signifies no uranitun detect ed. If present, the uranium concentration is less than 0.1 micrograms l;.ranium per gram of soil. The sensitivity of the water analysis is 0.0004 micrograms uranium per cc of water. ~scriotion of TeiTain aqjoining...MQ...E!:OJ29rlY at J:!obertson..a J:j. ss~t1 Just prior to the period of mud and water sampling t here had boen gena r-a.l and frequent rains causi ng sluage and residue to be washed onto the adjoining property wast of the area. The area nearest tha west fence was swampy and boggy with many small drainage ditches emanating .from the area itself. In the central portion of the adjoini..l'lg area there is a swampy stretch running northsouth for 250 feet and east"""'f9st f'or 125 feat. 'l'liElnty to thirty feet south of asphalt cover ed Brawn Road which borders the area on the nortn., there was a pool of l'fater 50 feet in length. Due wast of t his pool thora was a.nother swampy stretch 125 feet in length originating or terminating at the swampy section desc1~bed above. All of the ground west of the Sl'Bmp area leading to Cold Vlater C:reek was firm terr ain. Two IDAi."l ditchew originati.ng near the fence area were avident1 one 25 feet directly south of and parallel to Brown Road and the other, a larger one originates in ~~a residue area and runs due west for 500 fest into the creek. -1- . As previously m3ntioned, the rainy weather conditions prior to the' sa:npling period were unusually severe and caused the appearance t)f many ephe;aeral ditches in the area. Cold ilater Creek was swollen and turbulent along its entire course to the Missouri River. Discussion The results of the mud analysis showed conclusively that s01no3 residue from the area had been washed "estward towards the creek. It should b1~ recognized that the weather conditions at the time the samples W9re taken af~ects the amounts of uranium obtained par sample. 1.he uranium tolerance value has been given by K. z. ~~rgan a:s: 60 micrograms uranium per milliliter of water. All values from the seventeen water samples taken are well within the limits of tolerance, ths highest,.lO micrograms uranium per milliliter of water being 17% of the recommended laval. Fieure 1 shows the fall-off of intensity in Jlg/ml w.i th respect to distance. It can be noted here that although the path or the creek south of the area ~1s not been plotted, the concentration throughout was nil. The figure generally accepted for normal uranium in soil is 4 x 10-6 grams per gram. Of the 50 soil samples analyzed, the values range from nil to 190 tin:es this figure. Figures 2 and 3 show the number of samples takEn at surface and sub-ourface levels and their multiples of normal. Figura 4 contains plots of both surface and sub-ourface soil concentrations west of the fenced area, showing once again, the sharp drop in inte.nsity with distance. Conclusion '!he study revealed the followinit~ 1. The creek vrater samples ware well within the limits of tolel"ance. 2. }.fud samples adjacent to the area ranged in value from nil to 190 times that of normal uranium content in soil. It is felt that a sound conclusion cannot be drawn from the s~9les shown hera because of the unusual conditions that prevailed at the tillB of sampling. Because of the excessive rains, two divergent forces would tend to affect the results. There would be a tendency to a higher result because of tho increased erosion; while the increased quantity of water would tend to dilute 1;be concentration. With comprehensive data the evaluation of hazards presanted by erosion and drainage both into the creek and adjacent area can be more soundly determined. It is thersfore recommended that subsequent soil and liquid samples be taken during essentially dr.y conditions. -2- ------------------- . • '0 t z 3 • ~ ' 1 a O'- 2 l " ~ 6 7 a 9 o 34567891 ~±Tr-: f -:: - ·~ ,: _ + --~-ttt~ -. ~ --- 8 -- • ·. ~ . :!' . .... --~~ ... -.. .• • 1. - : • •. • t . ,;;;. ..: ·, J,.~,·. Figure .3 ,, ...... --- · -"·-~ ·· ___ ...,.. -.~ ....... ._..... _ . ....,._,..... ____ ~ ·-·------·----·-----'"--·--··! , ...... ~ ............... . " ·--· · ···-···.··--·-~ . 'i / -·--·' . ---.. , ·, ., ......... ... -.l Figun 2. ~j."· l.. .t. .· .k i:··":· ... ·- ,· • • • ANAJ,ISE.S Or' Water Samples Taken at Airport Area & Cold ·,rater Creak Robertson, ~ssouri Hlltiples Sample Ur!'niUI!l of pmf. No. Operation Date Description W.crogrami/ml !$vel 1 Airport Area 'J/23/48 Main stream 150 ft. from fence area 4.0 O.O? 2 ,, II " JUnction of stream and Cold ~ter Creek 0.45 o.oos .3 II It II Cold water Creek & Brown Rd . Approx. 250 it. "l from fence 6 . 0 0. 1 ., ... 4 II " II stream near Brown Rd. 10 i't. fran area .3. 5 o.o6 'J 5 II u Stream near Br01!1l Rd. {juncti on with Cold Water Creek) 10.0 0 .17 tt.r:' " I. . 6 II " • 10 ft. from area main stream leading into Cold ~~ Water Creek 7 .0 o.u 7 " " II 100 ft. from area . Stream near Br~tn Rd. 3. 5 o.o6 8 " II It Cold ','l'ater creek at Taylor Rd. Approx. 1 lllile t:: .:. ~., . J down tile creek 0. 015 O. OOOJ 1""' . ~ · 9 n It n Byp&ss 6? - Highl'lay l40 - ~zel'I'IOOd al. o.ooos o.oooo1 t 10 " It 11 Cold uater Creek - t mile N of New Halls Ferry Rd. o.oo10 0.00002 11 II II II Cold Water Creek - Ol d Ferry Ri. 0.0026 0. 00004 l2 II! n II Cold water Creek - Old Jamestown Rd. 0. 0010 . 00002 13 .. n .. Cold water Creek - Junction of Mo. 99 & Highway 67 0. 0020 . 0000.3 14 " II It Cold Water Creek-1m Halls Ferry Rd. & Patterson Rd. o.oo:w . 0000.3 15 " II It Cold water Creek at N• tural Bridge Rd. o.ooos . oooo1 • 16 II " It Cold Water Creek - St. Charles Rd. o.oooo 0 • • 5alnple No. Operation Date l? 18 A.irport. Area J/23/48 " II II aNALYSES OF Water S&mples Taken at Airport Al'aa & Cold Water Creek Robertson, ~s5ouri Description Cold ~t er Creek - ~dland Blvd. M.lltiples Ui~n.1:wn o.i" Pttti • Alicrograms/ml laval o.oooo 0 c:ra'Wfish picked up on area {Ash weight 3.0 grams} 12. )1/gram of ash .. · •r . ..:t I ~ -- ·-- • ANALYSES OF Soil Samples Taken at Airport Area, Robertson, Mo:. l!llti ples Sanple Uranium of nonaal No1 Q.Eeration Date Il!P'th ~ription micrograms tEE,aJn soil Con9_t 1 Airport Area 3/2E/4S Surface l.'ud 6r from S end of area drainage ditch 0 to 311 near railroad o.o 0 2 II II II Mld. .3" to 6tl 6r fran s end of area drainage ditch balOl'l surface near railroad o.o 0 3 11 II Surface mud 201 N of S and of fence 101 W of fence o.o 0 0 to 311 deep 4 !.Ud Jll to 6U 201 N of Send of fence 10' 'IV of fence o.o 0 r. ·.· II It n • deep ,~. · " 5 II II Surface mud .35' N of s end of f ence 101 W of fence o.o 0 ~ : o to 311 ~; . , .. 6 II II " l!l.d .3n to 6n .35 1 N of S end of fence lO' \1 of fence o.o 0 ~:· :"' deep ,. . f ? n 11 Surface mud 60• N from S eoo of fence lO• \'i of fence 3.2 .so 0 t o .311 a q II II MUd 311 to 7u 601 N from B end of fence 10 r 1'l of fence 3.3 .8,3 deep 9 II .. II Surface mud 95' .from S end of Fence 10' ',f of fence 760. 0 to 4" in ditch 190 10 II II II Surface mud 1251 N of SW end of fence 10' W of fence 19. 4.5 0 to 311 ll II II II }Jld 311 to 611 deep 1251 N of ~ end of fence 101 11 of fence 17. 4.3 12 II II II Surface mud 150' N of SW end of fence 10' W of fence l6. 4.0 • 0 to .3" deep • Sample Uranium !Jlltiples o:f no :rmal No. Operation Depth Description micrograms/gram soU Cone. 1;3 Airport Area J/28/48 llud ~~~ to 6" 1501 N of Sli end of .fence 101 Wo! .fenee 17. 4.;3 14 II II II &lrface mud 1801 N of 5W end t:.>£ renee 101 W of
0 to 3″ fence 8.1 2.0
15 n II .. l!ld 3u to 6•- 1801 N of S5. end of fence lOt Wo! o.o 0
16 II II Surface I!Dld 2201 N of SW end of fence 5′ ii of n. 2.8
0 to 3″ fence
17 11 II ” l’!Wi 3″ to 6n 2201 N of SN end of fence 5′ w or o.o 0
beneath surface fence
l8 II ” It lbd 0 to 511 250• N of SW end or fence 101 W of 9 • .3 2.7
deep fence
19 II II Surface mud 10′ N of NW end of fence o.o 0
0 to 4″ deep
20 II It II Surface mud 310′ N of Sif end of fence 101 \’l of o.o 0 I
0 to 411 fence
21 II II Surface md 201 s of Bl’own Rd. 1001 W of fence 12. 3
0 to 311 towards Cold ·,vater Creek
22 1:11 It .. )u to sin deep 100′ W of fenee towards Cold Water 2.1 o.s
Creek 201 S of Brown Rd.
2J II … It 0 to ,311 deep 2001 W of fence towards Cold ·:1ater 1.2 o3
Creek 201 5 of Brown Rd.
24 II II II Ml.d depth 311 2001 W o! fence towards Cold \'{ater o.o 0
to 611 Creek 5′ S ot Brown Rd.
25 II II II Surface I!Dld 275′ :’i o! fence towards Cold Water u. 2.8
0 to .)11 Creek 5′ S of Brown Rd. (Ditch) • 26 •• II It 3″ to 611 deep 275• w of fence towards Cola water
Creek 51 S of Brown Rd. (Ditch)
12. .3
·. – – —· -·- –·
.. – – • MJ.ltiples
$ample Uranium of normal
No . Operation DaUI Depth Desca-iption Mi.crogramB/gram soil cone.
27 Airport Area 3/’)13/413 l.ll.d 0 to Jitt 4501 ll” of fence near Col d Water Creek 5. 0 1. 25
101 from Brown Rd. (Ditch)
;cs II ” ” Surface mud 500′ r f of ~Ff end of fence junction 1. 5 .38
0 to 3 11 deep of ditch and Cold water Creek 10′ N
of Rl.ilroad tra cks
29 l l 11 n 3n to 7 11 deep 500′ \Y of SY: end of fence j unction o.o 0
ot ditch and·. Cold Water Creek 10′ N of Railroad tracks ·J.
30 II It II Surface mud 4001 Vf of Sl'( corner of fence 75′ N 4 – 5 1 .1 :!’
0 to 4″ deep of RR tracks (drainage ditch} : ~~– f:
31 ll II II 411 to 7″ be- 4001 W af S’:l corner of fence 751 N 2.2 .7
neath surface of RR tracks (drainage. ditch) ,.
32 ll II Surface mud 300′ ‘\’:” of S\7 end of fence (drainage 6 .0 1.5 ~ :.
0 to~~
·-·· : ditch) and 591 N of RR t racks . …,
3!11 to 6in 300′ ‘\’f of SW end of fence (drainage 6.
V ‘
33 •• 11 •• .24. I .
deep ditch) 50 1 N of RR tracks
34 II ” • Surface mud 200• W of s’• end oi f ence 751 N of n. 2.7
0 to 3″ 4eep RR tracks (drainage ditch)
35 II ll ” 311 to 6n 200• ‘II oi S’,f end of fence 75′ N of .3·4 .8.5
RR tracks (drainage ditch)
36 n It II 0 to 3″ deep 100′ W of’ SW end a! fence 50′ N o! 50. 12.5
Surface mud RR tracks (s1’lB.Illpy section)
Yl • • Ju to 6!n 1001 W of sn· end of f ence 50• N of ?.9 .2
RR tracks (Sllalllpy section)
38 II II II 0 to 2ttt sur- 1001 7( of srr and of fence 100′ N of 31. s.o
face mud RR tracks (swampy section)
. 39 n It 2~’ to 6~” 100′ w of S1f end of fence 1001 N o! 4. 0 1.0
If deep RR tracks (swampy section)
• MuJ:t.iples
&unple Urani\llll of normal
No. Oper14tion Date Depth Descri;etion :t.:~ crogramsLrz.a.m. soil Cone .
40 Airport ANa 3/2I3/JJ3 0..311 deep sur- 251 W of w fence towards Cold so. 12.5
face !!!.’J.d ~i’il.tar Creak, 200′ H or RR track
41 II 11 II 0…311 deep 201 w of 11 fence towards Cold ·t~ater 65. 16.2
surface mu.d C~ek 1001 1-1 of RR tra.cka (swamp) w: ~-·
42 II It J• to 6- deep 20• W of “f1 fence tor.oards Cold Water ?.1 1.8
Creak 100• N of RR tr&cks (swamp)
43 11 II 11 Surface mud 20• N of SVT end of fence .251 ‘!T of ?! 3.8 .95
0- 2~1 fence towards cold Water Creek
(drainage ditch)
44 II • • 2!11 to stu 201 N of Si’l end of fence 251 vr of Y o.o 0
deep fence t.ONards Cold ‘Nater Creek
(drainage ditch)
45 II 11 0 – 311 deep 110’ s of NW end of fence 251 7f or 38. 9.5
fence towards Cold :rater Creek ··:Sh-‘
Jn to 5~’
– ~
46 II 11 It u o• s of Nlf end of tenoe 251 w of 25. 6.2 ‘ .
deep fence tO”//&.rds Cold !’later Creek
47 ,, It II Surface mud Control Natural Bridge Rli. &. Air- o.o 0
0- .3″ deep port ~. 1 mile fran area
48 • • II 3″-Qn·daep Control Na.turs.l Bridge Rd . P~ Air- o.o 0
port Rd. 1 mile from area
49 11 • tt 9-3” daep sur- Control – 5 miles from Airport o.o 0
face 1111d Area city limits
50 II .. Jn-Ott deep Control – 5 miles fran J..irport o.o 0
Area city l:imits •
‘ .
.. •, ~·
… -.
, …… f’ … ~’ o-;w•….c;.s ICS
r KHOol cK£MtCAl WOR I
lfo4ALL.PtC ‘lor ·~ -~–··

