2016-05-09 – NRC – Jocassee Dam – Affidavits regarding flooding concerns at Oconee nuclear power plant – ML16202A536

2016-05-09-nrc-jocassee-dam-affidavits-regarding-flooding-concerns-at-oconee-nuclear-power-plant-ml16202a536

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Criscione, Lawrence
From: Criscione, Lawrence
Sent: Monday, May 09, 2016 6:16 PM
To: Kirkwood, Sara; Holahan, Gary; Clark, Theresa
Cc: ‘LSCriscione@gmail.com’; tomd@whistleblower.org
Subject: Affidavit with Exhibits of interest
Attachments: Criscione OSC affidavit-signed.pdf; Exhibit_35_Letter_from_Criscione_to_Lieberman_
2012-10-15.pdf; Exhibit_47_Letter_from_Criscione_to_Boxer_2012-11-14.pdf; Exhibit_54
_Various_emails_concerning_redactions_to_GI-204_Screening_Anal….pdf
Sara,
Attached is the affidavit that the Government Accountability Project used to draft my 2015 complaints to the US Office
of Special Counsel. The sections regarding the flooding concerns are on pp. 24‐27.
Also attached are my 2012 letters to the Senate E&PW and HS&GA committees and some emails concerning the
redactions made to the GI‐204 Screening Analysis report. The other exhibits of interest are my 2012‐Sep‐18 letter and
email to the chairman which you already have.
I got involved with the Jocassee/Oconee issue in 2011/2012 when some of my coworkers in RES were drafting the
Screening Analysis Report for GI‐204 (flooding at NPP sites due to upstream dam failures) and were concerned that they
were being unduly pressured to keep inconvenient information from the report—inconvenient in the sense that the NRC
did not yet know the extent of the flooding concerns and how to address them and thus desired that they be kept from
the public. It was disconcerting to my colleagues that their internal report on flooding might be watered down due to
containing information on significant nuclear safety issues that did not have a ready resolution.
The flooding portion of the attached affidavit was written in 2013 and based on information I obtained in 2012. This
issue has evolved since then and I have not stayed on top of it.
The concerns I still have regarding flooding are:
1. Instead of building the flooding defenses which they committed to, Duke Energy redid their flooding analysis at
Oconee and now claim that the site will not flood beyond the height of the five foot flood wall surrounding the
Standby Shutdown Facility. However, the unclassified and non‐safeguards records regarding this nuclear safety
issue are being strictly controlled within an internal group of employees designated as having a “need‐to‐know”
the information. I thus cannot find it in ADAMS and so do not know the new assumptions used by Duke
Energy. I have been told that Duke Energy did not consider an overtopping situation at Jocassee—something of
concerned to myself and some colleagues in RES and NRR.
2. Flooding documents regarding Fort Calhoun are being tightly controlled within the agency to a select group of
individuals designated as having a “need‐to‐know”. The Advisory Committee on Reactor Safeguards was even
excluded from seeing this unclassified and non‐safeguards information; the ACRS had to agree to a
Memorandum of Understanding with the US Army Corps of Engineers (USACE) whereby three of their members
were allowed to travel to a USACE facility in Nebraska to review the information and had to agree not to take
any documents back with them.
3. Personnel in NRO assigned to work on flooding reviews are being told they cannot discuss their work with
colleagues who do not have a specific “need‐to‐know” the information. That is, they cannot discuss concerns
they have with colleagues they trust unless those colleagues have been specifically assigned to the project they
are working on. This is anathema to an Open and Collaborative Work Environment and good scientific
protocol. This type of silo‐ing of information is necessary when working with classified or safeguards security
information, but has no place when the issues at hand are about protecting reactor plants from extreme acts of
natures. It is difficult to predict the frequency and severity of earthquakes, probabilistic maximum precipitation
events, latent construction and engineering failures, etc. and such topics warrant extensive peer review and
debate.
4. In 2012 I wrote the Chairman of the Senate Committee on Homeland Security & Governmental Affairs (at the
time, Senator Lieberman) concerning the fact that—based on their extensive use of Exemption 7(F) in redacting
dam‐related FOIA responses—the NRC believes there are credible terrorist threats to dams yet, to my
knowledge, there is no interagency process for ensuring that those dams whose failure from sabotage could
result in a serious nuclear accident are guarded against the same design basis threat that nuclear reactor plants
are guarded against. Senator Lieberman referred my concerns to Hubert Bell in December 2012 yet, after 3 ½
years, the NRC IG’s office has not obtained and reviewed any study from any source to determine whether or
not dams upstream of nuclear reactor plants are adequately guarded against terrorist activity (see FOIA appeal
2016‐0088A).
5. Supposedly the internal silo‐ing of dam/flooding related information and the broad use of Exemption 7(F) with
regard to dam/flooding FOIA responses is due to security concerns regarding the theoretical utility of
dam/flooding information to terrorists, yet to my knowledge—despite having concerns grave enough to justify
silo‐ing of information from even the full ACRS—the NRC has not made any attempt (e.g. commissioning a
security review or requesting an inquiry by the Department of Homeland Security) to determine whether or not
dams upstream of nuclear reactor plants are adequately guarded from the same design basis threats that
nuclear reactor plants must be guarded against.
6. Several of my colleagues in RES, NRO and NRR are concerned that the post‐Fukushima orders on flooding—
which were in response to a public law—have been backtracked on even though the law that was the source of
those orders has not been amended or rescinded.
7. Several of my colleagues are concerned that NRC licensees do not know whether all their penetrations of flood
barriers are water tight.
I have copied Tom Devine on this email. I do not expect that Tom will be able to participate in our meeting at Region III
next week, but I also do not expect him to have any concerns regarding us meeting without him present.
I will be taking leave on Wednesday through Friday this week, but please do not hesitate to call me at 573‐230‐3959 if
you have any questions. My gmail account forwards to my Hotmail account which forwards to my phone. Most of my
project work can be done outside of Citrix so I’m usually not connected to my NRC account during most of the day. If
you copy my Hotmail or gmail account I’ll likely see your questions sooner than if it just goes to my NRC account.
Thank you,
Larry
Lawrence S. Criscione
573‐230‐3959
From: Lawrence Criscione [mailto:lscriscione@hotmail.com]
Sent: Monday, May 09, 2016 4:33 PM
To: Criscione, Lawrence
Subject: [External_Sender]
1
AFFIDAVIT
My
name
is
Lawrence
Stephen
Criscione.
I
have
worked
for
the
US
Nuclear
Regulatory
Commission
(NRC)
as
a
Reliability
&
Risk
Engineer
since
October
26,
2009
in
the
Division
of
Risk
Assessment
of
the
Office
of
Nuclear
Regulatory
Research
(RES/DRA).
My
series
and
grade
are
series
801,
grade
GS-­‐14.
I
am
submitting
this
affidavit
to
the
U.S.
Office
of
Special
Counsel
(OSC)
under
the
Whistleblower
Protection
Act,
because
I
believe
I
have
been
denied
honest
consideration
for
a
position
for
which
I
was
qualified
(NRC
job
vacancy
R-­‐III/DRP-­‐
2013-­‐0009).1
I
also
believe
I
was
the
subject
of
an
unwarranted,
retaliatory
criminal
investigation
(OIG
Case
13-­‐001)
by
the
NRC’s
Office
of
the
Inspector
General.
(OIG)
The
denial
of
honest
consideration
for
position
R-­‐III/DRP-­‐2013-­‐0009
and
the
investigation
under
OIG
Case
13-­‐001
were
the
result
of
disclosures
I
made
to
the
NRC
regarding
the
agencies
handling
of
(1)
the
2003-­‐10-­‐21
unintentional
passive
reactor
shutdown
at
Callaway
Plant;
(2)
the
flooding
concerns
at
the
Oconee
Nuclear
Station
from
a
catastrophic
failure
of
the
Lake
Jocassee
Dam,
with
analogous
threats
at
nearly
one
third
of
America’s
operating
nuclear
reactors;
and
(3)
the
NRC’s
violation
of
federal
law
with
regard
to
implementing
the
Freedom
of
Information
Act.
Pursuant
to
5
USC
1213,
I
also
am
seeking
an
independent
investigation
of
the
breakdowns
I
witnessed
in
the
NRC’s
nuclear
safety
mission.
§
1.
