January 5, 2014
1412 Dial Court
Springfield, IL 62704
Office of the Inspector General
US Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Subj: Input regarding Audit of NRC’s FOIA Process—FOIA 2012‐0106, 2012‐0127, 2012‐0126, 2012‐
0321, 2012‐0325, 2013‐0008, 2013‐0013, 2013‐0109, 2013‐0127, 2013‐0128, 2013‐006A, 2013‐009A,
2013‐010A, 2013‐015A, 2013‐0213, 2013‐0239
Dear Robert, Beth and Stephen:
In my current position with the NRC, I have nothing to do with the FOIA process other than occasionally
processing a FOIA request for records in my possession. However, as a requester, I have probably had
more exposure to the NRC’s FOIA process from the “customer” side than anyone currently working at
Below are some examples I think you should consider during your audit of the NRC’s FOIA process.
I have made efforts in the letter below to stick to the topic of the manner in which the NRC handles the
Freedom of Information Act (FOIA). However, intimately intertwined with the FOIA process issues is the
process for determining and marking Controlled Unclassified Information (CUI). The NRC’s position is
that CUI and FOIA are entirely separate in that the marking of a document as CUI does not exempt its
release under FOIA. Although this is true (i.e. CUI markings do not exempt release under FOIA), what is
not true is that the determination of CUI is wholly separate from the FOIA. CUI markings should not
impact the FOIA, but the FOIA should—at some level—be used to guide CUI. Indiscriminate marking of
documents as CUI greatly impacts the ability of the NRC to meet our time requirements that are both
prescribed in US law1 and prescribed in our own regulations.2
In this letter, I make statements which some within the Office of the Inspector General might consider
allegations of willful violations of US law and NRC regulations. Although I do believe that willful
violations of US law and NRC regulations have occurred, it is not my intent to make such allegations to
the OIG. When I have allegations of intentional wrongdoing to make, I will do it via a disclosure to the
Office of Special Counsel (OSC). My intent with this letter is merely to provide the audit team with my
experiences with regard to the FOIA process. What is needed here is an OIG audit that seeks to
understand what has occurred in order to improve our future performance.
1 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(6)(A)(i): http://www.justice.gov/oip/foia_updates/Vol_XVII_4/page2.htm
2 10 CFR § 9.25(a): http://www.nrc.gov/reading‐rm/doc‐collections/cfr/part009/part009‐0025.html
§1. 2012‐09‐18 Letter to NRC Chairman
On September 18, 2012 I wrote a 19‐page letter3 to NRC Chairman Macfarlane concerning (1) the NRC’s
lack of timely action regarding the addressing of flooding concerns at the Oconee Nuclear Station (ONS)
and (2) our withholding—for over six years4—of this significant nuclear safety concern from the
There was nothing in my 2012‐09‐18 letter discussing specific security vulnerabilities regarding either
the Lake Jocassee Dam or the reactors at the Oconee Nuclear Station. Although my letter quoted from
documents which had been designated “Official Use Only – Security‐Related Information”, none of these
documents contained portion markings and it was thus not possible to tell which paragraphs were
considered “Security‐Related Information” and which were not. To me, the guidance available (e.g.
10 CFR § 2.390,5 NRC MD 12.6,6 SECY‐04‐0191,7 a policy statement,8 and several conflicting9
announcements posted on internal NRC intranet pages) did not indicate anything in my letter as being
Sensitive Unclassified Non‐Safeguards Information (SUNSI).
On September 20, 2012 my supervisor was directed to file an NRC Form 18310 accusing me of a security
infraction. In the form it stated:
Sensitive information (SUNSI) was not appropriately labeled or marked and was transmitted
outside the agency to other federal government entities. The email message does not appear to
have been sent to anyone outside the federal government. Neither the email nor the attached
letter was marked as containing sensitive information.
3 ML13256A372: http://pbadupws.nrc.gov/docs/ML1325/ML13256A372.pdf
4 The NRC’s concerns regarding flooding at the Oconee Nuclear Station following a failure of the Lake Jocassee
Dam were first raised in an April 2006 publicly available quarterly inspection report. However, once NRC
headquarters became involved in getting the issue addressed (late 2006) all correspondence concerning the issue
was designated “Official Use Only – Security‐Related Information” and the issue was not publicly acknowledged
until it appeared in the Huffington Post in September 2012.
5 10 CFR § 2.390 Public inspections, exemptions, requests for withholding
6 Management Directive 12.6, NRC Sensitive Unclassified Information Security Program (ML041700603)
7 SECY‐04‐0191, Withholding Sensitive Unclassified Information Concerning Nuclear Power Reactors from Public
8 NRC Policy for Handling, Marking, and Protecting Sensitive Unclassified Non‐Safeguards Information
9 On October 26, 2012 I wrote an 8 page email to my union representation advising them of the poor condition of
the guidance for Official Use Only information. Management Directive 12.6 is from 1999 (i.e. two years prior to
the drastic information handling changes resulting from the 2001‐09‐11 attacks) and is woefully out of date as
evidenced by the need to sort through conflicting guidance in SECY papers, policy statements and intranet
announcements to resolve significant questions. I also wrote a two page email on October 25, 2012 to NRC
Facilities Security (the program owner for MD 12.6) detailing some of this conflicting guidance. Both these emails
were captured in internal NRC ADAMS as ML12313A059. These emails had been meant to point out a problem in
the hopes of reaching a dialogue to produce solutions; they were not merely meant to be finger pointing.
However, thus far no dialogue has ensued. If anyone from the NRC OIG is interested in auditing our process for
handling Controlled Unclassified Information (CUI—the President’s term for what we call SUNSI), I would
appreciate an opportunity to speak with them.
10 Report of Security Incident/Infraction/Violation
On October 9, 2012 David Lochbaum of the Union of Concerned Scientists (UCS) requested my
2012‐09‐18 letter to the NRC Chairman. We registered Mr. Lochbaum’s request as FOIA 2013‐0008
(ML12283A329). Tom Zeller of the Huffington Post also requested that letter on October 15, 2012. Mr.
Zeller’s request was assigned tracking number FOIA 2013‐0013. Mr. Zeller was working on a story at the
time and requested “expedited processing”. Per the Freedom of Information Act, Mr. Lochbaum was
due a response by November 7, 2012, unless unusual circumstances applied whereby the NRC could
take until November 22, 2012.
An internal NRC document (ML13149A079, “Second Quarter Operating Plan FY‐2013”) indicates that Mr.
Lochbaum’s FOIA request was prepared by the Chairman’s office and submitted to the FOIA office by
October 26, 2012. This was only 14 working days after Mr. Lochbaum’s October 9th request and thus we
were well on track to provide Mr. Lochbaum a FOIA response within the 20 working days required by 5
U.S.C § 552(a) and by 10 CFR § 9.25(a).
Despite the Chairman’s office having submitted the requested document to the FOIA office within 14
working days, a response was not provided to Mr. Lochbaum within the 20 working days required by the
Freedom of Information Act. In the paragraphs below, I contend that our lack of response to Mr.
Lochbaum was not inadvertent but rather was due to intentional violation of federal law.
First, we were under no obligation to provide an unredacted version of the requested letter to Mr.
Lochbaum within 20 working days, but rather were merely obliged to provide Mr. Lochbaum a response.