., •
Hip 2


1986-05-06 – NRC – Chernobyl – Information for Licensee Regarding the Chernobyl Nuclear Plant Accident – ML031250016

·’;<) I • I LIS ORIGINAL UNITED STATES NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION • OFFICE OF INSPECTION AND ENFORCEMENT WASHINGTON, D.C. 20555 May 6, 1986 SSINS No.: 6835 --IN 86-33 IE INFORMATION NOTICE NO. 86-33: INFORMATION FOR LICENSEE REGARDING THE CHERNOBYL NUCLEAR PLANT ACCIDENT ~essees: Fuel cycle licensees and Priority 1 material licensees. furpose: • The purpose of this notice ts to provide background information only and requires no action on the part of recipients. The reference background information relates . to the Chernobyl nuclear plant accident and fs contained in the enclosed copy o.f Information Notice No. 86-32 sent to NRC nuclear power plant licensees on May 2, 1986. Discussion: As indicated by thr. enclosed information, radioactive material from the Chernobyl accident ts expected to be detected in the continental United States through EPA environmental surveillance, perhaps as assisted by Department of Energy facilities and NRC-lfcensed nuclear power reactor sites. The level·Of activity ta the United States ts expected to be low and should have little, if"any, impact on licensee monitoring programs. As stated in the enclosed notice~ any anomalous detection of radioactive material should be evaluated in ·accordance with your license to assure that any detected materials are properly identified as to source (i.e., licensed activities or the Chernobyl Event). , :J If you have any questions regarding this matter, please contact the Regional Administrator of the appropriate NRC regional office, or this office. Technical Contact: L. Rouse, NMSS 427-4205 Attachments: 1. Information Notice 86-32 "'"'1~ard L. Jod !:f:3 Division of~~.~~ Preparedness and Engineering Response Office of Inspection and Enforcement 2. List of Recently Issued I£ Information Notices ([6oso6os:W g lt0E>OU2
rt>R :t:€ la }Jo\\c.e. ~-~
May 2,. 1986
SSINS No.: b~J~
IN 86-32
Attachment 1
rn 86-33
May 6, 1986
Page 1 of 9
All nuclear power reactor faC:ilfty licensees holding an operating license (OL)
or construction permit (CP).
The pu·rpose of this information notice is to update licensees of the recent
Chernobyl nuclear power plant accident and to request voluntary reporting of
any licensee environmental radioactivity measurement data probably caused by
that event.
In order to enhance the Federal and state monitoring programs, all nuclear power
rea1;tor facilities with on-going environmental monitoring programs are requested
to consider the NRC request to report confirmed anomalous environmental radioactivity
measurements probably caused by radioactive material released in the
accident at the Chernobyl nuclear power plant in the U.S.S.R. It is requested
that recipients review the attached information and provide the enviro,nmental
data discussed herein.
Description of Circumstances:
Information issu~d by the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) concerning the
recent reactor accident in Chernobyl, USSR is contained in Attachments 1, 2 and 3.
In the week following the accident at Chernobyl, elevated levels of radioactivity
have been detected in air, rainwater, soil and food in many European countries.
The radionuclides that have been detected in air in these countries include:
I-131, Cs-137, Cs-134, Te-U2, Ru-103, Mo-99, Np-239, and Nb-95. Although
estimates of plume arrival time and location of entry into the continental
United States are highly uncertain at this time, the plume may arrive in the
Pacific Northwest United States during Hay 7-10, 1986.
It appears likely that radioactive material from the Chernobyl accident may
arrive within the continental U.S. in concentrations that are readily detectable.
In order to enhance nationwide environmental surveillance, the EPA (and some
states) have increased the airborne monitoring sampling frequencies to be better
able to detect any traces of the plume. In order to supplement and reinforce
this state and federal nationwide surveillance program, the NRC licensees [as
IN St”-32
Hay 2, 1986
Page 2 of 2
part of their routine Environmental Monitoring Program (EMP)] are requested to
voluntarily provide the following information:
1. Report to the NRC any anomalous environmental radiation or radioactivity
measurement that can be reasonably assumed to have resulted from the
Chernobyl accident. These confirmed measurement results from the
licensee’s routine EMP should be telephonically reported to the NRC
Operations Center (301-951·0550) wf thf n 24 hours of d~termining that
material from the accident has been measured. (Environment air sampling
probably is the most sensitive and thus most likely means of detecting
the airborne materials. Some other less-sensitive potential means of
detection may include personnel whole body counting equipment).
The reporting format should provide for:
1. Sample date(s) and approximate locations(s).
2. Medium or pathway (e.g., air particulate, air charcoal, milk).
3. Type of analysis (e.g., gross beta, iodine-131, other gamma emitter).
4. Statistical data (mean, range, number of samples).
Any data provided by NRC licensees wf 11 be shared with appropriate federal
agencies. The NRC as part a combined Interagency Task Force is providing daily
technical information reports to the Institute for Nuclear Power Operations (I~PO).
This updated technical information is available to member utilities through INPO’s
Nuclear Network system. Because the sensitivity and broad scope of existing
licensee programs, augmentation of the NRC licensee EMPs is not necessary.
Any anomalous detection of radioactive material should be evaluated in
accordance with facility license, technical specifications and applicable
regulations to assure that the detected materials are properly identified as
to source (e.g., either plant operations or the Chernobyl Event).
We appreciate your cooperation with us on thts matter. If you have any
questions regarding this matter, please contact the Regional Administrator of
the appropriate NRC regional office, or thts office.
• ~/;.~ Divf si of Emergency Preparedness
and E gineertng Response
Office of Inspection and Enforcement
Technical Contacts: James E. Wigginton, IE
Roger L. Pedersen, IE
(301) 492-9425
1. EPA Task Force Report (May 1, 1986)
2. Talking Points (April 30, 1986)
3. Fact Sheet (May 2, 1986)
4. List of Recently Issued IE Information Notices
– I f
~ ~-~–~nir1-11m 8:6:-‘3:2″ 1’,–~~—-~~ Soviet Nuclear Mayz.
Page 3 of
. ‘
ZOR KELEASE: 2:00 P.M., 1’BURSDAY, MAY l, ·1986
. .
A-Task Force Report
. (202) 382-4355 0n· Tues-‘ay:, thtt tnvtronrnental Protection Ag.,ncy, which
maintains the na~ion’s radiation ~onitoring net~ork,, increased
its Aa”plinQ frequency for airborne ra.,loactivlty to, daily. Results
o~tained thus far show no increase in radioactivity abov~ n~rT-tal
background levels. Th• Canadian air nonltorinQ network has also
increased lts sa~plin; frequency to daily. Results there show no
increase in radioactivity.
The air ~ass containing the radloactlvltf frOI~ t~~ initial
Ch•rnobyl nuclear event ls no~ widalt dispersed throughout
~orth•rn Europe and Polar regions. P~rti~~~ nf radioactivity.off
the north~•st norwe9ian coast yesterday ~ornlng shnulj continue to
disperse with possi~le no~eQent toward the east In the next s~~er&\
days. Other portions of the radioactive air ~ass may nove east~ar~
~hrough the Soviet Union and through th~ Polar regions over the
coning week.
The Soviets ~ave r•ported they t\a~e snoth~re~ the fire. From
our infot’Jllation.tt is not clear whether the fire is out or not. ~~
also cannnt confi CTt n.-•;; r.er>orts of ja.’!laoe at a second react•~L·, ~’Jt
the second hot spot seen in t.he L.,:.ans~T photos ls not a reAc~~c.
The u.~. Government has offered to provide technical
assistance to the Soviet GoverfU’llent to deal with the accident.
O~ Wednesday afternoo”• a senior Soviet official frona their
En~assy in WashinQton delivered a note to the ~part~ent of
State exrsressinQ appreciation for n’1c of fer of assistance and
stating that for the time being, assistanc\! is not n~eded •
. ,t the present tir”e, the! tl.S. no”-tC’n’=’ent has no data ~”
ra~latio” \e~~la oc- conta~lnatlon levels at •~Y location ~ithin
the Soviet Oniof\. Ye slso t\ave no fl rn l nforAat.ion concern t •l’J
the nuMhec- of casualties f co~ the aeci~ent.
(more) –
-2-. .. . . . . .
‘l’he Department of State is not advising ·against travel to the
S.oviet. Union, Scandinavia and eastern !urope. As a ·-result of the
nuclear.accident, the State Department has iaaued a travel advisory
recommending agalnilt travel to Xi•v and adjacent areas. We are
largely dependent on the Soviet• for information on conditions
within tbe USSR and we are doing everything posaible to obtain
relevant information frcn Soviet authorities. Americana plannino
travel to the sovi•t Union and adjacent countries abould carefully
monitor preaa reports on thi• rapidly changing a~tuation to make aa
fully jnfo~ed a decision aa poaalble with respect to their travel
plane. ·They .should bear in mind that many of these countries have
reported ·1nci.·e . aaed level• o-f radiation in ~· environment • . – ‘ .The State Department Off lee of Legia~atlve Affai~s has
commented that customary international law requires the soviet
Union to notify other-States/Countries of the possibility o!
transboundary effecta of the incident and to !urniah them with
the information neceaaa.ry to addreaa those effects.
Tbe Whit• Bouse has established an Interagency Taak Force
to coordinate the Government’s response to the nuclear reactor
accident in Chernobyl. Th• Task Poree is under the direction
o! Lee M. Thomas, Adminlatrator of the Environmental Protection
Agency, with representatives from th• White Bouse, Department of
State, EPA, Department of Energy, Nuclear Regulatory Camn1as1on,
National Oceanic and Atmospheric Adm1n1atratlon, o.s. Air Force,
Department of Agriculture, food and Drug Administration, Pederal
Emeroency Management Agency, Department of Interior, Federal . .
Aviation Adm1n1atratloA, the u.s. Public Health Service, and
other agenci••· ·
• I• •

— —
.. -,. ‘ . ~
April 30, 1986: .
. ·- — -· ………. “” …
I~ 86-32
May Z, 1986
o Late Friday, April 25, or early:saturday, April 26, a
serious accident occurred at the Chernobyl· nuclear facility
near ~lev in the Soviet Union. As a result of :an apparent
loss of reactor coolant, the facility experienced a core·
meltdown, explosion, and fire. Causes of the ~ccident ·are .
not known.
o The explosion and resulting fire released a plu=e of
radioactive materials to the atmosphere. So long as the
reactor ~re.fire continues, radioactive gases will be given
off. · . · . · · ·
• – o The facility involved is a graphite-moderated,,
boiling-water-cooled, pressure-tube unlt. It is one df four
such units at Chernobyl. To our knowledge, only this one
unit, known as Onit t4, is involved in the accident.
o The initial plume traveled in a northwest direction
toward Scandanavia. Predictions now suggest it will move in
an eastward direction. Radiation levels above normal background
have been detected in Scandanavian countries. However, these
levels pose no significant risk to human health or the
o The U.S. government has made an offer of technical
assistance to the Soviets. This good faith offer vas made
out of genuine concern for the health and safety of the Soviet
people. The Soviet government responded April 30 that no ·
foreign assistance is needed. •
o We have also requested specific information on the
accident. To date, ve have not received a full response to
that request. This is also a matter of great concern to the
UnitP.d States.
o The radiation plume emitted as a result of the Chernobyl
accident will disperse over time throughout the Northern
Hemisphere. Eventually, some radioactive contamination will
reach the Onlted States. However, based on the limited
information we now have. there is no reason to believe that
levels reaching this country will pose any significant risk
to human health or the environment. Please see the accompanying
fact sheet on radiation health effects for basic information
on exposure.
Page 5 of
o It is very· unlikely t._hat any a~gnificant· :amoun~s of
radiation from the accident will reac~ the u.s~ during the
next few days. The Environmental Protection Agency’s •.
Environmental Radiation Ambient Monitoring:syst~ — ERAM$ -~
is conducting daily sampling throughout the nat~on. In
addition to ambient air, the system also monitors radiatlo~
levels in drinking .water., surface water, and milk.
o The White House has established an interagenc:y task
force to monitor the health, safety and environmental consequences
of the Chernobyl accident. T~e task force is chaired-by Lee
Thomas, Administrator of the U.S. Environmental Protection·
Agency. Members represent the following federal agencies:
EPA, DOE, N~C~ NOAA, HHS, USDA, DOD, DOT and others. On a
daily basia, the task force compiles, evaluates, and widely
distributes ·current technical information on the Chernobyl
accident and its environmental and health consequencers.