Background

October
21,
2003
Unintentional
Passive
Reactor
Shutdown
at
Callaway
Plant
and
Violation
of
10
CFR
2.206
In
2003
I
was
working
at
the
Callaway
nuclear
power
plant
in
Callaway
County,
Missouri.
On
October
20,
2003
at
07:21
a
safety-­‐related
inverter
failed
at
Callaway.2
The
plant’s
Technical
Specifications
required
that
this
equipment
either
be
repaired
within
24
hours
or
that
the
operators
commence
shutting
down
the
reactor
and
have
it
shutdown
within
6
hours
(i.e.
by
13:21
on
October
21,
2003).3
At
01:00
on
October
21,
2003
the
operators
began
shutting
down
the
reactor
at
10%
per
hour.
Their
goal
was
to
have
the
reactor
shut
down
by
noon
if
repairs
could
not
be
made
to
the
failed
inverter
by
then.4
At
09:36
reactor
power
was
at
nominally
10%
and
the
operators
were
essentially
2
hours
ahead
of
schedule
for
shutting
down
the
plant
within
the
required
time
frame.5
In
accordance
with
accepted
industry6
and
regulatory7
practices,
the
operators
decided
to
stabilize
1
(Exhibit
1)
2
Exhibit
22
of
NRC
Office
of
Investigations,
Case
4-­‐2007-­‐049
(see
footnote
11
of
this
affidavit)
3
Callaway,
Unit
1,
Current
Facility
Operating
License
NPF-­‐30,
Tech
Specs,
Revised
6/27/2007
(ML053110040)
4
NRC
Event
Notification
40263
5
International
Nuclear
Safety
Journal
(INSJ),
14-­‐109-­‐1-­‐PB1,
“Analysis
of
the
October
21,
2003
Unintentional
Passive
Reactor
Shutdown
at
Callaway
Plant
with
regard
to
aspects
of
Reactivity
24
§
2.
Background

Flooding
Concerns
at
Oconee
Nuclear
Station
As
will
be
discussed
below,
the
Nuclear
Regulatory
Commission
has
known
since
April
2006
that,
were
the
Lake
Jocassee
Dam
to
fail,
the
resultant
flood
waters
would
inundate
the
Oconee
Nuclear
Station
(ONS)
and
disable
the
equipment
necessary
to
remove
decay
heat
from
the
cores
of
the
three
reactor
plants
sited
there.
The
NRC
has
been
informed
by
Duke
Energy
that
within
10
hours,
all
three
reactor
cores
would
melt
down,
releasing
their
fission
product
inventories
into
the
Reactor
Coolant
System
(RCS).
Without
mitigative
action
to
restore
equipment
(something
that
will
be
extremely
difficult
to
do
following
the
dam
failure
and
resultant
flood),
within
three
days
(1)
the
reactor
vessels
will
fail
and
release
their
fission
product
inventories
into
the
containment
buildings,
(2)
the
containment
buildings
will
fail
and
allow
release
of
fission
products
into
the
atmosphere,
(3)
a
radioactive
plume
of
fission
products
will
leave
the
site
and
travel
in
accordance
with
the
current
wind
patterns,
depositing
radioactive
fallout
along
its
path,
(4)
if
the
radioactive
plume
encounters
a
rain
storm
prior
to
reaching
the
sea,
it
will
likely
cause
large
parts
(i.e.
counties)
of
South
Carolina,
North
Carolina
and/or
Georgia
to
be
permanently
evacuated
in
a
fashion
similar
to
what
occurred
in
the
Ukraine
following
the
Chernobyl
accident
and
what
has
occurred
in
Japan
following
the
accidents
at
Fukushima.
The
plans
for
resolving
the
flooding
issues
at
the
Oconee
Nuclear
Station
have
been
delayed
repeatedly
over
the
past
eight
years,
and
currently
have
a
due
date
of
December
2016
based
on
my
informal
discussions
with
those
working
on
the
issue.
The
only
corrective
actions
done
thus
far
have
involved
minor
changes
to
monitoring
equipment
and
procedures;
none
of
the
actions
taken
thus
far
will
prevent
the
meltdown
of
the
reactors
were
the
Lake
Jocassee
Dam
to
fail.
The
resolution
of
this
substantial
and
specific
danger
to
public
safety
has
been
impeded
by
gross
mismanagement
and
abuse
of
authority
enabled
through
secrecy
in
violation
of
the
Freedom
of
Information
Act.
The
misconduct
is
ongoing.
The
flooding
concerns
at
Oconee
led
to
a
Generic
Issue
on
Flooding
at
Nuclear
Power
Plant
Sites
Due
to
Upstream
Dam
Failures
(Exhibit
32)
that
was
never
fully
released
to
the
public
(although
several
variously
redacted
versions
have
been
released
in
response
to
FOIA
request).
§
2.1.
Substantial
and
Specific
Danger
to
Public
Safety
The
probability
of
the
Lake
Jocasee
Dam
failing
has
been
calculated
by
the
NRC
to
be
2.8E-­‐4/year.72
Since
the
probability
of
a
reactor
accident
occurring
given
72
The
nomenclature
2.8E-­‐4/year
refers
to
an
annual
probability
of
failing
of
0.00028
for
every
given
year.
Although
this
is
a
small
number
equating
to
a
chance
of
failure
of
once
in
every
3571
years,
integrated
across
the
entire
US
fleet
of
100
reactors
this
number
equates
to
a
Fukushima
style
accident
of
once
every
37
years
in
the
U.S
and
once
a
decade
world
wide.
It
is
about
ten
times
higher
than
the
risk
goal
for
a
typical
US
reactor
plant.
25
the
failure
of
the
Lake
Jocassee
Dam
is
a
certainty,
there
is
thus
a
2.8E-­‐4
annual
probability
that
a
reactor
meltdown
will
occur
in
Oconee
County,
South
Carolina.
This
is
roughly
ten
times
the
risk
acceptable
for
a
licensed
US
nuclear
power
plant.
On
September
18,
2012
I
sent
a
letter73
to
the
NRC
Chairman
detailing:
(1)
the
NRC’s
inability
to
resolve—after
knowing
about
the
issue
for
six
years—the
actions
needed
to
be
taken
by
Duke
Energy
to
protect
the
three
reactors
at
the
Oconee
Nuclear
Station
(ONS)
from
a
catastrophic
failure
of
the
Lake
Jocassee
Dam,
and
(2)
the
fact
that
speculative
and
abstract
fears
regarding
terrorist
targeting74
were
sustaining
unwarranted
secrecy
that
prevented
the
open
and
transparent
discussion
of
the
significant
safety
concerns75
threatened
by
a
failure
of
the
Lake
Jocassee
Dam
due
to
acts
of
nature
or
latent
construction/design
failures.76
The
NRC
Chairman
never
contacted
me
regarding
my
2012-­‐09-­‐18
letter.
The
only
follow
up
I
ever
received
was:
(1)
my
branch
chief
(Ben
Beasley)
informed
me
on
September
20,
2012
that
he
had
been
directed
to
file
a
security
infraction
form
against
me
for
not
designating
my
letter
to
the
Chairman
as
“Security-­‐Related
Information”
(Exhibit
34),
(2)
the
Chairman’s
legal
counsel—following
an
October
15,
2012
letter
to
the
Senate
Homeland
Security
&
Government
Affairs
Committee
(Exhibit
35)
in
which
I
mentioned
I
had
not
received
any
follow
up
to
my
concerns—sent
me
an
email
on
October
16,
2012
informing
me
that
the
Chairman
had
referred
my
letter
to
her
to
the
NRC’s
Inspector
General
(Exhibit
36),
and
(3)
the
Inspector
General’s
special
agents
asked
me
about
my
concerns
on
January
17,
2013
during
their
interrogation
of
me
to
build
a
case
to
indict
me
on
felony
charges
of
Fraud
with
Computers
(18
U.S.C.
1030).
The
sense
I
got
was
that
no
one
was
interested
in
discussing
my
safety
and
mismanagement
concerns
and
that
they
were
resentful
that
I
had
“leaked”
the
issue
outside
to
Congress.
73
(Exhibit
33)
74
To
date
no
nuclear
plants
or
dams
have
been
destroyed
by
terrorist
activities.
The
solutions
to
security
concerns
(e.g.
vandalism,
sabotage,
terrorist
attack
or
acts
of
war)
are
vastly
different
than
the
solutions
to
nuclear
safety
concerns.
