2001-04-17 – Diablo Canyon – Security rifle left unattended

2001-04-17-diablo-canyon-security-rifle-left-unattended

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W Pacific Gas and
Electric Company
David H. Oatley Diablo Canyon Power Plant Vice President PO. Box 56 Diablo Canyon Operations Avila Beach, CA 93424 805.545.4350
April 17, 2001 Fax: 805.545.4234
PG&E Letter DCL-01-037
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission ATTN: Document Control Desk Washington, DC 20555-0001
Docket No. 50-275, OL-DPR-80 Docket No. 50-323, OL-DPR-82 Diablo Canyon Units I and 2 Licensee Event Report 1-2001-S01-00 Security Rifle Left Unattended Due to Personnel Error
Dear Commissioners and Staff:
Pursuant to 10 CFR 73.71, PG&E is submitting the enclosed licensee event report regarding a security rifle that was left unattended due to a personnel error.
This event was not considered risk significant and did not adversely affect the health and safety of the public.
Sincerely,
David H. atl ey:
cc: Ellis W. Merschoff
David L. Proulx Girija S. Shukla Diablo Distribution INPO
Enclosure
LMP/2246/SIR01-0093-5Y
NRC FORM 366 U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY APPROVED BY OMB NO. 3150-0104 EXPIRES 6-30-2001
(1-2o01) COMMISSION
Estimated burden per response to comply with this mandatory information collection request: 50 hours. Reported lessons learned are incorporated into the licensing process and fed back to industry. Send comments regarding burden estimate to the Records Management Branch (T-6 E6), U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, DC LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER) 20555-0001, or by internet e-mail to [email protected], and to the Desk Officer, Office of
Information and Regulatory Affairs, NEOB-10202 (3150-0104), Office of Management and Budget, Washington, DC 20503. If a means used to impose information collection does not (See reverse for required number of display a currently valid OMB control number, the NRC may not conduct or sponsor, and a
digits/characters for each block) person is not required to respond to, the information collection.
FACILITY NAME (1) DOCKET NUMBER (2) PAGE (3)
Diablo Canyon Unit 1 05000 275 1 OF 4
TITLE (4)
SECURITY RIFLE LEFT UNATTENDED
EVENT DATE (5) LER NUMBER (6) 1 REPORT DATE (7) OTHER FACILITIES INVOLVED (8)
MO DAY YEAR YEAR SEQUENTIAL REV 1 YEAR F
NUMBER NO
03 18 2001 2001 -S01- 00 04 17 2001 Diablo Canyon
-I 2 05000323
OPERATING MODE (9) THIS REPORT IS SUBMITTED PURSUANT TO THE REQUIREMENTS OF 10 CFR §: (Check all that apply) (11)
Power Operation 20.2201 (b) 20.2203(a)(3)(ii) 50.73(a)(2)(ii)(B) 50.73(a)(2)(ix)(A)
POWER LEVEL (10) 20.2201(d) 20.2203(a)(4) 50.73(a)(2)(iii) 50.73(a)(2)(x)
100% 20.2203(a)(1) 50.36(c)(1)(i)(A) 50.73(a)(2)(iv)(A) X 73.71 (a)(4)
20.2203(a)(2)(i) 50.36(c)(1 )(ii)(A) 50.73(a)(2)(v)(A) 73.71 (a)(5)
20.2203(a)(2)(ii) 50.36(c)(2) 50.73(a)(2)(v)(B) OTHER Specify in Abstract
below or in NRC Form 366A
20.2203(a)(2)(iii) 50.46(a)(3)(ii) 50.73(a)(2)(v)(C)
20.2203(a)(2)(iv) 50.73(a)(2)(i)(A) 50.73(a)(2)(v)(D)
20.2203(a)(2)(v) 50.73(a)(2)(i)(B) 50.73(a)(2)(vii)
20.2203(a)(2)(vi) 50.73(a)(2)(i)(C) 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(A)
20.2203(a)(3)(i) 50.73(a)(2)(ii)(A) 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(B)
LICENSEE CONTACT FOR THIS LER (12) NAME ITELEPHONE NUMBER (include Area Code)
Roger Russell1 (805) 5454327
COMPLETE ONE LINE FOR EACH COMPONENT FAILURE DESCRIBED IN THIS REPORT (13) CAUSE
I I I
SUPPLEMENTAL REPORT EXPECTED (14) EXPECTED MONTH DAY YEAR
SUBMISSION DATE
(15)
ES (If yes, complete EXPECTED SUBMISSION DATE). I X INO
CI TA. I (Limit to 14UU spaces, .e., approximately 1 o slngle-spacea typewritten lines) -10,1
On March 18, 2001, at 0100 PST, with both Unit 1 and Unit 2 in Mode 1 (Power Operation) at 100 percent power, a PG&E Nuclear Security Officer left his rifle unattended in an office in the Turbine Building, located in the Protected Area. At 0120 PST, the Nuclear Security Officer (NSO) discovered the rifle was missing. He immediately called another NSO to retrieve the rifle and return it to him at a guard shack at the north end of the Protected Area. At 0122 PST, the rifle was found in the office where the NSO had left it. All ammunition was accounted for.