” .
Fact Sheet-Chernobyl
Attachment 3
IN 86-S
May 2, 1986
FOR RELEASE: 2:00 P.M., FRIDAY, MAY 2, 1986
CONTACT: DAVE COHEN (202) 382-4355
Radiation monitoring networks ~n the United States and
Canada are continuing to analyze for airborne radioactivity •
daily. No increases fn radioactivity above normal background
levels have been detected in either country. Canadian officials
intend to increase the sampling frequency of their milk
monitoring network, which consists of 16 stations near
population centers in southern Canada, to weekly beginning
next week.
It is believed that air containing radioactivity now covers
much of Europe and a large part of the Soviet Union. The distribution
of radioactivity is likely to be patchy. Afr containing
radioactivity detected by aircraft at 5000 feet about 400 miles
west of no,rthern Norway is believed to have moved westward and now
appears to be heading south or southeastward perhaps to return to
western Europe. There is no independent confirmation O·f the radioactivity
in the air moving eastward across Asia.
(A weather map should be attached to today’s Task Force Report.
If you do not have a copy, ft can be picked up in the EPA press
office, room 311, West Tower, 401 M St., S.W. (202) 382-4355.)
Environmental monitoring data have been provided by the Swedish
government for the Stockholm area for April 28-30. Extrapolations
of those data suggest that radiation exposure levels at the Chernobyl
site would have been in a range from 20 rem to hundreds of rem
whole-body for the two-day period over which IDOSt of the radiation
release probably took place. Radiation doses for the thyroid gland
have been estimated to be in a range from 200 rem to thousands of rem
for the same period. These doses are sufficient to produce severe
physical trauma including death. It should be emphasized that these
are estimates subject to considerable uncertainty. The U.S. has
as yet no information from the Soviet Union as to actual radiation
levels experienced at the accident site.
Page 7 of
The Soviets have reported they have smothered the fire. We
still cannot confirm that the reactor fire in unit 4 has been
extinguished. There fs evidence that the reactor or associated
equipment continues to smolder. We also cannot confirm news
reports of damage at a second reactor, but the second hot spot
seen in the LANDSAT photos is not a reactor.
Based on the fact that no harmful levels of radioactivity are
expected to reach the continental United States, ft is highly
unlikely that potassium iodide (KI) will be needed to minimize
the uptake of radioactive iodine from the Russian nuclear power
plant accident. KI, although relatively harmless, has been
associated with certain allergic reactions; thus, since the use
of KI is not without some risk to the population, the U.S. Public
Health Service recommends against taking KI as a precautionary
measure. Federal authorities do not believe there is any reason
for concern at this time about the safety of either our domestic
food or drug supplies. Nor should there be concern over imported
products already in the United States or on their way to the
United States at the time of the nuclear accident in the Soviet
The State Department is continuing efforts to obtain relevant
information from Soviet authorities on the nuclear accident and
the potential health dangers that might be posed to individuals
in the Soviet Uni on and adjacent countries. State has noted, f.or
example, recent statements issued by Polish authorities concerning
public health precautionary measures.
The State Department is seeking more information from all the
governments in the region. The U.S. is sending experts to
potentially affected areas for medical consultation and to provide
relevant expertise on which to make appropriate reconnendations
with regard to the health of American citizens.
With the limited data at hand, the Departments of State and
‘- . Health and Human Services have issued an advisory against travel
to Kiev and adjacent areas. To minimize possible exposure to
radioactive contamination, we also suggest that those in Eastem
Europe avoid milk and other dairy products. In addition, State
is recommending that women of child-bearing age and children
i!:k should not travel to Poland until the situation ts clarf fied.
The State Department is receiving reports from our European
embassies, based on their discussions with local officials, as to
the impact of the accident and local reactions to it. We are
still not receiving the necessary technical information from the
Soviets on the details of the accident.
.Page”. cs. of–:~ ·.
,_ ….
The White House has .established an Interagency .Task Force
to coordinate the Government’s response to the nuclear reactor
accident in Chernobyl. The Task Force is under the direction
of Lee M. Thomas, Administrator of the Environmental Protection
Agency, with representatives from the White House, Department of
State, EPA, Department of Energy, Nuclear Regulatory Conaission,
National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration, U.S. Atr Force;
Department of Agriculture, Food and Drug Administration,· Federal
Emergency Management Agency, Department of Interior. Federal
Aviation Administration. the U.S. Public Health Service, and
other agencies.
‘ ‘ ‘ •
Page 9 of 9
… ,.. .

.. . .
Notice No. Subject
86-32 Request For Collection Of
Licensee Radioactivity
Measurements Attributed To
The Chernobyl Nuclear Plant
86-31 Unauthorized Transfer and
Loss of Control of
Industrial Nuclear Gauges
86-30 Design Limitations of
Gaseous Effluent Monitoring
86-29 Effects of Changing Valve
Motor-Operator Switch
86-27 Access Control at Nuclear
86-26 Potential Problems In
Generators Manufactured By
Electrical Products
86-25 Traceability And Material
Control Of Material And
Equipment, Particularly
OL = Operating License
CP = Construction Permit
Date of
Attachment 2
IN 86-33
Hay 6, 1986
Issued to
All power reactor
facilities holding
an OL or CP ..
All power reactor
facilities holding
an OL or a CP
All power reactor
facilities holding
an OL or a CP
All power reactor
facilities holding
an Ol or a CP ·
All power reactor
facilities holding
an OL·or CP, research
and nonpower reactor
facilities, and fuel
fabrication & processing
All power reactor
facilities holding
an Ol or CP
All power reactor
facilities holding
an OL or CP


2013-05 – NRC – Chernobyl Nuclear Power Plant Accident Background

Chernobyl Nuclear Power Plant Accident
On April 26, 1986, a sudden surge of power during a reactor systems test destroyed Unit 4 of the nuclear power station at Chernobyl, Ukraine, in the former Soviet Union. The accident and the fire that followed released massive amounts of radioactive material into the environment.
Emergency crews responding to the accident used helicopters to pour sand and boron on the reactor debris. The sand was to stop the fire and additional releases of radioactive material; the boron was to prevent additional nuclear reactions. A few weeks after the accident, the crews completely covered the damaged unit in a temporary concrete structure, called the “sarcophagus,” to limit further release of radioactive material. The Soviet government also cut down and buried about a square mile of pine forest near the plant to reduce radioactive contamination at and near the site. Chernobyl’s three other reactors were subsequently restarted but all eventually shut down for good, with the last reactor closing in 1999. The Soviet nuclear power authorities presented their initial accident report to an International Atomic Energy Agency meeting in Vienna, Austria, in August 1986.
After the accident, officials closed off the area within 30 kilometers (18 miles) of the plant, except for persons with official business at the plant and those people evaluating and dealing with the consequences of the accident and operating the undamaged reactors. The Soviet (and later on, Russian) government evacuated about 115,000 people from the most heavily contaminated areas in 1986, and another 220,000 people in subsequent years (Source: UNSCEAR 2008, pg. 53).
Health Effects from the Accident
The Chernobyl accident’s severe radiation effects killed 28 of the site’s 600 workers in the first four months after the event. Another 106 workers received high enough doses to cause acute radiation sickness. Two workers died within hours of the reactor explosion from non-radiological causes. Another 200,000 cleanup workers in 1986 and 1987 received doses of between 1 and 100 rem (The average annual radiation dose for a U.S. citizen is about .6 rem). Chernobyl cleanup activities eventually required about 600,000 workers, although only a small fraction of these workers were exposed to elevated levels of radiation. Government agencies continue to monitor cleanup and recovery workers’ health. (UNSCEAR 2008, pg. 47, 58, 107, and 119)
The Chernobyl accident contaminated wide areas of Belarus, the Russian Federation, and Ukraine inhabited by millions of residents. Agencies such as the World Health Organization have been concerned about radiation exposure to people evacuated from these areas. The majority of the five
Page | 2
million residents living in contaminated areas, however, received very small radiation doses comparable to natural background levels (0.1 rem per year). (UNSCEAR 2008, pg. 124-25) Today the available evidence does not strongly connect the accident to radiation-induced increases of leukemia or solid cancer, other than thyroid cancer. Many children and adolescents in the area in 1986 drank milk contaminated with radioactive iodine, which delivered substantial doses to their thyroid glands. To date, about 6,000 thyroid cancer cases have been detected among these children. Ninety-nine percent of these children were successfully treated; 15 children and adolescents in the three countries died from thyroid cancer by 2005. The available evidence does not show any effect on the number of adverse pregnancy outcomes, delivery complications, stillbirths or overall health of children among the families living in the most contaminated areas. (UNSCEAR 2008, pg. 65)
Experts conclude some cancer deaths may eventually be attributed to Chernobyl over the lifetime of the emergency workers, evacuees and residents living in the most contaminated areas. These health effects are far lower than initial speculations of tens of thousands of radiation-related deaths.
U.S. Reactors and NRC’s Response
The NRC continues to conclude that many factors protect U.S. reactors against the combination of lapses that led to the accident at Chernobyl. Differences in plant design, broader safe shutdown capabilities and strong structures to hold in radioactive materials all help ensure U.S. reactors can keep the public safe. When the NRC reviews new information it takes into account possible major accidents; these reviews consider whether safety requirements should be enhanced to ensure ongoing protection of the public and the environment.
The NRC’s post-Chernobyl assessment emphasized the importance of several concepts, including:
 designing reactor systems properly on the drawing board and implementing them correctly during construction and maintenance;
 maintaining proper procedures and controls for normal operations and emergencies;
 having competent and motivated plant management and operating staff; and
 ensuring the availability of backup safety systems to deal with potential accidents.
The post-Chernobyl assessment also examined whether changes were needed to NRC regulations or guidance on accidents involving control of the chain reaction, accidents when the reactor is at low or zero power, operator training, and emergency planning.
The NRC’s Chernobyl response included three major phases: (1) determining the facts of the accident, (2) assessing the accident’s implications for regulating U.S. commercial nuclear power plants, and (3) conducting longer-term studies suggested by the assessment.
The NRC coordinated the fact-finding phase with other U.S. government agencies and some private groups. The NRC published the results of this work in January 1987 as NUREG-1250.
The NRC published the second phase’s results in April 1989 as NUREG-1251, “Implications of the Accident at Chernobyl for Safety Regulation of Commercial Nuclear Power Plants in the United
Page | 3
States.” The agency concluded that the lessons learned from Chernobyl fell short of requiring immediate changes in the NRC’s regulations.
The NRC published its Chernobyl follow-up studies for U.S. reactors in June 1992 as NUREG-1422. While that report closed out the immediate Chernobyl follow-up research program, some topics continue to receive attention through the NRC’s normal activities. For example, the NRC continues to examine Chernobyl’s aftermath for lessons on decontaminating structures and land, as well as how people are returned to formerly contaminated areas. The NRC considers the Chernobyl experience a valuable piece of information for considering reactor safety issues in the future.
The Chernobyl reactors, called RBMKs, were high-powered reactors that used graphite to help maintain the chain reaction and cooled the reactor cores with water. When the accident occurred the Soviet Union was using 17 RBMKs and Lithuania was using two. Since the accident, the other three Chernobyl reactors, an additional Russian RMBK and both Lithuanian RBMKs have permanently shut down. Chernobyl’s Unit 2 was shut down in 1991 after a serious turbine building fire; Unit 1 was closed in November 1996; and Unit 3 was closed in December 1999, as promised by Ukrainian President Leonid Kuchma. In Lithuania, Ignalina Unit 1 was shut down in December 2004 and Unit 2 in 2009 as a condition of the country joining the European Union.
Closing Chernobyl’s reactors required a combined effort from the world’s seven largest economies (the G-7), the European Commission and Ukraine. This effort supported such things as short-term safety upgrades at Chernobyl Unit 3, decommissioning the entire Chernobyl site, developing ways to address shutdown impacts on workers and their families, and identifying investments needed to meet Ukraine’s future electrical power needs.
On the accident’s 10th anniversary, the Ukraine formally established the Chernobyl Center for Nuclear Safety, Radioactive Waste and Radio-ecology in the town of Slavutych. The center provides technical support to Ukraine’s nuclear power industry, the academic community and nuclear regulators.
The Soviet authorities started the concrete sarcophagus to cover the destroyed Chernobyl reactor in May 1986 and completed the extremely challenging job six months later. Officials considered the sarcophagus a temporary fix to filter radiation out of the gases from the destroyed reactor before the gas was released to the environment. After several years, experts became concerned that the high radiation levels could affect the stability of the sarcophagus.
In 1997, the G-7, the European Commission and Ukraine agreed to jointly fund the Chernobyl Shelter Implementation Plan to help Ukraine transform the existing sarcophagus into a stable and environmentally safe system. The European Bank for Reconstruction and Development manages funding for the plan, which will protect workers, the nearby population and the environment for decades from the very large amounts of radioactive material still in the sarcophagus. The existing sarcophagus was stabilized before work began in late 2006 to replace it with a new safe shelter. The new confinement
Page | 4
design includes an arch-shaped steel structure, which will slide across the existing sarcophagus via rails. This new structure is designed to last at least 100 years.
Information Resources
United Nations Scientific Committee on the Effects of Atomic Radiation – Chernobyl
International Atomic Energy Agency – Chernobyl Forum
World Health Organization – Health Effects of the Chernobyl Accident
May 2013