If
there
are
legitimate
security
concerns,
then
the
solution
is
to
increase
the
guard
force
at
the
dam.
Concerns
regarding
security—whether
speculative
or
grounded—should
not
impede
the
open
discussion
of
legitimate
safety
concerns.
75
Safety
concerns
(vice
security
concerns)
are
failures
from
acts
of
nature
(e.g.
a
PMP—
Probabilistic
Maximum
Precipitation
event),
from
design
or
construction
errors,
or
from
human
errors
in
the
operation
of
the
facility.
76
The
safety
concerns
are
real—according
to
Bureau
of
Reclamation
data
all
dams
(concrete,
earthen,
mixed)
fail
at
a
rate
of
approximately
1E-­‐4/yr
(this
corresponds
well
with
the
NRC’s
determination
of
2.8E-­‐4/yr
for
the
failure
rate
of
the
Lake
Jocassee
Dam).
The
failure
of
the
Lake
Jocassee
Dam
would
place
ONS
under
17
feet
of
water,
leading
to
the
meltdown
of
the
reactors
and
the
failure
of
their
containment
buildings,
and—depending
on
the
current
wind
direction—would
cause
significant
radiological
contamination
in
various
parts
of
the
Southeast.
Since
the
odds
of
a
“Fukushima-­‐style”
accident
happening
in
South
Carolina
are
equivalent
to
the
failure
rate
of
the
Lake
Jocassee
Dam,
there
needs
to
be
an
open
public
discussion
on
the
safety
of
the
Lake
Jocassee
Dam.
26
§
2.2.
Abuse
of
Authority
and
Gross
Mismanagement
The
NRC’s
Office
of
Nuclear
Reactor
Regulation
has
a
duty
to
be
open
and
transparent
with
the
public
about
their
concerns
regarding
the
hazards
posed
by
the
Lake
Jocassee
Dam
to
the
reactors
at
the
Oconee
Nuclear
Station.
But
NRR
successfully
kept
a
serious
safety
liability
at
a
commercial
nuclear
power
plant
site
secret
from
the
public
for
over
five
years
(from
2007
until
2012).
The
issue
regarding
the
“Fukushima-­‐style”
hazards
posed
by
the
Lake
Jocassee
Dam
to
the
three
reactors
at
the
Oconee
Nuclear
Station
only
came
to
the
light
of
the
public
due
to
a
FOIA
“fishing
expedition”
by
a
reporter
in
Oregon
(Exhibit
37).
Managers
within
NRR
abused
their
authority
in
keeping
this
issue
from
the
public.
In
a
2006
publicly
available
inspection
report
(which
was
pulled
from
the
NRC’s
public
website
in
November
2012)
the
NRC
Resident
Inspectors
at
Oconee
noted:
…a
December
10,
1992
Jocassee
Dam
Failure
Inundation
Study
(Federal
Energy
Regulatory
Commission
Project
No.
2503)
predicted
that
a
Jocassee
Dam
failure
could
result
in
flood
waters
of
approximately
12.5
to
16.8
feet
deep
at
the
Oconee
Nuclear
Site.
At
some
point
in
2007
NRR
began
marking
all
external
and
internal
correspondence
regarding
the
flooding
hazards
posed
by
the
Lake
Jocassee
Dam
as
“Official
Use
Only

Security-­‐Related
Information”
or
similar
designations
prohibiting
public
release.
The
reason
for
the
shift
away
from
transparency
and
Open
Government
is
not
fully
understood
by
me,
but
it
undermines
public
oversight
and
shields
the
NRC
from
accountability
or
even
exposure
of
dangerous,
embarrassing
breakdowns
in
nuclear
safety
law
enforcement.
It
is
difficult
for
the
NRC
to
publicly
admit,
or
even
let
the
public
know,
that
three
reactors
in
South
Carolina
are
vulnerable
to
a
nuclear
accident
due
to
flooding
caused
by
the
failure
of
an
upstream
dam.
By
withholding
this
information
from
the
public,
the
NRC
eliminated
all
public/legislative
scrutiny
of
their
efforts
and
public/legislative
pressure
to
address
the
issue
in
a
timely
manner.
The
consequence
has
been
a
five
to
fifteen77
year
delay
in
acting
against
a
hazard
whose
likelihood
is
ten
to
one
hundred
times
greater
than
accepted
standards,78
and
77
The
Jocassee/Oconee
flooding
issue
arose
in
February
1994
and
was
dismissed
in
November
1994.
It
then
reappeared—in
its
present
incarnation—in
August
2005.
It
does
take
time
to
address
a
complex
issue
such
as
this,
but
if
the
NRC
had
been
efficient
in
Aug.
2005
we
would
be
about
five
years
ahead
of
where
we
are
now.
If
one
would
make
the
argument
that
the
NRC
dropped
the
ball
in
1994
(and
I
support
that
argument
but
it
is
not
the
one
I
made
to
the
Chairman)
then
one
could
argue
we
are
15
years
behind
where
we
should
be.
78
Although
there
are
no
regulatory
limits
for
risk
of
a
core
meltdown
and
containment
failure,
the
generally
accepted
expectation
at
the
NRC
is
a
risk
of
Core
Damage
Frequency
(CDF)
on
the
27
whose
consequences
would
likely79
be
worse
than
Fukishima.
The
elimination
of
public/legislative
scrutiny
and
pressure
invariably
enabled
this
issue
to
languish.
The
vulnerability
persists,
and
the
delay
in
honoring
our
public
safety
mission
is
gross
mismanagement.
§
2.3.
Media
Coverage
The
issues
regarding
flooding
at
nuclear
power
plants
due
to
upstream
dam
failures
were
covered
in
2012-­‐02-­‐25
and
2012-­‐03-­‐01
articles
in
the
Cascadia
Times.
The
issue
also
appeared
in
the
Huffington
Post
in
September
(Exhibit
38),
October
(Exhibit
39),
and
December
2012
(Exhibit
40).
The
issue
appeared
in
other
news
outlets
as
well
including
an
Iranian
newspaper.
All
of
the
occurrences
listed
here
were
brought
to
my
attention
by
fellow
NRC
employees
who
saw
the
articles
via
the
“NRC
in
the
News”
link
on
the
home
page
of
the
NRC’s
internal
webpage.
I
was
well
known
at
the
NRC
to
be
associated
with
this
issue.
§3
Retaliatory
Investigation
On
September
19,
2012
the
NRC’s
Office
of
the
Inspector
General
opened
Allegation
A-­‐12-­‐07095,
Release
of
Security
Related
Documents
by
RES
Employee
in
response
to
my
September
18,
2012
email
and
letter
to
the
NRC
Chairman.
Note
that
the
“release
of
security
related
documents”
referred
to
in
the
allegation
was
not
a
release
of
information
to
the
public
but
rather
a
release
of
information
to
the
US
Congress
and
the
US
Office
of
Special
Counsel.
On
October
10,
2012,
the
Office
of
the
Inspector
General
completed
their
review
of
Allegation
A-­‐12-­‐07095
and
opened
OIG
Case
13-­‐001
for
a
full
investigation.
Although
these
documents
eventually
made
it
into
the
public
domain,
at
the
time
Allegation
A-­‐12-­‐07095
and
OIG
Case
13-­‐001
were
initiated
(i.e.
September
19
and
October
10,
2012)
there
was
not
yet
any
indication
that
the
documents
had
order
of
1E-­‐5/yr
and
a
risk
of
Large
Early
Release
Frequency
(LERF)
on
the
order
of
1E-­‐6/yr
to
1E-­‐
7/yr.
There
are
some
at
the
NRC
(e.g.
me,
Galloway,
Mitman,
Ferrante,
Perkins)
who
believe
that
a
catastrophic
failure
of
the
Lake
Jocassee
Dam
will
almost
certainly
lead
to
core
damage
at
Oconee
and—in
the
absence
of
any
data
showing
that
Duke
Energy
could
recover
containment
cooling
within
68
hours—possibly
containment
failure.
Since
the
NRC’s
current
failure
frequency
for
the
Lake
Jocassee
Dam
has
been
calculated
at
2.8E-­‐4/yr
(which
is
an
order
of
magnitude
higher
than
the
typical
plant
CDF
and
two
orders
of
magnitude
higher
than
the
typical
LERF),
the
risk
at
ONS
is
about
10
to
100
times
greater
than
at
a
typical
US
reactor
plant.