If the letter could not be released due to an ongoing Inspector General investigation (as some have
speculated to me) then all we had to do to meet the legal requirements of the Freedom of Information
Act would be to inform Mr. Lochbaum we were withholding the letter per Exemption 7(A). We had the
letter within 14 working days. The Chairman’s office reviewed the letter within 14 working days.
Although there might be plenty of excuses for not releasing an unredacted version of the letter within
20 working days, there are no valid excuses for not providing a response within 20 working days.
For reasons unknown to me, we refused to withhold my 2012‐09‐18 letter to the Chairman based on
any FOIA exemptions. I can only assume that the reason we would not use FOIA exemptions to withhold
my letter is because we knew no FOIA exemptions applied and felt it was safer for us to merely
intentionally delay responding to the FOIA requests than to withhold its release based on illegal
application of FOIA exemptions.
Second, on February 12, 2013 I realized that Mr. Lochbaum’s and Mr. Zeller’s requests had not yet been
responded to,11 so I made my own FOIA request for the 2012‐09‐18 letter. My request was assigned
tracking number 2013‐0127 on February 13, 2013 (ML13044A486 ). In my request, I specifically mention
Mr. Lochbaum’s and Mr. Zeller’s requests by tracking number. By March 29, 2013 it had been 31
working days since the NRC acknowledged receipt of FOIA 2013‐0127. In accordance with 10 CFR §
9.25(j) I submitted an appeal to the NRC regarding our de‐facto denial of the records sought due to not
meeting our statutory required 30 working day time limit.12 My appeal letter was addressed to the NRC
Chairman (Allison Macfarlane), the Secretary of the Commission (Annette Vietti‐Cook), the Executive
Director for Operations (Bill Borchardt) and the NRC’s Chief Freedom of Information Act Officer (Darren
Ash). The NRC assigned tracking number 2013‐010A to my appeal letter. In the letter I point out that,
11 Although there is a response to Mr. Lochbaum dated February 6, 2013, this document was not publicly posted
until February 14, 2013, and I thus, at the time, had no knowledge of it.
12 10 CFR § 9.25(b)
by then, Mr. Lochbaum’s request was 140 days old and Mr. Zeller’s was 134 days old. I also reminded
them of the FOIA timeliness policy put force by President Obama and echoed by the Attorney General.
So, nearly six months prior to the eventual release of the letter, the leadership of the NRC had been
aware that we were grossly overdue on providing my 2012‐09‐18 letter to Mr. Lochbaum and to Mr.
Up until this point (i.e. March 29, 2013) one can argue that the gross delay in responding to FOIA 2013‐
0008 and 2013‐0013 had been due to bureaucratic ineptitude (e.g. low level staff in the FOIA office not
having the authority to force staff in other offices to meet the FOIA time requirements, or technical staff
in NRR disagreeing upon what could and could not be released regarding Jocassee/Oconee FOIA
requests). However, after March 29, 2013 we can no longer claim Mr. Lochbaum’s and Mr. Zeller’s FOIA
requests were “lost in the bureaucracy” since, on 2013‐03‐29, the highest levels of NRC management
were informed of the issue. Yet it would still take nearly another six months before Mr. Lochbaum’s,
Mr. Zeller’s and my own FOIA requests were answered.
On April 9, 2013 we provided Mr. Lochbaum a third partial response to FOIA 2013‐0008 and on April 18,
2013 we provided Mr. Zeller a second partial response to FOIA 2013‐0013. Neither of these responses
included my 2012‐09‐18 letter to the Chairman despite the fact that: (1) it had been processed by
October 26, 2012 and (2) the uppermost leadership of the NRC had been informed 7 (in the case of Mr.
Lochbaum’s response) and 14 (in the case of Mr. Zeller’s) working days earlier that we were grossly
overdue in providing my 2012‐09‐18 letter to Dave and Tom.
On May 7, 2013 Public Employees for Environmental Responsibility (PEER) submitted a Freedom of
Information Act request (2013‐0239) for my September 18, 2012 letter to the NRC Chairman along with
the email it had been attached to and the reference documents which had been included with it. So
now the NRC had a fourth request for my 19‐page letter to the NRC Chairman which, according to
ML13149A079, had been submitted by the Chairman to the FOIA office on October 26, 2012.
On May 23, 2013 per 10 CFR §9.25(j) Dave Lochbaum filed an administrative appeal concerning the
NRC’s failure to provide him my 2012‐09‐18 letter within the 30 working day limit prescribed by 10 CFR
§ 9.25(b). Dave’s appeal was captured as FOIA 2013‐015A.
On May 24, 2013 I wrote the NRC inquiring as to when I could expect to receive a response regarding my
overdue FOIA requests and appeals. That letter was addressed to the NRC Chairman, the NRC Inspector
General (Hubert Bell), the NRC General Counsel (Margaret Doane), the Secretary of the Commission, the
Executive Director for Operations, the NRC’s Chief Freedom of Information Act Officer, and to the NRC’s
FOIA/Privacy Act Officer (Donna Sealing). In that letter I (erroneously) reminded the NRC that I had
been waiting nine weeks (it had actually only been 8 weeks) for a response to my March 29, 2013 FOIA
appeals. I also brought it to the recipients’ attention that Mr. Lochbaum had been waiting 32 weeks and
Mr. Zeller 152 working days for my 2012‐09‐18 letter. And I provided my analysis that “The NRC
Chairman is, for some reason, stonewalling Mr. Zeller and Mr. Lochbaum.” I closed the letter with an
appeal to the NRC to live up to our legal obligations under the Freedom of Information Act and our own
regulations. So, nearly four months prior to the eventual release of the letter the NRC leadership was
again reminded that they were grossly overdue on providing an adequate FOIA response to myself, Mr.
Lochbaum and Mr. Zeller.
On June 10, 2013 several attorneys from the NRC’s Office of General Counsel met with technical staff,
branch chiefs and division directors from NRR and RES regarding how to respond to FOIA requests
concerning the Jocassee/Oconee issue. So for at least three months the Office of General Counsel—that
is, the NRC office tasked with ensuring we follow federal law and with ensuring we adequately
implement our own regulations—had been involved with resolving these FOIA issues and yet had not
seen to it that these grossly overdue FOIA requests and appeals were promptly answered. Also on June
10, 2013, the NRC issued a partial response to PEER’s FOIA request (FOIA 2013‐0239) yet did not include
the 19‐page letter to the Chairman in the response, despite the Chairman having submitted it to the
FOIA office over 7 months earlier.
On June 13, 2013 I received a shallow one‐page response from the NRC’s Office of General Counsel
regarding my May 24, 2013 letter. Although the June 13, 2013 letter technically might qualify in some
courts as the NRC engaging a FOIA requester to work through concerns, the letter made no statement of
when I could expect an answer to my requests and provided no justification for the delay in releasing
the information other than that responding to my requests “requires coordinating among multiple
offices within the NRC to ensure that we are taking a consistent approach”. That statement hardly
explained to me why Mr. Lochbaum had been waiting 9½ months for one 19‐page letter, Mr. Zeller had
been waiting 40 weeks for a request on which he requested “expedited processing”, and why I had been
waiting 114 working days for my request and 84 working days for its appeal.