1972-12-05 – Cotter Corporation – Decontamination of Latty Avenue Storage Site, Hazelwood Missouri

n’ … __ …- ·’
WLA 2154
=··- ‘”:’l : “‘” ·- ~.
; ~ : .. ; f • .'”!;. ( _.
:.;..,: . .. =~-;”‘·:- …
tr. Frar~< ?it~nan, Pirec~or Divisic:~ cf W ~t:.a i-;ar.age~;ot: and Trans~or~ati~;o U.S. Ato::tic En\;r~y Ccr=.ission WashinEt~n, D.C. 205~5 Dece10e.r S, 1!:7 . Re: Cot:t:e~ Cor?cration-Decontaminat:ion of Storaz.a Si :-s, ~a::el""·ood, Hi..ssot.:ri Cott:c~ Cor~c~a~ion sub~its he~~with a orc~csa: fo~ ceco:1t:~=.ina~i~~ cf th~ si~ a a~ Lat:~y Avar.ue, fiez~ l\,oc::!, l·:.izso~=-i u;c::1 ·~~.:.c:t ce!'~clin r-z:.~ioac-:.i•Je r~si·.!ue~ cic:--ivad fror:: t: ite prccessi::~ of Co;;;.:o m"'a!"•i u::-. o:-cz have been store!oration al’.d 5 & :…
Const~c~ion Coo~a~y, !nc. 7 which set fo~h L~ de~ail~
the ~:u,e~ in wale~ t~e deconta~~tion orocess will
be ef!ec:tec. –
As ycu and your s~aff ~iow, Cot~er Cor?ora~io»
a~quireci tr.e residue cat:eri~l ~, lS67, and in ~h~
in~eri~, r~:ov~~,;rocessed and ~de ult~ate dispcsi~
ic~ of all resi~ues ~hich coulc eco~o:ically
be ~rea~~d except for 1:,uoo “tens oi Colcraco
raf£~ia-:=~ ~~ic~ ~i~l be shi?P=~ to the ~ll L~ ~t~
~ •
WLA 2155
near future. The then re::naining ::.a:tarial, which is
t~e subject of this proposal, consis~s prir.cipally
of leae~ec bari~ sulfate, niseellar.eous residues
and da~ris, cocprising approximately a,soo tons.
We have ex~lored all altar~a~iv~s to dis~ositicn
at the Quarry DUr.p Site ~~d conclude tha~ none of the~
offer comparable advantages in terms of safety, convenience
and econo~cs. The Quarry Dump Site alreaay
contains similar raaioactive waste and must be consi~eraa
a permanent burial area, and its location in relation
to the Hazelwood stcrage site L~sures safe transpor~atic~
ove~ a distance ma~y ti~es shorter than the nearest
available alterna~ive.
We stand ready tc provi~a any !frr~her inforr~tiov
which you ~1 dasire i~ considering ~~d a~ting upon ‘
this proposal.
Ve~y truly yours,
By: ~a-.:J p. m ~·:ZI–
oav~c:; ?. ,.a;::-co”C~,
txecu~ive Vice Presidan~
WLA 2104
‘\.., .. ,..·
,_.. ..
AEC License No. SUB 1022 (40-8025)
May, 1972
-., ~ …
~ .. .
.. .. –
rt is the intent of this proposal to provide a
means whereby land leased by Cotter Corporaticn of Golden,
Colorado (t~e Licensee} may be decontaminated and returned
for•no~al ~and use with no restrictions, in full compliance
with all applicable rules a..11d regulations of the Atomic
Energy Co~ssion. The property in question consists of
Hazelwood, Missouri {see FI~J?~ 1).
D~~ recent years, the area has been use~ as a
.. storage and processing site for raffinates and c~~er radioactive
res~dttes, and other radioactive debris. This proposal
presents a plan of action for decontamination of the site and
ultimate disposal of the radioactive residues and debris •

–· RETA &
Latty Avenue
Sketch net to scale
WLA 2106
WLA 2107
The history of the residues is a long and complicated
one. The most complete historical review of this
material was compiled by Walter J. Raubach in August, 1967.
This review is included hereLn as APP~~~IX A.
According to Mr. Bauback, the original material
was obtained from the Belgian congo in 1944 for processing
by_Mallinckrodt at the Destrehan Street Plant in St. Louis.
acre trac~, located at Roberston, Missouri. In J~~e of 1960
the residues were offered for public sale for processing or
utilizaticr. by private industry.
•T.he intent of the ‘Offer for Sale’ was to allow
private industry to recover the valuable metals: copper,
nickel ~~d ccbal~ • . The original request for bid offered ~~e
bidder several al~ernatives. The pur~~aser could use the

• … _.
WLA 2108
existing site for purposes of concentrating and extracting
any desired material, or he could remove the residue from
the site for processing or utilization elsewhere. The
materials remaining qfter the purchaser’s processing operations
were over, could be disposed of oy b~e purchaser at the
Weldon Springs dump site whether or not processing was done .
on the present site or elsewhere. The Weldon Springs Quarry
Dump site was a pit located in St. Charles County on Missouri
State Bighway No . 94 apprc:;;imately five :niles SO’.!th~·;es t of
the Weldon Springs plant and approximately 30 miles from the
airport site. The site was accessible by tru~~ from Missouri
State Route 94 and a spur track lead off the eristi:1g east
way of. the Atcmic Energy Co~~ssion•s plant track system providing
railway access to the dump pit.”
Later in 1960, word was received that it was quite
.-unlikely that the private contract would be awarded since ~~e
United States Geological Survey forbade the dumping of the sludges,
processed or not, into the quarries in question because of the
high probability of contaminating the Missouri River shortly
above the im:akes for the St. Louis City and St. Louis County
WLA 2109
water supplies. Due to the many problems, the St. Louis
Area Office was contacted by Oak Ri dge Operations and asked
to hold up awarding any contract on airport sludge.
The material was subsequently obtained, in 1964,
(see APPENDIX B) by Continental Mining & Milling Company of
Chicago, Illinois. Continental bor rowed $2,500,000 from
Commercial Discount of Chicago to buy ane p~ocess the residues ,
using the resieues as security . Continental mvved tt~e mate=ial
from the airpor t to the present site on Latty Avenue. This move
required t en d~~ t–u~~ s for five months and cost Continental
$100 , 000. They were unable to maintain the loan pa~nnents while
~~–.—~. …..- -e- ‘””””” ” ~
they w.ere moving the material, so Commercial foreclosed ti · 1..:~ ~-~- – · .. ·
. • =·: .. ‘::~ ••• • “‘·
·.. ~ ~- “‘::::· ….. ·. ~ …. .. .
.. . ,., ..
-~·· :.. ·· … “” ____ _
The Cornroercial Discount Corporation paid $800,000
for the raffinates at a public auction of the assets of the
·· Continental Mining & Milling Company. lt was their only recourse
to protect the $2,500,000 investment they had in the raffinates.
In this foreclosure procedure, t hey obtained besides the 100,000
tons of waste mat erial, an office building, · three plant buildings
and the prope~t upon which the residues are now stored. ThE~e
• •• I
WLA 2110
residues were again offered for sale at a public auction on
February 3, 1967, and they failed to draw a single bid.
Commercial D. iscount decided to process the residues
themselves by drying and shipping them to Cotter corporation
for mineral extraction (License No. SMC-907 (40-7603)]. The\
consulting firm of Ryckman, Edgerley, Toml~nson and Associat~s
(RETA), were retained to advise them on radiological heal~~
and industrial hygiene problems. In Novembe~, 1968, Co~~ercial •
Discount discontinued operation and the site was shut down.
In August, 1970, Cotter Corporation began d=Yi~g
,.. …… ___ ..&..,.: ___ iT.: _____ \.~- ~,.’t’f’\,.,,_-.~ 14A f’ltl’\.-…e-\1″1 –.:1 –‘–~ ~-.._., …..,_ -1:”—–•·•- a..–~-··– •”””-‘• ._,….,.., ..-w….. \,W WWJJf.;J ~f.””‘ Q,.;)h.C:Y. A~..C.I\. \..V
assist them with personnel monitoring ~~d related =aeiological
health aspects. In-August, 1971, Cotter Corporation had completec
shi?ment of the Ccn;o raffinates to ~~eir processing
site in Colorado. Low concentrations of valuable metals and
other elements rendered the remaining material economically
unfeasible to process in like manner.
Pre~~ntly, the remaining mat~rial stored on the site
includes (see FIGURE 2):
(~ \ ….
–· RETA &
Wl A 21 1 l
I •’ t r’ I \ [ ,, I
. “‘. l !!f· a
-r, ~ MUST BE ,
RU99”. & ~ MISC. DEBRIS :
. f
0 . ·”‘
(1) Colorado Raffinate- 15,000 tons,
containing about 4S tons of uranium.
(2) Leached Barium Sulfate Cake- 8,700
WLA 2112
tons, :ontaining about 7 tons of urani~~.
(3) Miscellaneous Residues – approximately
200 tons, containing approximately 2 tons
of u.raniun.
These resicues are stored in deteriorated steel drums
and sparsely distributed aw~ng pieces of clothing, boots, floor
tile and other debris which render t he small aiUount of uranium
economically unobtainable. The drums are dete~ioratec to such
A more detailed description of the material remaining
can be found in A??ENDIX 3, pages S-11.
Referring to F:i:G”‘uRE .2, Bui!din9 “D” is the only buildillg
whic.~ wil! r;.~e decontaminatior: . !3uilding .. A” is an
office while Buildings •a” and ~c” were used for maintenance and
(- ~ .·
WLA 2113
storage,only. These ~~ree buildings were protected from
contamination by radioactive dust during ~~e drying operations •
.Building-. “O!’ housed the drying operations a.”ld is
slightly contaminated (:0.5 mr/hr}. To deconta~nate this
building it is first necessary to disma”ltle and steam clPA~
the dryer, conveyors, air pollution equipment, and other
miscellaneous ma~~ine~J. This equipment will then be ha~-~¥
from the ·site for subsequent salvage.
After all equipment is removed from the building,
its earthen floor will be stripped to eighteen (18″} inches
below ~riginal grade* The ceiling and walls will then be
scrubbed to remove any dust ?articles. Finally, the earthen
floor will be brought back up to existing grade using clean,
compacted fill material.
~e second step of decontamination requires that
all uncontaminated solid wastes be remcvee tc a licensed
.sanitary landfill.· Items which will be removed include logs,
trees, brush, abandoned appliances and other miscellaneous
WLA 2114
debris,_ which has been dumped on the site by area residents
during periods when the operation had been shut down.
All remaining Colorado raffinate will be loaded
into railroad cars and shipped to Cotterts processing site
for storage. At present, no economical means exist for extracting
additional metals from this material. The procedure
to be used for shipping the Colorado raffinates will be si~lar
to that for the Congo residue, except that the drying operation
will be omitted.
After the Colorado raffinate is removed, the remaining
de?ris, including the leached barium sulfate, will be t~cked
to the Weleon Springs Quarry dump site, as per the original
1960 proposal. After removal of the radioactive materials
from the area, the top soil will be stripped to a depth of 18” ,
.-or until radioactivity levels come below specified limits (Title
10, Section 20.105}. ~his material will be used to provide cover
for the residues in the Quarry.
WLA 2115
To recapitulate, it is proposed that the Weldon
Springs Quarry Dump site be used as ult~~te disposal for
the following materials:
Leached Barium Sulfate 2800 c.y.
.Rubble & Other Debris 1000 c.y.
Deteriorated Steel Drums
& Miscellaneous Ite~s 1000 c.y.
Stripped Top Soil 19200 c.y.
TOTAL QUANTITY (approx.) 24000 c.y.
· A cursory visit to the quarry on May 3, 1972, showed
the area to be satisfactory for this use. The entire
premises is a secured area,,adequately fenced and equipped with
caution sigr.s. Evidence of past dumping was quite visible and
showed a mound of reinforced concrete rubble, steel dr~~s,
miscellaneous construction metals, an abandoned fork lift and
·othe~ equip~ent. The floor of the quarry is easily accessible
from State Highway 94. By carefully placing the radioactive
. residues and covering them with the stripped top soil, the
dumping of this material could, indeed, enha~ce the overall
appearance of the site.
WLA 2116
As noted in the 1960 proposal, there is some concern
with possible contamination of water supplies. It should
be noted, however, that the quarry is placed high above the
flood level of the river and; hence; there is no danger of
flooding the quarry. Also, past experience with the residues
at the Latty Avenue site demonstrated that the material does
not exhibit a tendency to “leach” into the ground water. Since
beginning work with the residues in FebruarJ, 1967, there has
been no evidence of ground wa~er cont&~ination at ~~e storage
n \ ….. __ ~ ,” ;
WLA 2117
_, ,
Because of its inherent. physical properties and/or \
radioactivity level, major health problems are not a~ticipa~ed.
Precautio~s will be taken, however, to insure that no conditions
develop which will endanger the health apd safety of
employees and the general public.
Personnel Monitoring
As stated in the Application for source Material License,
(see APPENDIX C) “each worker will be issued a fiL~ badge.” It
is proposed ~~at for the decont~~nation work, the film badge program
be discontinued. Under Section 20.202 (a) {1), personnel
monitoring is mandatory for persons, over 18 years of age,
-· entering a restricted area that receives, or is likely
to receive, a dose in any calendar quarter in excess of 25 percent
of ~~e al!owable dosage. Previous experienc~ (see TABLE 1)
has demonstrated that employees working at the site have not
been exposed to dosages in excess of the allowable 25 percent.
22 M
22 120
12 90
22 210
22 230 10.5
12 60
20 200
10 50
21 210
4 M
Not Issued
11 120
ll 120
11 130 ll.S
Average dosage – 1.8 mr/~k = 101.4 mr/qtr.
Maximum allowable without personnel monitoring;
25% of 1-1/4 rem = 312.5 mr/qtr.
WLA ~118
136.5 mr
153.4 mr
*Records obtained from Film Badge monitoring program for
period of drying operation (8/70-2/71).
(} ‘ .
WLA 21 l .[._. __ ___lil_ St_a:e_ ~;_ci·_Mix_er ____ _..,. _..~. — H,’,,” 03
~————-~ Saub
—–<"'>f __ “””!””” ________ (
.::::::;.;– o~:::~~:~
Sttil”.\, 10 Stage Kidi·Mixer Scrub
Aqueous Product
. . .
A flowsheet for tne removal of otnar than the thoriu~ and uranium
has noc been developed and this now see~s a reasonabl~ Ching to
do at chis point. I£ ten or fif:een c=u~s of this ~ac~rial were
p~ocessed to dev~lop a flowsheet for the ~ecovery of the tho~iu~,
uranium, copper, nickel, cobalt, seleniu~, and a ~are earth fraction,
it migh~ be possible to raduce L~e ~adioactive contamin~tion
of the final waste raffinates such that they would be no problem
and could be disposed of almo·s·c anywn.ere.
The 250 kilogr~s of thorium-230 contained in these raf!inates
are more interesting than ionium per se; cost esti~ates are already
in existence for irradiation to protactinium-231 and subsequent
irradiation co uraniuc-232. Mound has ~welve thoriurn-230″slugs
on hand that were irradiated in the MIR at Idaho Falls i~ 1960.
It· •is planned to process these capsules in order 😮 develop a flowsheec
for the production of ?rotac~iniu~-231.
Augusc 15,. 1967
– 8
\. ·,