79
Once
the
cores
meltdown
and
the
containment
buildings
fail
(which
Duke
Energy
predicts
would
happen
within
9
and
68
hours
respectively)
the
consequences
become
dependent
on
the
weather.
If
no
rain
is
encountered
by
the
radioactive
fallout
cloud
on
its
way
to
the
Atlantic
Ocean
or
Gulf
of
Mexico,
and
if
its
path
is
relatively
direct,
then
the
consequences
could
be
less
than
Fukushima.
If
precipitation
systems
are
encountered
then
substantial
amounts
of
land
might
need
to
be
evacuated
for
decades.
28
been
released
beyond
the
US
Congress
and
the
Office
of
Special
Counsel.80
This
is
an
important
distinction:
OIG
Allegation
A-­‐12-­‐07095
and
Case
13-­‐001
were
not
initiated
to
investigate
the
appearance
of
Official
Use
Only
documents
in
the
public
domain,
but
rather,
were
initiated
to
investigate
the
disclosure
of
Official
Use
Only
documents
to
the
US
Congress
and
to
the
US
Office
of
Special
Counsel
even
though
disclosures
to
both
these
bodies
are
protected
by
law.
On
January
17,
2013
I
was
interrogated
by
two
special
agents
from
the
NRC’s
Office
of
the
Inspector
General
regarding
my
release
of
documents
stamped
“Official
Use
Only”
to
several
dozen
Congressional
staffers
and
to
US
Special
Counsel
Carolyn
Lerner.
That
interrogation
was
recorded
and
I
was
informed
during
the
interrogation
that
I
would
be
afforded
an
opportunity
to
review
the
transcript.
During
the
interrogation
I
agreed
to
several
requests,
which
I
did
not
write
down
due
to
the
stress
of
being
involved
in
an
accusatory
and
confrontational
interrogation
and
due
to
the
understanding
that
I
would
be
allowed
to
review
the
transcript.
At
the
end
of
the
interrogation,
I
was
directed
to
agree
to
a
Confidentiality
Agreement
while
still
under
oath.
I
asked
for
a
copy
of
the
agreement
to
keep,
but
was
told
I
could
not
have
one.
Again,
I
did
not
take
notes
on
what
I
was
required
to
read
because
I
had
been
told
I
would
be
afforded
an
opportunity
to
review
the
transcripts.
After
seven
weeks
and
despite
repeated
requests
I
was
neither
afforded
an
opportunity
to
review
the
transcripts
of
my
interrogation
nor
was
I
provided
a
copy
of
the
confidentiality
statement
I
was
directed
to
read.
On
March
3,
2013
under
the
Privacy
Act
I
requested
the
recording
of
my
interrogation.
On
March
14,
2013
my
Privacy
Act
request
was
denied
citing
Exemption
7(A)
of
the
Freedom
of
Information
Act.
I
appealed
that
decision
and
on
March
15,
2013
the
NRC
assigned
tracking
number
2013-­‐008A
to
my
appeal.
On
April
2,
2013
my
appeal
was
denied
by
Hubert
Bell,
the
NRC
Inspector
General.
Mr.
Bell
cited
Privacy
Act
exemption
(j)(2)
and
FOIA
exemption
(7)(A)
as
the
basis
for
his
denial.
In
order
to
obtain
the
record
of
my
interrogation,
I
employed
Scott
Hodes
in
order
to
ensure
the
NRC
did
not—prior
to
the
closure
of
OIG
case
13-­‐001—
maliciously
destroy
the
recording
of
my
January
17,
2013
session.
On
July
3,
2013
Mr.
Hodes
filed
a
civil
action
on
my
behalf
that
was
assigned
“Civil
Action
No.
13-­‐CV-­‐
00942-­‐RMC”.
After
prolonged
negotiations,
on
October
28,
2013
a
settlement
agreement
was
reached
whereby
the
transcript
and
recording
of
my
interrogation
would
be
released
within
the
shorter
time
period
of
either
the
passage
of
one
year
(i.e.
by
October
28,
2014)
or
within
5
working
days
of
the
closure
of
both
OIG
Case
13-­‐001
and
13-­‐005.
The
transcript
and
recording
were
provided
to
me
on
March
17,
2014.
80
The
first
appearance
of
one
of
these
“Official
Use
Only

Security-­‐Related
Information”
documents
in
the
public
domain
was
in
an
October
19,
2012
Huffington
Post
article.
29
I
chose
to
settle
my
lawsuit
because
it
had
already
cost
me
$2,000
and—
although
my
attorney
believed
we
would
certainly
prevail
in
court—it
was
the
estimation
of
my
attorney
that
it
would
likely
take
at
least
12
months
before
I
would
get
the
recording
and
would
cost
an
extra
$4,000.
Below
is
a
summary
of
the
retaliatory
investigation
and
criminal
referral
for
prosecution,
which
openly
and
specifically
occurred
because
I
made
non-­‐classified
disclosures
to
Congress
of
the
upstream
dam
vulnerability.
§3.1
Background
On
September
18,
2012
I
wrote
a
19-­‐page
letter
to
the
NRC
Chairman
(Exhibit
33).
I
transmitted
that
letter
from
my
NRC
email
account.
Along
with
the
letter,
I
attached
to
the
email
several
NRC
documents
designated
“Official
Use
Only

Security-­‐Related
Information”
to
back
up
statements
I
had
made
in
the
letter.
I
copied
the
email
to
about
two
dozen
Congressional
staffers,
several
dozen
NRC
employees
and
to
the
US
Special
Counsel
(Exhibit
43).
Everyone
to
whom
I
copied
on
the
original
email
or
to
whom
I
later
forwarded
the
email
were
all
employees
of
the
US
federal
government.
I
was
informed
on
or
prior
to
September
20,
2012
by
my
branch
chief
(Ben
Beasley)
that
he
had
been
directed
to
fill
out
a
NRC
Form
183,81
because
my
2012-­‐
09-­‐18
letter
to
the
NRC
Chairman
and
the
accompanying
email
were
not
stamped
“Official
Use
Only

Security-­‐Related
Information”.
Over
the
past
year
my
2012-­‐09-­‐
18
letter
and
most
of
the
documents
submitted
with
it
had
been
released
under
the
Freedom
of
Information
with
no
security-­‐related
redactions.82
Although
some
of
the
documents
attached
to
my
2012-­‐09-­‐18
are
still
designated
“Official
Use
Only”,
there
are
currently
outstanding
FOIA
appeals
regarding
these
documents
and
the
NRC
may
yet
release
them.
So,
although
these
documents
were
designated
“Security-­‐
Related
Information”—and
although
I
did
control
them
as
if
they
were
(i.e.
I
did
not
distribute
them
to
anyone
outside
the
federal
government)—it
is
apparent
that
most
of
them
did
not,
in
fact,
contain
any
security
sensitive
information.
On
a
number
of
separate
occasions
in
September,
October
and
November
2012,
I
was
interviewed
by
a
Huffington
Post
reporter
(Tom
Zeller)
regarding
the
NRC’s
handling
of
the
flooding
risk
posed
to
the
reactors
at
the
Oconee
Nuclear
Station
by
the
Lake
Jocassee
Dam.
I
was
quoted
in
at
least
three
Huffington
Post
articles.
At
some
point
in
the
autumn
of
2012
I
was
quoted
by
an
Iranian
news
service
concerning
the
NRC’s
handling
of
the
flooding
concerns
at
Oconee.
I
have
never
spoken
with
any
foreign
reporters,
foreign
government
agents,
or
anyone
else
81
(Exhibit
34)
82
The
only
redactions
were
my
home
address
and
cell
phone
number
which
were
redacted
by
the
NRC
under
Exemption
6
due
to
their
belief
that
releasing
information
I
voluntarily
allow
to
be
published
in
the
telephone
directory
is
a
“clearly
unwarranted
invasion
of
personal
privacy”.
30
connected
with
a
foreign
government
or
group
regarding
the
Jocassee/Oconee
flooding
issues.
Although
the
quote
attributed
to
me
was
accurate,
I
did
not
provide
it
to
the
Iranians.
All
quotes
attributed
to
me
in
the
Iranian
news
story
were
verbatim
repetitions
of
quotes
I
had
made
to
Tom
Zeller
of
the
Huffington
Post
and
which
appeared
in
Mr.