At 0207 PST, in accordance with Regulatory Guide 5.62, Section C.2.2.24, “Loss of Security Weapon at the Site,” and 10 CFR 73.71(b), the Security Watch Commander made a 1-hour notification to the NRC.
The cause of the event was personnel error.
Corrective actions included disciplinary action and providing rifle racks at locations within security holding areas.
NRC FORM 366 (EuMS RS-10 1-20u1)
LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER) TEXT CONTINUATION
FACILITY NAME (1) DOCKET NUMBER (2) LER NUMBER (6) PAGE (3)
YEAR SEQUENTIAL NUMBER REVISION
NUMBER
DiabloCanyonUnit1 0 15 0 10 10 2 7 5 2001 0 1 1 0 0 2 OF4
TEXT
Plant Conditions
Units 1 and 2 were in Mode 1 (Power Operation) at 100 percent power.
1I. Description of Problem
A. Background
Nuclear Security Officers (NSOs) rotate to various positions throughout the plant protected area, and routinely carry both a side arm and rifle. For additional details, refer to the Diablo Canyon Power Plant (DCPP) Physical Security Plan (PSP). Additional background information is not provided here because it would involve safeguards information.
B. Event Description
On March 18, 2001, at 0040 PST, a NSO was on break in the outer office of a two-office security holding area in the Turbine Building. He set his rifle down in a corner of the outer office.
At 0100 PST, the NSO left the outer office and forgot to pick up his rifle. He proceeded to his next post, located at the north end of the Unit 1 protected area.
At 0120 PST, the NSO realized that his rifle was missing. He called another NSO at the holding area and asked that he locate the rifle in the adjacent outer office.
At 0122 PST, the second NSO located the rifle in the adjacent outer office where it had been left.
At 0124 PST, the NSO who retrieved the rifle returned it to the NSO who had left it unattended. The NSO who left it unattended verified it was his rifle, accounted for all ammunition, and determined there was no evidence of a discharge, or tampering.
At 0130 PST, the NSO who left the rifle unattended notified the Diablo Canyon Watch Commander (DCWC) of the unattended rifle.
At 0207 PST, the DCWC notified the NRC of the unattended rifle in accordance with Regulatory Guide 5.62, Section C.2.2.24, “Loss of Security Weapon at the Site,” and 1 OCFR73.71 (b). Reference NRC Event Number 37847.
LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER) TEXT CONTINUATION
FACILITY NAME (1) DOCKET NUMBER (2) LER NUMBER (6) PAGE (3)
YEAR SEQUENTIAL NUMBER REVISION NUMBER
DiabloCanyonUnitl 0 15 0 0 0 2 7 5 2001 1 S01 0 0 3 1 OF
TEXT
C. Inoperable Structures, Components, or Systems that Contributed to the
Event None
D. Other Systems or Secondary Functions Affected
None
E. Method of Discovery
The NSO who left the rifle unattended realized he had done so when he rotated to the next security post inside the Protected Area.
F. Operator Actions
None
G. Safety System Responses
None
Ill. Cause of the Problem
A. Root Cause
The root cause of the unattended rifle was personnel error, inattention to detail.
B. Contributory Cause
A contributory cause of the event was a lack of storage location for the weapon. While on break, the NSO placed his weapon in a corner. There was no designated storage location in the room. Had there been a standard storage location for his weapon, he may have checked it as part of a routine, prior to leaving for his assigned post.
LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER) TEXT CONTINUATION
FACILITY NAME (1) DOCKET NUMBER (2) LER NUMBER (6) PAGE (3)
YEAR SEQUENTIAL NUMBER REVISION
NUMBER
Diablo Canyon Uniti 0 5 0 0 10 12 17 15 2001 -S 10 1 1 0 10 4O
TEXT
IV. Analysis of the Event
The event was determined not to be risk significant because there was no additional degraded condition in the security program at the time. Sufficient margin exists within security response scenarios to successfully neutralize a design basis threat, even though the NSO did not have possession of his rifle.
Also, an NSO was in the adjacent room during the event and believes no other individuals came into the room where the unattended rifle was located.
Therefore, the event screened out as a “minor issue,” was not risk significant, and did not adversely affect the health and safety of the public.
V. Corrective Actions
A. Immediate Corrective Actions
On March 18, 2001, the Nuclear Security Sergeant and the NSO met to discuss job and performance expectations. Disciplinary action was administered to the NSO.
B. Corrective Actions to Prevent Recurrence
Rifle racks are being provided at security holding areas to allow a storage location for rifles while NSOs are on breaks.
The manager of Security Services has emphasized to NSOs the expectation to immediately notify the DCWC of potentially reportable events.
VI. Additional Information
A. Failed Components
None
B. Previous Similar Events
None