According to the RES Plan of the Day, on June 25, 2013 there was an additional meeting between
managers from NRR and RES and attorneys from OGC concerning “FOIA Jocassee Dam Issues” yet it still
took another 11 weeks for my letter to the Chairman to be released.
On July 5, 2013 PEER appealed the NRC’s partial response to FOIA 2013‐0239. As part of their appeal,
PEER complained that my 19‐page letter to the NRC Chairman had not yet been provided by the NRC—
despite us having 41 working days to provide it.
On July 16, 2013 there was a “four‐figure meeting” convened to discuss the Jocassee/Oconee FOIA’s
which was attended by all three Deputy Executive Directors for Operations (DEDOs), several Office
Directors, several Division Directors, multiple attorneys, and technical staff to discuss the
Jocassee/Oconee FOIAs. With that many highly paid decision makers convening on one issue, a taxpayer
would hope that a decision could be made, but two months later (Sept. 16) my grossly overdue FOIA
requests and appeals were still not answered.
On August 15, 2013 PEER sued the NRC for release of my 2012‐09‐18 letter as well of the documents
attached to the email which transmitted it.
The NRC did not release my September 18, 2012 letter to the NRC Chairman until they were forced to do
so by a lawsuit filed by Public Employees for Environmental Responsibility. The letter was finally
released on September 17, 2013 to PEER as enticement for PEER to agree to a motion to enlarge the
time for the NRC to respond to the 2013‐08‐15 lawsuit.
On September 25, 2013—after waiting 351 days—we provided my 2012‐09‐18 letter to Mr. Lochbaum
in our fourth and final response to his FOIA request. Two days later, on September 27th, Mr. Ash closed
Mr. Lochbaum’s FOIA appeal (FOIA 2013‐015A) to the following statement (I received a similar response
to FOIA 2013‐010A):
On behalf of the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC), I am responding to your e‐mail
message of May 23, 2013, to the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA)/Privacy Act (PA) Officer. You
appealed the agency’s lack of response to your October 09, 2012, FOIA request (FOIA/PA‐2013‐
0008) for specified records.
Since the NRC provided you a final response to FOIAlPA‐2013‐0008 on September 25, 2013, this
appeal is now closed.
For whatever reason, we deemed that mine and Mr. Lochbaum’s denial of timely response appeals
needed no explanation for the time delay. Ironically, when a member of the public appeals our failure
to respond to a FOIA request within 20 working days, our process for addressing that appeal appears to
be to—like the request being appealed—ignore the appeal until it can be trivially closed after we have
eventually responded to the request.
As part of your FOIA audit, I would like you to seek to understand why it took so long to release a 19‐
page letter; a letter which—in the end—contained no redactions other than my home address and cell
phone number. Some questions to ask are:
1.1. What investigation was done regarding the security infraction documented on 2012‐09‐20 via a
Form 183? What were the results of this investigation? Was it determined that sensitive
information had been compromised? Do the investigation results conflict with the eventual
decision to release the 2012‐09‐18 letter without any redactions other than two PII redactions?
Did this investigation contribute to us not meeting our 20 working day requirement for
providing a response to FOIA 2013‐0008? Did this investigation justify immediately responding
to FOIA 2013‐0008 by claiming Exemption 7(A)?
1.2. What exactly did the Office of the Chairman provide to the FOIA office on October 26, 2012 in
response to FOIA 2013‐0008? Was it the same version of the letter that was eventually released
as ML13256A372? Why wasn’t this letter provided to Mr. Lochbaum by the November 7, 2012
1.3. How was Mr. Zeller’s October 2013 FOIA request (FOIA 2013‐0013) for “expedited processing”
processed? Was it formally decided to either grant or deny Mr. Zeller’s request for “expedited
processing”? If so, was Mr. Zeller informed of the decision? How are decisions regarding
“expedited processing” made? Given that the requested letter was eventually released with no
redactions other than PII, is it reasonable that we could not provide the letter to Mr. Zeller in
October 2012 while he needed it for an article?
1.4. Are the bonuses for any Senior Executive Service (SES) employees tied to meeting our legally
required FOIA time commitments13? If so, how is the performance measure structured? Is it a
“gate” (e.g. going 1 day beyond the time limit is no different than going 364 days beyond the
time limit) or does it have a “progressively weighted penalty” (e.g. FOIA’s that are two months
overdue cause a higher penalty than FOIA’s that are just one month overdue)? Once a FOIA is
overdue, is there any financial incentive to the SES staff to minimize the “lateness” of the NRC’s
1.5. How was my March 29, 2013 FOIA appeal (FOIA 2013‐010A) processed by the NRC? Did the
SECY read my letter or was it directed to her staff? Did any meetings occur to discuss why, after
140 days, we had still not provided a response to Mr. Lochbaum?
1.6. How are appeals submitted under 10 CFR 9.25(j) (i.e. “lack of response”) handled? Is there any
requirement in a Management Directive to investigate why the FOIA request has not yet been
responded to? Is there any requirement in a Management Directive to engage the FOIA
13 E.g. 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(6)(A)(i) and (ii), 10 CFR § 9.25(a) and (b), 10 CFR § 9.29(b)‐(f)
requester and explain the reason for our failure to meet our statutory time requirements? Is it
acceptable to merely avoid addressing a “lack of response” appeal until the original request has
finally been closed and then to just close the “lack of response” appeal to the fact that it is no
longer applicable now that a response has been provided? Although no laws or internal
procedures might have been violated, were—in the opinion of the OIG auditors—FOIA appeals
2013‐010A and 2013‐015A adequately addressed? Should it be NRC policy to—upon receiving a
“lack of response” appeal—investigate why we failed to meet our legally required time
commitments and to, in our response to the appellant, explain the circumstances that justify an
extended response time?
1.7. Why was FOIA appeal 2013‐010A not addressed by May 13, 2013 (i.e. 20 working days from its
acknowledgement by the NRC)? Why, after knowing for 20 working days that we were grossly
overdue in our legal deadlines for responding to FOIA 2013‐0008 and 2013‐0013, was the senior
leadership of the NRC not able to ensure these FOIA requests were adequately processed?
Although some FOIA requests cannot be physically processed within the 20 working day legal
requirement (e.g. FOIA 2012‐0325 which encompassed stacks of documents literally several feet
high), when a request is merely waiting on a management decision (e.g. the release of a 19‐page
letter that the agency had been addressing for over 6 months) is it acceptable for senior
leadership to allow that request to continue to be delayed? What is the expectation of action
for agency senior leadership when they become aware that we are not meeting a legal
requirement that—with merely the will‐power to make a decision—we could easily meet?
1.8. What was the cost to the American taxpayer that was accrued by us not releasing my
2012‐09‐18 letter by the original November 7, 2012 due date for FOIA 2013‐0008? How much
staff time was directly coded to FOIAs 2013‐0008, 2013‐0013, 2013‐0127, 2013‐0239, 2013‐
010A and 2013‐015A? What was the total dollar value of the staff hours committed to the July
16, 2013 meeting attended by the three DEDOs and multiple Office Directors, Division Directors,
attorneys and senior technical staff? How many staff hours were spent at the June 10 and June
25th meetings? How much money was spent by the NRC responding to the 2013‐08‐15 lawsuit
filed by PEER? How much money was spent by the US Attorney’s Office in representing the NRC
in the PEER lawsuit? How much money was spent by the US Circuit Court in processing the PEER
v. NRC lawsuit? How much money would have been saved had we released an unredacted
version of my letter on November 7, 2012 instead of delaying until September 17, 2013?