Zeller’s
articles.
Since
the
quotes
in
the
Iranian
newspaper
appeared
after
Mr.
Zeller’s
articles
were
published,
I
have
always
assumed
that
the
Iranians
merely
copied
the
quotations
out
of
the
Huffington
Post.
The
Huffington
Post
articles
on
the
Jocassee/Oconee
flooding
issue
contained
links
to
some
of
the
documents
that
I
provided
to
the
US
Congress.
It
is
my
understanding
that
a
Congressional
staffer
to
whom
I
submitted
the
documents
provided
copies
of
them
to
Greenpeace
who,
in
turn,
passed
them
along
to
the
Huffington
Post.
Although
I
did
not
distribute
any
“Official
Use
Only”
documents
outside
of
the
US
government,
the
NRC’s
Office
of
the
Inspector
General
claims
that
I
essentially
“laundered”
documents
through
Congress.83
That
is,
they
claim
I
sent
the
documents
to
Congressional
staffers
who
I
knew
would
leak
them.
Although
everyone
at
the
NRC
should
know
there
is
a
potential
that
information
submitted
to
Congress
could
be
publicly
released
through
a
number
of
venues,84
I
did
not
make
any
arrangements
with
anyone
in
Congress
to
leak
any
documents.
However,
when
asked
by
the
Huffington
Post
I
did
tell
them
to
whom
in
Congress
I
had
sent
the
documents.
I
do
not
view
this
as
conspiring
to
launder
documents.
I
view
this
as
informing
the
Huffington
Post
as
to
what
congressional
offices
should
be
aware
of
the
flooding
issues
and
whose
own
oversight
should
be
monitored.
None
of
the
documents
in
question
were
classified
or
in
any
way
restricted
from
release
by
law.
On
October
26,
2012
I
met
with
my
branch
chief
and
division
director
and
was
told
to
submit
a
list
of
all
the
documents
that
I
had
shared
outside
of
the
NRC.
At
this
meeting
I
was
also
told
to
route
any
future
documents
that
I
wished
to
send
to
Congressional
offices
through
my
chain
of
command
and
the
Office
of
Congressional
Affairs.
I
provided
the
requested
list
on
October
30,
2012.
It
is
enclosed
as
(Exhibit
43).
In
mid-­‐January
2013
I
was
contacted
by
special
agent
William
Walls
of
the
NRC’s
Office
of
the
Inspector
General
regarding
my
availability
to
participate
in
an
interview
concerning
OIG
Case
13-­‐001
of
which
I
was
told
I
was
the
subject
of
the
investigation
(Exhibit
44).
Prior
to
the
interrogation,
the
OIG
refused
to
inform
me
as
to
what
the
specific
charges
were.
I
was,
however,
informed
that
the
interrogation
would
be
conducted
under
a
Garrity
warning
and
not
a
Kalkines
statement,
which
meant
that
I
was
under
criminal
investigation.
83
(Exhibit
42)
84e.g.
during
meetings
of
Congressional
oversight
committees,
by
press
releases
of
Congressional
offices,
or
simply
by
a
leak
from
a
staffer
31
§3.2
January
17,
2013
Interrogation
On
January
17,
2013
I
was
interrogated
by
two
armed
special
agents,
William
Walls
and
Daniel
Esmond
of
the
US
NRC’s
Office
of
the
Inspector
General.
Kevin
Nietmann,
an
OIG
Technical
Advisor,
was
also
present.
Also
present
was
Randy
Sullivan
(my
NTEU
steward)
and
a
transcriber
from
Neal
R.
Gross
Court
Reporters
and
Transcribers
who
was
transcribing
the
interrogation
and
operating
a
recording
device.
In
the
sections
below,
which
summarize
the
transcript85
in
(Exhibit
45),
I
hope
to
make
the
case
that
my
2013-­‐01-­‐17
interrogation
was
conducted
with
the
intent
of
trumping
up
felony
charges
against
me
in
order
to
use
as
leverage
to
get
me
to
resign
from
my
job.
In
the
aftermath,
it
places
me
at
a
severe
disadvantage
when
seeking
any
other
federal
position,
such
as
the
Resident
Inspector
posts
for
which
I
have
been
denied.
The
first
37
minutes
of
the
interrogation
(up
to
page
34,
line
7
of
the
transcript)
we
discussed
OIG
Case
13-­‐005
which
the
OIG
claims
I
am
the
source
of
(i.e.
they
claim
that
in
my
letter
to
the
Chairman
I
made
allegations
which
they
are
now
investigating).
Although
I
never
intended
for
a
criminal
investigation
to
be
initiated
into
the
NRC’s
mismanagement
of
the
Jocassee/Oconee
flooding
issues,
the
OIG
initiated
one
anyway
(i.e.
OIG
Case
13-­‐005).
During
that
exchange
I
tried
to
accurately
summarize
my
views.
The
Oconee
Nuclear
Station
was
licensed
to
design
criteria
that
we
now
believe
are
no
longer
valid—particularly
we
now
believe
(versus
what
we
believed
in
the
late
1960s/early
1970s
when
the
plant
and
dam
were
originally
sited)
that
the
failure
of
a
dam
of
similar
construction
to
Jocassee
is
a
credible
event
(i.e.
something
we
must
account
for
in
our
analysis)
whereas
when
the
reactors
and
dam
were
originally
constructed
a
dam
failure
at
Jocassee
was
considered
of
such
low
probability
(i.e.
not
credible)
that
it
did
not
need
to
be
analyzed.
So
although
I
would
be
comfortable
living
and
working
in
Oconee
County,
as
a
regulator
I
believe
that
our
current
understanding
of
dam
failures
and
flooding
at
nuclear
plants
dictates
that
to
prevent
a
substantial
and
specific
threat
to
public
health
and
safety
we
need
to
either
improve
the
flooding
defenses
at
Oconee
or
we
need
to
lower
the
level
of
Lake
Jocassee
such
that
the
flooding
due
to
a
dam
failure
would
be
acceptable.
The
impression
I
get
from
my
transcript
is
that
the
OIG
agents
were
trying
to
manipulate
this
view
into
an
opinion
that
I
did
not
think
the
issue
was
safety
significant
since
there
was
not
an
immediate
need
to
shut
down
the
plant.
Nuclear
accidents
rarely
kill
people.
At
Fukushima
we
are
seeing
thousands
of
people
displaced
from
their
homes
but
we
are
not
seeing
any
deaths.
My
nightmare
85
The
recording
of
the
interrogation
is
being
included
as
(Exhibit
46).
There
is
information
on
the
recording
that
is
not
in
the
transcript
(e.g.
the
tone
of
the
questions,
pauses,
inflections)
and
the
transcription
does
have
some
errors.
32
at
Jocassee/Oconee
is
a
failure
of
the
dam
would
cause
flooding
at
the
site
that
eventually
leads
to
all
three
nuclear
reactors
melting
down
and
their
containment
structures
failing
(as
what
occurred
at
Fukushima
following
the
tsunami
flooding).
Then
the
radioactive
debris
being
carried
by
the
winds
meeting
a
precipitation
system
on
its
way
to
the
ocean
and
contaminating
several
counties
in
South
Carolina
to
the
extent
that
they
need
to
be
evacuated.
This
is
an
economic
nightmare
for
all
US
taxpayers
and
a
life-­‐altering
catastrophe
for
the
people
who
need
to
be
evacuated—but
it
involves
no
deaths.
I
have
serious
safety
concerns.
Yet
when
asked
if
I’d
live
and
work
in
Oconee,
I
have
to
say
“yes”.
I’m
not
from
there.
If
the
government
has
to
buy
me
out
of
my
home
due
to
a
nuclear
accident
it
would
not
devastate
me
to
move.
In
the
59-­‐68
hour
scenario
that
it
would
take
for
the
nuclear
accident
to
unfold,
I
could
easily
move
my
family
to
safety.
I
had
to
be
honest.
I
was
under
oath.
But
the
OIG
agents
manipulate
this
to
“Well,
in
your
own
words,
you
just
mentioned
that
you
wouldn’t
sell
a
house
and
you’d
continue
to
live
there.”
You
can
have
serious
safety
concerns
without
fearing
for
your
life.