1977-07 – DOE – Preliminary Report on the Results of a Radiological Survey Conducted at the Former Cotter Property

Data Capture
Document Discovery
(Iltis form will be used in recording the document information in the Site Research Database after the completion of the
scanning of the document.)
Reviewers-fill o11t all information. tbat applies to the document then place Ust in front of the document
Siw/Facility of Review: Date of Review:
Site That Document Applies To: Documem Type:
DOESile 0
AWE Site
Document Title/Comment;: _________ _
t?10rJ- ifl-!& ,k. 51Te retprfm
r-r3vlt of= 4olrllkfgd 5’vN>tJ-Irt7
Keyword(s): ——-
HistoricaJ Ia formation
En.vironmental Data
Workplace Monitoring Data (i.e.; contamination
s~s, general area/breathing zone air sampling,
radonlthoron monitoring, area radiation surveys,
fix.ed location dosimeters, missed dose information,
Radiologi~ Ccntrollimits, Radiation Work Pennits)
Process Descriptions (i.e.; general description,
source tenns, encapsulation/containment practices)
Site Dosimetry:
Medi~aVX-ray & External Dosimetry
(i.e.; TLD Film Badges, Pocket Ion Chambers)
Internal Dosimetry {i.e.; urinalysis, feca~
In-Vivo, breath sampling, radon/thoron, nasal
Monitoring PrograiU Data (i.e.; analytical
methods for bioassay, dosimeter performance
characteristic~. detection limits, exchange
.frequencie!i, record keeping practices,
meastnment units)
Internal Information (i.e.; radionuclides
and associated chemical forms, particle size
distributions, respiratory protection practices,
solubility class).
CJaimaut Specific Document
Re<:ords Staff- flU o~~-tb¢ f~U.o~~g.prior to sc:arf~ing ·or wpyi&g () /000 ls-!l. . . . . Project Box Number: :·· Pr~j~~Dol:ument ~umber: ·: . ~ Folder Title:_·_.·_·.....__ ___. ....;-.,._. ......._ _._..,..:~-~.. ....,_--;--...:..;.;._...,...... ___- -.:.·-:·:. ._,·, .,..:.;...•. .....;-.·- '-:'-........... ;...._7------'-_...;_--...o........: . . . . : ,.;. ~· : .. ~ · .... -..... :-, .: ·. ·.· .. .. ·.· ~: • • -:4 '.:· : ~.:·:~~:· · . ...·.· .. . . . . -: ··. ·· . . _, .... :·· . :'. ·;·. · .... " . . ',1: . ',• ... : . OCT 21 1983 ~tr. John E. Baublitz. D1 rector';:.:_ D1v1s;on of Remedial Action Programs Office of Terminal waste Dhp!osal and Remed1 a 1 Act 1 on · ....... Office of Nuclear Energy Oepartment of Energy wasn1ngton, o.c. lOS4S Dear Mr. Baublitz: .. - This is fn response to your letter of October s. 1983 regarding the Department of Energy•s (DOE) research and development project at the fonmer Cotter Corporation site on Latty Avenue 1n Hazelwood. Missouri. ~Regarding the preliminary survey conducted in late September 1983, by your contracto·r. ·Oak .Ri.~s.e tlational Laboratory. we are aware that not all of the contamination is c~1ned to the p11e of contaminated soil. As indicated in the letter frQn w~ T. Crow to E. Dean Jarboe dated August 22, 1979 (enclosed) only the area identified as Parcel I has been released for unrestricted use. The decontam1nat1on of Parcel 11 was never completed because all decontamination efforts were stopped in January 1979 wnen Colonel Griggs. A1rport Director. requested that we delay transfer of the contaminated soil to the airport until quest1ons raised by Congressman Robert A. Young were resolved. After Congressman Young's concerns were addressed and he agreed that the contaminated soil should be moved to the airport site, the St. Louis Airport Authority decided not only d1d they not want the wastes from Latty Avenue but they wanted DOE to reassume title to the atrport site. We were pleased to note that Congress gave DOE authority and funds to take act1on at the Latty Avenue site. because our planned remedial actions have been ~ont1nually oe·t~ Missouri 63130
Norfolk and Western R.R.
ATTN: Mr. R.S. Michels
Regional Manager
Industria1 Rea1 Estate
.Railway Exchange Building
St. Louis~ Missourj 63101
Commonwealth Edison company
ATTN: Mr . J.J. O’Connor
Executive Vice President
P.O. Box 767
Ch icago , Il linoi s 60690
Missouri Di vision of Heal t h
AITN: Mr . Ken Mj11er, Acting Director
Bu~eau of Radiological Health
1407 Southwest Boulevard
P.O. Bux 570
Jefferson City, Missouri 65101
Missouri Department of Natural Resources
ATTN: M~. Car~1yn Ashfuro. Director
1014 Madison Street
J efferso!! City, ~·1issouri 65101
Mr. Ed McGrath
28 Fr€de rick Avenue
Gaithe rsburg, Mary1and
: ..• ~ … -~ .-= ··: ··.·
‘• !
A radiofogica( survey was conducted during the periods June 27 throush
July 1 and July 11 through July 14, 1977, at the former Cotter property,
located at 9200 Latty Avenue in Hazelwood, Missouri. A summary of the
results is presented here. AH information presented in this report is of a
preliminary nature and wiU be updated when further analysis has heen completed.
There a~e four buildings, covering a total of approximately 18,000 ft
on this ll-aere site. The· buildings are presently being prepared for use in a
chemicoJ coating operation. At the time of the survey, there .were four construcfion
workers on the site. Scaled drawings of the property are shown m
Figs. l and 2.
Summary of Survey Ke.sults
Building 1: This structure measures 120 ft x 100 ft, has a 30-ft ceiling, a
dirt floor, and open areas along the wells (including spoces for
~; 33 windows) totaling approximately 2500 ft2.
Beta-gamma close rates were measun:cl at 1 em above the surface with
G-M wrvey meters on the floor, walls, ceiling, and ~supports. Measurements
on the floor and lower walls were mode at points determined by a 20 ft x 20 ft
grid (see Fig. 3), and additional measurements were made at potnts showing
hiehest external gamma radiation levels. . .. O~erheod measurements were mci§TI
. ‘AUG 8 ·· ~ . . . • –· .dJi;::..- • …..tj;.
. : ·;·i·- -~. .. •. – • . ; :.; : .
. . …..~. -·~: ,~y~~
·— ·-……—– “: ~-~~~’ -~’ — _,_ …. —- —

.,. .. f
-2- .·,
at uniformly and closely spaced points. Results ore given in Table:. J and 3
and Fig. 3. Beta-gamma dose rates in the building exceeded 0.20 mrod/hr
at most poinfl and were as high os 2.4 mrod;hr of 1 em above the dirt floor.
External gamma radration levels at l m above the surface were measured
with Nal scintillation meters and with closed-window G-M meters. Readings
were taken at the points of the grid mentioned before (see Table 1}, and
maximum external gamma radiation levels were determined within alternate
squares formed by the same grid (see Fig. 4). Readings were generally in
·the range of J00-500 JJR/hr.
Direct alpha readings wer~ taken on the walls, ceiling, and supports
with alpha scinti11otion. survey meters. Results ‘ore reported in Fig. 3 and
Table 3. Maximum readings within the grid blocks on the lower walls (that
is, Jess than 6 ft above the floor) exceeded 600 dpm/100 cm2 throughout.
The highest reading ·~as JS,OOO dpm/100 em2• Maximum readings generally
were observed on a steel ledge. Direct alpha readin9s WerP. tt.:~ken at
approximately 5 em above thP. dirt flo~r at a few points; these readi;,g:»
exceeded 5,000 dpm/100 cm2 at some points and probably resulted from
radon emanating from the soi I.
·Transferable alpha and beta contamination lttvels were measured on the
ceiling, wa11s, and supports. Results are reported in TabJe 4. Transferable
alpha contamination levels were s~nerally higher than transferable beta levels;
transferable alpha levels averaged JJS dpm/100 cm2 on the lower walls and
55 dpm/100. crn2 on overhead .surl’aces.
,. · . . ::·· .
. . __ ….. ……,…..:—-·-··-··-·–.. —– ~·-·—–· .. – . .. .
‘ I ‘
·:.::· ..
Roden concentrations in air were measured continuously over 24-hr
periods with Wrenn chambers. Results are reported in Tobie 5. Although
the building was open at all times and underwent several air exchanges per
hour, radon concentrations were as high as 57 pCi/Jiter.
Building 2: This structure measures 60 ft x 50 ft and hos a dirt and
gravel floor. At the time of the survey, the building had
uncovered door, wall, and window operungs totaling approximately
500 ft2•
A survey plan identical to that for Buildjng 1 was employed except
that fewer grid blocks were used; each grid block measured approximately
20 ft X 17 ft (see fig. 5). Results for beta~amma cose rates ore presented
in Tables 2 and 3 and Fig: 5. Beta-gamma dose rates were gencrofly lower
than in Building 1 but exceeded 0.20 mrad/hr in some places. It appeared
that high gamma rodl~tion levels outside the building were in pc~t re~po11S•Lie
for the elevated beto-gam’!’O dose ro~e~ and P.xternol ;om:.:~ :-odi.:;io;·, it:vt:i:i
(see Table 2 •”Jnd F:g. 6) inside the structur~. Maxi.rr.um direct aipha readings
within srid block~ on the lower walls (fjg. 5} were generally in the range
1,300-2,600 dpm/100 cm2. Again, highest readings were on a steel ledge.
Traruferabfe alpha and beta contamination levels we~re slightly lower than
those in Building l (see Table 4). Radon concentrations in air in this open
building were as high as 7 pCi/liter.