1.9. Who finally made the decision to release my 2012‐09‐18 letter as ML13256A372? Why was it
possible to, within 20 working days of receiving a lawsuit, process my 2012‐09‐18 letter for
release yet not be able to process it within 11 months outside of the lawsuit? Obviously a
lawsuit places a higher level of management attention on a subject, but is it acceptable for that
lack of attention to be present outside of a lawsuit? Could not procedures be put in place to
ensure appropriate attention is applied at the “administrative appeal” phase and thereby
possibly avoid a lawsuit?
1.10. How are responses to FOIA appeals handled in the SES bonus structure? Given that appeals are
much rarer than FOIA requests, are overdue FOIA appeals weighted differently than overdue
requests? Or are FOIA appeals merely lumped in with requests when determining SES
performance? Since FOIA appeals are addressed to specific SES managers (e.g. either the EDO,
the SECY, the Inspector General, or the General Counsel), is timely response to appeals directly
tied to the performance measures for those managers? Are any SES bonuses affected when an
inadequate response to a FOIA administrative appeal leads to a FOIA lawsuit that is
subsequently lost in court?
§2. Richard Perkins’ Emails (FOIA 2012‐0321)
On September 17, 2012 Tom Zeller of the Huffington Post sent the following request to the NRC’s FOIA
All email messages concerning Generic Issue 204 and/or upstream dam failures that were
delivered to, or sent by NRC employee Richard H. Perkins, PE, Division of Risk Analysis, Office
of Nuclear Regulatory Research, US Nuclear Regulatory Commission between January 1, 2010
and September 14, 2012.
Mr. Zeller’s incoming request was assigned FOIA 2012‐0321. It can be found at:
During the autumn of 2012 Mr. Perkins spent weeks assembling and redacting his emails and notes for
release under the Freedom of Information Act yet after a year none of his emails or notes have been
provided to Mr. Zeller.
During the summer of 2013 Mr. Zeller left the Huffington Post for a fellowship at the Massachusetts
Institute of Technology (MIT). As a result, he does not frequently check his old Huffington Post email
account. On September 20, 2013—after we had had Mr. Zeller’s FOIA request for over a year—the NRC
sent Mr. Zeller an email at his Huffington Post email account. Upon failing to hear from Mr. Zeller, the
NRC promptly closed FOIA 2013‐0321 to the following:
The subject FOIA request is administratively closed due to lack of interest in pursuing the request.
Our closure response to Mr. Zeller can be found at:
I found out about the closure of FOIA 2012‐0321 on November 1, 2013 and immediately informed Mr.
Zeller who promptly informed the NRC he was still interested in the documents.
Please note that it is possible that, due to the Office of Inspector General’s investigation into the
handling of the Jocassee/Oconee flooding issues,14 some—maybe even all—of Mr. Perkins’ emails
cannot be immediately released to Mr. Zeller. However, under the Freedom of Information Act, we
need not release these emails provided we provide Mr. Zeller a response detailing under what
exemption we are withholding the emails. Although I personally doubt that any of the emails—and
certainly not most of them—could not have been released months ago, we have no excuse for not
having responded to Mr. Zeller long before now.
Mr. Perkins originally submitted his emails to the FOIA contact for the NRC’s Office of Nuclear
Regulatory Research (RES) on November 8, 2012 and then, on December 14, 2012, re‐submitted the
material with annotations as to who in other NRC offices need to review it. Email correspondence from
the NRC FOIA office shows that in May 2013 the FOIA office was processing the material. Seeing as how
14 I believe the relevant case number is OIG Case 13‐005, but there may be other cases that also apply.
Mr. Zeller’s FOIA request is over a year old, in your audit of the FOIA process I suggest you seek answers
to the following questions:
2.1. Why, after having Mr. Perkins’ emails for over nine months, the NRC was not able to provide at
least a partial release to Mr. Zeller prior to closing the request on September 20, 2013?
2.2. What interaction, if any, did the NRC have with Mr. Zeller between the September 17, 2012
submission of his request and their September 20, 2013 closure of his request?
2.3. Who at the NRC prevented a partial response from being released to Mr. Zeller during the one
year and three days that his FOIA request was active? Was it bureaucratic incompetence, or did
someone place a hold on either the releasing or the processing of FOIA 2012‐0321?
§3. Abuse of 10 CFR § 2.390 (Example: ML100780084)
On February 6, 2013 we released a redacted version of ML100780084 to Dave Lochbaum of the UCS
(ML13039A084). Although Mr. Lochbaum never actually requested ML100780084, it was one of the
documents that had been attached to my 2012‐09‐18 email to the NRC Chairman, and we—
generously—included within the scope of FOIA 2013‐0008 all the documents attached to the my 2012‐
09‐18 email that had been used to transmit my 2012‐09‐18 letter to Chairman Macfarlane.
ML100780084 is a 2010‐03‐15 NRC generic failure rate evaluation for Jocassee Dam risk analysis
prepared by Jim Vail, Fernando Ferrante and Jeff Mitman of the Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
(NRR). The redacted version of ML100780084 (i.e. ML13039A084) was released to Paul Blanch under
FOIA 2013‐0110 and was later released to me under FOIA 2013‐0126. This redacted document
contained only one redaction: a figure detailing a generic cross section of Jocassee Dam.
On March 8, 2013 Jim Riccio of Green Peace, forwarded me a meeting notice for a March 19, 2013 NRC
public meeting with Duke Energy concerning the flooding evaluation for Oconee Nuclear Station. At
some point, the March 19th meeting was moved to March 25, 2013. On the morning of March 25th, Jim
forwarded me the Duke Energy slide presentation which apparently John Boska (NRR) had sent to him.
These slides were, later that day, presented at the March 25th public meeting by Duke Energy. In
addition to Mr. Riccio, there was at least one other member of the public present at that meeting:
Colleen Payne, who has worked, lived and run for public office in South Carolina. There was also at least
one member of the public on the phone line: a South Carolina resident who is a member of Friends of
At the meeting, NRR informed the participants that Duke Energy’s slide presentation was posted on the
NRC’s public website and could be found by referencing ADAMS Accession Number ML13084A022.
By March 29, 2013, FOIA 2013‐0126 was 30 working days old and I had not yet received a response even
though four of the five documents requested had already been released to others in either redacted or
unredacted form (including ML100780084 which had been released to Mr. Lochbaum and Mr. Blanch).
So on March 29, 2013 I appealed my request in accordance with 10 CFR § 9.25(j). That appeal was
assigned tracking number FOIA 2013‐009A.
On April 11, 2013 I finally received a response to FOIA 2013‐0126. The response contained the same
redacted version of ML100780084 which we had provided to Mr. Lochbaum on February 14, 2013. I
immediately submitted an update to my appeal (FOIA 2013‐009A) challenging the redactions made to
ML100780084. In my update letter, I noted that the same figure which had been redacted from
ML100780084 had been included in the slide presentation which Duke Energy had presented at the
March 25, 2013 public meeting (ML13084A022). The public link to ML13084A022 no longer works;
sometime after my April 11, 2013 update letter, NRR removed ML13084A022 from public access.