Millions
of
Americans
having
to
leave
their
hometowns
and
family
farms
due
to
radiological
contamination
is
a
devastating
catastrophe
even
if
no
one
falls
ill
or
dies.
Another
concern
I
had
was
that
the
agency
had
not
done
an
adequate
job
staying
on
top
of
the
issue
and
driving
it
to
conclusion.
However,
I
am
not
aware
of
any
statutes
that
make
it
a
crime
for
federal
bureaucrats
to
be
ineffective.
In
all
my
letters
(e.g.
to
the
NRC
Chairman,86
to
Senator
Lieberman,87
to
Senator
Boxer88)
I
focus
on
the
ineffectiveness
of
the
process,
which
is
gross
mismanagement
and
abuse
of
authority,
and
not
criminal
wrongdoing
on
the
part
of
any
individuals.
During
their
questioning,
I
get
the
overall
impression
from
the
first
34
pages
of
the
transcript
that
the
agents
believe
the
agency’s
actions
have
been
adequate.
Finally,
during
these
first
34
pages
there
is
discussion
about
my
background.
In
totality,
this
came
across
as
them
trying
to
discredit
my
background
because
I
have
not
been
trained
in
hydrology,
civil
engineering,
security,
etc.
My
background
was—at
the
time—nearly
17
years
working
in
nuclear
power.
I
understand
how
organizations
function
and
make
decisions,
how
operators
typically
perform
(or
fail
to
perform)
both
when
they
are
doing
a
well
trained
task
and
a
novel
evolution,
the
history
behind
the
evolution
of
nuclear’s
“defense-­‐in-­‐depth”
strategy,
the
limitations
of
deterministic
analyses
and
probabilistic
risk
assessments,
the
reliability
concerns
with
equipment,
etc.
Like
all
operators,
I
have
had
in-­‐depth
training
for
the
accidents
at
Three
Mile
Island
and
Chernobyl.
I
worked
in
the
NRC’s
Operations
Center
in
the
weeks
following
the
Fukushima
accident.
Although
I
must
defer
to
other
experts
with
regard
to
hydrology
and
dam
design—these
experts
agree
with
me
(I
have
no
citation
here
but
you
are
welcome
to
interview
Greg
Baecher
of
the
University
of
Maryland
and
Tom
Nicholson
of
NRC/RES
and
they
will
tell
you
that
the
failure
rate
of
the
Lake
Jocassee
Dam
is
on
the
order
of
1E-­‐4/yr).
Although
I
am
86
(Exhibit
33)
87
(Exhibit
35)
88
(Exhibit
47)
33
not
a
security
expert,
the
security
experts
in
Office
of
Nuclear
Security
and
Incident
Response
(NRC/NSIR)
agree
with
me
that
the
Jocassee/Oconee
issue
is
not
a
nuclear
security
concern
requiring
designation
as
Safeguards
information
(Exhibit
48).
The
remainder
of
the
interview
(i.e.
beyond
page
34
line
7)
was
conducted
for
the
purposes
of
manufacturing
a
felony
case
against
me.
Beginning
on
page
34
they
asked
me
general
questions
about
my
assigned
work,
my
work
schedule,
my
work
from
home
habits,
and
my
use
of
personal
computers.
I
had
the
general
sense
from
the
interview
that
they
were
questioning
whether
or
not
I
should
be
pursuing
concerns
regarding
Jocassee/Oconee
on
“agency
time”.
To
be
clear,
a
lot
of
my
efforts
were
done
“off
the
clock”.
However,
at
no
time
were
any
of
my
work
products
hindered
by
office
hours
spent
looking
at
Jocassee/Oconee
documents.
As
a
nuclear
professional,
I
am
expected
to
be
able
to
interact
with
colleagues
and
to
discuss
safety
issues
not
assigned
to
me.
Although
I
cannot
neglect
my
assigned
work
to
pursue
personal
interests,
that
is
not
what
occurred.
What
occurred
was,
in
addition
to
my
assigned
duties,
I
spent
some
time
looking
into
concerns
that
colleagues
(primarily
Richard
Perkins
but
others
as
well)
shared
with
me.
This
is
not
uncommon
at
the
agency,
where
discussion
and
research
among
staff
beyond
those
immediately
assigned
to
a
task
is
common.
Due
to
my
assigned
workload,
by
necessity
I
conducted
nearly
all
research—beyond
that
necessary
to
respond
to
colleagues—after
working
hours.
I
would
find
it
chilling
were
someone
to
tell
me
I
cannot
look
into
a
safety
concern
a
colleague
has
brought
to
me
unless
I
am
authorized
to
do
so
by
my
supervisor.
Although
no
one
has
said
this
to
me,
it
is
the
impression
I
got
from
the
totality
of
the
OIG’s
January
17,
2013
interrogation
of
me.
Beginning
on
page
44
my
union
steward
interrupted
the
interrogation
to
ask
what
is
meant
by
“Security-­‐Related
Information”
(Exhibit
49).
My
steward
works
in
NRC/NSIR
and
is
used
to
working
with
Safeguards
information,
which
is
a
designation
defined
by
a
federal
statute
that
controls
release
of
such
information.
He
was
unaware
of
“Security-­‐Related
Information”
which
is
an
informal
marking
that
NRR
places
on
documents
that
they
don’t
wish
to
be
publicly
release.
I
think
it
telling
that
my
steward
had
this
confusion,
because
I
believe
that
“Security-­‐Related
Information”
is
intentionally
made
to
resemble
Safeguards
Information
so
that
staff
will
be
leery
of
leaking
it
(it
is
a
federal
crime
to
release
Safeguards
Information
to
an
individual
without
an
official
government
need
for
it
whereas
“Security-­‐Related
Information”
has
no
formal
definition
whatsoever
and
can
legally
be
given
to
anyone).
There
was
much
discussion
as
to
whether
or
not
I
processed
“Security-­‐
Related
Information”
on
my
personal
PC.
I
am
still
not
sure
whether
or
not
I
am
allowed
to
process
“Security-­‐Related
Information”
and
proprietary
information
on
my
personal
PC
(I
know
I
cannot
process
Safeguards
or
classified
information).
I
got
34
the
impression
from
reading
the
testimonies
of
Kathy
Lyons-­‐Burke
(Exhibit
51)
and
Thorne
Graham
(Exhibit
52)
that
it
is
not
allowed
to
send
“Security-­‐Related
Information”
or
proprietary
information
via
commercial
email
servers
(e.g.
Hotmail,
Gmail,
Yahoo)
yet
it
is
still
common
for
employees
to
do
so.
But
I
am
still
unclear
about
using
my
personal
PC
for
processing
propriety
documents.
I
may
have
broken
some
IT
rules,
but
it
is
clear
to
me
that
the
IT
rules
are
ill
defined
and
often
violated.
In
their
September
11,
2013
Report
of
Investigation,
the
agents
mention
the
following
findings
(Exhibit
50):
OIG
found
that
on
December
10,
2012,
CRISCIONE
forwarded
an
email
containing
NRC
OUO-­‐SRI
from
his
NRC
email
account
to
his
personal
Hotmail
account,
although
NRC
prohibits
transmittal
of
such
information
to
commercial
and
personal
email
accounts.
The
sensitive
information
he
forwarded
pertained
to
subject
matter
of
the
Screening
Analysis
Report.
In
addition,
CRISCIONE
admitted
sending
the
NRC
OUO

SRI
Screening
Analysis
Report
to
members
of
Congress
from
his
personal
Hotmail
account,
and
storing
a
copy
of
the
report
in
his
Hotmail
account,
although
NRC
prohibits
staff
from
using
their
personal
email
accounts
to
transmit
or
store
OUO

SRI
information.
Note
that
the
above
findings
were
never
presented
to
me.
I
had
to,
on
my
own
initiative,
request
the
Report
of
Investigation
under
the
Freedom
of
Information
Act
and
wait
six
weeks
for
the
NRC
to
release
it
to
me.
Despite
all
the
discussion
of
IT
issues
during
my
interrogation,
no
one
has
ever
informed
me
that
any
of
the
IT
actions
taken
by
me
and
discussed
during
the
interrogation
violated
any
NRC
policies.
The
only
reason
I
am
aware
I
have
violated
policies
is
because
I
have
gained—through
my
own
initiative—documents
through
the
Freedom
of
Information
Act
and
inadvertently
(i.e.
while
looking
for
other
information)
came
across
passages
indicating
I
had
broken
some
NRC
IT
rules.