·-·-··– —··—-·–······ .. ·.
‘ \ ! l i
, –.
“– :’
– 4-
Building 3: This structure measures 42 ft x 28 ft and has a 1.5-20 ft ceiling
and a concrete floor.
The floor and lower walls were divided into 7 ft x 7 ft blocks, and
maximum direct alpha readings and beta-gamma dose rates were detemined
for each .block (see Fig. 7). Direct alpha readings and beta-gamma dose
rates on overhead surfaces are given in Table 3. Transferable alpha and beta
contamination levels ore given in Table 4. E~ternaf gamma radiation levels
at J m above the surface at randomly selected points are given in Fig. 8.
Radiation levels were generally lower than in Buildings J and 2, except for
alpha contamination levels. Radon concentrations in air did not exceed
1 pCi/liter.
Building 4: This small structure (56 ft x 20 ft) was partially destroyed
in a fire and is undergoing extensive construction modifications,
particularly on thg v·,alls and ceiling. The buildhig has a
concrete floor.
Radiation levels were generC!!Iy low except for alpha contaminct!on on
the concrete floor. Direct alphc.! readings on the floor were in the range
50-530 dpm/100 cm2 (see Fig. 9), and transferable alpha contamination levels
were· as high as 60 dpm/100 cm2 (Table 4). fxternaJ gamma radiation levels
. – at randomly selected points are given in Fig. JO. ·
Outdoor Measurements:· The property was divided into .blocks by a .50 ft x 50 ft
grid system (see Fig. 11). At each intersection of grid line.s,· beta-gamma dose

rates at· J an and external gamma radiation lewis at 1 m were determined •
. • ….. · . . . . . : .. ·· …..
~~———-··· , …
-· ‘-!.

– 5-
Results ore given in lobi e 7. J n cddi ti on, within each block maxi mum
beta-gamma dose rates were determined. Readings for those blocks where
. the maximum within the block exceeded the ~axirMJm of the four corners
are given in Fig. 11. It is evident from the resutb shown in Table 7 and
Fig. 11 that beta-gamma dose rates at t em above the surface exceed 0.20
mrad/hr outdoors over o significant portion of the property.
Resu I ts .o f S0 1” I Sa mp I e A ro I yses: Co ncentrah•o ns o f 226Ro , 238U , on d 227A c
i.n soi I sampt es coli ected during a presurvey visit and in one samp I e taken
from a surveyor’s work boots are presented in Table 6. 227
Ac is in the
chain and is a daughter of
Pa which is known to have been present in
large quantities in some of the residues once stored at the former AEC St.
Louis Airport Storage Site. Strictest NRC limits ·ror ~emitters apply to this
ra d1• 0nucl “• de . 1t appears t ho t sJ• gm·!!n” cant quan t•1t •1 es o f 226Ra , 238U , and 227Ac
ore contained in the soil on the proper!)’, porticli!~dy in the dirt floor in
Po U·I1 d·• ng 1. Be cause no spec:•· r·J C e r~r orts were mao·e to cemove 230rh f rom
pitchblende residue~ stored at the airport site, it must a,e assumed that’ this
radionudide may be present in large quantities. A linited number of samples
will be analyzed for
Th. The ~ample whose locotigq is described as “in
and aroond BuHdings 1, 2, 3, and 4” was token from ·C surveyor’s boots and
was soil and mud from the area shown in fig. 2. This sample contained t20
Ra/g and 110 pCi
Ac/g; the concentration .tJi 230
Th hos not yet
been determined. This sample should be representative of the contamination
beins carried into homes by workers ond visitors on the sfte. •
i f
t l
I • ‘;
•__ :
:· • .,!
….. _~
Table 1. Building 1, floor: measurements at grid points of beta-gamma
dose rates and external gamma radiation levels
Grid point Beta-gamma dose r~te External gamma radiation
(Sec Fig. 3) at 1 em level at 1 m
(mrad/hr) {~R/hr)
Al 1.40 320
Bl 2.40 300
Cl 0.35 240
01 1.50 220
El 1.20 190
Fl 1.00 220
Gl 1.30 240
G2 1.00 160
F2 0.60 160
E2 0.40 190
D2 0.30 160
C2 0.30 160
B2 · u.s:> 180
“”” ·1.30 220
A3 1..30 240
B3 0.50 220
C3 0. 75 240 ..
D3 0.75 220
E3 0.70 210
F3 o.so 160
G3 o.so 120
C4 0.65 140
. ···-
Table 1. (ccn~’d.)
Grid point
(See Fig. 3)
…. ~
…. ¥
.\ ‘ I
.Builcilng 1. floor: measurements at grid points of beta-gar.m:a·
dose rates and external gamma radiation levels
Beta-gamma dose rate
at I’ em
External gawma radiation
level at· 1 m

Table 2. Building 2, floor: measurements at grid points of beta-gamma
· dose rates and external_ gamma radiation levels
Grid point Beta-gamma dose rate External. gar.:..”na radiation
(See Fig. 5) ~t !’em level at 1 m
(mrad/hr) (lJR/hr)
Al 0.08 80
Bl 0.08 45
Cl o.os 40
Dl 0.07 70
D2 0.15 80
C2 0.28 80
B2 0.13 55
A2 0.06 40
A3 0.08 55
83 0.10 45
C3 0.15 55
D3 0.15 105
D4 0.10 95
C4 0.08 65
84 0.14 65
A4 0.15 80

.. 1
Table 3. Direct measurements of a and B-y contamination levels
on upper walls and ceiling in Buildings 1, 2, 3, and 4
Number of Direct a measurements e-y dose
measurement5 Average Maximum Average
(dpm/lOOcm2 ) (dpm/100c:m2 ) (mr::~d/hr)
67 900 ssoo 0.24
36 280 1144 0.16
-16 so 360 0.07
10 cc. a~cause some radon an~ progeny from previous 2000-
cond intervals remain in the Wrenn chamber, each reading act1.:::1ly rep:::csents a concentr.l’!’:i.C;-,
ich has been intet:;J.·ated over a period of 2 to 4 hr.
: ~· t .. ·–· — . ·-· ·–· -~-….,.—:—–.. ·-………….. -. ______ …. ..
… –·
I ”
Table 6. Concentration of radionuc1ides in soil
samples taken inside and near buildings
location Depth 226Ra 2380
(pCi/g) (pCi/g)
In and around Buildings
1. 2, 3. and 4 surface 120 N.D. a
Building 2, grid point C3 surface 28 20
Building I. near grid
point 04 6 – 9 in. 240 190
Building 1, near grid
point 04 0 – 6 in. 130 200
Building 2, grid point B2 surface 16 17
Outdoors, near grid
point GlO surface 3 2.1
Outdoors, near grid point
JCS • near railro~d spur surfa.ce 2700 N.D.
Building 1. grid point Gl surface 430 860
Building 1. grid point E4 surface 320 550
On railroad spur. near Sh’
~u .. wer of 8uilding 1 surface 470 530
Building l, grid point C3 surface 190 420
Building 1, grid point Al surface 540 1100
aN.D. : not determined.
• : . , ….
.. ..
.: 1.3
.. l
. I
• ~~
;=; ;
~– m..
,_ \. ··- .
Table 7. Outdoor measurements at grid points of beta-gamma
dose rates and external gamma radiation levels
Grid point Beta-gamma dose rate External gamr.la radiation
(See Fig. ll) at 1 em level at l m
(mrad/hr) (llR/hr)
Al 0.04 20
A2 0.50 125
A3 0.50 220
A4 0.30 220
AS 0.”35 1SS
A6 . 0.20 155
A7 0.18 180
AS 0.18 170
A9 0.25 155
AIO 0.10 80
All 0.10 65
Al2 0.18 110
Al3 . 0.18 140
Al4 1.20 375
A15 0.18 110
Al6 0.13 45
Al7 0.13 45
Al8 0.11 80
Al9 o·.u 80
Bl 0.03
•. 25
82 0.08 55
83 0.20 95
– ··-·- – – ____ … _. .. _.. .. –·”•• .
t : . . ·-· ·- ‘ .
table 7. (coat~d.) Outdoor measurements at grid points of beta-gaE~a
dose rates and external_ gamma radiation levels
” M ~.:.:
!’!” :.:..
:y;~ .
-~·· .
./ “”. \
Table·,. (cont’d.) Outdoor measurements at grid points of beta-gamma
dose rates and external· gamma radiation levels
Grid point Bet~~amma dose’rate -External_. ga.t-nma radiation
(See Fig. 11) at 1 em level at l rn
C8 0.08 30
C9 0.09 40
ClO 0.08 45
Cll 0.04 20
Cl2 o.os 25
Cl3 0.04 20
C14 0.03 20
ClS 0.04 25
Cl6. 0.05 20
Cl1 0.23 85
C18 0.21 125
Cl9 0.80 3 ….. f;)
C20 ·0.25 220
Dl 0.05 45
02 0.30 170
03 0.08 45
04 0.08 45
OS 0.10 40
06 0.1·3 ss
D7 0.06 . 45
D8 . 0.08 45
·’ ,” .
.· .. , ..
.. •. •
….. -·
\ ·.. ·1
. . I
.: ….

= ~

Table 7. (cont rd.) Outdoor measurements at grid points of beta-gcurJna
dose rates and external gamma radiation levels
Grid point Bet~-gamma dose rate External gamma radiation
(See Fig. 11} at l em level a’t 1 m
(mrad/hr) (~R/hr)
09 0.10 45
010 0.08 45
Dll 0.04 25
D12 0.03 20
Dl3 0.03 20
014 0.03 20
DIS o.os 30
Dl6 0.08 45
Dl7 0.08 45
018 0.08 45
Dl9 0.08 65
020 0.15 220
El 0.55 190
E2 0.06 40
E3 0.04 40
E4 0.06 30
ES 0.05 40
E6 0.06 45
E7 o.os 30
E8 o.os .30
E9 0.04 20
.ElO 0.03 25 .
·- …. -···-. -.– ·–· – —–·
.– — ··-··· … –

‘ !