ML13084A022 still exists in ADAMS. The current document assigned that ADAMS Accession Number is
the same as the one which Jim Riccio sent me except it contains the following statement on each and
Withhold from Public Disclosure under 10 CFR 2.390
The statement above comes from 10 CFR § 2.390(b)(1)(i)(A). 10 CFR § 2.390(b) states:
The procedures in this section must be followed by anyone submitting a document to the NRC
who seeks to have the document, or a portion of it, withheld from public disclosure because it
contains trade secrets, privileged, or confidential commercial or financial information.
I am not an attorney, but my interpretation of 10 CFR § 2.390(b) is that it’s subsections apply to “anyone
submitting a document to the NRC” and not to NRC staff. That is, the request to withhold Duke Energy’s
2013‐03‐25 public slide presentation “from public disclosure under 10 CFR 2.390” should have been
made by Duke Energy, not the NRC. Obviously though, it was not made by Duke Energy. That is, Duke
Energy would have no reason to prepare a slide presentation for a public meeting and then request to
withhold that already presented presentation from the public.
It appears that the NRC staff has added the statement “Withhold from Public Disclosure under 10 CFR
2.390” to the 2013‐03‐25 slide presentation in order to justify withdrawing it from the public domain.
In 10 CFR § 2.390(b)(1)(i)(A) it states:
Each document or page, as appropriate, containing information sought to be withheld from
public disclosure must indicate, adjacent to the information, or as specified in paragraph
(b)(1)(i)(A) of this section if the entire page is affected, the basis (i.e., trade secret, personal
privacy, etc.) for proposing that the information be withheld from public disclosure under
paragraph (a) of this section.
Despite the “Withhold from Public Disclosure under 10 CFR 2.390” markings, the basis for proposing that
the information be withheld from public disclosure is nowhere indicated. It is therefore not clear why
the NRC has withdrawn, ML13084A022 from the public domain. However, ML13084A022 was replaced
with ML13123A204, which contains the same slides as those presented at the public meeting with the
exception of slide 18. Slide 18 is entitled “Jocassee Dam Low Erodibility Classification” and used to
contain a generic cross section of the Lake Jocassee Dam; the same cross section diagram that was
redacted from ML100780084. The diagram has been replaced with a statement of “Diagram removed
due to security sensitive information”. With regard to this statement, please note the following:
(a) I do not believe the original slide containing the diagram contained “security sensitive
(b) I do not believe it was removed due to containing security sensitive information but rather
believe it was removed in order to justify the redactions made to ML100780084 and thereby
justify our withholding of ML100780084 from the public for nearly three years
(c) I do not believe that the NRC has the authority to withhold Duke Energy’s slide show under 10
CFR § 2.390. We certainly can remove a diagram from a presentation on our public website if
we believe it contains information which should be non‐public, but claiming 10 CFR § 2.390 as
the source for doing that when the utility wants the information to be public is an abuse of 10
CFR § 2.390.
With regard to item (a): The generic cross section diagram of the Lake Jocassee Dam is very similar to
what one can find in any Civil Engineering text book. In my April 11, 2013 letter updating FOIA appeal
2013‐009A, I enclosed several diagrams taken off the world wide web that were very similar to the
generic cross section of the Lake Jocassee Dam. There is not any information contained in that cross
section that jeopardizes the dam’s security. Furthermore, Mr. Lochbaum of the Union of Concerned
Scientists has pointed out to me a video on Youtube that contains footage of the Lake Jocassee Dam
being constructed. As mentioned already, NRR themselves sent this diagram to Greenpeace and posted
it on the world wide web until I mentioned it in a FOIA appeal as supporting evidence for overturning a
redaction. This diagram was not accidentally released by NRR. It was purposefully released because
there is nothing in it that is security related. It was then purposefully withdrawn because it was being
used by me in support of an appeal to a FOIA redaction.
With regard to item (b): In an April 19, 2008 internal NRR meeting regarding how to pursue the
Jocassee/Oconee flooding concerns, one of the division directors voiced concerns that requiring
improvements to the Standby Shutdown Facility’s flood wall under the backfit rule “would be an
admission that the NRC did not regulate the licensee properly in that a flood protection requirement is a
mistake”.15 In other words, at least some Senior Executive Service (SES) personnel within NRR were
concerned that the Jocassee/Oconee flooding issues had the potential to make the NRC look bad.
On January 6, 2010 the leadership of NRR met to discuss the Jocassee/Oconee issue (ML100280954).
The purpose of the meeting was whether NRR should issue an order to Oconee requiring them to, in a
timely manner, mitigate the risks posed by a failure of Jocassee Dam, or whether NRR should merely
issue another 10CFR50.54(f) request for information and potentially follow up with an order later. The
“Cons” listed for the “10CFR50.54(f) option” were that it was not as enforceable as an order and that it
had a slower response time for resolution of the external flooding issue. The “Cons” listed for the
“order option” were that there was the potential for a public hearing and that an order required
signature authority. In other words, to go the route of an order, the Commission and the public would
need to be made aware of the risks which Jocassee Dam posed to Oconee. Despite the slower response
time, NRR opted to go the route of the 10CFR50.54(f) letter and avoid the Commission and public
scrutiny an order would entail. In other words, at least some Senior Executive Service personnel within
NRR wanted to avoid the public and the Commissioners knowing the seriousness of the
Jocassee/Oconee flooding concerns until NRR had a plan to address them, even if that meant taking
longer to get them addressed.
Anyone who understands the basic tenets of human nature will concede that there is a certain level of
embarrassment and awkwardness in the NRC having to admit that one of our licensees might not be
adequately protected from a credible event such as a dam failure. I concede that, just because it is
embarrassing or awkward for the NRC to admit the liabilities which the Lake Jocassee Dam poses to the
reactors at Oconee, does not mean that is why we withheld the information from the public. But will
you concede that, based on human nature, NRR may have had a desire to withhold this information
because it is embarrassing? I think the two paragraphs above demonstrate that at least some personnel
in NRR verbalized the concern that the Jocassee/Oconee flooding issues would make the agency look
bad if they were made public. The question is, was the issue withheld from the public because of valid
security concerns—or even “speculative or abstract fears” which, although invalid, were honestly held
by those concealing the issue—or was the issue withheld “because errors and failures might be
Here are thirteen examples of documents concerning the Jocassee/Oconee flooding issues which were
stamped “Official Use Only” but were eventually released under Freedom of Information Act requests
WITH NO REDACTIONS:
ML081640244, ML090570779, ML12129A186, ML12188A071, ML12206A325, ML12363A083,
ML12219A163, ML12363A090, ML13057A612, ML082390690, ML091060761, ML100150066,
The thirteen documents above are just the ones I know of. There are many more that have not yet been
released under the FOIA (either because they have not yet been requested or because the request has
not yet been granted). In addition to the above documents, there are another seven which have been
stamped by Duke Energy as “This letter contains security sensitive information. Withhold from Public
Disclosure under 10 CFR 2.390” yet, after being requested under the FOIA, had no redacted information:
ML082750106, ML092020480, ML091380424, ML12363A131, ML101610083, ML103490330,
There are plenty of other documents which were released under the FOIA with minimal redactions yet
had been stamped “Official Use Only” and kept from the public eye in their entirety until requested
under the FOIA. By stamping everything “Official Use Only” we kept the whole Jocassee/Oconee issue
from the public for six years (from late 2006 until mid 2012).