I
still
have
supposedly
“Security
Sensitive”
documents
in
my
personal
email
account.
During
my
interrogation
I
was
told
not
to
delete
anything
from
my
personal
email
account.
As
I
was
being
walked
to
the
elevator
after
my
interrogation,
I
asked
special
agent
Daniel
Esmond
when
I
can
again
delete
records
from
my
Hotmail
account.
He
told
me
that
they
would
let
me
know.
I
have
yet
to
hear
from
anyone.
So,
what
exactly
is
so
sensitive
about
these
documents
that
they
cannot
be
stored
on
my
Hotmail
account
yet—even
though
the
NRC
knows
they
are
in
my
account—cannot
be
deleted?
I
left
my
January
17,
2013
interrogation
pretty
shaken
up
about
having
to
admit
apparent
violation
to
NRC
IT
rules
(rules
which
I
was
not
aware
of
but
likely
had
signed
statements
agreeing
to),
yet
in
the
end
these
rules
do
not
seem
to
be
of
much
concern
to
anyone.
35
Beginning
on
page
54,
line
24
there
was
much
discussion
on
using
the
Non
Concurrence
Process,
the
Differing
Professional
Opinions
(DPO)
process,
Open
Door
meetings,
etc.
to
address
my
concerns.
The
topic
of
going
through
channels
was
again
brought
up
around
page
70,
line
14
(Exhibit
23).
The
totality
of
the
discussion
left
me
with
the
impression
that
my
professional
integrity
was
being
challenged
because
I
did
not
use
these
processes.
I
used
Open
Door
meetings
in
the
past
on
the
Callaway
2003-­‐10-­‐21
issue,
with
little
success.
I
could
not
use
the
Non-­‐Concurrence
process
on
the
Jocassee/Oconee
issues
because
I
was
not
assigned
to
concur
on
any
of
the
correspondence.
I
could
not
use
the
DPO
process
because
none
of
the
Jocassee/Oconee
issues
were
formally
assigned
to
me
and
thus
I
was
not
involved
in
any
of
the
decision-­‐making.
I
believe
the
Non
Concurrence,
DPO
and
Open
Door
policies
are
good
policies,
but
the
problem
with
“going
through
channels”
is
that
those
who
control
the
channels
have
myriad
ways
to
bureaucratically
stymie
you.
That
being
said,
as
a
Professional
Engineer
I
typically
go
through
channels:
at
Callaway
Plant
I
dutifully
took
the
October
21,
2003
incident
through
all
levels
of
my
chain
of
command
seeking
a
solution
before
bringing
the
matter
to
the
NRC
as
a
career
ending
allegation.
The
above
being
said,
the
Jocassee/Oconee
issue
had
spent
six
years
“going
through
channels”.
And
Melanie
Galloway—a
deputy
division
director
in
NRR—
submitted
a
Non
Concurrence
and
so
did
Jeff
Mitman—a
well-­‐regarded
senior
risk
analyst
in
NRR.89
If
these
individuals
could
not
get
proper
consideration
for
their
concerns,
how
could
I?
Additionally,
regarding
the
inappropriate
withholding
of
the
issue
from
the
public,
Richard
Perkins—the
project
lead
for
the
Upstream
Dam
Failure
generic
issue—fought
that
battle
at
every
meeting
he
attended
for
over
a
year.
The
NRC
had
had
ample
exposure
of
this
issue
through
its
“channels”
when
Richard
Perkins
and
others
asked
me
if
I
could
get
the
issue
in
front
of
a
congressional
oversight
committee.
Beginning
on
page
58
we
discuss
the
role
other
federal
agencies
had
in
reviewing
the
release
of
the
report
(Exhibit
53).
The
general
implication
of
this
discussion
was
that
other
agencies
did
not
want
their
information
released,
yet
I
somehow
released
it.
These
other
agencies
are—like
the
NRC—not
monolithic
organizations.
There
were
plenty
of
individuals
in
these
organizations—just
like
in
the
NRC—who
felt
the
report
could
go
out
with
no
redactions
(Exhibit
54).
Beginning
on
page
79
there
is
a
discussion
on
“need-­‐to-­‐know”
(Exhibit
55).
On
October
25,
2012
I
was
directed
by
Dan
Cardenas
in
the
Division
of
Facilities
Security
(NRC/ADM/DFS)
to
go
to
an
internal
web
page
and
read
all
the
documents
89
Ms.
Galloway’s
Non-­‐Concurrence
is
in
NRC
ADAMS
as
ML091170104
(Exhibit
83)
and
Mr.
Mitman’s
is
ML110260443
(Exhibit
84).
36
there
concerning
handling
of
SUNSI
(Sensitive
Unclassified
Non-­‐Safeguards
Information—so
basically
SUNSI
is
anything
that
is
controlled
from
public
release
by
administrative
policies
vice
by
legal
statutes)
(Exhibit
56).
This
direction
was
being
given
as
a
follow
through
item
from
the
September
20,
2012
security
infraction
that
had
been
submitted
against
me
for
not
marking
my
2012-­‐09-­‐18
letter
to
the
NRC
Chairman
as
“Security-­‐Related
Information”
(which,
by
the
way,
in
response
to
the
PEER
v.
NRC
lawsuit
was
publicly
released
by
the
NRC
in
September
2013
with
no
redactions
other
than
my
home
address
and
phone
number).
This
direction
was
coming
two
days
after
Doug
Coe’s
October
23,
2012
interview
with
OIG
special
agents
in
which
Doug
was
pointedly
asked
about
what
actions
had
been
taken
as
a
result
of
the
supposed
2012-­‐09-­‐18
security
infraction
and
why
I
continued
to
have
unrestricted
access
to
NRC
internal
ADAMS
(Exhibit
57).
I
did
not
fully
understand
the
contradictory
and
confusing
agency
guidance
for
marking
and
handling
SUNSI
and
replied
to
Dan
Cardenas
with
a
series
of
questions.
After
19
months,
Mr.
Cardenas
still
had
not
seen
fit
to
answer
my
questions—despite
being
the
subject
matter
expert
on
SUNSI—and
instead
referred
me
to
my
supervisor
(Exhibit
56).
I
am
far
from
the
only
NRC
employee
confused
by
our
guidance
on
SUNSI.
From
discussions
in
Ben
Beasley’s
October
19,
2012
interrogation,
it
is
clear
that
he
is
confused
too
(Exhibit
58).
Unfortunately
for
the
sake
of
public
transparency
and
openness,
Ben—like
most
NRC
employees—deals
with
his
confusion
by
defaulting
“conservatively”
and
ensures
he
errs
on
the
side
of
withholding.
The
central
questions
I
had
for
Mr.
Cardenas
revolved
around
the
idea
of
need-­‐to-­‐know
for
official
government
business
(e.g.
is
me
leaving
the
screening
analysis
report
on
upstream
dam
failures—which
is
marked
“Not
for
Public
Disclosure—with
the
intern
in
Representative
Duncan’s
office—the
US
Congressman
from
the
South
Carolina
congressional
district
that
includes
Oconee—
for
distribution
to
his
appropriate
staffer
a
violation
of
“need-­‐to-­‐know”).
The
totality
of
this
part
of
the
IG’s
questioning
of
me
left
me
with
the
impression
that
I
did
not
have
the
authority
to
determine
who
had
a
“need-­‐to-­‐know”
and
therefore
needed
to
go
through
official
channels
to
deliver
documents
to
Congress.
Beginning
on
page
88
there
is
a
discussion
regarding
how
I
came
to
be
quoted
in
the
Iranian
press
(Exhibit
59).
I
am
not
certain
how
I
came
to
be
quoted.
I
did
not
speak
to
any
foreign
journalists
and
the
quotes
attributed
to
me
(which
I
recall
to
be
actual
quotes
which
I
had
spoken
to
Tom
Zeller
of
the
Huffington
Post)
in
the
Iranian
newspaper
match
the
ones
quoted
in
an
earlier
Huffington
Post
article
so
I
assume
that
the
Iranians
used
the
Huffington
Post
as
a
source
for
their
article.
37
The
Iranian
news
article
was
linked
to
in
the
“NRC
in
the
News”
link
on
the
NRC’s
internal
home
page
so
it
is
widely
known
throughout
the
NRC
that
I
was
quoted
by
an
Iranian
newspaper.