• ‘:””-:.:,.
‘ ,
Table 7. (cont’d.) Outdoor measurements at grid points of b~~a-garr~a
dose rates and external. gamma radiation levels
Grid point
{See Fig. ll)
Beta-gamma dose rate
at l em
.. : . >
External ga~”a radiation
level at· 1 m

… – — ·- ··–~— -..
—‘ /-·.. .
; .) \ …
Table 7. {cont’d.) Outdoor measurements at grid points of beta-ga~~a
dose rates and external gamma radiation levels
il ·-~·~”!
. . ~
:=.! ..
!..:.~. === :
;;;; -‘l .
.- ‘””;
Table 7. (cont’d.) Outdoor measurements at grid points of beta-garr~a
dose rates and external gamma radiation levels
Grid point Bet~-gamma dose rate External gar..rna radi. ~··:
.. … . . ‘ ‘ .
··. ·::.:. ~ ::· ? ·~.:. .~ :.: . ·:·. .. :~~~·:;~.~:-.~;~-?·::. .
Enci~~ur~s -·.. = : ; ·· ‘\/.-:· ~:
, \ . .-:·:·:~._; ~::-::~: ….. ·-.. … .. .. .
. . ·’:-‘.·
.·. .·• ·
.. . ; -··
. ~ … .:. . … . . : :..: .
….. ~
: …. ·· . !,: :.:· .. · . ·~ .. · .
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,, .,:~:~’i ·. ”-;::\}.~ .
. .. . ~ .
. . · ··:.· ..
‘ t • •• • . . ~ …
I ) ‘ •.., • •• •., • • ; ·•
‘. :.,._. ………….- …’!’·” _… ..:. .·.: ;•’. ._: _;,.·;~.·..·;..:;·..:·._,..· :_.···-,.::….,.; ….;…..·. ~.·;, ..· ~.
: .· ·:
Auome·y Work ·P•o··du· ct·· · ·, . .· .. …..· .. ·. .. · ·· ·.-·~ ··::.. ~ :.: ,t ·:’. ·.~
. . . · ~ · -~ … ~ ~-.. ·:·;~:~:-·.-: ·:.·~ ~.:;~:- ~·:.~: · :·:·.~ :
Prepared .In Anticipation of ~~n’: . .. :. .. :~. .~ !r:.~·~>:·, ::. .~ ‘
.. . ….. ! • • … ..- :.
· … · …. ·. ~· ·
…… , . ;- ~ ……. .
n.ew”+ n /.;._-.. ~——–=l·:_· 1>====9
:!l lia~~.;~;r;m~; win~u~ec======== · ….. ·.·
. · …….. .
.. ‘:-:.:._ ~
~. .. . •.
:-.:~·~;; ….. · .. · .. ·
. ·~ .: .. ,_ :·~
~; .
~:.·~ -~· ….
:..~ .–~
“!·. . : . ; .
. ··
..!…-. · -:.·
~.· .. . .
···.: :·, …. ..
‘ .. · … –
-P-o-n-d·s· _ _
– ·· ..
‘ ~·-·-·
·.~ …… . -· . ;”” .
. ….
.!, ‘ .. ., … ·.~~~
… .. .·, – ··… .
.. :
. f
…. · .• …
l .•f . …;.·_ . :.,.. .
?.~i~t-:., .. •, ·.
0 I . ,……:.
.. ·.···
, … ~ •• . • ‘!’:.• •
•• • : :; ·#
. . ~ .. . · … . . •… ..· -… . .
. ·:· ………. .
::..:,·.; .
…: .· . …
~.:…::• .- ••! .. • . ,. …
. . . ···-·· ·-,. .. · ·:.~· · . ~ tT-·.·.”~ .. ttt ¢ .• !4 . .I A.
Litty Avenue
. . .
0.06 o.os
. ……
c 0 06 0 30 0.100 0~0.02 . • . . • .. – 0.03
.· …. .
.. . … • …. -· • • .;.· .
~—-~o.2o 0 03 ·o.o2
0 0.10 • -0.02
· .. ;:-.’. . .
o.o<- -- ·'· \ .. . · ....... . ·- .-.. ·.•·:~ . : ~··: . •. -·. .·: .. .... :~ ~:~-~ ~~ . ..: ·- . ~~ ... -~··· r·...-- .:~· ;~~ ......... - ~:·r~- . ·:. . .·: ..... :, . ... · . ; ..... , ... ~,. 0.01 .,#~'" • .• ---· .• '.*· .• o.os 0.15 0.01 0.02 0.02 o.o1 0.02' 0.02 0.100.02 0.01 0.01 0.04 0.15 o. 04 o. 03 o.os RADIATION MONITORING SURVEY 0.04 0.03 0.07 Values of Gross Activity in MR/hr. at approximately three feet above qrade. April 29, 1974 0.1 0.25 ·"' ;. ~.. . .. .. . .. . :: ·. . . : .· ._.. .. . ..•.. 0.03 .. ~ o. 07 :..-: .. ~·7 .. ;. .·,.. 0~ 0 0.40 0.12


2014-08-01 – EPA – USACE – Independent Technical Review for Operable Unit 1 at the West Lake Landfill Site

Independent Technical Review for Operable Unit 1 at the West Lake Landfill Site
The West Lake Landfill Site is on a parcel of approximately 200 acres located in
the northwestern portion of the St. Louis metropolitan area. It is situated approximately
one mile north of the intersection of Interstate 70 and Interstate 270 within the limits of
the city of Bridgeton in northwestern St. Louis County. The Missouri River lies about 1.5
miles to the north and west of the Site.
The Site consists of two radiologically contaminated landfill cells comprising
Operable Unit 1 (OU-1) and the Bridgeton Sanitary Landfill (Former Active Sanitary
Landfill) and several inactive areas with sanitary and demolition fill that have been
closed comprising OU-2. Land use at the site and the surrounding areas in Earth City is
Other facilities which are not subject to this response action are located on the
200-acre parcel including concrete and asphalt batch plants, a solid waste transfer station,
and an automobile repair shop.
The Site was used agriculturally until a limestone quarrying and crushing
operation began in 1939. The quarrying operation continued until 1988 and resulted in
two quarry pits. Beginning in the early 1950s, portions of the quarried areas and adjacent
areas were used for landfilling municipal solid waste (MSW), industrial solid wastes, and
construction/demolition debris. These operations were not subject to state permitting
because they occurred prior to the formation of the Missouri Department of Natural
Resources (MDNR) in 1974. Two landfill areas were radiologically contaminated in
1973 when they received soil mixed with leached barium sulfate residues.
The barium sulfate residues, containing traces of uranium, thorium, and their longlived
daughter products, were some of the uranium ore processing residues initially
stored by the Atomic Energy Commission (AEC) on a 21.7 acre tract ofland in a then
undeveloped area of north St. Louis County, now known as the St. Louis Airport Site
(SLAPS), which is part of the St. Louis Formerly Utilized Sites Remedial Action
Program managed by the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers (USACE)
In 1966, residues associated with the production and refining of uranium
materials were purchased by Continental Mining and Milling Company of Chicago,
removed from the SLAPS, and placed in storage at the Hazelwood Interim Storage Site
(HISS) on Latty Avenue under an AEC license. In 1967, Commercial Discount
Corporation, which obtained possession of the HISS property and residuals, began drying
residue and shipping them to Cotter Corporation in Canon City, Colorado (DOE 1987).
WLLFOIA4312- 001 – 0058946
In 1969, residues remaining at the HISS were sold to Cotter Corporation in Canon City.
In 1970, Cotter Corporation dried and shipped some of the remaining residues from the
HISS to Canon City (DOE 1994). In December 1970, an estimated 10,000 ton of
Colorado raffinate and 8,700 tons ofleached barium sulfate remained at the Latty
Avenue HISS.
Reportedly, 8,700 tons of leached barium sulfate residues were mixed with
approximately 39,000 tons of soil and then transported to the West Lake site in 1973.
According to the landfill operator, the soil was used as cover for municipal refuse in
routine landfill operations.
The geology of the landfill area consists of Paleozoic-age sedimentary rocks
overlying Pre-Cambrian-age igneous and metamorphic rocks. The Paleozoic bedrock is
overlain by unconsolidated alluvial and loess deposits of recent (Holocene) age. Alluvial
deposits of varying thickness are present beneath Areas 1 and 2. The landfill debris varies
in thickness from 5 to 56 feet in Areas 1 and 2, with an average thickness of
approximately 30 feet in Area 2. The underlying alluvium increases in thickness from
east to west beneath Area 1. The alluvial thickness beneath the southeastern portion of
Area 1 is less than 5 feet (bottom elevation of 420 ft/amsl) while the thickness along the
northwestern edge of Area 1 is approximately 80 feet (bottom elevation of 370 ft/amsl).
The thickness of the alluvial deposits beneath Area 2 is fairly uniform at approximately
100 feet (bottom elevations of 335 ft/amsl).
A subsurface oxidation event (SSE) is ongoing in the South Quarry Landfill
portion of the Bridgeton Sanitary Landfill. The South Quarry cell is connected to the
North Quarry cell which is adjacent to Operable Unit 1, Area 1, one of the locations on
site that received the radiologically contaminated soils in 1973. Pursuant to an order
from the Missouri Attorney General, the site owner is required to install a subsurface
barrier between the North Quarry cell and OU-1 Area 1 to prevent the SSE from
migrating into the radiologically contaminated materials.
As a follow-up to EPA R7 consultation with EPA’s National Remedy Review
Board (NRRB) in February 2012, the following evaluations are being conducted to assess
the Remedial Alternatives for OU-1: 1) partial excavation evaluation; 2) alternative
landfill cap designs; 3) evaluation on the use of waste treatment technologies, including
apatite; 4) recalculation of RIM volumes for a full excavation scenario; 5) groundwater
fate and transport modeling; and 6) recalculation of discount rate. These evaluations will
be contained in a forthcoming Supplemental Feasibility Study (SSFS) Amendment or
equivalent document.
WLLFOIA4312- 001 – 0058947
This will be an interagency agreement. The EPA is requesting assistance from
the US Army Corps of Engineers (US ACE) to conduct an Independent Technical Review
(ITR) of specific documents associated with Operable Unit-1 at the West Lake Landfill
and being developed in response to National Remedy Review Board (NRRB) comments.
The technical support may consist of performance of specific tasks which USEP A
contractors have neither the expertise or cannot provide at reasonable cost to EPA.
USACE shall furnish personnel and services required to conduct an ITR of
reports prepared by the Responsible Parties in response to the recommended NRRB
Tasks included in this scope are:
1. Project Planning and Support
2. Independent Technical Reviews
3. Community Relations Support
4. Close-Out
This task includes work efforts related to project initiation, management, and
support. Activities required under this task include the following, as applicable:
1.1 US ACE shall participate in a scoping meeting with EPA to discuss the work
1.2 USACE shall provide proposed level of effort and costs for the support activities
to be performed. Based on EPA’s review of the scope, level of effort and cost
estimate, USACE may be called upon to participate in negotiations with EPA on
the proposed level of effort and to revise the level of effort as a result of these
1.3 The USACE shall perform site-specific project management including:
1.3 .1 Establishment and maintenance of necessary work assignment files,
schedules, and project documentation
1.3.2 Provide monthly reporting and invoices. These documents shall contain
WLLFOIA4312- 001 – 0058948
narrative of specific task and subtask activities sufficient enough for the
EPA Remedial Project Manager (RPM) to evaluate the work assignment
1.3.3 Monitor costs and performance
1.3.4 Coordinate staffing and other support activities to perform the work
assignment tasks in accordance with the Statement of Work (SOW)
including USACE subcontractors, if utilized.
1.3.5 Attend necessary work assignment meetings
1.3 The USACE shall accommodate any external audit or review mechanism that
EPA may require. Level of effort for this work will be determined at a later date
and this IA will be amended to include this task and associated cost.
This task includes the work required to conduct the ITR and documents the
required deliverables.
2.1 US ACE shall coordinate and prepare a review plan and assist EPA in preparing
the reviewer’s charge statement.
2.2 US ACE shall perform an ITR of reports prepared by the Responsible Parties
(RPs) in response to the NRRB consultation with EPA on the Supplemental
Feasibility Study dated December 28, 2011. The purpose of the ITR is to
provide an independent assessment of the RP’ s work products to ensure the
scientific and technical components have been applied in a sound manner to meet
established regulatory requirements. The ITR will be conducted by qualified
individuals who are independent of those who performed the work, and who are
collectively equivalent in technical expertise (i.e., peers) to those who prepared
the reports.
The reports prepared in response to the NRBB recommendations will include:
2.2.1 Up to four ITR reports to address the following:
• The RP’ s evaluation of a partial excavation alternative;
• The RP’s recalculation of RIM volumes to address alternate excavation
• The RP’ s evaluation of up to three alternative landfill cap designs;
• The RP’ s evaluation on the use of up to five waste treatment technologies,
including apatite and soil sorting;
• The RP’s results of groundwater fate and transport modeling; and
• The RP’ s recalculation of all alternatives using a 7% discount rate.
2.2.2. A Supplemental Feasibility Study Addendum or equivalent document.
WLLFOIA4312- 001 – 0058949
2.2.3 A Revised Proposed Plan, if required. If a Revised Proposed Plan is
required, the level of effort for the ITR will be determined at a later date and this
IA will be amended to include this task and associated cost.
2.2.4 An Amended ROD, if required. If a Revised ROD is required, the level of
effort for the ITR will be determined at a later date and this IA will be amended
to include this task and associated cost.
2.3 USACE ITR team will review historical documents for familiarity and
understanding of the site. Historical documents will not be the subject of the
ITR. Historical documents to be reviewed include, but may not be limited to the
• OUI Site Characterization Summary Report
• OUI Remedial Investigation Report
• OUI Baseline Risk Assessment
• QUI Feasibility Study
• OUI Supplemental Feasibility Study
• OUI Record of Decision
• EPA Radiological and Infrared Survey Report (ASPECT) (May 20I3)
• MDNR Radiological Survey Report (May 20 I3)
• Radiation Management Corporation Radiological Survey (I982)
• NRC Radioactive Material in West Lake Landfill (I988)
2.4 US ACE shall prepare an ITR report for each of the documents reviewed. The
letter report will contain USACE’s technical evaluation and, to the extent
practicable, shall be written in terms understood by the general public. The letter
report will be submitted to EPA as a “final” product. The number of days
allotted for completion of the ITR will be jointly determined and agreed upon by
EPA and USACE based upon the size and nature of the document to be
reviewed, but shall be no less than 45 calendar days for any review.
2.5 The USACE ITR will focus exclusively on the scientific and technical aspects of
the documents and whether the scientific and technical components have been
applied in a sound manner to meet established regulatory requirements. It will
not address grammatical, editorial, or formatting aspects of the document.
2.6 The US ACE ITR team shall participate in one technical meeting with EPA and
the RPs for each of the documents reviewed. The purpose of these meetings will
be to provide clarification on any comments. These meetings will be conducted
in the St. Louis area. If not able to be accomplished via an in-person meeting,
the meeting shall be accomplished by phone and internet (Web Meeting).
2. 7 EPA shall furnish US ACE with the following:
WLLFOIA4312- 001 – 0058950
2.7.1 Background documents, data, and other information necessary to ensure
the ITR’ s completeness;
2.7.2 Notification, at least 30 days in advance, of submittal of a document for
2.7.3 A tentative schedule identifying anticipated document submittal dates,
review times, and meetings.
This task includes efforts related to community relations support to EPA.
Activities required under this task include the following:
3.1 Upon issuance of this IA, USACE shall attend two community meetings to inform
the public ofUSACE’s support to EPA under this IA and answer questions. For
the initial public meeting after IA release, USACE will prepare a Power Point
presentation or other visual aids, as required to communicate the ITR process to
the public. For the second public meeting after the IA release, USACE shall
attend to answer any remaining public questions regarding the IA scope.
3.2 Upon completion of the review of each document, US ACE staff shall attend a
community meeting and present a description of the work accomplished by
US ACE and the findings of the ITR. The presentation will be provided via Power
Point, or via other means, if required. An electronic file of the Power Point
presentation shall be furnished to EPA at the meeting. USACE shall furnish 50
paper copies of the PowerPoint presentation for distribution to the public.
3.3 USACE staff shall be available to participate in pre- and post-meeting public
availability sessions for the meetings at which the USACE reviews are presented.
USACE shall provide necessary public availability session displays and
information packets (up to 50 handouts of Power Point presentation).
3.4 EPA, as lead agency, shall be the central point of contact for all project
stakeholders. If requested by EPA, US ACE shall provide written responses to
written questions received by EPA from the community regarding USACE’s
scope of work for the ITR effort.
This task includes efforts related to work assignment close-out. Activities
required under this task include the following:
4.1 Upon notification by EPA, the USACE shall begin all internal procedures
necessary to close out the work assignment including any file duplication,
distribution, storage, or archiving per the contract requirements.
WLLFOIA4312- 001 – 0058951
4.2 The USACE shall return documents identified to EPA or other document
repositories as directed.
August 1, 2014 to December 30, 2016
The statutory authority for entering into this IA is Section 105(a)(4) of the
Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act
(CERCLA) of 1980 (42 U.S.C. 9601 et seq., Public Law 96-510, December 11,
1980), as amended by the Superfund Amendments and Reauthorization Act
(SARA) of 1986 (Public Law 99-499, October 17, 1986), and Executive Order
1.3.2 Monthly Reports/Invoices
2.2 ITR Reports
Project Manager Dan Gravatt
Project Officer Ina Square
Throughout period
Per agreed upon schedule
WLLFOIA4312- 001 – 0058952