There are some who would argue that these documents were released once they were requested under
the FOIA, so therefore this shows the NRC is not trying to hide anything. But how does the public know
to request documents on an issue if they don’t even know the issue exists? That is, since all documents
mentioning the Jocassee/Oconee issue were withheld from the public as “Official Use Only”, how is the
public to even know that a serious safety concern exists?
Also, few of the documents listed above were initially released without redactions. Most of them
required several administrative appeals and/or a lawsuit prior to being released without redactions.
With regard to item (c): 10 CFR § 2.390 allows licensees to request public withholding of information
which we require them to submit to us. It does not allow the NRC to withhold information which the
licensee did not request be exempted. The NRC can certainly choose to withhold information from the
public through various justifications, but that is only justified through 10 CFR § 2.390 when the licensee
is requesting it.
If Duke Energy wants to brag about the design of the Lake Jocassee Dam, then who are we to stop
them? Who are we to tell them that they cannot share a diagram showing a generic cross section of
their dam? It is not classified information. It is not Safeguards. There is no federal statute preventing
them from disclosing it. Who are we to tell them they cannot disclose it? Who are we to claim they
want it withheld under 10 CFR § 2.390 when they obviously do not?
Duke Energy wishes to use their generic cross section diagram of the Lake Jocassee Dam to show to the
public that it has a “Low Erodibility Classification”. And they have every right to use this diagram in that
manner. We, on the other hand, need to defend our application of Exemption 7(F) for redacting that
diagram from ML100780084 for if we cannot defend that redaction then we must admit that there was
no reason to designate ML100780084 (i.e. the Generic Failure Rate Evaluation for Jocassee Dam Risk
Analysis) as “Official Use Only ‐ Security‐Related Information” and to withhold it from the public for
nearly three years.
The Department of Homeland Security has a designation called “Critical Infrastructure Information” (CII).
I am neither an expert in security nor law, but it is my understanding that CII applies to information
voluntarily submitted to the Department of Homeland Security that the owner desires to keep nonpublic
for various reasons (typically for commercial competitiveness). Note that CII is not a designation
that the Department of Homeland Security applies to information and forces the owner to abide by. It’s
the owner’s private non‐classified information and the owner can share it as they like; it is the DHS, not
the owner, who is restricted from sharing the information with the public. If Duke Energy wants to
share a generic cross section of the Lake Jocassee Dam with the public to demonstrate its “Low
Erodibility Classification”, then under the statute for CII they have every right to do so. There are some
at the NRC who claim that the generic cross section of the Lake Jocassee Dam is CII and therefore must
be withheld. They are mistaken. It is only CII if Duke Energy voluntarily submits it to DHS and requests
of DHS that it be withheld as CII. However, since the generic cross section diagram has absolutely
nothing to do with the security of the dam and with protecting it from sabotage, Duke Energy has
publicly shared it to relieve any fears that the Lake Jocassee Dam is not well‐built (note that I have
always believed the Lake Jocassee Dam to be a well‐built dam—but I also believe the analysis of our
internal experts that well‐built dams still fail at a frequency of about 2E‐4/year).
With regard to 10 CFR § 2.390, Duke Energy’s public presentation of the generic cross section diagram
provides irrefutable justification for the NRC to reject any claim Duke Energy might make under 10 CFR
§2.390. Instead, we are using 10 CFR § 2.390 to withhold the information from the public without Duke
even requesting that we do so. How does this make any sense? How is this not us intentionally boggling
our own regulations to suit our desire for justifying the withholding of information from the public?
In your audit of the NRC FOIA process, I suggest you seek answers to the following questions:
3.1.Why would Duke Energy include a diagram of a generic cross section of the Lake Jocassee Dam
as part of the Power Point presentation at the March 25, 2013 public meeting but then request
that that same cross section be withheld from the public?
3.2.Does 10 CFR § 2.390 allow for the NRC to dictate to a licensee that that licensee must re‐submit
documents to the NRC requesting withholding under 10 CFR § 2.390 when their original
submittal did not contain such a request? That is, can the NRC insist on the licensee requesting
withholding under 10 CFR § 2.390 or must all withholding under 10 CFR § 2.390 originate from
the licensee’s desire (rather than the NRC’s desire) that specific information be withheld from
§4. Arbitrary Withholding without Regard for “Big Picture” — Example: Melanie Galloway’s
Non Concurrence Form 757 (ML091170104 and ML13340A179)
During 2013, Melanie Galloway’s January 2009 Non Concurrence Form 757 (ML091170104) has been
released in several redacted forms, the latest version being pages 2 through 20 of ML13340A179.
The portion of ML13340A179 pertaining to ML091170104 (i.e. pp 2‐20 of ML13340A179) contains only
one redaction: the final line of the table entitled “Risk Reduction From Ongoing Modifications” on page
2 of Melanie’s three page argument.
The sole remaining redaction to Melanie’s Non‐Concurrence Form is, to me, nonsensical. Attorneys
from the Office of General Counsel may be able to justify it, but, in light of what already has been
released in the document, I challenge you to find an engineer who would agree with its continued
withholding (for starters, I suggest you ask Ms. Galloway herself to justify this sole remaining redaction).
In the paragraphs immediately preceding the redacted table, Ms. Galloway states the following:
No other potential initiating event at Oconee is as risk significant. The probability of core
damage from a Jocassee Dam failure is three times higher than the sum total probability of core
damage from all other initiating events. Duke has acknowledged that, given a Jocassee Dam
failure with subsequent site inundation, all three Oconee units will go to core damage; that is,
given a dam failure, the conditional core damage probability (CCDP) is 1.0. Thus, for a Jocassee
Dam failure frequency of 2E‐4, there is a conditional core damage frequency (CCDF) of 2.0E‐4
(CCDF = IEF X CCDP).
For a Jocassee Dam failure, using potentially optimistic assumptions, Duke estimates that
containment will fail approximately 59 to 68 hours after dam failure without mitigating actions.
Under the dam break conditions, resultant flood waters and infrastructure damage would affect
public evacuation and potentially affect Emergency Operations Facility response capability.
Duke has not demonstrated that its radiological emergency plan actions can be adequately
implemented under these conditions.
To reduce risk from other, unrelated initiators, Duke is currently performing several modifications
to the Oconee site. As the table below indicates, these modifications will improve risk less than
improvements that would mitigate a Jocassee Dam failure.
The table included by Ms. Galloway is merely the justification for her statement in the last bullet
immediately preceding it (i.e. “these modifications will improve risk less than improvements that would
mitigate a Jocassee Dam failure”). The table provides no insight into how to capitalize on any security
vulnerabilities at Oconee Nuclear Station and to claim it somehow identifies a potential target—yet to,
at the same time, claim the above four bulleted items are publicly releasable—is unsound.