Beginning
on
page
89
there
is
a
discussion
regarding
how
Greenpeace
and
the
Huffington
Post
came
to
possess
the
unredacted
GI-­‐204
screening
analysis
(Exhibit
60).
At
the
time,
I
believed
that
it
had
been
provided
to
Jim
Riccio
of
Greenpeace
by
Vic
Edgerton
of
Congressman
Kucinich’s
office.
However,
I
did
not
know
this
for
certain
and
strongly
felt
that,
even
had
I
known,
it
was
not
appropriate
for
me
to
discuss
the
completely
legal
actions90
of
a
legislative
branch
staffer
(i.e.
Edgerton)
with
investigative
agents
of
the
executive
branch
(i.e.
Walls)
who
were
trying
to
determine
how
an
embarrassing—yet
unclassified,
non-­‐Safeguards
and
wholly
otherwise
legally
unrestricted
from
release—document
made
it
into
the
public
domain.
When
I
hesitated
to
speculate
on
the
precise
name
of
an
individual,
I
was
directed
to
do
so.
This
made
me
very
uncomfortable.
I
did
not
think
it
right
that
I
name
Vic
Edgerton,
who
might
not
have
been
the
one
who
leaked
the
document
and
thus
whose
name
I
would
be
besmirching.
I
also
did
not
think
it
right
that,
were
Vic
to
be
the
actual
source,
I
name
him
since
he
had
every
right
to
consult
with
Greenpeace
on
the
document
and
his
mention
in
an
NRC
IG
investigation
report
might
limit
his
ability
to
get
documents
from
the
NRC
in
the
future.
I
should
note
here
that
my
feelings
about
this
questioning
would
have
been
wholly
different
had
we
been
discussing
classified
or
Safeguards
documents.
I
believe
that
the
NRC’s
IG
has
every
right
to
investigate
the
release
of
classified
material
and
Safeguards
documents
since
their
release
is
a
violation
of
law.
Congressional
staffers
are
not
above
the
law,
but
they
are
above
NRC
administrative
rules
designed
to
keep
embarrassing
issues
out
of
the
hands
of
the
public.
Beginning
on
page
98
there
is
a
discussion
regarding
my
relationship
with
Richard
Perkins
with
regard
to
the
Jocassee/Oconee
issue
(Exhibit
61).
Richard
and
I
worked
in
the
same
branch
and
he
would
share
his
concerns
with
me
all
the
time
regarding
how
he
believed
NRR
was
trying
to
withhold
the
Oconee/Jocassee
issue
from
the
public.
It
was
in
support
of
his
efforts
that
I
reached
out
to
congressional
committees.
I
believe
our
relationship
is
the
typical
type
of
professional
collaboration
that
is
expected
in
an
“Open
and
Collaborative
Work
Environment”
(OCWE).
The
totality
of
this
part
of
the
IG’s
questioning
of
me
left
me
with
the
impression
that
they
believed
I
had
colluded
with
Richard
Perkins
to
publicly
release
the
GI-­‐204
Screening
Analysis.
90
There
was
nothing
legally
prohibiting
Vic
Edgerton,
me,
or
anyone
else
from
releasing
the
GI-­‐
204
screening
report
to
the
public.
For
NRC
employees
(such
as
myself)
there
were
administrative
policies
preventing
it
but
no
legal
statutes.
38
Beginning
on
page
116
there
is
a
discussion
regarding
what
qualifies
me
to
determine
whether
or
not
an
issue
is
release-­‐able
to
the
public
(Exhibit
62).
As
an
NRC
employee,
one
of
my
tasks
is
to
process
Freedom
of
Information
Act
(FOIA)
requests
for
which
I
am
the
document
owner.
In
that
role,
I
believe
I
have
the
authority
to
determine
what
can
and
cannot
be
released
(although
that
authority
can
be
questioned
and
overridden
as
the
FOIA
submittal
is
routed
through
the
process).
Another
role
I
am
sometimes
assigned
is
to
do
the
SUNSI
review
of
records
I
am
placing
in
ADAMS.
In
that
role,
I
am
specifically
being
assigned
the
task
of
determining
if
a
document
is
publicly
release-­‐able.
The
totality
of
the
OIG’s
questioning
in
this
part
of
the
interview
left
me
with
the
impression
that
only
the
FOIA
office
and
the
Office
of
General
Counsel
can
authorize
the
public
release
of
a
document.
Beginning
on
page
123
the
tone
of
the
investigation
gets
accusatory
(Exhibit
63).
The
accusation
is
made
that
it
was
my
intent
to
publicly
release
the
report
through
Congress.
On
page
126
there
is
a
hostile
exchange
between
Agent
Esmond
and
my
union
steward
regarding
Agent
Esmond’s
inability
to
understand
why
I
would
think
it
acceptable
to
provide
a
document
marked
“Not
for
Public
Disclosure”
(i.e.
the
GI-­‐204
screening
analysis)
to
Congress
when
I
knew
there
was
a
possibility
it
could
get
publicly
release.
On
page
129
agent
Walls
states
in
a
very
intimidating
manner
(Exhibit
63):
Many
people
believe
that
you
are
directly
responsible
for
Greenpeace
and
Huffington
Post’s
receipt
of
the
unredacted
GI-­‐204
report,
and
posting
that
report
for
the
public’s
consumption.
I
didn’t
know
how
to
answer
such
an
accusation.
As
I
was
trying
to
formulate
and
answer
he
interrupted
me
and
stated:
Well,
you’ve
told
me,
you
didn’t
say,
“No,
I’m
not
responsible,”
so
that—you
not
coming
out
and
telling
me
that,
that
tells
me
something.
I’ve
got
another
follow
up
question.”
At
this
point
I
asked
him
to
hold
on
and
give
me
a
chance
to
answer
that
accusation
at
which
point
he
aggressively
interrupted
me
and
stated:
You’re
right,
I’m
going
to
make
some
accusations,
because
I
think
you
have
taken
some
steps
that
you
haven’t
fully
thought
through,
or
maybe
you
have.
At
this
point
he
went
on
to
the
next
question
without
giving
me
an
opportunity
to
finish
my
answer
to
his
earlier
accusation
about
many
people
believing
I
am
directly
responsible
for
the
release
of
the
GI-­‐204
screening
analysis
report.
39
This
portion
of
the
interrogation
left
me
feeling
intimidated.
I
felt
that
I
was
being
accused
of
directly
releasing
the
report
to
the
public—something
I
am
legally
allowed
to
do
but
something
that
I
did
not
do
since
it
violates
NRC
administrative
policies.
The
interrogation
then
focused
on
whether
or
not
I
led
anyone
to
believe
that
it
would
be
acceptable
to
release
the
documents
and
what
I
did
once
I
realized
that
the
Huffington
Post
was
in
possession
of
the
documents.
Again
Agent
Walls
asked
me
if
I
felt
responsible:
SR.
SPEC.
AGENT
WALLS:
Did
you
feel
responsible?
MR.
CRISCIONE:
That
there
was
an
article
written
about
this?
SR.
SPEC.
AGENT
WALLS:
That
those
documents
were
made
public.
Did
you
feel
responsible?
MR.
CRISCIONE:
Yeah.
That’s
going
back
to
that
first
question
too
about
“many
people
believe”
whatever…
SR.
SPEC.
AGENT
WALLS:
Do
you
feel
responsible
for
this
public—this
report
being
made
public?
MR.
CRISCIONE:
It
was
not
my
intent…
SR.
SPEC.
AGENT
WALLS:
[interrupting
in
a
harsh
tone]
You’re
the
only
subject
of
this
investigation.
I’m
asking
you,
do
you
feel
responsible?
Yes
or
no?
MR.
CRISCIONE:
It
was
not
my
intent
to
release
this
document
through
some
unofficial
channels
to
the
public.
All
right?
SR.
SPEC.
AGENT
WALLS:
That
may
have
not
been
your
sole
intent,
but
you
knew
it
was
a
possibility.
MR.
CRISCIONE:
Right.
SR.
SPEC.
AGENT
WALLS:
And
you
were
okay
with
it.91
91
Here
I
am
“guilty
as
charged”.
It
was
not
my
sole
intent,
but
I
was
certainly
“okay
with
it”.
The
document
we
are
talking
about
here
was
not
Safeguards,
was
not
classified
a