1977-10-31 – MDNR – Letter to West Lake Landfill

3.600 St. Louis County
Vest Lake Dmolition Landfill flQy « .Q7
October 11, 1977 tttuu o*
Mr. y’illian Cannev
west L?.Ve Landfill, Inc.
Rt. 1, Sox ZT£
Bri^etca, V”» *3044
Dear Mr. Canney:
This is tc fcllw un on the insnectlm of tN-» ‘Test T.«fe« Demolition
Lan:l’ill .f»r. ncrrt»r 4, 1977, Vv a T>T.r«Bent-tive of thp Vissouri
T>enr..-c: •-.£ . ;e ‘>.tura3 ‘3rpr!!rr««’T J* r» r-?””1″ of this Irrnoction,
thr fcllf.’ln” inrr.ti5factoT”» fa.iturss *.r* r.ot<".l naci rpcorr«er.d«tions for their ccrre.ctJon nrt rivp.n. 1. ?Jon--'ier'olitlon landfill wnste inclu-Jin? vastes not even acceptable at sanitary landfills vere beinr, deposited at the demolition landfill site. 2. Routine technlout»s of spreadlrr and coTpactin1? the deaolitiocs vastcs vere not bein? practiced. COMIfF.vTS A.',T A con«3i'i<»raMft arount of naint sludge in 55 Ballon metal dnras had been disposed of on tSe site. It appeared that the najority of the paint slu'Jte had been nixed vith soil and had caused one area to be verv odorous and extreaely dan?. Neither the demolition or sanitary landfill should be aecsptlnp any quantity of r>aint or other sludges. It
is understood that a snail anonnt Mr;ht <^et into the landfill •undetected but, it was obvious thit « t^ooJ nortion of the sludge could and should have been tnrnp'1 •'•..-.tv. "mediate steps must be taken to stop all Incarli*1 ^enoqit? of sach naterlala and to Irmfidiatelv renove such materials vhen they sore hcv? are -Junped. (Section 80-6.010 (2) (A) of the "issouri Solid tfastt Rules and Regulations lists the tynes of materials to be accented at a demolition landfill. Enclosed is one conv of the 3ules and Regulations. 3.600 rt. T.ouls County West L.V-.C l^-.olition Landfill October 2?, 1977 Acceptance of non-denotion wastes has been observed in the past at the denolltion landfill site. It is felt that it is a corbl-iation of an inadequate sl?n listing the wastes to be acc«rteJ, innrfequcte inspection of leads conln? in and a willingness to accent such non-der.olltion materials 'then they .ITS on site. r«»cticp •~~A.rin (2) (C) 2 require thnt n list of wastes to be accor-to : lo -Us^lavi! nr?-inentlv it -^V_ r.«tr. crtr.ir.ces. TIo sl?n v?».s ohrr"»-v-; *.t either entrnnce for the ••!r-»olltion landfill. A sim llrtir." t>»» *•*«*? to be ««:c’^t«•’. **u^t be erected it oil
er.tr-vjce-s to ths demolition landfill. A rer,r»onsiMe supervisor
snould Vo locfltc^ on site v^o is villin? to t1ioroM7.hly inspect
every Io2<* that ernes in and to reject all non-denolition materials. Anyone cnu,?ht dtnpir.<» non-^ersolltion vastes should be force»^ to renove such wastes to a proper disposal facilltv. The corsbinatlon of advising proseectlve «*\nr»ers of vhat vnstes are accepted via the landfill sir>n alon« ^rtth a responsible supervisor who is knovleisable
about what vastes can and cannot he accepted should result in a
great reduction in non-denolition wastes bein? dumped at the demolition
It was observed that the demolition materials vere being dumped at
the top of the MorldLn* face of the landfill and for the nost part
slrTply pushed over the edr;e of the f?.cc. Very little compaction
was beinj: ftcconplished. It was understood that seme bulky wastes
such as larne concrete blocks and tree trunks cannot be compacted
but, the rajority of the other demolition wastes can be spread
and contacted in layers around tvo feet thick on or near a 3 to 1 slope.
If possible, It is recowaended that the demolition vastes be durroed
at the base of ^rorklnr; face. IThether t*”» vaster are dumped at the
top or base of the working face, every effort -:ust be aade to spread
and ccnpact the demolition wastes in”levers not to exceed two (2)
feet as true!: as practical fron the stnnrnoint of the size and shape
of the Tuif.rlalq. If a load is observed containing larjje materials
tb.it coulrf hinder the nroper corranction of other demolition vastes,
it shoul’.’ be dirrped x»hic />?/»o7/77^K L&uair II
. Pfiuft I filnr
‘ A
I. Special Conditions and Approved Modifications
I A, Are there any special conditions or approved modifications of the satisfactory compliance subsections of
the rules and regulations? (e.g. impermeable barrier, limited excavation, exceptions to weekly cover requirements)
. wy
Yes ^~ No
(If “No,” describe violations under “REMARKS.”)
II. Check Types of Waste Accepted
• 6. Is the demolition landfill operation in compliance with the special conditions or approved modifications?
ttt 11 k i _ ii _ « _ _ _ * i _ _ . . • _ f _ A • ._ — _i _ . *i^^a«A^i^O »i\
Demolition and construction waste
Brush and untreated wood waste
Inert Plastics
fi&d ..dtuAiA i dujdwt uz&j
III. Remaining Life of Landfill
A, Estimated average volume of compacted solid waste received.
(tons, yards/day, week)
B. Estimated volume of remaining landfill covered by approved engineering plans.
acre feet
I1S.05B- 11/76
IV. Satisfactory Compliance Subsections Regulations 80-4.010
• Check all sul .tions: SAT — Satisfactory; UNS — Unsatisfactory. (If necessa
under “Remarits.”)
escribe “UNS” violations’
Routine sanitary landfill techniques ol spreading ind compacting
Mlid waste stall be used is much is practicable ID dispose of
solid MSle in i demolition landfill.
A list of wastes to be icceptid shall be displayed prominently it
the site entrance.
A responsible supervisor skill be present it the disposil irei it
til times when the am is open to receive waste.
deluded wastes deposited removed to an approved disposal site
Site accessible by all-weather roads. l^^i
Surface water courses and runoff satisfactorily diverted from the
landfill. Demolition landfill construction and grading to promote
rapid surface water runoff without eicessive erosion.
Decomposable solid wastes deposited above predicted maximum
water table.
No open burning without written permission from the agency hav- «
ing jurisdiction. < WTROL Decomposition gases adequately vented to prevent danger to occupants of adiactnt property. Gases vented to prohibit eiplosive or tone accumulations. ^x RS Vector control programs implemented when necessary. 1 j^l fETICS " 2 t Litter collected and compacted into cell be utilized daily. Wastes easily moved by wind covered as necessary. On site vegetation and natural windbreaks being utilized for litter control and aesthetic appearance. ' V \/ If SUBSECTION NUMBER SATISFACTORY COMPLIANCE OPERATING PROCEDURE SAT UNS (10) AESTHETICS (continued) (10)(C)4 Salvaged materials remcweldaily *r stored yfaestbycally acceptable manner. QMlM. /JW. Cttf/EU. * (11) COVER MATERIAL U1HO1 U1XO2 Twelve ( 12) inches compacted soil cover material applied at lust once every seven calendar days. Final cover of it least two i2) tetl compacted toil applied on alt completed areas. >c
Solid waste spread in layers not to eiceed two (2) fett as much as
Solid waste compacted to smallest practical volume.
Cover material compacted as much as practical.
Equipment available and operated to spread and compact the solid
waste is received or at least when the accumulated waste reaches
200 cubic yards.
No solid waste disposed of in watei where the water interfered with
spreading and compacting 01 where the water is causing a mosquito
(13XO6 .
fire titnguishers provided on all equipment.
Provisions for eitinguishirg fires m waste, equipment or structures.
Scavenging prohibited.
Controlled access limited to operating hours.
Tratht control wjns provided.
Dust control adequate.
* -.
;< sz y X Records of complaints and major problems. Records of dates of cover material application. —• Records of vector control efforts. Records of dust and litter control efforts. Records of quantity of waste received. ' Records of location of general types 01 wastes ano depth ol fill. .. M^B^M •^^•^ mmm^^m ^^WV^H •••^B «— - • 1 fc. +-*" V. Operation Proceeding in Accordance With Approved Engineer Plans? (If "No," describe violations under "Remarks.") >^y
Yes * No %
REMARKS !T/7J’HA t^’^^^f.^ tSHrt’M SX^sMW0e*r ~6** /VtfCMlUit
Attach addjonalheets as nece«ary

1 •«
TABLE I – Results of Analysis
Westlake Landfill,
pH (Std. Units)*
Specific Conductance (jjmhos/cm)
Alkalinity as CaC03 («g/D
Acidity as CaC03 (mg/1)
Total Solids (mg/1)
Suspended Solids (mg/1)
Volatile Suspended Solids (mg/1)
Grease (mg/1)
Chemical Oxygen Demand (mg/1)
Total Organic Carbon (ng/1)
Phenol (mg/1)
Fluoride (mg/1)
Chloride (mg/1)
Cyanide (mg/1)
Kjeldahl Nitrogen as N (mg/1)
Sulfate (mg/1)
Sulfide (mg/1)
Surfactant (MBAS) (mg/1)
Chromium (mg/1)
Copper (mg/1)
Iron (mg/1)
Lead (mg/1)
Nickel (mg/1)
Zinc (mg/1)
of Leachate From
Incorporated (1/23/78)
. <0.1 83.2 580 <0.! 0.5 <0.5 1.60 31.0 <0.5 <0.3 10.8

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