In a December 18, 2013 letter to Public Employees for Environmental Responsibility (PEER) we provided
the following justification for redaction to the table in ML13340A179:
Disclosure of the withheld information could reasonably be expected to endanger the life or
physical safety of any individual because information that is expected to be helpful to potential
adversaries interested in executing an attack or other malevolent act can be inferred from the
withheld information, and disclosure of the withheld information could thus reasonably be
expected to endanger the life or physical safety of the residents living nearby Oconee Nuclear
The above statement is nonsensical when one considers what has already been released in
a) “Duke has acknowledged that, given a Jocassee Dam failure with subsequent site
inundation, all three Oconee units will go to core damage”
b) “For a Jocassee Dam failure, using potentially optimistic assumptions, Duke estimates that
containment will fail approximately 59 to 68 hours after dam failure without mitigating
c) “Under the dam break conditions, resultant flood waters and infrastructure damage would
affect public evacuation and potentially affect Emergency Operations Facility response
Now compare the above to what is continued to be withheld: a table which mathematically
demonstrates that “To reduce risk from other, unrelated initiators, Duke is currently performing several
modifications to the Oconee site. …. these modifications will improve risk less than improvements that
would mitigate a Jocassee Dam failure.”
It might make sense to the NRC attorneys in the Office of General Counsel that the information in items
a) through c) can be publicly released yet the mathematical estimation of the actual risk reduction from
the proposed modifications must be withheld, but does this make sense to you (the OIG audit team)?
Does it make sense to Ms. Galloway? Does it make sense to the technical staff within NRR?
It doesn’t make sense to me. I would like the OIG audit team to explain to me just how someone’s life is
in danger (which is what FOIA Exemption 7(F) supposes) by the public knowing the reduction to core
damage frequency that would occur at Oconee were Ms. Galloway’s proposed improvements to be
made. To me, this information seems to be wholly about public safety and not at all about security.
That is, this information is useful in the public debate as to whether or not the suggested expenditures
(which ultimate would come from the Duke Energy rate payers) for improvements at Oconee justify the
reduction in risk to the public. I fail to see how withholding this information has anything to do with
protecting someone’s life. Does knowing this information somehow make the Lake Jocassee Dam a
terrorist target whereas knowing the information contained in items a) through c) does not?
In our justification to PEER, we state:
…because information that is expected to be helpful to potential adversaries interested in
executing an attack or other malevolent act can be inferred from the withheld information…
With regard to the above quote, it would be useful for you (the audit team) to know whether (1) there is
a security study demonstrating how a potential could infer helpful information from the redacted table
or (2) this is not based on any study but is merely an abstract assumption.
I am not an attorney, but I assume there must be a higher bar for withholding information from the
public than that it is merely “…expected to be helpful to potential adversaries interested in executing an
attack or other malevolent act…”. Consider the following hypothetical example:
Hypothetical Example: NRC attorneys are worried that there might be terrorist groups wanting
to assassinate the President of the United States. These attorneys recognize that in order to
successfully execute such an attack, a primary piece of information that is “expected to be
helpful to potential adversaries interested in executing an attack or other malevolent act”
against the President is who, of the 300 million Americans, is the President. Therefore, the
name of Barrack Obama must be redacted from all NRC records.
Obviously from the above example the standard of withholding must be higher than merely “expected
to be helpful to potential adversaries interested in executing an attack or other malevolent act”.
Common sense must come into play. And, with regard to ML13340A179, commons sense dictates
that—considering what is already released in the very same document—the information withheld is of
essentially no use to terrorists yet is helpful to the public debate on whether or not the NRC’s suggested
improvements to protect from a non‐terrorist induced failure of the Lake Jocassee Dam are justified.
Finally, I have been told that the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) does not release the
failure rates for FERC regulated dams and, since the Lake Jocassee Dam is regulated by FERC, the NRC
must withhold its failure rate. Although I do not agree with this (i.e. I believe the NRC has a duty to the
public to release the failure rates of dams whose failure could inundate a nuclear facility), it is
immaterial since (1) we have released this failure rate in other documents and (2) the redacted piece of
information is not the failure rate withheld by FERC. That is, the withholding of the information
redacted from the table in ML13340A179 is being done solely at the discretion of the NRC and has
nothing to do with commitments to FERC.
In your audit of the NRC FOIA process, I suggest you seek answers to the following questions:
4.1.Why would knowing the information withheld from the redacted table on page 5 of
ML13340A179 be of use to potential adversaries yet the information in the bullets preceding it
on page 4 not be useful to potential adversaries? Is the utility to potential adversaries an
abstract assumption or is there an actual security analysis showing how this information could
4.2.Does Melanie Galloway concur with OGC’s redactions to page 5 of ML13340A179? Was she
consulted as to the need to continue to redact the table on page 5 in the latest release of her
non‐concurrence form? Who in NRR believes that—given the release of the bulleted items on
page 4—the table on page 5 must continue to be withheld?
§5. Inability to Quickly Process Official Correspondence with Licensees or Documents from
Formal Meetings (Examples: FOIA 2012‐0127, 2012‐0128, 2012‐0325, 2013‐0213)
On April 11, 2013 I submitted FOIA request 2013‐0213. Here is the text of that request:
I request that the NRC make the following 69 documents publicly available in its Agencywide
Documents Access and Management System (ADAMS):
1. Letter from Albert F. Gibson, NRC, to J. W. Hampton, Duke, “Notice of Violation and
Notice of Deviation (NRC Inspection Report Nos. 50-269/93-25, 50-270/93-25, and 50-
287/93-25),” dated February 11, 1994
2. Letter from J. W. Hampton, Duke, dated March 14, 1994
3. Internal NRC memo documenting a meeting between Region II and NRR concerning a
hypothetical Jocassee Dam failure.
4. Letter from Albert F. Gibson, NRC, to J. W. Hampton, Duke, “Notice of Violation and
Notice of Deviation (NRC Inspection Report Nos. 50-269/94-31, 50-270/94-31, and 50-
287/94-31),” dated December 19, 1994
5. Letter from David E. LaBarge, NRC, to W. R. McCollum, Jr., “Oconee Nuclear Station, Units
1, 2, and 3 Re: Review of Individual Plant Examination of External Events (TAC Nos.
M83649, M83650, and M83651),” dated March 15, 2000
6. ML061180451, OCONEE NUCLEAR STATION – INTEGRATED INSPECTION REPORT
O5000269/2006002, 05000270/200602, 05000287/2006002
7. The enclosure to document ML080780143, “IR 05000269-06-016, IR 05000270-06-016, IR
05000287-06-016, on 03/31/2006, Oconee Nuclear Station – Preliminary White Finding”
8. ML062890206, Oconee, Units 1, 2 & 3 – Response to Preliminary White Finding
9. ML070440345, Summary of Revised Fragility Evaluation Results for Jocassee Dam
10. Letter from Bruce H. Hamilton, Duke, to NRC, “Seismic Fragility Study”
11. ML070590329, Manual Chapter 0609.02 Appeal Panel Recommendations (Oconee Reply
to a Notice of Violation and White Finding (EA-06-199))
12. ML070610460, Oconee Appeal Panel Review of Manual Chapter 0609.02 Appeal Panel
Review of Oconee Standby Shutdown Facility White Finding (EA-06-199)
13. ML072970510, Oconee, Units 1, 2 and 3 – Request for NRC to Review Appeal of Final
Significance Determination for SSF Flood Barrier White Finding
14. ML071580259, Consideration of New Information Associated with a Final Significance
Determination for a White Finding – Oconee NS
15. ML072770765, 10/01/2007, Slides with Notes for Final Regulatory Assessment of Oconee
Flood Barrier Issue
16. ML072770775, Dam Failure Information
17. ML072770777, Questions and Answers Related to Oconee Flood Barrier
18. ML073241045, Reconsideration of Final Significance Determination Associated with
Standby Shutdown Oconee Facility Flood Barrier White Finding
19. ML081350689, Briefing Package For Drop-In Visit By Duke Energy Chief Nuclear Officer
With Chairman Klein And Commissioner Jaczko On May 21, 2008
20. ML082390669, Proposal for a Risk Analysis of the Failure of the Jocassee and Keowee
Dams to Assess the Potential Effects on the Safe Shut Down Facility of the Oconee
Nuclear Station, South Carolina
21. ML082120390, Oconee Nuclear Station – Revisions to the Selected Licensee
Commitments Manual (SLC)
22. ML081640244, Information Request Pursuant to 10 CFR 50.54(F) Related to External
Flooding, Including Failure of the Jocassee Dam at Oconee Nuclear Station, Units 1, 2,
and 3 (TAC Nos. MD8224, MD8225, and MD8226)
23. ML082550290, Meeting with Duke Energy Carolinas, Oconee Flood Protection and the
Jocassee Dam Hazard
24. ML091420319, 12/04/2008 Meeting Summary, Meeting to Discuss External Flooding at
Oconee Nuclear Station (Reissuance, with Error on Page 3 Corrected)
25. ML090480044, Oconee Nuclear Station, External Flood NRR Meeting, Rockville, MD,
December 4, 2008
26. ML090280474, Briefing Package for Commissioner Lyons Visit to Oconee on February 4,
27. ML091170104, Oconee Nuclear Station, Units 1, 2 And 3 – Non-concurrence on
Evaluation of Duke Energy Carolinas, LLC September 26, 2008, Response to Nuclear
Regulatory Commission Letter Dated August 15, 2008 Related to External Flooding
28. ML091030172, Oconee External Flooding Briefing for Commissioner Jaczko
29. ML092940769, 05/11/2009 Summary of Closed Meeting with Duke Energy Carolinas, LLC,
to Discuss Preliminary Results of the Recent Inundation and Sensitivity Studies
Concerning Failure of the Jocassee Dam and Resultant Flooding at Oconee Nuclear
Station, 1, 2, and 3
30. ML090820470, 5/11/2009 Notice of Forthcoming Closed Meeting with Duke Energy
Carolinas, LLC, to Discuss Sensitivity Studies Concerning Failure of the Jocassee Dam &
Resultant Flooding at the Oconee Nuclear Station, Unit 1, 2, & 3
31. ML091480116, E-mail re Briefing Package for Visit to Jocassee Dam on June 23, 2009
32. ML091620669, 6/11/09 Summary of Closed Meeting with Duke Carolina to Discuss
External Flooding at Oconee
33. ML091760072, NRC Site Visit to the Oconee Nuclear Station on June 15, 2009
34. ML092230608, Oconee, Submittal of Selected Licensee Commitments Manual SLC
35. ML090570117, Oconee Flood Protection and the Jocassee Dam Hazard Basis for NRC
Allowing Continued Operation
36. ML092380305, Oconee, Slides for Closed Meeting Regarding External Flood Technical
Meeting On August 27, 2009
37. ML092710344, Site Visit Observation on 09/25/2009 by Joel Munday for Oconee
38. ML093080034, 10/28/09 Slides for Oconee Nuclear Station, Units 1, 2, and 3 – Meeting
Slides – External Flood NRC Technical Meeting
39. ML093380701, Oconee Nuclear Station, Units 1, 2, and 3, Oconee External Flood Analyses
and Associated Corrective Action Plan
40. ML090680737, 12/04/09 Summary of Closed Meeting to Discuss the Duke Energy
Carolinas, LLC., 09/26/08 Response to NRC’s August 15, 2008 50.54(f) Letter on External
Flooding at Oconee
41. ML100280954, 01/06/2010 Briefing to the Executive Team on the Oconee Nuclear
Station External Flooding Issue
42. ML100210199, Oconee, Units 1, 2 and 3 – Additional Information Regarding Postulated
External Flood Threat Issues
43. ML100470053, Oconee, Units 1, 2, & 3, External Flood, Response to Request for
44. ML100610674, Oconee, Units 1, 2, & 3, External Flood Revised Commitment Letter
45. ML103430047, Oconee Nuclear Station, Units 1, 2, & 3, Letter From Duke Energy
Carolinas, LLC Regarding External Flood, Response to Request For Additional Information
46. ML100810388, Prepare Briefing Book and Material for Eric Leeds for the Duke Fleet
Meeting on March 18, 2010
47. ML100760109, Generic Failure Rate Evaluation for Jocassee Dam
48. ML101600468, Oconee, Units 1, 2 & 3, Response to Requested Information on the
Protection Against External Flooding Including a Postulated Failure of the Jocassee Dam
49. ML101750619, OUO – Communication Plan For Issuance of Confirmatory Action Letter
To Duke For Oconee – External Flooding June 2010
50. ML101890803, 06/29/2010 Summary of Closed Meeting With Duke Energy Carolinas,
LLC, to Discuss External Flooding at Oconee
51. ML102170006, Oconee Units 1, 2, & 3, Response to Confirmatory Action Letter (CAL) 2-
52. ML102990064, NRC Staff Assessment of Duke Energy Carolinas, LLC, Oconee External
Flooding Issue (TAC NOS. ME4441, ME4442, and ME4443)
53. ML110180609, Enclosure 1, Oconee Nuclear Station, Major Project Plans
54. ML110260443, Non-concurrence on Oconee Assessment Letter
55. ML103410042, Supplement to Technical Basis for Allowing Oconee Nuclear Station to
Remain in Operation Through November 2011, Associated with the External Flooding
56. ML110740482, Analysis Report for the Proposed Generic Issue on Flooding of Nuclear
Power Plant Sites Following Upstream Dam Failures
57. ML111460063, Oconee Nuclear Site, Units 1, 2, and 3, Response to Confirmatory Action
Letter (CAL) 2-10-003
58. ML11229A710, E-mail re Briefing Package for Visit to Oconee Nuclear Power Plant on
September 12-13, 2011
59. ML11244A024, Briefing Package for Visit to Oconee Nuclear Power Plant on September
60. ML11278A173, Oconee Nuclear Station (ONS), Units 1, 2, and 3, Response to Requests
for Additional Information Regarding Necessary Modifications to Enhance the Capability
of the ONS Site to Withstand the Postulated Failure of the Jocassee Dam
61. ML11294A341, Oconee Nuclear Station (ONS), Units 1, 2, and 3, Response to Requests
for Additional Information Regarding Necessary Modifications to Enhance the Capability
of the ONS Site to Withstand the Postulated Failure of the Jocassee Dam
62. ML12026A549, Briefing Package for Commissioner Svinicki Visit to Oconee on February
63. ML12026A254, Communication Plan for Oconee Nuclear Station (ONS) Following
Issuance of GI-204
64. ML12039A239, Oconee, Units 1, 2 and 3 – Request for Withholding from Public
Disclosure Duke Energy Letter Dated May 20, 2009 Involving Postulated Failure of the
65. ML12039A217, Briefi